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Introduction
The growing realization that technological innovation could lead to prosperity per-
suaded many governments and industries to make unprecedented efforts to promote
innovation and intellectual property rights (IPRs). In the high-technology sectors, the
patent system has been a vital mechanism to drive innovation. The view that IPRs
and competition law routinely appear to be at odds is predicated on the dichotomy
of the underlying pro-competitive and anticompetitive effects. Nonetheless, both
Intellectual Property (IP) law and competition law share the broad objectives of
promoting consumer welfare and an efficient allocation of resources.
Technologies protected by patent law are extremely valuable when they become
part of a standard. This accepted standard or norm for instance 3G, 4G or 5G is an
outcome of number of technologies working together in a cohesive and efficient
manner. While patents continue to protect these technologies in a standard, they
become essential for the standard to work. With patented technologies becoming
part of a standard, further obligations are bestowed upon holders who invest
towards those technologies. One of the foremost obligations is to allow other
interested stakeholders to use standard essential patents (SEPs), which form a part
of a standard on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms and
conditions. With FRAND obligation in place, non-compliance on the part of
technology holders would bring them within the periphery of the scrutiny of
competition authorities.
SEPs are fairly common in the telecommunication sector. Standards declared by
standard setting organizations (SSOs) allow innovators to negotiate licenses with
implementers on FRAND terms and conditions. In most instances, innovators and
implementers successfully negotiate licensing of SEPs. However, there have been
instances wherein disagreements on royalty base and royalty rates, terms of
licensing, bundling of patents in licenses, pooling of licenses have emerged. This
has resulted in a surge of litigation in various jurisdictions and also drawn the
attention of competition/antitrust regulators. Further, a lingering lack of consensus
among scholars, industry experts and regulators regarding solutions and techniques
that are apposite in these matters across jurisdictions has added to the confusion.
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As SSOs play a major role in developing and declaring standards, it is necessary
to examine the role essayed by them in evolving policies that seek to serve the
public interest in a variety of ways by facilitating interoperability among comple-
mentary products. It is necessary to examine the role of procedural changes by
SSOs and the level of transparency maintained by SSOs in changing IPR policies.
Some contributions in this book focus on the changing dynamics of collaboration
among innovators within the context of anticompetitive effects on standard devel-
opment. How substantive competition rules are enforced plays a crucial role in
achieving their goals. There has been a push for increased transparency and due
process from both industry participants as well as competition regulators them-
selves. But, in matters of FRAND encumbered SEPs, should competition regulators
be like lifeguards that act when there is a possibility of an adverse outcome (to
competition), or like tollbooth attendants that monitor (competitors) at every stage?
This question becomes even more important in the light of emerging trends in Asian
jurisdictions vis-à-vis best practices in due process and antitrust enforcement
established in some other jurisdictions.
For regulators and courts across several jurisdictions, resolving issues at the
interface of IP and competition law especially in markets driven by high-technology
industries have become a daunting task. This edited volume brings together
chapters from scholars and practitioners of IP and competition law that discuss how
regulatory agencies and courts deal with issues at the interface of IP, competition
and standardization of high-technology products in India, Germany, UK, China,
South Korea and the European Union (EU).
This edited volume highlights some of the contentious issues that have been
discussed in the last two decades. These broadly include the rights of the SEP
holders with respect to the use of their technology by a licensee and role of antitrust
authorities and courts in matters relating to licensing of SEPs. The courts amongst
other issues have thus far decided cases in relation to infringement of patents,
granting of injunction in FRAND encumbered SEPs, FRAND obligation of the
technology holder, comparable licenses in setting royalty rates and the conduct of
parties leading up to negotiation of licensing of SEPs. The conduct of parties (i.e.
a willing or an unwilling licensee) has become a decisive factor before granting
injunctions to SEP holders in FRAND encumbered SEPs.
Part I of the book delves into the law and policy dimensions of the innovation in
the high-technology industry. It discusses the issues related to the interface between
IPRs, competition law and the role of SSOs in developing standards. Hanna
Stakheyeva in the chapter titled Intellectual Property and Competition Law:
Understanding the Interplay focuses on the interface between IPR and competition
law. Exercising rights by the IPR holder in certain circumstances may attract the
provisions of competition law especially when it has an adverse effect on consumer
welfare or amounts to abuse of dominant position. IPR holders may also seek to
protect themselves against unfair competition by exercising their rights and statu-
tory remedies. She provides a general overview of the interface between IPR and
competition law with specific reference to sectors like the pharmaceuticals, infor-
mation technology, luxury brands by providing an analysis of the potentially
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problematic agreements and practices from the point of view of the competition
rules. Nikolaos E. Zevgolis in his chapter on The Interaction Between Intellectual
Property Law and Competition Law in the EU: Necessity of Convergent
Interpretation with the Principles Established by the Relevant Case Law takes the
discussion forward on the interface between IPR and competition law by examining
how the EU Competition Commission (EC) through procedural guidance and
economic, effect-based substantive rules established principles to deal with anti-
competitive practices of IPR holders. He looks at the question of market power and
concludes that it can only be assessed on a case-by-case basis. He examines this
concept by explaining the ‘careful’ approach of the EC in the Motorola and
Samsung cases. Sheetal Chopra, Matteo Sabattini and Dina Kallay in their
chapter on The Relevance of Standardization in a Future Competitive India and the
Role of Policy Makers, Antitrust Authorities and Courts to Promote it explore the
motivations and strategies of certain stakeholders to devalue SEPs. This chapter
aims to address the challenges that the information and communications technology
(ICT) industry is currently facing considering past scepticisms from antitrust
agencies and courts. Finally, the chapter recommends policy-makers to avoid tilting
the fragile balance between technology providers and technology implementers
achieved through FRAND licensing. An imbalance of interests could, otherwise,
potentially affect the innovation cycle, reduce investments in R&D, and favour
proprietary solutions as opposed to interoperable, standardized options. Eric
L. Stasik in his chapter on The role of the European Commission in the
Development of the ETSI IPR Policy and the nature of FRAND in Standardization
discusses the crucial role of SSOs in formulating IPR policies that aims to balance
the interest of patent holder and implementers. Stasik traces the role of EC in
evolving ETSI’s IPR policy and how this has influenced the development of
standards and FRAND rates. Ashish Bharadwaj, Manveen Singh and Srajan
Jain in their chapter on All Good Things Mustn’t Come to an End: Reigniting the
Debate on Patent Policy and Standard Setting examine the 2015 IPR policy of the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), an SSO that has signifi-
cantly influenced the development of standards in mobile technology.
Part II provides an understanding of the evolving jurisprudence in SEPs
involving the high-technology industry. It specifically attempts to highlight the
conflict between the SEP holders and implementers. It provides an understanding
of the differences in approach to negotiating a license between a SEP holder and
implementer that has led to litigation between the parties and also drawn the
intervention of competition authorities in some jurisdictions. Noah D. Mesel in his
chapter on Interpreting the ‘FRAND’ in FRAND Licensing: Licensing and
Competition Law Ramifications of the 2017 Unwired Planet v Huawei UK High
Court Judgements discusses the implications of the UK High Court judgements in
Unwired Planet v Huawei. Building on the Court of Justice of the European
Union’s (CJEU) decision in Huawei v ZTE, the UK High Court has stated that a
FRAND license is by definition a global license; how, specifically, should the
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royalty rates be calculated; whether a FRAND royalty rate is a finite number or a
range of possible rates; clarification of the parties’ obligations with respect to the
negotiation process; and what the contents of a FRAND license agreement should
be. In addition, the UK High Court has added further clarification as to how
FRAND law should be analysed in the context of prevailing competition law.
Indranath Gupta, Vishwas H. Devaiah, Dipesh A. Jain and Vishal Shrivastava
in their chapter on Evolving Huawei Framework: SEPs and Grant of Injunctions
reflect on the framework developed in the Huawei judgement and show how this
framework has evolved in the post Huawei cases in Germany. The post Huawei
cases have tried to adhere to the overall framework provided under Huawei,
although there are number of inconsistencies as to specific obligations. From the
perceived inconsistencies, this chapter concludes on a note that the overall conduct
of the parties would play a major role before granting injunctive relief to SEP
holders. Further, Yang Cao in his chapter on The Development and theoretical
controversy of SEP licensing practices in China examines how the Chinese
Supreme Court thinks that an SEP holder can only claim the royalty rate that is
apparently below the normal licensing rate. He argues that the Guangdong court in
IDC v Huawei case seems to have adopted a so-called possible lowest royalty rate
policy. He examines how different royalty rate policies have been adopted by
different courts in China and explores possible factors that can determine the rate.
Dae-Sik Hong in his chapter on Regulating abuse of SEPs in Mobile
Communication Market: Reviewing 1st and 2nd Qualcomm Cases in Korea anal-
yses how the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) dealt with two sets of cases
involving Qualcomm. Hong analyses some of the competition law issues raised in
the two cases. He examines the issue of defining relevant markets, the criteria for
determining whether there is a violation or evasion of FRAND commitment, the
competition law assessment of FRAND commitment infringements, and the theo-
ries of competitive harm and its proving. Ashish Bharadwaj and Tohru
Yoshioka-Kobayashi in their chapter on Regulating Standard Essential Patents in
Implementer-Oriented Countries: Insights from India and Japan discuss about the
regulations governing SEPs in the setting of implementer-oriented countries. They
argue that recent public policy struggles in India and Japan illustrate the difficulty
of their fair and effective regulation. They further argue that experiences in India
and Japan imply that implementer-oriented countries should develop capacities of
court judges and national competition agencies to provide fair and reasonable
decisions and try to resolve information asymmetry.
Part III provides perspectives on the developments in the high-technology
industry in India. It examines the role of the Indian competition and patent law in
shaping the high-technology industry in India. Aditya Bhattacharjea in his chapter
on Predatory Pricing in Platform Competition Economic Theory and Indian Cases
examines the issue of predatory pricing, or pricing below costs in order to drive out
one or more rival firms. This chapter provides a non-technical introduction to the
economics of predatory pricing, showing why scholars and competition agencies in
the US and EU became increasingly sceptical of the feasibility of such a business
strategy. He then discusses how the Competition Commission of India (CCI) has
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dealt with some of these issues, in recent cases which have involved allegations of
predatory pricing against the app-based taxi aggregators Ola and Uber, whose
rivalry exemplifies platform competition. Geeta Gouri, a former Member of the
CCI, in her chapter on Competition Law and Standard Essential Patent in India: A
Few Critical Issues to Ponder explores the reason behind the Delhi High Court
decision to permit the CCI to resume its investigation on the allegation of abuse of
dominance by Ericsson while negotiating SEP licenses with Indian manufacturers
of mobile phones. This chapter provides a layered nuanced approach using eco-
nomic analysis. Yogesh Dubey and Konark Bhandari in their chapter on
Interface Between Antitrust Law and Intellectual Property in the Payment System
Market in India examine the digital payments’ sector, especially after demoneti-
zation. This chapter seeks to examine whether mobile wallet companies can
successfully compete with banks when they are denied access to critical interop-
erability infrastructure that is currently under the proprietorship of banks. This
chapter will delve into whether mobile wallet companies can resort to the invo-
cation of the Essential Facilities Doctrine (EFD) in trying to secure access to such
interoperability infrastructure and how this interacts with the IPRs of the banks.
Yugank Goyal, Padmanabha Ramanujam and Anmol Patel in their chapter on
Towards a Transaction Cost Approach to the Essential Facilities Doctrine examine
the EFD through transaction cost lens. The chapter locates the doctrine’s presence
in Indian case laws, identify the problems therein (particularly in cases involving
IP) and propose that the doctrine’s construction in India should be guided by EU’s
model. Lastly, Althaf Marsoof in his chapter on Local Working of Patents: The
Perspective of Developing Countries explores the local working requirement in
patent law. He examines the tension between two international instruments, the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and
the Paris Convention and suggests how TRIPS flexibilities may be used in favour of
imposing a local working requirement under domestic patent law, while also
considering the approaches adopted in relation to local working requirements in
India and Sri Lanka.
In conclusion, we are immensely grateful to all the contributors. We hope that
the observations made in this volume contribute to the improved understanding of
extremely complex and divergent issues. This edited volume presents a nuanced
deliberation on relevant global developments and perspectives relating to stan-
dardization, patent and competition issues. Therefore, we hope that our contribution
is useful for all our readers.
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Part I
Law and Policy Dilemmas in Innovation
Intensive Industries
Chapter 1
Intellectual Property and Competition
Law: Understanding the Interplay
Hanna Stakheyeva
1 Introduction
The most common concern from a competition law perspective is the possible
violation of competition law due to the existence of patents/trademarks/copyright,
which grant exclusive power that may potentially be abused by the Intellectual
Property right (IPR) holders to the detriment of consumer welfare, as well as
innovation. Hence, competition law is applicable to the area of intellectual property
(IP) and may be invoked by the consumers, any interested/affected third party to
ensure that the IP right holders are not abusing their (dominant, if not monopolistic)
position. At the same time, IP rights holders may rely on competition law to protect
themselves from unfair competition and encourage more competition and innova-
tion in the market.
This chapter provides a general overview of the interplay between competition
law and IPRs in such sectors as pharmaceuticals, information technology, luxury
brands. It analyses potentially problematic agreements and practices from the point
of view of the competition rules and provides some highlights of the latest inves-
tigations launched/conducted primarily at the EU level. It is concluded that recent
enforcement of competition law in the sphere of IP (patents (standard essential
patents (SEPs)), trademarks and copyright) in various industries shall significantly
affect the legal landscape for the IP right owners; hence they should now, more
routinely, consider competition law risks and implications in every step of their
economic activity.
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2 IP and Competition Law: Main Concerns and Misuses
Competition law issues may arise in any area of IP: patents, trademarks, and/or
copyright. In most cases it is the IP right holders with a strong market power (if not
dominance) that have to be particularly cautious about competition law implications of
their practices. As known ‘[…] the fact that an undertaking holds a dominant position is
not in itself contrary to the competition rules. However, an undertaking enjoying a
dominant position is under a special responsibility not to engage in conduct that may
distort competition.’1 Companies that have IP rights are perceived as dominant, and
their activities fall under a special attention of the Competition Authorities more often
nowadays. Following parts provide analysis of the main competition law issues in the
three IP-related areas: patents, trademarks and copyright.
2.1 Patents and Competition Law
Patent holders are most likely to abuse market power via various practices, such as
refusal to license, excessive pricing, unfair or discriminatory licensing, anticom-
petitive use of SEPs; abuse of dominance and delaying market entry of competitors
via misuse of patent/regulatory process (supplementary protection certificates
(SPCs)), excessive pricing, as well as concluding anticompetitive agreements
(patent settlement agreements (PSAs)).
2.1.1 Abuse of Market Power via Refusal to License and Seeking
Injunctive Relief by SEPs: ‘Smartphone Patent Wars’
The IP right holders may seek to lock competitors’ products from entering the
market based on the SEP and thereby breach competition law. The SEP protects
technology that is essential to a standard2 (in other words, it is impossible to
manufacture standard-compliant products without using such technologies covered
by SEP). No alternative solution is possible, e.g. ‘slide to unlock’ technology is
non-SEP since different technologies can be developed for unlocking a smartphone
1Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft (2004) OJ L32/23, para 52.
2A standard sets out requirements for a specific item, material, system, service and ensures that
products ‘communicate’/match with each other (e.g. A4 size paper, mobile phone charger, 4G, 3G
telecommunication standards). Standards are set by the standard setting organizations (SSO), e.g.
ETSI, etc.
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screen. This would not be possible with SEPs.3 The SEP is not only relevant for the
telecommunications, but also for audio/video, security and biometrics, transport,
logistics, aerospace, energy generation, power electronics, industrial equipment, etc.
The SEPs confer significant market power on their holders, and potential to
abuse it by adopting standards to exclude competitors or extract excessive royalty
fees, cross-license fees to which the licensee would not otherwise agree to. The SEP
protects the invention which is necessary and standard for the use of a certain
technology. As operating in the downstream market is dependent on having access
to the product in the upstream market, the SEP becomes an ‘essential facility’.4 The
competition authorities worldwide have been focusing on this, amid concerns that
‘SEP owners may have been exploiting market power, and holding up innovation,
through unreasonable or discriminatory licensing demands.’5 To alleviate these
competition concerns, Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs) today require the
SEP owners to commit to licensing their SEPs on fair, reasonable, and
non-discriminatory terms (FRAND), which aims at bringing equilibrium in the
compulsory licensing that the SEP implies. FRAND ensures accessibility of the
technology incorporated in a standard to the manufacturers of standard-compliant
product, and reward SEPs holders financially through licensing revenue.6
There have been several cases in relation to the SEPs, FRAND and interim
injunctions as part of the patent infringement proceedings. This part will focus on
Samsung and Motorola cases to demonstrate these issues and their interplay with
the competition law more precisely. Both cases relate to Samsung and Motorola’s
negotiations with Apple in Germany for the licensing of their respective mobile
telecom SEPs. Those negotiations subsequently broke down, causing Samsung and
3Case AT.39939 Samsung Electronics-Enforcement of UMTS SEPs (2014) OJ C 350/8, para 7
states that:
Standards ensure compatibility and interoperability of telecom networks and mobile devices.
Mobile devices typically implement a large number of telecommunication standards (such as the
so-called third generation or ‘3G’ (UMTS) standard). These standards make reference to thousands
of technologies, many of which are protected by patents. Patents that are essential to a standard are
those that cover technology to which a standard makes reference and that implementers of the
standard cannot avoid using in standard-compliant products. These patents are known as SEPs.
SEPs are different from patents that are not essential to a standard (non-SEPs).
4Essential facilities doctrine: To prevent the competitive featured of the downstream market from
being threatened by the concentrated structure of the upstream market and to develop competition
in this former market, the obligation for undertakings in a dominant position to compulsorily enter
into agreement with their competitors can be established.
5‘IP and Antitrust: Implications of Recent Cases and Likely Policy Developments in 2017’
(Freshfields, 2018) <http://antitrust.freshfields.com/ip-and-antitrust> accessed 8 January 2018.
6Samsung Electronics (n 3), states that:
(9) ETSI is one of the three European Standardisation Organisations. ETSI is officially
responsible for producing standards and specifications supporting EU and EFTA policies and
enabling an internal market in telecommunications. (10) The rules of ETSI impose two main
obligations on companies participating in the standard-setting process: (i) to inform ETSI of their
essential intellectual property rights (IP) in a timely fashion before the adoption of the standard,
and (ii) to give a commitment to make their IP available on FRAND terms and conditions.
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Motorola to bring patent infringement proceedings against Apple in the German Courts.
In the context of those patent infringement proceedings they applied for interim
injunctions for their respective SEPs. This encouraged the European Commission
(EC) to open formal investigations against Samsung and Motorola to determine whether
their conduct violated competition law i.e. whether they abused their dominant position.
In theMotorola case,7 the EC found that, although seeking interim injunction before
courts is generally a legitimate remedy for holders of SEPs in case of patent
infringements, Motorola violated the European Union (EU) competition law (Article
102 of the Treaty on Functioning of the EU (TFEU) which prohibits abuse of domi-
nance) by seeking injunction in court against a willing licensee, Apple, on the basis of
Motorola’s SEP. Motorola declared the patent on which it sought injunction as essential
to the implementation of the 2G European Telecommunications Standards Institute
(ETSI) standard, and it committed to license the SEP to third parties on FRAND terms.
Additionally, Apple agreed with Motorola that in case of dispute the German courts
would set the applicable rate and Apple would pay royalties accordingly (all of which
showed willingness to enter into the license agreement and to pay adequate compen-
sation to the SEP holder). The EC also found it anticompetitive that Motorola insisted
Apple to give up its right to challenge the validity or infringement of Motorola’s
SEP. Eventually, Motorola was ordered to eliminate the negative effects resulting from
the injunction.8 In its infringement decision, the EC exercised its discretion (and
exceptionally) did not impose a fine because of the divergent decisions of the EU
Member States and the absence of the EU case law.
In the Samsung case,9 the EC decided not to proceed to an infringement action
and instead accepted legally binding commitments10 offered by Samsung not to
seek injunctions in relation to any of its present and future SEPs (e.g. Universal
Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS)) for mobile devices for a period of
five years against any potential licensee that agrees to accept a particular licensing
framework for the determination of FRAND terms and conditions during the
standard-setting process in the ETSI. The detailed licensing framework provided
for: (i) a negotiation period of 12 months; and (ii) if no agreement was reached, a
third party FRAND determination by a court or arbitrator.11
Therefore, as seen from the two cases, the EC’s position is that where a patent
holder has given a commitment to license on FRAND terms, and the potential
7Case AT.39985 Motorola-Enforcement of GPRSs Standard Essential Patents (2014) OJ 344.
8‘EU—Apple v Motorola/Press Release Anticompetitive Use of SEP’ (EPlawpatentblog, 2014)
<http://www.eplawpatentblog.com/eplaw/2014/07/eu-apple-v-motorola-press-release-re-anti-com
petitive-use-of-sep.html> accessed 8 January 2018.
9Samsung Electronics (n 3).
10Commitments offered to the EC, ibid.
11‘The EU Court of Justice Judgement in Huawei v ZTE—important confirmation of practical steps
to be taken by Standard Essential Patent Holders Before Seeking Injunctions’ (Norton Rose
2015) <http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/131306/the-eu-court-of-justi
ce-judgement-inhuawei-v-zte-important-confirmation-of-practical-steps-to-be-taken-by-st#autofoo
tnote8> accessed 15 October 2017.
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licensee is ‘willing’ to negotiate a licence on that basis, the seeking of an injunction
by the SEP holder could constitute an abuse of a dominant position under Article
102 TFEU. This is on the basis that, in the EC’s view, the SEP holder can use the
threat of an injunction to distort licensing negotiations and impose unjustified
licensing terms on licensees.12
This position has also been confirmed by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU)
in 2015 in its landmark judgement in Huawei Technologies Co. v ZTE.13 The CJEU
stated that:
Article 102 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that the proprietor of a patent essential to
a standard established by a standardisation body, which has given an irrevocable under-
taking to that body to grant a licence to third parties on fair, reasonable, and
non-discriminatory (‘FRAND’) terms, does not abuse its dominant position, within the
meaning of that article, by bringing an action for infringement seeking an injunction
prohibiting the infringement of its patent or seeking the recall of products for the manu-
facture of which that patent has been used, as long as:
– prior to bringing that action, the proprietor has, first, alerted the alleged infringer of the
infringement complained about by designating that patent and specifying the way in which
it has been infringed, and, secondly, after the alleged infringer has expressed its willingness
to conclude a licensing agreement on FRAND terms, presented to that infringer a specific,
12ibid.
13Case C–170/13 Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v ZTE Corp EU:C:2015:477.
According to the facts of the case, Huawei Technologies, a multinational company active in the
telecommunications sector, is the proprietor of, inter alia, the European patent registered under the
reference EP 2 090 050 B 1, bearing the title ‘Method and apparatus of establishing a synchro-
nisation signal in a communication system’, granted by the Federal Republic of Germany, a
Contracting State of the EPC (‘patent EP 2 090 050 B 1’). That patent was notified to ETSI on
4 March 2009 by Huawei Technologies as a patent essential to the ‘Long Term Evolution’
standard. At the same time, Huawei Technologies undertook to grant licences to third parties on
FRAND terms.
Between November 2010 and the end of March 2011, Huawei Technologies and ZTE Corp., a
company belonging to a multinational group active in the telecommunications sector and which
markets, in Germany, products equipped with software linked to that standard, engaged in dis-
cussions concerning, inter alia, the infringement of patent EP 2 090 050 B 1 and the possibility of
concluding a licence on FRAND terms in relation to those products. Huawei Technologies indi-
cated the amount which it considered to be a reasonable royalty. For its part, ZTE Corp. sought a
cross-licensing agreement. However, no offer relating to a licensing agreement was finalised.
Nonetheless, ZTE marketed products that operate on the basis of the ‘Long Term Evolution’
standard, thus using patent EP 2 090 050 B 1, without paying a royalty to Huawei Technologies
or exhaustively rendering an account to Huawei Technologies in respect of past acts of use. On 28
April 2011, Huawei Technologies brought an action for infringement against ZTE before the
referring court, seeking an injunction prohibiting the infringement, the rendering of accounts, the
recall of products and an award of damages.
In those circumstances, and having regard to the fact that an undertaking to grant licences on
FRAND terms created legitimate expectations on the part of third parties that the proprietor of the
SEP would in fact grant licences on such terms, a refusal by the proprietor of the SEP to grant a
licence on those terms might, in principle, constitute an abuse within the meaning of
Article 102 TFEU.
1 Intellectual Property and Competition Law: Understanding the Interplay 7
written offer for a licence on such terms, specifying, in particular, the royalty and the way in
which it is to be calculated, and
– where the alleged infringer continues to use the patent in question, the alleged infringer
has not diligently responded to that offer, in accordance with recognised commercial
practices in the field and in good faith, this being a matter which must be established on the
basis of objective factors and which implies, in particular, that there are no delaying tactics.
In conclusion, in the EU, a FRAND encumbered SEP holder would violate
competition law if it sought an injunction in patent litigation against the imple-
menter especially if the user acted in a way that was consistent with being a ‘willing
licensee’.14
2.1.2 Abuse of Dominance via Misuse of Regulatory Procedures
Another aspect of interplay between patents and competition law may be seen via
the IP holders using their right to the SPCs and abusing the regulatory procedures in
relation to it. The SPC is a right that extends the duration of the exclusive right for
the duration of marketing authorisation (which shall be no longer than five years in
the EU). Often this right is abused by the patent holders to prevent/delay the entry
of generic products in the market.
Among the most prominent examples of such abuse is the AstraZeneca-Losec15
case. The EC fined the Anglo-Swedish group AstraZeneca €60 million for mis-
using regulatory and patent strategies for one of its medicinal products, Losec. In
particular, AstraZeneca was found guilty of delaying the market entry of competing
generic products by: (a) deliberately making misleading representations before the
patent offices and/or courts of several European Economic Area (EEA) Member
States, and inducing them to grant extended patent protection for Losec in the form
of SPCs to which the product was not entitled; and (b) preventing parallel imports
by deregistration of Losec’s marketing authorisations (at that time, generic products
could only be marketed, and parallel importers only obtain import licenses, if there
was an existing reference marketing authorisation for the product).
As a result of the investigation, the EC concluded that AstraZeneca’s conduct
amounted to an abuse of its dominant position. The EC’s decision was appealed to
the General Court of the EU (GC).16 In its judgement the GC confirmed the EC’s
findings, but reduced the fine to €52.5 million, as, in GC’s opinion, the EC did not
provide evidence that AstraZeneca’s conduct was objectively of a nature intended
to exclude parallel imports. At the same time, the GC rejected the argument that the
conditions of competition would not be normal/the same on the pharmaceutical
market and that exceptional circumstances would be required for a pharmaceutical
manufacturer to hold a dominant position. Finally, the GC confirmed that, to
14Freshfields (n 5).
15Case COMP/A.37.507/F3 AstraZeneca (2005) OJ L 332/24.
16Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca v Commission (2010) ECLI:EU:T:2010:266.
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constitute an abuse, a company’s behaviour: does not necessarily need to have a
direct effect on competition (the capacity to restrict competition may be indirect);
and does not require an intention to cause harm (since abuse of dominance is an
objective concept).
The case was further appealed to the CJEU.17 In its judgement, the CJEU
rejected all of AstraZeneca’s arguments, including its challenge of the relevant
market definition and of the finding that AstraZeneca’s patent and regulatory
strategies constituted an abuse of a dominant position. Hence, the CJEU fully
supported the position and findings of the GC.
2.1.3 Abuse of Dominance via Excessive Pricing
Excessive pricing may be regarded as a practice against competition rules if
implemented by an undertaking in a dominant position in the relevant market. IP
right holders do enjoy some form of market strength and very often are considered
as dominant, hence they do bear an additional responsibility when it comes to their
commercial practices. Setting up excessively high pricing by the patent holding
undertaking may infringe competition law. One of the most recent examples is the
EC’s formal investigation launched in May 2017 into Aspen Pharma’s pricing of
five cancer drugs.18 The EC is investigating whether Aspen Pharma abused its
dominant position within Article 102 TFEU by imposing significant price increases
for the drugs in question. The EC also investigated allegations that Aspen Pharma
threatened to (or did) withdraw the drugs in some EU Member States.19
Cases of unfair/excessive pricing as an abusive practice are notoriously complex,
and the EC’s investigation of Aspen Pharma led to allegations that it is acting as an
unofficial price regulator together with the authorities that have primary responsi-
bility for drug procurement. One of the main reasons for non-intervention of the
competition authorities in such cases is the difficulty in evaluating what constitutes
excessive. This is confirmed by a limited case law and practice currently in place.
Some jurisdictions like the US do not consider conduct of undertakings with market
power as merely exploiting customers that results in an abuse of dominance. Turkey
follows the EU approach where excessive pricing is regarded as one of the practices
that may be prohibited if practiced by a dominant company (indirectly via ‘unfair
pricing’ concept under Article 102 of the TFEU).
17Case C-457/10P AstraZeneca v Commission (2012) ECLI:EU:C:2012:770.
18COMP/ 40394 Aspen (2017).
19The EC investigation does not include Italy because the Italian competition authority already
adopted a relevant decision on 29 September 2016 concluding that Aspen abused its dominant
position by setting ‘unfair prices’ (up to 1500% price increase) and imposing a fine of €5 million.
See ‘Antitrust: Commission Opens Formal Investigation into Aspen Pharma’s Pricing Practices for
Cancer Medicines’ (Europa, 2017) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1323_en.htm>
accessed 8 December 2017.
1 Intellectual Property and Competition Law: Understanding the Interplay 9
Specific parameters for establishing the excessive prices as a violation of the EU
competition law were first determined by the CJEU in the United Brands20 case
back in 1978. In order to determine that the excessive pricing exists, it is necessary
to verify whether (i) the difference between cost incurred and price charged is
excessive, and (ii) if yes, whether the price imposed is either unfair in itself or when
compared with competing products.21 This ‘two-step’ test has been frequently
applied by EC, as well as recently confirmed by the CJEU in its AKKA/LAA22
judgement in 2017. The CJEU in AKKA/LAA judgement emphasizes that the dif-
ference in rates following the price comparison must be significant and not tem-
porary to be considered as appreciable and hence abusive. The concept of
‘significant’ is rather vague and subjective depending on the circumstances of each
case. Even so, these factors are ‘merely indicative’ of abuse of a dominant position.
In such situations, it is for the undertaking holding a dominant position to show that
its prices are fair by reference to objective factors that may have an impact on
management expenses; and it is up to the national competition authority to assess
the circumstances of each specific case.
2.1.4 Anticompetitive Agreements: Restricting Competitors’ Entry
to the Market or ‘Paying off Competition’
Patent holders prolonging their patent protection very often resort to anticompeti-
tive agreements with potential competitors/new entrants and thereby ‘pay off
competition’. This is particularly common for the pharmaceutical sector.
In the field of pharmaceuticals, there has been, for some time, competition
concern about practices of pharmaceutical companies that might be delaying entry
of new, innovative and cheaper generic medicines onto the market.23 PSAs, like
any other agreements, are subject to competition law, and under certain circum-
stances, these agreements may be considered contrary to competition law. As
expiry of the patent term approaches and medicines lose patent protection, origi-
nators are increasingly confronted with the prospect of competition from generics
(with significantly lower prices). Originators in many instances enter into
patent-related procedures/disputes/litigation in order to delay the entry of generics
in the market. Normally originators claim that their patents have been infringed by
generics who have introduced their own versions of the product prior to expiry of
the patents. Generics in turn deny such infringement and contest the validity of the
patents. In such circumstances, PSAs are a fast and economical way to end patent
20Case C-27/76 United Brands and United Brands Continentaal v Commission (1978) ECLI:EU:
C:1978:22.
21ibid, para 252.
22Case C–177/16 Autortiesību un komunicēšanās konsultāciju aģentūra/ Latvijas Autoru
apvienība v Konkurences padome (2017) ECLI:EU:C:2017:689.
23Freshfields (n 5).
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disputes, particularly where both parties recognise the merits of settlement and
decreased litigation costs.
In all PSA cases so far investigated by competition authorities, the ‘initial concerns
stemmed from the fact that the settlements under scrutiny involved ‘large’ payments
from patent holder to the generic entrant’.24 Settlement agreements containing
restrictions beyond the exclusionary zone of the patent (e.g. beyond its geographic
scope, its period of protection etc.) or regarding patents for which the patent holder
knows that the patentability criteria are not met (e.g. lack of inventive step, incorrect,
misleading or incomplete information etc.) can also be regarded as problematic
agreements.25 PSAs can be categorised into agreements: with no limitation of generic
entry; and with limitation of generic entry (with or without the transfer of money).
In the case of Citalopram,26 the EC fined the Danish pharmaceutical group
Lundbeck €93.8 million and four generic companies (Alpharma, Arrow, Ranbaxy
and MercK) a total of €52.2 million. The EC found that the companies concluded
agreements concerning citalopram/antidepressants in order to prevent the market
entry of competing generic versions of citalopram following patent expiry. The
agreements involved significant value transfers (by way of direct payments, as well
as the purchase of generic citalopram stock for destruction) from Lundbeck to its
generic competitors. The EC concluded that the agreements thus constituted
‘pay-for-delay’ agreements, which violated Article 101 TFEU. The case was
appealed before the GC. Lundbeck believed that the EC’s decision contains several
‘serious legal and factual errors,’27 and was requesting that the GC annuls the
decision and/or reduces the fine imposed. Eventually the GC in September 2016
fully rejected Lunbeck’s arguments and fully upheld the EC’s findings and ruled
that pay-for-delay agreements were in breach of EU competition law.28 The GC
also noted that ‘irrespective of any patent dispute, generics competitors agreed with
Lundbeck to stay out of the market in return for value transfers […] which
24Pierre Regibeau, ‘Further Thought on ‘pay-for-delay’ Settlements’ (2014) 2 Concurrences 12,
19.
25‘6th Report on the Monitoring of Patent Settlements (period: January–December 2014)’
(Europa, 2 December 2015) <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/
patent_settlements_report6_en.pdf> accessed 15 May 2016.
26Case COMP/AT.39226 Lundbeck (2013).
27‘Lundbeck Appeals European Commission Decision’ (Lundbeck, 2 September 2013) <http://
investor.lundbeck.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=788105> accessed 5 August 2014.
28Cases T-472/13 H. Lundbeck A/S and Lundbeck Ltd v European Commission (2016) ECLI:EU:
T:2016:449; T-460/13 Sun Pharmaceutical Industries and Ranbaxy (UK) v Commission
(2016) ECLI:EU:T:2016:453; T-467/13 Arrow Group and Arrow Generics v Commission
(2016) ECLI:EU:T:2016:450; T-469/13 Generics (UK) v Commission (2016) ECLI:EU:
T:2016:454; T-470/13 Merck v Commission (2016) ECLI:EU:T:2016:452; T-471/13 Xellia
Pharmaceuticals and Alpharma v Commission (2016) ECLI:EU:T:2016:460.
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constituted a ‘buying-off of competition’’,29 which is a restriction of competition
that cannot be tolerated. Moreover, such agreements could not be justified by a
legitimate need of IP rights protection.
In Fentanyl case,30 the EC was concerned about a so-called ‘co-promotion’
agreement between the Dutch subsidiaries of the US pharmaceutical company
Johnson & Johnson (Janssen-Cilag) and the Swiss company Novartis (Sandoz),
entered in 2005. The main aim of the agreement was to avoid the companies
competing against each other, thus depriving users of fentanyl in the Netherlands to
access a cheaper painkiller. The agreement foresaw monthly payments from
Janssen-Cilag to Sandoz if no generic product was launched in the Dutch market.
Consequently, Sandoz abstained from entering the market with generic fentanyl
patches for the duration of the agreement from July 2005 until December 2006.
This may have delayed the entry of a cheaper generic medicine for 17 months and
kept prices for fentanyl in the Netherlands artificially high. The key concern was
that the agreed monthly payments exceeded the profits that Sandoz expected to
obtain from selling its generic product, for as long as there was no generic entry.
The EC concluded that the agreement breached Article 101 TFEU and imposed
fines of €10,798,000 on Johnson & Johnson and €5,493,000 on Novartis.
In Modafinil case,31 the companies Cephalon and Teva settled patent infringe-
ment disputes in the UK and the US concerning Modafinil (a treatment for sleeping
disorders). As part of the settlement agreement, Teva undertook not to sell its
generic Modafinil products on EEA markets before October 2012 and a series of
side deals were included in the settlement agreement. The EC opened an investi-
gation to assess whether the PSA violated EU competition law. The investigation is
still on going. Statement of objections was sent by the EC in July 2017 stating its
preliminary view that a PSA concluded with Cephalon was in breach of EU
competition law. Under the agreement, Teva committed not to market a cheaper
generic version of Cephalon’s drug for sleep disorders, Modafinil. In other words,
the originator company Cephalon agreed to pay Teva to keep its cheaper generic
version of Cephalon’s sleep disorder drug Modafinil out of the market.
The Perindopril case,32 concerns an investigation by the EC of practices of the
French pharmaceutical company Servier and several of its generic competitors33 for
potentially delaying the generic entry of Perindopril, a cardio-vascular medicine.
The EC concluded that Servier had acquired competing technologies to produce
perindopril to preserve its position with regard to Perindopril, which was about to
reach the end of its patent protection; and induced its generic challengers to
29‘Antitrust: Commission Welcomes General Court Judgements Upholding its Lundbeck Decision
in First Pharma Pay-For-Delay Case (Europa, 2016) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
MEMO-16-2994_en.htm> accessed 5 May 2017.
30Case COMP/AT.39685 Fentanyl (2013).
31Case COMP/AT.39686 Cephalon (2011).
32Case COMP/AT.39612 Perindopril (Servier) (2012).
33Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Unichem and its subsidiary Niche, as well as Matrix, which is
now known as Mylan Laboratories, Krka and Lupin.
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conclude patent settlements. By concluding the agreements, the competitors vio-
lated Article 101 TFEU and Servier also abused its dominant position under Article
102 TFEU. The EC imposed a €427.7 million fine34 on the companies.
2.2 Trademarks and Competition Law
The most common competition law issues related to trademarks are anticompetitive
restrictive agreements (clauses in the commercial contracts, e.g. prohibition to sell
online, qualitative selective distribution, vertical restrictive agreements, etc.). It is
not unusual for manufacturers/trademark owners to seek to impose contractual
restrictions that prevent retailers from marketing their products via online market-
places (such as PriceMinister, Amazon and Fnac.com) and internet auction sites
(such as eBay). Such contractual clauses usually appear in selective distribution
agreements for luxury or highly technical products.
On the one hand such contracts with online sales restrictions (normally in
selective distribution contracts) may be claimed as anticompetitive due to their
restrictive nature,35 on the other hand the trademark owners may rely on its right to
protect the reputation and image of the brand to justify the restriction, particularly
when it comes to the luxury brands. Here we come across the issue of how to assess
this luxury image or ‘an aura of luxury’ justification. It was recognised by the CJEU
in Dior36 case, whereby:
the proprietor of a trade mark can invoke the rights conferred by that trade mark against a
licensee who contravenes a provision in a licence agreement prohibiting, on grounds of the
trade mark’s prestige, sales to discount stores […], provided it has been established that that
contravention […] damages the allure and prestigious image which bestows on them an
aura of luxury.
The CJEU in Coty Germany37 delivered its judgement upon the German court
application for a preliminary ruling. The dispute under appeal was between Coty
Inc. (Coty) and Parfümerie Akzente GmbH (Akzente, an authorized offline dis-
tributor of Coty). Coty was suing Akzente in the German court for violating a
34‘Antitrust: Commission Fines Servier and Five Generic Companies for Curbing Entry of
Cheaper Versions of Cardiovascular Medicine’ (Europa, 9 July 2014) <http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_IP-14-799_en.htm> accessed 5 May 2017.
35A ban on Internet sales, even in a selective distribution system, is generally prohibited as a
hardcore restriction of competition. At the same time the manufacturers remain free to organise
their selective distribution network and may require some quality standards.
36Case C-59/08 Copad SA. v Christian Dior couture SA and Others (2009) ECLI:EU:C:2009:260.
37Case C-230/16 Coty Germany GmbH v Parfümerie Akzente GmbH (2017) ECLI:EU:
C:2017:941 (Coty case).
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condition under the selective distribution agreement that prohibits Akzente from
selling Coty’s luxury products (under brands Marc Jacobs, Calvin Klein and Chloe)
on open third party online platforms (e.g. Amazon).
‘Luxury image’ argument that was relied upon by Coty and supported by the
CJEU in this case implies that the manufacturer/trademark owner of branded goods
shall be able to safeguard the image and prestige of its luxury brand(s), among other,
by way of restricting online sales of its distributors on third party’s platforms.38
The CJEU here refers39 to the Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique40 2009 criteria of
the selective distribution systems that have to be observed for the selective distribution
to be outside the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU: (i) re-sellers are chosen on the basis of
objective criteria of a qualitative nature laid down uniformly for all potential re-sellers
and not applied in a discriminatory fashion, (ii) the characteristics of the product in
question necessitate such a network in order to preserve its quality and ensure its proper
use and, finally, (iii) the criteria laid down do not go beyond what is necessary.
The ‘necessity’ of the online sales restriction may be explained by the need to
preserve the quality of the luxury goods. The quality of such goods is not just the
result of their material characteristics, but also ‘of the allure and prestigious image
which bestow on them an aura of luxury.’41 The image enables consumers to
distinguish them from similar goods. Hence, any impairment to that aura of luxury
may affect the actual quality of those goods.42
Such online sales restrictions provides the supplier with a guarantee that the
goods in question will be exclusively associated with the authorized distributors,
which is one of the objectives sought when recourse is made to the selective
distribution system. Hence, the bans in relation to sales on third party online
platforms in selective distribution systems shall not be treated as a per se restriction
of competition law; and a ‘luxury image’ argument may justify any possible
restrictive effect of such clauses.43
38The online sale restriction at issue is not absolute. It applies solely to the internet sale of the
contract goods via third-party platforms which operate in a ‘discernible manner’. See ibid, para 52.
Hence, authorized distributors shall be permitted to sell the contract goods online: both (i) on their
own websites (as long as they have an electronic shop window for the authorized store and the
luxury aura of the goods is preserved), and (ii) via unauthorized third party platforms when the use
of such platforms ‘is not discernible to the customer’ See ibid, para 55.
39Coty case (n 37), para 52.
40C–439/09 Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique (2011) ECLI:EU:C:2011:649.
41Coty case (n 37), para 25.
42See also Copad (n 36), paras 24–26.
43We repeat that the prohibition shall not be absolute and shall concern only sales of contract
goods at third party platforms. Authorized distributors shall be permitted to sell the contract goods
online via unauthorized third party platforms when the use of such platforms is ‘not discernible’ to
the customer (although the CJEU has not provided any definition of the notion of ‘discernible/not
discernible to the customer’).
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The ‘luxury image’ justification could not be accepted by the competition
authorities in France and Germany in the Adidas case. Following antitrust probes
into online sales restrictions of Adidas in Germany and France, the competition
authorities came to conclusion that producer cannot prohibit an authorised reseller
from selling its products online by relying on the quality standard justification.
Consequently, Adidas had to modify its selective distribution contracts and online
sales policy accordingly.44 Therefore, an absolute ban on online sales would be
illegal; however, the trademark owners still have a chance to justify such restric-
tions by relying on the quality/brand/reputation protection argument. It is important
that the restriction does not go far beyond the simple requirement of quality
standards.
2.3 Copyright and Competition Law
Copyright covers computer programs and software. Companies holding copyright
have been investigated by competition authorities more often in the modern (dig-
ital) world. Copyright provides some sort of economic power in the market, which
may potentially be abused by way of tying, refusal to license, foreclose competitors,
as well as using excessive royalties, if implemented by a dominant company. The
most prominent example includes the Microsoft (refusal to deal and tying), Intel
(loyalty rebates) and Google (‘favouring your own content’) cases, in all of which
the companies-copyright owners were found to be abusing their market position via
various practices.
In Microsoft45 case in 2004, the EC found that the company was dominant and
held a copyright for a computer program. The investigation commenced based on a
complaint filed by Microsoft’s competitor to whom Microsoft refused to provide
information on interoperability that would enable competitors to develop competing
programs for workgroup servers compatible with the Windows platform. Following
the investigation the EC fined Microsoft €497 million46 for abusing its dominant
position in the personal computer (PC) operating systems47 and work group server
services, as well as multimedia player market, including by way of (i) refusal to
44On 18 November 2015, the Autorité de la concurrence (the French Competition Authority or
FCA) obtained confirmation from Adidas that it will withdraw from its contracts any clauses
prohibiting its distributors from using marketplaces for their online sales. ‘When Can Sales Via
Online Platforms be Restricted?’ (Eversheds Sutherland, 23 December 2015) <http://consumerhub.
eversheds-sutherland.com/retail/when-can-sales-via-online-platforms-be-restricted/>.
45Microsoft (n 1).
46See T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission (2007) ECLI:EU:T:2007:289.
47As mentioned in para 71 of the Microsoft decision, the operating system product is copyrighted
material and, as such, its use can be subjected to licensing conditions that are transferred across the
distribution channel.
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supply its competitors with interoperability information for operating PC Windows
with other systems and to use that information for the purpose of developing/
distributing products competing with Microsoft’s own products, and (ii) the tied
sale of Windows Media Player software together with the Windows client PC
operating system, hence leaving no choice for consumers and foreclosing the
multimedia player market to smaller competitors.
Normally tying is a good idea as it leads to better product offerings, however
there is a risk of foreclosure effect where (i) the tied and tying products are distinct
products (depends on customer demand), i.e. it is possible to buy those products
separately; (ii) it is a lasting practice; and (iii) it is implemented by the dominant
undertaking.
As for the refusal to provide information on interoperability that would enable
competitors to develop competing programs for workgroup servers compatible with
the Windows platform, it was found to be anticompetitive, since Microsoft is a
dominant player and such information was indispensable (essential facility) for the
smaller players to enter/stay the relevant market.
On the other hand, the EC’s infringement decision in Intel48 imposing a record
€1.06 billion fine was appealed to the GC49 and subsequently to the CJEU,50 and
eventually was referred back to the GC, who is now conducting the new assessment
of the evidence and effects of the rebates system provided by Intel. The main
message of the CJEU’s judgement is that the anticompetitive effect of the loyalty
rebates should not be presumed where the undertaking in question argues that its
conduct is not capable of restricting competition in the market.
The Intel case started with a complaint before the EC brought by the Advanced
Micro Devices (AMD) against Intel back in 2000. Following the investigation, the
EC found that Intel indeed infringed Article 102 of the TFEU, i.e. abused its
dominant position, in particular by granting (i) rebates on condition that original
equipment manufacturers (OEMs) would purchase from it all or almost all of their
x86 central processing units (CPUs) for use in their computers, and (ii) payments to
the largest desktop computer distributor in the EU, Media-Saturn-Holding, on
condition that it would be selling exclusively computers containing Intel’s x86
CPUs. On top of that, according to the EC, Intel also (iii) provided payments to the
OEM’s for the postponement or cancellation of the launch of AMD CPU-based
products or put restrictions on their distribution. The gravity of the infringements
which affected the ability of Intel’s competitors to compete justified the fine
imposed by the EC.
The CJEU in Intel case did not overrule the EC’s decision. It addressed three out
of six grounds of appeal and referred it back to the GC. It is now for the GC to
decide on whether to annul or uphold it (again) depending on the new assessment of
48Case COMP 37/990 Intel (2014).
49Case T-286/09 Intel Corporation v European Commission (2014) ECLI:EU:T:2014:547.
50Case C-413/14 P Intel Corporation Inc. v European Commission (2017) ECLI:EU:C:2017:632.
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the evidence and effects of the case at hand. The CJEU has ruled on the important
issues, such as:
• EC’s procedural obligations/Intel’s right of defence: The CJEU criticised the EC
for material procedural mistake affecting Intel’s right of defence. This included
failing to record adequately and take into account the evidence (a five hr
interview with Intel’s customer) that had been given by a third party.
• EC’s territorial jurisdiction: The CJEU emphasized on the extraterritoriality of
the EU competition law, i.e. that activity of an undertaking outside the EU may
infringe EU competition law by its effect that is foreseeably ‘immediate and
substantial’. Behaviors which, while not implemented within the EU, but which
have or likely to have an impact on the EU market serve as a basis for the EC’s
jurisdiction in such cases.
• The CJEU reminded that an undertaking suspected of having infringed Article
102 TFEU could argue that its behavior was not capable of restricting compe-
tition. In case such an objection is expressed, the EC is required to examine
(i) the extent of the dominant position, (ii) the market coverage of the rebates at
issue, (iii) the conditions, the duration and the amount of those rebates, and also
(iv) the exclusionary effect of such behaviors on competitors who are at least as
efficient as the dominant undertaking (‘as efficient competitor test’/‘adverse
effect on competition (AEC) test’). Such an analysis may reveal the exclusionary
effect of the behaviors at issue. This could be counterbalanced by advantages in
terms of efficiency, which can benefit the consumer.
In summary, the CJEU’s judgement in Intel case confirms the statement that the
anticompetitive effect of the loyalty rebates should not be presumed where the
undertaking in question argues that its conduct is not capable of restricting com-
petition in the market.51 In such situations all the circumstances of the case must be
analysed in order to correctly determine whether competition rules have been
infringed. Additionally, this judgement is a reminder of the fact that the competition
law has extraterritorial effect; and competition authorities must pay due care to the
procedural formalities and right of defence of the undertaking(s) under investiga-
tion, e.g. to record all evidence, including interviews and meetings.
And finally, the Google52 case, where following the investigation EC decided to
penalise Google €2.42 billion for an abuse of dominance by way of promoting its
own comparison shopping service (favouring its own content) in its search results.
In other words, Google’s advertisements enjoyed higher number of clicks as a result
of better display/visibility—i.e. Google’s own services appeared at the top of the
search results, while even the most highly ranked rivals’ services appeared on
average only on page four or so of Google’s search results. According to the EC,
such practices significantly affected competition in the market for comparison
51Previous case-law considered that exclusivity rebates granted by dominant undertakings were,
per se, anticompetitive.
52Case AT.39740 Google Search (Shopping) (2017).
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shopping and allowed Google to make significant gains in traffic at the expense of
its competitors and to the detriment of consumers. On the one hand, Google was
found violating EU competition law by using its own search engine (software),
Google Search, and favouring its own services over those of competitors by making
Google’s results more visible. But on the other hand, consumers could still visit
other sites/platform to compare prices before buying online.
3 Conclusion
Competition law issues may arise in any area of IP: patents, trademarks, and/or
copyright. In most cases it is the IPR holders with a strong market power (if not
dominance) that have to be particularly cautious about competition law implications
of their practices, since an undertaking enjoying a dominant position is under a
special responsibility not to engage in conduct that may distort competition.
With regards to patents, the most common competition law issues here are
related to the abuse of market power via various practices, such as: refusal to
license/deal, excessive charges/pricing, unfair/discriminatory licensing, anticom-
petitive use of SEPs/abusing litigation by SEP holders; delaying market entry of
competitors via misuse of patent/regulatory process (SPC), excessive pricing, as
well as concluding anticompetitive agreements (PSAs).
When it comes to trademarks, the most common competition law issues that we
may come across are anticompetitive restrictive agreements (clauses in the com-
mercial contracts, e.g. prohibition to sell online, qualitative selective distribution,
vertical restrictive agreements, etc.). It is not unusual for trademark owners to
impose contractual restrictions that prevent retailers from marketing their products
via online marketplaces. Such contractual clauses usually appear in selective dis-
tribution agreements for luxury or highly technical products and subject to strict
criteria and/or ‘luxury brand image’ justification in relation to online sale prohi-
bitions (as recently confirmed by Coty case).
Copyright, just like patents and trademarks, provides some sort of economic
power in the market, which may potentially be abused by way of tying, refusal to
license, foreclose competitors, as well as using excessive royalties, if implemented
by a dominant company.
Recent enforcement of competition law in the sphere of patents (SEPs), trade-
marks and copyright in various industries shall significantly affect the legal land-
scape for the IP right owners; patent holders must now, more routinely, consider
how competition law may impact the exercise of their IP rights. In that respect,
competition compliance programs and competition law due diligence is very much
advisable to identify and avoid competition law related risks.
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Chapter 2
The Interaction Between Intellectual
Property Law and Competition Law
in the EU: Necessity of Convergent
Interpretation with the Principles
Established by the Relevant Case Law
Nikolaos E. Zevgolis
1 Introduction
The fact that the interaction between competition law and intellectual property
(IP) law continues to raise new questions and give rise to opportunities for debates is
not something novel. However, the European Commission’s hope is considered
crystal clear: On the one hand to free resources for the proactive estimated value of
new policy areas, and on the other hand to secure and guarantee ‘the uniform appli-
cation of European Union’s (EU) Competition Law through procedural guidance and
economic, effect-based substantive rules’.1 This is the reason why the European
Commission (EC) does not favor a per se approach regarding this specific issue.2
Therefore, it is not incidental that not only market participants but also competition
watchdogs have accepted, ‘sometimes even fostered’, standard setting because of its
beneficial effects: inter alia, standardization ensures interoperability of standard-based
N. E. Zevgolis (&)
Hellenic Competition Commission, Tutorship cooperation with the Hellenic Open University,
Athens, Greece
e-mail: nikoszevgolis@hotmail.com
1See Ralf Boscheck, ‘Patent Trolls: In Search of Efficient Regulatory Standards’ (2016) 39 World
Competition 67, 84, quoting: ‘This approach is very much in line with the evolution of the EU
competition law regime and its shift from centralized authorization to decentralized enforcement
through national authorities, courts and undertakings themselves’.
2Alexander Italianer, ‘The Object of Effects’ (CRA Annual Brussels Conference—Economic
Developments in Competition Policy, Brussels, 10 December 2014), quoting that: ‘there is a clear
case law demanding an analysis of effects’.
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products, it renders these products more comparable for consumers3 and it can help to
select the ‘best’ available technical solution for a given task.4 An individual who uses, for
instance, a smartphone or a laptop can easily understand the reasons for standardization.
2 The Adequacy (or Inadequacy?) of the European
Commission’s Soft Law
2.1 Main Provisions in the Horizontal Cooperation
Guidelines 2011/C 11/01: The Rule (IPR Are
Pro-competitive) and the Exceptions
IP laws and competition laws share two main targets: promotion of innovation and
enhancement of consumer welfare. According to para 269 of the Horizontal
Cooperation Guidelines, Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) ‘promote dynamic
competition by encouraging undertakings to invest in developing either new or
improved products and processes’. This is the reason why IPR are considered ‘in
general pro-competitive’.5 Nevertheless, because of IPR, ‘a participant holding IPR
essential for implementing the standard,6 could, in the specific context of
3European Commission Guidance on the Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article [102 TFEU]
to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings 2009 OJ (C 45) 7–20, para 5:
Consumers benefit from competition through lower prices, better quality and a wider choice
of new or improved goods and services. The Commission, therefore, will direct its
enforcement to ensuring that markets function properly and that consumers benefit from the
efficiency and productivity which result from effective competition between undertakings.
4Peter Picht, ‘The ECJ Rules on Standard essential Patents: Thoughts and Issues Post-Huawei’
(2016) 37 ECLR 365.
5See ‘Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union to Horizontal Co-Operation Agreements’ 2011/C 11/01 (Horizontal Cooperation
Guidelines), para 269.
6para 263 of the Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines:
standards normally increase competition and lower output and sales costs, benefiting
economies as a whole. Standards may maintain and enhance quality, provide information
and ensure interoperability and compatibility (thus increasing value for consumers).
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standard-setting, also acquire control over the use of a standard’.7 In cases where
‘the standard constitutes a barrier to entry’,8 Standard Essential Patent (SEP) holder
‘could thereby control the product or service market to which the standard relates’.9
This situation, when it happens, could allow SEP holder to behave in anticom-
petitive ways: for instance, by ‘holding up’ users after the adoption of the standard
either by refusing to license the necessary IPR or by extracting excessive10 royalty
fees, it can prevent effective access to the standard.11 However, there should not be
a misunderstanding: even if the establishment of a standard is in a position to create
or increase the market power of IPR holders possessing IPR essential to the
7Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines (n 5).
8ibid. About this kind of barrier to entry, the following ought to be underlined: According to
Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines (n 5), para 266, in the hypothetical case where ‘one technology
has been chosen and the standard has been set, competing technologies and companies may face a
barrier to entry and may potentially be excluded from the market’. Furthermore, according to the
same para, ‘standards requiring that a particular technology is used exclusively for a standard or
preventing the development of other technologies by obliging the members of the standard setting
organization to exclusively use a particular standard, may lead to the same effect. The risk of
limitation of innovation is increased if one or more companies are unjustifiably excluded from the
standard-setting process’.
9Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines (n 5).
10However, it ought to be underlined that, in terms of competition law high royalty fees can only
be qualified as excessive in case that the pre conditions for an abuse of a dominant position are
fulfilled according to Article 102 TFEU and the settled case-law of the Court of Justice of the
European Union. See indicatively Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission (1978) ECLI:EU:
C:1978:22.
11This is the reason why it is acceptable (Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines, para 264) that
standard-setting can, in specific circumstances, give rise to restrictive effects on competition by
potentially restricting price competition and limiting or controlling production, markets, innovation
or technical development. This can happen through three main channels, namely reduction in price
competition, foreclosure of innovative technologies and exclusion of, or discrimination against,
certain companies by prevention of effective access to the standard. More specifically, standard-
ization may lead to anticompetitive results by preventing certain undertakings from obtaining
effective access to the results of the standard-setting process (ie, the specification and/or the
essential IPR for implementing the standard). According to Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines,
para 268, in the case that ‘a company is either completely prevented from obtaining access to the
result of the standard or is only granted access on prohibitive or discriminatory terms, there is a
risk of an anticompetitive effect’. A contrario, according to the same para:
a system where potentially relevant IPR is disclosed up-front may increase the probability
of effective access being granted to the standard since it allows the participants to recognize
and define which technologies are covered by IPR and which are not. This enables the
participants to both factor in the potential effect on the final price of the result of the
standard (for instance, choosing a technology without IPR is likely to have a positive effect
on the final price) and to verify with the IPR holder whether they would be willing to
license if their technology is included in the standard.
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standard, there is no presumption that holding exercising IPR essential to a standard
equates to the possession or exercise of market power.12 The EC recognizes that the
question of market power cannot be answered by per se ruling; a contrario, it can
only be assessed on a case-by-case analysis.
2.2 Preconditions for Pro-competitive Standard-Setting
2.2.1 The Central Issue of Access to the Standard
According to the Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines,13 where participation in
standard-setting is unrestricted and the procedure for adopting the standard in
question is transparent, standardization agreements which contain no obligation to
comply with the standard and provide access to the standard on fair, reasonable, and
non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms will normally not restrict competition within
the meaning of Article 101 para 1 TFEU. At this point, it must be clarified that any
standard-setting agreement which makes a discrimination or even distinction
against any of either the participating or potential members could have as a result a
restriction of competition. For instance, in a case that because of a standard setting
organization (SSO) upstream only companies are explicitly excluded (i.e. compa-
nies which are not active on the downstream production market), this could lead to
an exclusion of potentially better technologies.14
Furthermore, para 280 ought to be read in combination with para 293 of the
same Guidelines. According to this last paragraph, whether standardization agree-
ments may raise concerns about restrictive effects on competition may depend on
whether the members of a SSO remain (or not remain) free to develop alternative
standards or products that do not meet the requirements demanded by the agreed
12At this point it should be underlined that, according to the Guidance on the Commission's
enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by
dominant undertakings. See Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, 2009/C
45/02 (Abusive Exclusionary Conduct):
In accordance with the case-law, it is not in itself illegal for an undertaking to be in a
dominant position and such a dominant undertaking is entitled to compete on the merits.
However, the undertaking concerned has a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to
impair genuine undistorted competition on the common market.
13Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines (n 5), para 280.
14ibid, para 297.
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standard.15 For instance, in case that the standard-setting agreement binds the
members to only produce products in compliance with the standard, the risk of a
likely negative effect on competition is significantly increased and could in certain
circumstances give rise to a restriction of competition by object.16 A contrario,
standards only covering aspects of minor importance or parts of the end-product are
considered less likely to give rise to competition concerns than more comprehen-
sive standards.
In addition, the assessment whether the agreement restricts or not competition
will also focus on the central issue of access to the standard. In case that the result
of a standard (i.e. according to Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines, para 294, the:
specification of how to comply with the standard and, if relevant, the essential IPR for
implementing the standard’) is not at all accessible, or only accessible on discriminatory
terms, for members or third parties (non-members of the relevant standard-setting
organization)
This barrier to entry17 and/or segmentation ‘may discriminate or foreclose or
departmentalize markets according to their geographic scope of application and
thereby possibly restrict competition’. Nevertheless, ‘in the case of several com-
peting standards or in the case of effective competition between the standardized
15See for example, the Commission Decision in Case IV/29/151 Philips/VCR OJ L 47, 18
February 1978, para 23:
As these standards were for the manufacture of VCR equipment, the parties were obliged to
manufacture and distribute only cassettes and recorders conforming to the VCR system
licensed by Philips. They were prohibited from changing to manufacturing and distributing
other video cassette systems … This constituted a restriction of competition under Article
85(1)(b).
16ibid.
17Barriers to entry (or expansion) can take various forms. They may be either legal barriers (for
example, tariffs or quotas), or they may take the form of advantages specifically enjoyed usually by
undertakings with (single) dominant position: for instance, privileged access to essential inputs or
natural resources, important technologies. See Case T-30/89 Hilti v Commission [1991] ECR
II-1439, para 19. Economies of scale and/or scope, an established distribution and sales network,
Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission [1979] ECR 461, para 48. They may also include
costs and other types of hindrance (for example, resulting from network effects, faced by cus-
tomers in switching to a new supplier). According to the Guidance on the Commission's
enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by
dominant undertakings:
economies of scale mean that competitors are less likely to enter or stay in the market if the
dominant undertaking forecloses a significant part of the relevant market. Similarly, the
conduct may allow the dominant undertaking to ‘tip’ a market characterised by network
effects in its favour or to further entrench its position on such a market. Likewise, if entry
barriers in the upstream and/or downstream market are significant, this means that it may be
costly for competitors to overcome possible foreclosure through vertical integration […].
2 IP and Competition in EU: Necessity of Convergent Interpretation 25
solution and non-standardized solution’18 a case-by-case analysis is demanded:
even a limitation of access may not produce restrictive effects on competition.19
Supposing that participation in the standard-setting process is open, in the sense
that it allows all competitors (active or potential and/or stakeholders) in the market
affected by the standard to participate in choosing and elaborating the standard, this
will eliminate the risks of a likely restrictive effect on competition by not excluding
certain undertakings from the ability and the opportunity to influence the choice and
elaboration of the standard.20 The greater the likely market impact of the standard,
and the wider its potential fields of application, the more important it is to allow
equal access to the standard-setting process. However, if the facts of the case show
that there is competition between several such standards and SSOs (and not nec-
essarily the same standards are applied by the whole industry) perhaps there will not
be any anticompetitive effects. Furthermore, according to Horizontal Cooperation
Guidelines, para 295, ‘if in the absence of a limitation on the number of participants
it would not have been possible to adopt the standard, the agreement would not be
likely to lead to any restrictive effect on competition under Article [101 para 1
TFEU]’. Or if the adoption of the standard would have been heavily delayed by an
inefficient process, any initial restriction could be counterbalanced by efficiencies
which should be considered more significant under Article 101 para 3 TFEU.21
According to the same para of the Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines:
[i]n certain situations the potential negative effects of restricted participation may be
overcome or at least restricted by ensuring that stakeholders are kept informed and con-
sulted on the work in progress’.22 The rule is that ‘the more transparent the procedure for
adopting the standard, the more likely it is that the adopted standard will take into account
the interests of all stakeholders’.23
18Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines (n 5), para 294.
19ibid.
20In Case IV/31.458 X/Open Group OJ L35, 6 February 1987, para 32: the European Commission
considered that even if the standards adopted were made public, the restricted membership policy
had the effect of preventing non-members from influencing the results of the work of the group and
from getting the know-how and technical understanding relating to the standards which the
members were likely to acquire. In addition, non-members could not, in contrast to the members,
implement the standard before it was adopted. This is the reason why the agreement was—under
these specific circumstances—considered that it constituted a restriction of competition under
Article 101 para 1 TFEU.
21Nevertheless, it ought to be underlined that the four preconditions for the application of Article
101 para 3 TFEU ought to be concurrent cumulatively.
22See Case COMP/39.416 Ship Classification (2010) OJ C2/05.
23See Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines (n 5), para 295.
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2.2.2 The Significance of Market Shares of the Goods or Services
Based on the Standard
To assess the effects of a standard-setting agreement, the market shares of the goods
or services based on the standard ought to be considered. One of the main problems
is that, according to Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines, para 296:
it might not always be possible to assess with a minimum of certainty at an early stage
whether the standard will in practice be adopted by a large part of the industry, or whether it
will only be used by a very small part of the industry’. Therefore, ‘in many cases the
relevant market shares of the companies having participated in developing the standard
could be used as a sign or indication for assessing the likely market share of the standard;
the reason is that the companies participating in setting the standard would in most cases
have an interest in implementing the standard.24
Nevertheless, according to the same para of the Horizontal Cooperation
Guidelines:
as the effectiveness of [standardization] agreements is often proportional to the share of the
industry involved in setting and/or applying the standard, high market shares held by the
parties in the market or markets affected by the standard will not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that the standard is likely to give rise to restrictive effects on competition.25
So, a case-by-case analysis is demanded. Market shares provide a useful first
indication of the market structure and of the relative importance of the various
undertakings active on the market.26 However, the EC and the national competition
authorities will assess market shares in the light of the relevant market conditions,
and the dynamics of the market and of the extent to which there is a product
differentiation (if there is such and to which extent there is). In addition, the trend or
development of market shares over time may also be considered in volatile markets
or in markets where auctions take place.27
24ibid, para 296.
25ibid.
26Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. v Commission [1979] ECR 461, paras 39–41; Case C-62/
86 AKZO v Commission [1991] ECR I-3359, para 60; Case T-30/89 Hilti v Commission [1991]
ECR II-1439, paras 90–92; Case T-340/03 France Télécom v Commission [2007] ECR II-107,
para 100.
27See Abusive Exclusionary Conduct (n 12), para 13.
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2.2.3 Result of Standardization Agreements
Standardization agreements frequently create the necessary preconditions for sig-
nificant static28 and dynamic efficiency gains.29 For instance, Union wide standards
may facilitate market integration30 and allow companies to market their goods and
services in all Member States, leading on the one hand to increased consumer
choice and on the other hand decreasing prices.31 More specifically, market inte-
gration cannot only be facilitated but also enhanced—the creation of a common
market lay at the heart of the EU project, transaction costs can be reduced, the
necessary time for innovative products offered to end users can be minimized,
interoperability between network and products can be reduced etc. According to the
Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines para 308, ‘standards which establish technical
interoperability and compatibility often encourage competition on the merits
between technologies from different enterprises and help prevent lock-into one
supplier’.32 In addition, transaction costs may be reduced due to standards in a very
profitable way not only for sellers but also for buyers. For example, standards
28Both allocative efficiency and productive efficiency constitute the so-called static efficiency. See
Massimo Motta, Competition Policy. Theory and Practice (Cambridge University Press 2004)
45–55; Robert H Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself (New York: Basic
Books 1978, reprinted with a new Introduction and Epilogue 1993) 90–91.
29See Emanuelson Anna, ‘Standardization Agreements in the Context of the New Horizontal
Guidelines’ (2012) 33 ECLR 69. However, in theory it has also been recognized that:
[w]hen asked to examine a restrictive agreement or a merger, the test to be performed by
competition authorities essentially amounts to determining whether the negative effects of
the agreement/transaction on competition is more than compensated by ‘efficiencies’ taking
the form of the production of new and/or better products, the realization of economies of
scale or scope etc. Such a balancing test will not necessarily be easy as parties to a
proceeding will generally try to inflate the ‘negative’ or ‘positive’ effects of the agreement/
merger in question.
See Damien Geradin, ‘Efficiency Claims in EC Competition Law and Sector Specific
Regulation’ (Comparative Competition Law—Whose Regulation, Which Regulation? Workshop
Florence, 12 and 13 November 2004) 1.
30Regarding this issue, see indicatively Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The
Four Freedoms (3rd edn, OUP 2010) 14–17.
31This point of view is close enough to the point of view of a large part of Post-Chicago school,
which considers efficiency as one of the purposes of antitrust, but not the only one. See, for
instance, Eleanor M Fox, ‘The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium’ (1981) 66
CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1152, 1154; Robert Pitofsky, ‘The Political Content of Antitrust’
(1979) 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1057. A contrario, ‘The fundamental Chicago view is that the
pursuit of efficiency, by which is meant allocative efficiency as defined by the market, should be
the sole goal of antitrust’. See Alison Jones & Brenda Sufrin, EC Competition Law (Text, cases
and materials) (2nd edn, OUP 2004) 22; Eleanor M Fox and Lawrence A Sullivan, ‘Antitrust—
Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?’ (1987) 62
New York Univ. LR 936, 956–959.
32Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines (n 5), para 308.
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regarding safety, quality or/and environmental aspects of a product (a ship, for
instance) may also facilitate consumers’ choice and can lead to increased product
quality. Furthermore, standards play a significant role for innovation (it is about the
so-called dynamic efficiency). According to the Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines
paras 308 and 309, these standards:
can reduce the time it takes to bring a new technology to the market and facilitate inno-
vation by allowing undertakings to build on top of agreed solutions. To achieve those
efficiency gains in the case of standardization agreements, the information necessary to
apply the standard must be effectively available to those potentially wishing to enter the
market.
In this regard, the Commission’s Decision in Case IV/31.458, X/Open Group is
characteristic: ‘The Commission considers that the willingness of the Group to
make available the results as quickly as possible is an essential element in its
decision to grant an exemption’.33
It is useful to be clarified that dissemination of a standard may be enforced by
marks or logos which certify compliance thereby providing the demanded certainty
to customers. However, agreements for testing and certification go beyond the
primary objective of defining the standard; this is the reason why they usually
constitute a distinct, separate paragraph not only agreement but also market.34
From the above-mentioned analysis, it is clear that the effects on innovation
ought to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, there is rebuttable
presumption that standards creating compatibility on a horizontal level between
different technology platforms are considered to be likely to give rise to efficiency
gains.35
2.3 Main Provisions in the Commission Notice Guidelines
on the Application of Article 101 TFEU to Technology
Transfer Agreements36
2.3.1 The Principle of Union Exhaustion
According to the Commission Notice Guidelines on the Application of Article 101
TFEU to technology transfer agreements,37 IP laws give exclusive rights on holders
33X/Open Group (n 20), para 42.
34Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines (n 5), para 310.
35See Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines (n 5), para 311.
36Commission Notice Guidelines on the Application of Article 101 TFEU to Technology Transfer
Agreements, (2014/C 89/03) (Application of Article 101 TFEU to TTA).
37ibid, para 5.
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of patents, copyrights, design rights, trademarks and other legally protected rights.
The owner of IP is protected under IP laws that prevent its unauthorized use and
exploitation, for instance, by licensing it to third parties. However, according to the
principle of Union exhaustion,38 once a product incorporating an IPR, with the
exception of performance rights (rental rights are also included39), has been put on
the market inside the European Economic Area (EEA) by the holder or with its
approval, the IPR is exhausted in the sense that the holder can no longer use it to
control the sale of the product. This principle of Union exhaustion is for instance
enclosed in Article 7 para 1 of Directive 2008/95/EC to approximate the laws of the
Member States relating to trademarks,40 according to its provision, the trademark
shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in relation to goods which have
been put on the market in the Union under that trademark by the proprietor or with
its approval. The same principle is also enshrined in Article 4 para 2 of Directive
2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the
legal protection of computer programs41 where there is the provision that the first
sale in the Union of a copy of a program by the right holder or with its approval will
exhaust the distribution right within the Union of that copy (except for the right to
control further rental of the program or a copy thereof).42 The holder of an IPR has
no right under IP laws to prevent sales by licensees or buyers of such products
incorporating the licensed technology. Against the backdrop of this rule, the
principle of Union exhaustion is considered compatible with the essential function
of IPRs, which is to grant the holder the right to exclude others from exploiting its
IP without its consent.43
38It is about one of the main principles in the EU. According to the Court of the European Union:
[…] it must be recalled that the objective of the principle of the exhaustion of the right of
distribution of works protected by copyright is, in order to avoid partitioning of markets, to
limit restrictions of the distribution of those works to what is necessary to safeguard the
specific subject-matter of the intellectual property concerned.
See, C-128/11UsedSoft GmbH v Oracle International Corp. [2012] ECR 407, para 62. See also to
that effect, Case C-200/96 Metronome Musik [1998] ECR I-1953, para 14; Case C-61/97 FDV
[1998] ECR I-5171, para 13; and Case C-403/08 Football Association Premier League and Others
[2011] ECR I-9083, para 106.
39In this respect, see Case 158/86 Warner Brothers and Metronome Video [1988] ECR 2605; Case
C-61/97 Foreningen af danske videogramdistributører [1998] ECR I-5171.
40OJ L 299, 8 November 2008, para 25.
41OJ L 111, 5 May 2009, para 16.
42See in this respect UsedSoft GmbH (n 38).
43Application of Article 101 TFEU to TTA, para 6.
30 N. E. Zevgolis
2.3.2 No Immunity from Competition Law Intervention
In general, it is acceptable that IP laws grant exclusive rights of exploitation.44
Nevertheless, this fact does not entail that IPRs enjoy a kind of immunity from
competition law intervention. The application of Article 101 TFEU is possible
regarding agreements whereby the holder licenses another undertaking to exploit its
IPRs.45 ‘Nor does it imply that there is an inherent conflict between IPRs and the
Union competition rules’.46 In reality, both bodies of law have the same twofold
basic objective: on the one hand promoting consumer welfare and on the other hand
an efficient allocation of resources. Innovation constitutes perhaps the most
essential and dynamic component of an open and competitive market economy.
Dynamic competition is promoted by IPRs, since undertakings are encouraged to
invest in developing new or improved products and processes. Competition is the
main factor that creates conditions of pressure on undertakings to innovate. This is
the reason why, both IPRs and competition are important for promoting innovation
and ensuring a competitive exploitation thereof.
For the assessment of license agreements under Article 101 TFEU it must be
kept in mind that the creation of IPRs often requires substantial investment, and that
all rarely constitutes a risky effort with serious sunk costs. In order not to reduce
dynamic competition and to maintain the incentive to innovate, the innovator must
not be improperly restricted regarding the exploitation of IPRs that turn out to be
valuable. For the abovementioned reasons the innovator ought to be free to seek
appropriate financial remuneration for successful projects which is sufficient to
maintain investment incentives, taking also failed projects into account.
Furthermore, technology rights licensing may require the licensee to make signif-
icant sunk costs in the licensed technology and production assets necessary to
exploit it. Sunk costs mean that in case that the licensee leaves that particular field
of activity, the investment cannot be used by the licensee for other activities or sold
other than at a significant loss. Article 101 TFEU cannot be applied without taking
into account such ex-ante investments made by the parties and the risks relating to
it. The risk that the parties face and the sunk cost that ought to be committed may
thus lead to the agreement falling outside the scope of Article 101 para 1 TFEU or
fulfilling the conditions of Article 101 para 3 TFEU, as the case may be, for the
period of time required to recover the investment.
44At this point, a necessary clarification ought to be made: in US antitrust law, monopolization
constitutes an offense. On the contrary, under EU competition law, monopolization does not
constitute an offense. ‘The plain language of Article [102 TFEU] makes it clear that it only
prohibits abuses of a dominant position. Thus, Article [102 TFEU] does not condemn conduct
aimed at acquiring market power and leading to the creation of a dominant position, even if such
conduct is successful.’ See Geradin Damien, ‘Pricing Abuses by Essential Patent Holders in a
Standard-Setting Context: A View from Europe’ (2009–2010) 76 Antitrust LJ 329, 346.
45See for instance Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig [1966] ECR 429.
46Application of Article 101 TFEU to TTA, para 7.
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According to the Commission Notice Guidelines on the Application of Article
101 TFEU to technology transfer agreements,47 in assessing licensing agreements
under Article 101 TFEU, ‘the existing analytical framework is sufficiently flexible
to take due account of the dynamic aspects of technology rights licensing’.
A presumption that IPRs and license agreements as such give rise to competition
concerns simply does not exist. More specifically, ‘most license agreements do not
restrict competition and create pro-competitive efficiencies’.48 The truth is that
licensing as such is pro-competitive, because it leads to dissemination of technology
and promotes innovation by the licensor and the licensee(s). Furthermore, license
agreements that restrict competition may often give rise to pro-competitive effi-
ciencies, which must be assessed under Article 101 para 3 TFEU and balanced
against the negative effects on competition.49 This is the reason why the great
majority of license agreements are compatible with Article 101 TFEU.
2.4 The Necessity of Considering the Guidance in Applying
Article [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct
by Dominant Undertakings50
Both the above-mentioned Guidelines (about Horizontal Cooperation and
Technology Transfer) ought to be read and analysed together with the content of the
Guidance in Applying Article [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by
Dominant Undertakings. According to this last Guidance about abuse of domi-
nance, the (basic) aim of the Commission’s enforcement activity is to ensure that
dominant undertakings do not impair effective competition by foreclosing their
competitors in an anticompetitive way.
47ibid, para 9.
48ibid.
49Commission Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, OJ C 101, 27 April
2004, 97. See also Geradin (n 1), quoting the following:
When asked to examine a restrictive agreement or a merger, the test to be performed by
competition authorities essentially amounts to determining whether the negative effects of
the agreement/transaction on competition is more than compensated by ‘efficiencies’ taking
the form of the production of new and/or better products, the realization of economies of
scale or scope etc. Such a balancing test will not necessarily be easy as parties to a
proceeding will generally try to inflate the ‘negative’ or ‘positive’ effects of the agreement/
merger in question.
50Abusive Exclusionary Conduct (n 12), 7–20.
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However, according to the Guidance in Applying Article [102 TFEU] to
Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, para 7:
conduct which is directly exploitative of consumers, for example charging excessively high
prices or including certain behavior that undermines the efforts to achieve an integrated
internal market, is also liable to infringe Article [102 TFEU]. The Commission may decide
to intervene in relation to such conduct, where the protection of consumers and the proper
functioning of the internal market cannot otherwise be adequately ensured.
3 The Dynamic Relationship Between Antitrust Law
and Intellectual Property Law51
3.1 The US and EU Convergence Regarding the Exercise
of SEPs
The above-mentioned provisions show that the relationship between antitrust and IP
law is ‘law in the making’, which means that it is not something static; on the
contrary it is about something dynamic. In the Information and Communications
Technologies (ICT) industry, the exercise of SEPs constitutes the area where the
most recent developments are observed.
Furthermore, it ought to be underlined that US and EU authorities finally have
reached similar positions on the main principles governing the solution to questions
raised by the exercise of SEPs, despite the fact they started from different legal
positions.52 The truth is that several issues remain open. Courts and competition
regulators from both sides of the Atlantic have already set out guidance to the patent
holders and potential licensees with such a level of clarity that should enable them
to reach agreed solutions and further reduce the risks of patent hold-up or patent
hold-out. In EU, the principles have been set out by courts (i.e. settled or estab-
lished case law). Further, (self-binding) guidelines laid by competition regulators/
51See relatively Jean-Yves Art, ‘Competition and Intellectual Property: Friends or Foes—The Case
of SEPs’ in Raffaelli (ed), Antitrust Between EU Law and National Law (Brussels/Milan 2015)
190.
52ibid.
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watchdogs,53 has enabled both patent holders and potential licensees to achieve
workable solutions and further reduce the above-mentioned risks.54
3.2 The Commission’s Practice: The Motorola
and Samsung Decisions as Basic Examples
Regarding SEPs, in 2014 the Commission adopted two decisions. The Motorola55
and Samsung 56 decisions outlined that there should be some limits to SEP rights
precisely because of the competition context in which the standardization process
takes place. The Commission was able to act not only quickly but also effectively in
both cases on a general issue which had broader market relevance.57
Regarding Samsung, the Commission accepted binding commitments that
Samsung will not seek injunctions58 against Apple in relation to SEPs where certain
53At this point, it must be clarified that the courts decisions constitute the so-called case law. The
EC’s decisions do not constitute case law; they constitute the Commission’s practice. The
guidelines constitute the so-called soft law. However, the guidelines suffer from the disadvantage
of being nonbinding ‘and the EU institutions may change their minds on particular issues or some
issues may arise for the first time with all the attendant uncertainty’. See indicatively Vincent JG
Power, ‘European Union State Aid Law and Ports, in Philip Wareham (ed) Competition Law and
Shipping: The EMLO Guide to EU Competition Law in the Shipping and Port Industries (CMP
Publishing 2010) 269.
54As Niels Ersboll, ‘Information exchange between Competitors’ in Philip Wareham
(ed) Competition Law and Shipping: The EMLO Guide to EU Competition Law in the Shipping
and Port Industries (CMP Publishing 2010) 67:
EU Competition Law on information exchange between competitors has been developed
through the case law of the European Courts and the European Commission decisional
practice. However, the case law is sporadic and the judgements and decisions are often
highly case specific, which makes them difficult to apply across the board.
55Case AT.39985 Motorola—Enforcement of GPRS SEPs, paras 311, 322, 377, 415–420.
56Case AT.39939 Samsung Electronics-Enforcement of UMTS SEPs (2014) OJ C 350/8, para 62.
57Jorg Witting and Peter Willis, ‘European Commission closes Samsung and Motorola cases on
alleged abuse of standard essential patents’ (Bird & Bird, 7 May 2014) <https://www.twobirds.
com/en/news/articles/2014/global/commission-closes-samsung-and-motorola-cases-on-alleged-
abuse-of-standard-essential-patents> accessed 25 October 2017.
58European Commission ‘Antitrust Decisions on SEPs (SEPs)—Motorola Mobility and Samsung
Electronics—Frequently Asked Questions’ (MEMO 29 April 2014), states that:
An injunction is a court order aimed at preventing the continuation of a patent infringement.
Generally, it includes the prohibition to sell the product infringing the patent. Such
injunctions can be preliminary—as a precautionary measure typically for the time of the
assessment of the case on the merits by the court. Injunctions can also be permanent as a
result of the decision on the merits by a court.
34 N. E. Zevgolis
conditions are met. Regarding Motorola, the Commission found that this company
had infringed Article 102 TFEU by seeking and enforcing injunctions against
Apple in relation to SEPs. The Commission emphasized the importance of pro-
tecting IPRs and highlighted the exceptional nature of its intervention in these two
cases, reflecting the fact that the use of technology covered by SEPs is essential for
entry into certain markets.
At this point it ought to be underlined that although both the Samsung and
Motorola cases concerned patents essential to mobile telecommunications stan-
dards, and the decision of the Commission in both cases has the intention of
establishing more general principles, applicable to all SEPS that are crucial for the
assurance of interoperability across not only the communications and IT sectors, but
also more widely in sectors, like, for example, the maritime transports sector, the
automotive sector59 and the renewable energy, which are also characterized by
innovation and standardization.
In the above-mentioned cases, the behavior of Motorola and the behavior of
Samsung were considered abusive by the Commission for the following main
reasons: first of all, because they could result in a temporary ban on online sales of
Apple mobile products, secondly, because they could force Apple into accepting
disadvantageous terms as the price of settlement, and finally because they could
cause harm to the standard development process.
So, in few words, the purpose/effect of the settlement was that Apple’s continued
(and constant) presence in the market ought to be ensured. However, it is
remarkable that the final solution that the EC decided in these two cases as
preferable was the acceptance of binding commitments instead of the ascertainment
of abusive exploitation of a dominant position and the imposition of a high fine to
each company. Consequently, a very careful approach by the Commission is
detected and endorsed, which shows that the peculiarities of the Motorola and
Samsung cases were correctly recognized and considered as the crucial reason for
the special treatment of both companies. After the Motorola and Samsung cases, an
interesting development in European case law took place.
59Regarding this specific sector, see Shervin Pishevar, ‘Is Standardization for Autonomous Cars
Around the Corner?’ (CPI, 2017) <https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/
uploads/2017/11/9652873_2_Autonomous-Auto-Standardization-shortened.pdf>.
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3.3 Did the European Case Law Follow the Commission’s
Approach?
3.3.1 Assessment of the Case Huawei/ZTE (C-170/2013)
and Criticism60
In the Huawei v ZTE ruling the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
confirmed not only according to the Commission’s point of view,61 but also
according to a significant part of theory,62 the position of the Commission in the
Motorola and Samsung cases on two main points. The first, that SEPs are different
from other patents because of the commitments to license on FRAND terms, and
the second is that in cases where there is a company willing to take a license on
FRAND terms, ‘injunctions should be off the table’.63
However, even if the judgement of the CJEU does partially or indirectly confirm
the EC's approach to the same issues in the Motorola and Samsung cases, its
approach is considered narrower,64 which means that there are still unresolved
issues.65 Furthermore, there is a part in theory which gives the impression that it is
even more severe against the Commission’s approach in theMotorola and Samsung
cases,66 considering that even before the Huawei/ZTE judgement, it was doubtful
whether the Commission’s actions in the Motorola and Samsung cases were con-
sistent with its own enforcement guidance (about the application of Article [102
60See indicatively, Björn Lundqvist, ‘The Interface between EU Competition Law and SEPs—
from Orange-Book-Standard to the Huawei Case’ (2015) 11 ECJ 367, 368.
61See also Commissioner Vestager, ‘Intellectual Property and Competition’ (19th IBA
Competition Conference, Florence, 11 September 2015) <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/
commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/intellectual-property-and-competition_en>.
62‘Huawei (indirectly) confirms the previous practice of the European Commission’. See Andreas
Heinemann, ‘Standard Essential Patents in Standard Setting Organizations: Competition Law and
the Realization of Licensing Commitments’ (2015) 10 JIPLP 947, 950.
63The CJEU placed remarkable emphasis ‘on the finding that actions for patent infringement are
not in breach of Article 102 TFEU provided certain requirements are met’. See Heinemann (n 62)
950.
64‘[M]ore in line with that established in the CJEU's so-called essential facilities case law’. See
Sean-Paul Brankin, Salome Cisnal de Ugarte and Lisa Kimmel, ‘Huawei: Injunctions and SEPs—
Is Exclusion a Foregone Conclusion?’ (2015–2016) 30(1) Antitrust 80; See also, Peter Picht
quotes in a literary way that ‘the ECJ’s ‘middle path’ needs to get broader and more discernible in
order not to become a slippery slope’. Peter (n 4) 375.
65See Sean-Paul Brankin, Salome Cisnal de Ugarte and Lisa Kimmel, ‘Huawei/ZTE: Towards a
More Demanding Standard of Abuse in Essential Patent Cases’ (2016) 7 JECLAP 520. See also
Lundqvist (n 60) 389, 391, who quotes that ‘[t]he ECJ, by drafting the procedure so narrowly,
strongly encourages the parties to settle the dispute quickly’.
66See Brankin (n 64).
36 N. E. Zevgolis
TFEU]). For the reasons that were analyzed above in 2.4 of this chapter,67 this
approach may be considered as undue; the self-binding Guidance of the
Commission in Applying Article [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by
Dominant Undertakings cannot be interpreted in such a narrow sense, according to
which, the intervention of the Commission would be excused only in cases of
anticompetitive foreclosure of competitors. In such a scenario, excessive pricing
cases, for instance, would be excluded from the Commission’s abuse of dominance
‘radar’.68
More specifically, according to para 42 of the Huawei v ZTE judgement: ‘[t]he
court must strike a balance between maintaining free competition […] and the
requirement to safeguard that proprietor’s IPRs and its right to effective judicial
protection’. The court should strike not just a balance, but also the right balance.
So, the honest effort made to establish a fair balance between patent law and
competition law is demonstrated by the CJEU in the Huawei v ZTE case.69
Perhaps, there is some doubt about the CJEU’s intent with regard to the higher
foreclosure standard in Magill and the so-called essential facilities cases that fol-
lowed on from Magill by the statement earlier in the CJEU’s judgement that ‘it
67See Abusive Exclusionary Conduct (n 12), para 7.
68Regarding this issue, see ‘The Right Price for Intellectual Property Rights: The Debate
Continues’ (Oxera, October 2017). See also the Case C-177/16 AKKA/LAA v Konkurences
padome ECLI:EU:C:2017: 689. In this case the CEU (ex ECJ) concluded—amongst others—the
following:
1. Trade between Member States is capable of being affected by the level of rates set by a
copyright management organisation that holds a monopoly and also manages the rights of
foreign copyright holders, with the result that Article 102 TFEU may be applicable.
2. For the purposes of examining whether a copyright management organisation applies unfair
prices within the meaning of point (a) of the second paragraph of Article 102 TFEU, it is
appropriate to compare its rates with those applicable in neighbouring Member States as well
as with those applicable in other Member States adjusted in accordance with the PPP index,
provided that the reference Member States have been selected in accordance with objective,
appropriate and verifiable criteria and that the comparisons are made on a consistent basis. It is
permissible to compare the rates charged in one or several specific user segments if there are
indications that the excessive nature of the fees affects those segments.
3. The difference between the rates compared must be regarded as appreciable if that difference is
significant and persistent. Such a difference is indicative of abuse of a dominant position and it
is for the copyright management organisation holding a dominant position to show that its
prices are fair by reference to objective factors that have an impact on management expenses or
the remuneration of right holders.
69Paras 42, 52, 53 and 73 are considered as crucial paragraphs of the decision Huawei v ZTE.
However, according to Brankin and others para 73 is a key paragraph. It should be mentioned that
in this paragraph the CJEU expressly adopted a narrower, and exclusionary, analysis of abuse.
Brankin (n 64), para 73.
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must be pointed out, as the Advocate General has observed in point 70 of his
Opinion, that the particular circumstances of the case in the main proceedings
distinguish that case from [the Magill case law]’.70 Nevertheless, the CJEU had no
real intention of distinguishing these cases completely. In para 70 of his Opinion, to
which the CJEU refers, AG Wathelet expressly stated that the Magill case law
remains ‘partially relevant’. In this context, it must be acceptable that, as in the
refusal to supply cases, SEP cases involve—as the CJEU specifically recognized—a
delicate balancing of competing rights and interests. As Andreas Heinemann
pointed out correctly in his final remarks,
[t]he Huawei judgement of the CJEU provides new guidance for the relationship between
intellectual property law and competition law. It clarifies that a solution conducive to
innovation cannot be achieved by protecting intellectual property rights against competition
law, but, rather, only by embracing the complementary nature of both areas of law.71
3.3.2 Results and Consequences of the CJEU’s Decision in Huawei/
ZTE Case
The success story of the Huawei v ZTE judgement is constituted on successfully
balancing the bargaining powers between owners of so-called ‘SEP owners’ and
producers of smart phones and other telecommunications devices relying upon
these patents. As Torsten Körber quoted:
[t]he ECJ’s judgement in Huawei v ZTE marked the outcome of an important battle in the
so-called ‘patent wars’ between the makers of smart phones and other telecommunications
equipment. In its judgement, the ECJ balanced the bargaining powers between owners of
so-called ‘standard essential patents’ (‘SEP owners’) and makers of smart phones and other
telecommunications devices relying upon these patents (‘makers’).72
The truth is that the CJEU in its Huawei v ZTE was extremely prudent and made
very careful steps. However, the potential consequence of the ECJ’s judgement in
Huawei v ZTE is that in the future, SEP owners who bring abusive actions against
good faith licensees cannot count on a lack of severity because the European Court of
70Case C-170/13 Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v ZTE Corp. EU:C:2015:477, para 48.
71Heinemann (n 62) 952.
72Torsten Körber, ‘Abuse of a Dominant Position by Legal Actions of Owners of Standard
essential Patents: Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v ZTE Corp.’ (2016) 53 CML Rev. 1107.
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Justice (ECJ) has already clarified the SEP owners’ obligations under Article 102
TFEU in this specific judgement of preliminary ruling, according to Article 267
TFEU. In any case, the CJEU decision in the Huawei v ZTE case constitutes a ‘road-
map’ for FRAND cases.73
3.3.3 Unanswered Questions
The CJEU did not answer the question whether SEP owners enjoy a dominant
position per se, despite the fact that the Advocate General (Melchior Wathelet) had
questioned a per se assumption.74 Nevertheless, according to a rebuttable pre-
sumption, in practice SEP owners are almost always dominant.
The CJEU based the licensing obligation of the SEP owner (as well as the
compulsory licensing defense of the alleged infringer) on both Article 102 TFEU
and the FRAND commitment. This leaves room for the question whether the
Huawei v ZTE decision also applies to cases in which the SEP owner is not bound
by a FRAND commitment (for example, in the case that the SEP owner has
acquired the SEP from the original owner without submitting to the FRAND
commitment). It is doubtful whether the answer to this question could be affirma-
tive.75 Perhaps, this will be one of the issues that the forthcoming Guidelines
prepared by the EC are going to clarify.76
The CJEU distinguished the facts of the Huawei v ZTE case (a SEP situation)
from those of the German Orange Book-Standard case (non-SEP situation). So, a
crucial question is whether the test applied in Huawei v ZTE case can still be
applied to non-SEP cases. Making use of the teachings of a de facto standard (like
in the German case) can be as indispensable for market access as making use of a
SEP (like in the Huawei v ZTE case). If the requirements of the Magill decision77
73Heinemann (n 62).
74Advocate General’s Opinion in Huawei Technologies (n 70), paras 57–58.
75According to Hanns Ullrich ‘FRAND terms are not a single, uniform set, but a framework
providing for a range’. Hanns Ullrich ‘FRAND Access to Open Standards and the Patent
Exclusivity: Restating the Principles’ (Concurrences No. 2, 2017) para 44.
76See the last part of this chapter.
77Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) & Independent Television
Publication Ltd (ITP) v Commission [1995] ECR I-743, [1995] 4 CMLR 718, [1995] 1 CEC 400.
For instance, in the Magill case the ECJ stated that: ‘the refusal by the owner of an exclusive right
to grant a licence, even if it is an act of an undertaking holding a dominant position, cannot in itself
be abuse of a dominant position’. Nevertheless, the ECJ pointed out that ‘the exercise of an
exclusive right by the proprietor may, in exceptional circumstances, involve abusive conduct’.
Such exceptional circumstances may occur where the refusal to license cannot be objectively
justified and would eliminate all competition in a downstream market for a new product not offered
by the owner of the IPR for which there is customer demand. See George Karydis and Nikolaos
Zevgolis, ‘Regulation 1400/2002 and Access to Technical Information: Necessity of Convergent
Interpretation With the Principles Established by the Relevant Case Law’ 2009) 30 ECLR 95, 100,
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are fulfilled, the owner of an indispensable IPR (either it is a SEP or a non-essential
patent) is under a licensing obligation due to Article 102 TFEU. Hence, in principle,
the same rules (i.e. the Huawei v ZTE test) could be applied.
The CJEU did not clarify the meaning of ‘FRAND’. The court left this task to
the parties which may request the help of a court or an arbitration panel. This
appears to be correct in principle, because general rules regarding the very diverse
and dynamic telecommunications sector, for example, is not realistic to find.78 This
is the reason why the author’s hope is that this issue will not be one of the issues
that the forthcoming Guidelines prepared by the EC are going to clarify.79
It ought to be mentioned that some lower German patent courts seem to somehow
ignore the CJEU’s Huawei v ZTE decision; these courts still seem to be somewhat
reluctant to rethink their traditional lines of reasoning (which are IPR-holder
friendly).80 Nevertheless, according to Regulation 1/2003, the national courts are
bound by the ECJ’s interpretation of Article 102 TFEU (and Article 101 TFEU).
4 Conclusion: The Forthcoming Guidance—Should We
Expect Undesirable Surprises?
Everybody who is involved in the issue about the interaction between IP Law and
Competition Law accepts that consumers must gain access to a wide range of
innovative and creative goods and services at reasonable prices. The relevant—and
mainly the recent—case law, seems that it satisfies the need for predictability. In
any case, the undisputable truth is that competition policy and IP policy ought to
‘work hand in glove in order to promote economic growth’.81
Due to the Huawei v ZTE judgement, the successful effort made by the CJEU to
establish a fair balance between patent law and competition law is demonstrated
with emphasis. It is characteristic and indicative that in Japan, for example, the
specific judgement was used in order to create relevant Guidelines.82 However, in
quoting that ‘[…] it should be underlined that, according to the ECJ’s judgement in its Magill
decision (para 34), as regards the application of Article 82 in the case of a refusal to deal,
intellectual property rights ought to be treated in a different way from other property rights’.
78Art (n 51) 185.
79See the last part of this chapter.
80Korber (n 72) 1110.
81Commissioner Vestager, ‘Intellectual Property and Competition’ (19th IBA Competition
Conference, Florence, 11 September 2015).
82Toshiaki Takigawa, ‘Antitrust Perspectives from Japan’ (2nd International Conference on
Standardization, Patents and Competition Issues: Perspectives from Asia Pacific region and
Europe, New Delhi, 10 and 11 June 2017).
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April 2017, the Commission indicated it might publish a formal policy document in
order to clarify the rules on patent ownership and licensing. Any guidance by the
Commission ought to build on the Huawei v ZTE judgement and must not
undermine it.
According to unconfirmed information, an EU ‘guidance’ document on how
companies can manage the licensing of technology to connect devices to the
internet was expected before the end of 2017. It would be about a document that
would try to balance the interests of companies that license patents (for example,
Ericsson, Nokia and Qualcomm) with those that use the patents to create
Internet-connected products. ‘There have been ongoing debates on all different kind
of levels on how to strike a balance between providers and implementers, to ensure
that all sides feel there is a level playing field where certain basic rules are
shared’.83 However, the publication of the Commission’s Notice (or Guidelines?)
has already been delayed for several reasons because there were different views in
the Commission itself, i.e. between the internal divisions involved. Furthermore,
there was a significant interest and reaction from the industry, which was concerned
that its point of view was not sufficiently considered. Opposing interests are present
in the case examined: the undisputable truth is that patent owners are seeking to
continue the current licensing model, ‘which allows them to license to the ‘end
user,’ such as smartphone makers’.84 On the other hand, device manufacturers have
the intention of accessing 5G technology through components set inside their
products, without being obliged to license the technology. One of the
Commission’s main concerns is that the next generation of technology ought to be
available also for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). This is the challenge
that the Commission faces: the diffusion of technology should really take place
throughout the value chain. For now, unfortunately it seems that SMEs are not able
to really find their way, without the Commission’s help. However, in general, the
European policy about the SMEs is considered quite protective. Therefore, in
combination with the ‘rulings’ by the ECJ in its Huawei v ZTE judgement and also
several competition cases involving SEPs, it is considered that ‘a certain ‘holistic’
vision’, constitutes a desideratum in the debate in process over licensing.85 The
good news is that the waters are not unchartered, the already existing case law
combined with the relevant soft law and practice created by the EC simply confirms
this point.
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83See Matthew Newman, ‘EU IP Document Will Balance Interests of Tech Companies With
Those of License Holders’ (Mlex Market Insight, 25 September 2017).
84ibid.
85Antti Peltomäki stated that ‘If we are able to tie the knots, and if we are able to give a certain
kind of map and tools for you to play, then we've done our job’. Antti Peltomäki, ‘Keynote
Address’ (LeadershIP EU, Brussels, 25 September 2017).
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Chapter 3
The Relevance of Standardization
in a Future Competitive India
and the Role of Policy Makers, Antitrust
Authorities and Courts to Promote it
Sheetal Chopra, Matteo Sabattini and Dina Kallay
1 Introduction
Knowledge driven economies have understood the importance of Intellectual Property
(IP) and its role towards inclusive development of nations. Worldwide, countries
continue to evolve their Intellectual Property Right (IPR) laws to best suit their
country’s socio-economic needs. The common theme in this evolutionary process is
implementation of measures that can promote commercialization of IP. It is understood
that globally less than 5% of patents are commercialized. Reasons for such low
commercialization rate can stem from any of the following: patents were strategically
filed for defensive purposes, the right holders do not have sufficient wherewithal to
have their patents commercialized, or sectoral constraints exist.1
The Information and Communications Technology (ICT) sector offers numerous
examples of voluntary, industry-led efforts that have addressed the issue of com-
mercialization. One notable example is represented by patented standardized
technologies, where standard essential patents (SEPs) are made ‘available and
accessible’ through licensing on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND)
terms and conditions. FRAND commitment ensures that the patented technologies
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adoption is guaranteed and encouraged. The benefits to consumers that the ICT
industry has achieved in recent years and the emergence of the ‘networked society’
are testaments to the efficiencies and enormous consumer welfare created by the
FRAND licensing regime. Due to FRAND the ICT industry has witnessed, among
other efficiencies, increased competition, availability of products at falling, com-
petitive prices, removal of market entry barriers and induced direct and indirect
network effects.2 Almost eight billion subscription base globally (equivalent to
world’s population) and over 400 mobile phone manufacturers worldwide testify
the efficacy and dynamism of the FRAND licensing model, that thus deserves a
‘hand of blessing’ and not an ‘eye of suspicion’.3
As recognized by antitrust authorities, technology providers who have volun-
tarily diluted exclusionary rights related to their SEPs deserve in exchange a fair
Return on Investment (ROI).4 The ROI from patent licensing serves as one of the
drivers in technological developments, especially in the ICT sector. Indeed, con-
necting millions of devices by different vendors with each other and making them
work properly together (i.e. allowing for interoperability) can only be achieved
when there are sustained efforts made in R&D and continued investments by the
broadest base of technology developers and business models.
Despite guaranteeing highly competitive markets and other societal benefits and
progress, licensing models based on FRAND are often looked upon with suspicion
by some industry members, policy makers, courts and sometimes even consumers.
Indeed, over the past few years, a number of competition agencies have shown a
keen interest in SEPs. While much of the interest has taken the form of antitrust
advocacy, rather than enforcement cases, questionable anticompetitive effects of
this focus are beginning to emerge. These include—encouraging patent infringe-
ment in violation of the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) Trade Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement principles; tilting the playing
field against market players who do not infringe; and eroding procompetitive
standardization to the detriment of consumers.
2Boston Consulting Group (BCG), ‘Mobile Technologies Create Trillion Dollar Impact’
(15 January 2015) <https://www.bcg.com/d/press/15jan2015-mobile-revolution-technologies-
trillion-dollar-impact-835>.
3See data on subscriptions, mobile networks traffic and forecast. ‘Ericsson Mobility Report’
(November 2017) 4 <https://www.ericsson.com/assets/local/mobility-report/documents/2017/
ericsson-mobility-report-november-2017.pdf>.
4The European Commission advocates in favor of ‘efficient and globally acceptable licensing
approach, which ensures a fair return on investment for standard essential patent (SEPs)
holders’; See, Commission, ‘ICT Standardization Priorities for the Digital Single Market’
COM(2016) 176 final; Also the Standard Development Organization ETSI recognizes that SEP holder
should be ‘fairly and adequately rewarded’; ETSI, ‘Essential IPRs in ETSI’ (2018) <http://www.etsi.
org/about/how-we-work/intellectual-property-rights-iprs>.
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This chapter will explore the motivations and strategies of certain stakeholders to
devalue FRAND assured essential patents. It will also address the challenges that the
ICT industry is currently facing in the background of past scepticisms from antitrust
agencies and courts. Finally, the chapter will recommend policy makers to avoid
tilting the fragile balance between technology providers and technology imple-
menters which is achieved through FRAND licensing. An imbalance of interests
could, otherwise, potentially affect the innovation cycle, reduce investments in R&D,
and favor proprietary solutions as opposed to interoperable, standardized options.
2 Mobile Communications
Mobile phones have become part of our day to day life and, for some people, they
are now an indispensable product. To create our smartphones has been a burden-
some exercise. A brick-sized phone was developed three decades ago.5 Back in the
early 1980s, it took more than a decade to get a wireline connection in India and
still a phone could not connect globally. Today, cellular technology connects seven
billion6 people, equivalent to the world’s population.
Technological revolution across various generations of cellular technology (1G,
2G, 3G, 4G) in terms of speed and performance has tremendously empowered
every sector of society. Standardization has enabled telecom capacities, aesthetics,
and solved problems such as roaming, network efficiency, voice quality, speeds,
performance, data delivery along with voice communication etc. While 1G and 2G
standards focused more on enhancing voice quality (voice calls) and messaging, 3G
and 4G standards focused more on data rates and video streaming (data calls).
Thanks to 3G or 4G networks data speeds were significantly increased. In fact,
mobile data transmission speed over 4G is 12,000 times faster7 than with 2G
networks, thus enabling streaming of a 90 mins video in just 90 secs over 4G, as
against 72 hrs over 2G. Enhanced disruptive competition in the market has further
acted as highly profitable to consumers with some operators having slashed the data
rates by more than 60%.8
5Justus Baron, Kirti Gupta and Brandon Roberts, ‘Unpacking 3GPP Standards’ (Searle Centre,
March 2015) <https://www.law.northwestern.edu/researchfaculty/searlecenter/innovationecono
mics/documents/Baron_Gupta_Unpacking_3gpp_Standards.pdf>.
6‘Global Mobile Subscriber Surpass 7 Billion’ (TeleGeography, 28 July 2015) <https://www.
telegeography.com/press/press-releases/2015/07/28/global-mobile-subscribers-surpass-7-billion/
index.html> accessed 24 August 2017.
7BCG (n 2).
8Kalyan Parbat, ‘Reliance Jio’s aggressive rates to shake up industry: Experts’ Economic Times (5
September 2016) <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/54009228.cms?utm_source=
contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst> accessed 24 August 2017.
3 The Relevance of Standardization in a Future Competitive India … 45
2.1 Complex Telecom System: Air-Interface and Backhaul
We all, as consumers, can use our mobile phones with great convenience. To make
this happen, however, there is a complex mesh of networks in the background (also
termed as ‘backhaul’), that is set up to take care of varying consumer’s needs.
The figure below offers a glimpse of the variety of components involved to
complete a connection that is almost real time (Fig. 1).
The figure above offers some insight into how a voice or a data call (Call) is
routed following complex procedures including surpassing unlimited hurdles that
fall in the journey of a call such as physical constraints like trees, buildings, thick
walls, basements etc.
a. An air-interface: An air-interface refers to establishing a connection between a
mobile phone and the Cell Tower (BTS-A base station, that receives and
transmits signals),9 as shown in below figure where the communication happens
over the air (Fig. 2).
This refers to a communication over the air between the handset and the tower
(radio access) with the help of radio waves. Allocation of the spectrum (relevant
frequency bands) is essential to make this air-interface successful.10 This radio
interface must be fully defined so that there is compatibility between mobile
Fig. 1 Cellular network (2G and 3G), Nanocell. (NanoCell Networks Pvt Ltd is an organization
with focus on delivering telecom training solutions)
9‘Definition: Base Station’ (Techtarget) <http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/base-station>
accessed 24 August 2017.
10As the EC explains ‘[r]adio spectrum is the basis for wireless communications like Wi-Fi or
mobile phones, but is also key to areas like transport, broadcasting, public safety, research,
environmental protection, and energy’; See European Commission, ‘What is Radio Spectrum
Policy?’ <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/what-radio-spectrum-policy>.
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stations and networks. Complex technologies are involved to ensure that net-
works and handsets from different manufacturers interact with each other in an
efficient manner.
b. Backhaul (Core Network): A backhaul11 generally refers to the entire set of
multistep processes that is followed to ensure that a call (voice or data12)
becomes successful. Once the base station receives signals (voice or data call-
ing) from a user, it transmits this data in packets to core network (also known as
backhaul) mostly through wired networks13 such as ethernets/cables. Once the
base station tower sends signals to core networks, it then authenticates the user,
passes billing information, data to be transmitted (voice or information), checks
what network resources should be allocated to a user such as bandwidth, call
routing to a destination etc.
In the backhaul, there are multiple equipments that render important functions,
few of those include HLR (Home Location Register), VLR (Visitor Location
Register), EIR (Equipment Identity Register), Authentication Centre, GMSC
Fig. 2 An air interface
11‘Backhaul Basics, A Definition Network Experts Define Backhaul Networks’ (RCR Wireless
News, 13 May 2014) <https://www.rcrwireless.com/20140513/network-infrastructure/backhaul-
network-definitions-cellular-backhaul-definition> accessed 24 August 2017.
12Data calling includes videos, web browsing, information access etc.
13However, maintaining extensive wired network is impossible due to several constraints (pro-
cessing delays due to multiple relays, environmental challenges such as faced in maintaining
sub-marine cables etc.).
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(Gateway Mobile Switching Centre), GGSN14 (Gateway General Packet Radio
Service (GPRS)) Support Node, which is like a ‘gatekeeper’ that interconnects
between GPRS system and internet), SGSN15 (Serving GPRS Support Node
which authenticates user for voice traffic for GPRS (2G) mobiles) etc.
Few important things that are required for call (data and/or voice) transmission
include:
• Spectrum and Radio frequencies (Broadband)
To understand it better, consider broadband is like a road/highways/railway
tracks and as a vehicle (like an aircraft/car/ship/train) as different Radio
frequencies.
• Data (voice or information)
As an analogy, consider passengers as ‘Data’ that is carried by over-allocated
frequencies (car/aircraft/ship/cycle/train) in the available scarce spectrum (road/
tracks/highways). Data can be a voice or information like videos/files etc.
• Standardized technologies
Evolution in telecommunication technologies ensures how to best utilize the
existing scarce spectrum that is available in nature and is a non-renewable source.
As an analogy, technological development increases capacity of a vehicle to carry
more passengers. Consider a car that can carry only five passengers (i.e. ‘data’)
maximum. Technology enhances the capacity of this car (by making changes in
sitting arrangement, or including new seats at the back, joining seats) to now carry
more than let’s say, seven passengers. Further, consider that there are many cars
carrying set of passengers on road, then the technology will ensure that there is less
traffic congestion by building up subways and highways etc.
3 Benefits of Standardization
Globally, only a handful of companies are the major technology contributors to
cellular standards, as shown in the graph below, by contributing to the global
standardization ecosystem through an open and collaborative innovation framework
(Fig. 3).
14GGSN is a router to subnetworks. GGSN plays a critical role in network protection, security,
quality of service (QoS) enforcement, and interaction with charging and billing systems. ‘Cisco
GGSN Gateway GPRS Support Node: Connectivity for the UMTS/HSPA Packet Core’ (Cisco, 25
June 2010) <https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/collateral/wireless/asr-5000-series/data_
sheet_c78-607120.html> accessed 13 November 2017.
15It is the service access point for GPRS network and authenticates user for voice data for GPRS
mobiles. Once authentication is complete, SGSN registers mobile on GPRS network, ‘SGSN’
(Telecom ABC) <http://www.telecomabc.com/s/sgsn.html> accessed 13 November 2017.
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Technology providers voluntarily decide to make standardized patented tech-
nologies available and accessible to everyone at FRAND terms and conditions
subject to balanced and harmonized IPR policies of Standard Development
Organizations (SDOs). Thanks to standardization the telecommunication sector has
enabled turn-over of three trillion USD and generated 11 million jobs.16 At a global
scale, standardization has also enabled development of over 2.2 million mobile
applications17; the total number of phone calls made per day is over 10 billion
(2013 data)18; number of text messages sent per day is 18.7 billion (2014 data)19;
data generated per day is 2.5 exabytes or 2.5 quintillion bytes (2016 data)20 and
Fig. 3 Total contributions for the top ten industry players (Source All research)
16Julio Bezerra and others, ‘The Mobile Revolution and How Mobile Technologies Derive
Trillion-Dollar Economy’ (BCG, 15 January 2015) <https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/
articles/telecommunications_technology_business_transformation_mobile_revolution/>.
17‘Number of apps available in leading app stores as of March 2017’ (Statista) <https://www.
statista.com/statistics/276623/number-of-apps-available-in-leading-app-stores/>.
18Roberto Romano, ‘3 Billion Phone Calls Made in US Every Day’ (Texas Insider, 18 June 2013)
<http://www.texasinsider.org/3-billion-phone-calls-made-in-us-every-day/>.
19Kenneth Burke, ‘How Many Texts Do People Send Every Day?’ (Text Request, 18 May 2016)
<https://www.textrequest.com/blog/many-texts-people-send-per-day/>.
20Mikal Khoso, ‘How Much Data is Produced Every Day?’(Level: Northeastern University New
Ventures, 13 May 2016) <http://www.northeastern.edu/levelblog/2016/05/13/how-much-data-
produced-every-day/>; ‘How Much Data Does The World Generate Every Minute?’
(IFLSCIENCE, 2017) <http://www.iflscience.com/technology/how-much-data-does-the-world-
generate-every-minute/>.
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e-commerce revenue generates 1.2 million dollars every 30 secs (2015 data).21 It is
expected that close to 160 zeta bytes of data will be generated by 2025 (Fig. 4).22
While global standardization and FRAND licensing have been recognized as the
reason for this development, unwilling licensees continue to disturb the global
standardization framework by indulging in delaying tactics.23 Such unwilling
licensees also gain a competitive advantage over those licensees that are diligently
signing up FRAND licensing agreements.
4 Good Faith Negotiations v Hold-out Behavior:
Recent Case-Law
Standards allow for open collaborative innovation framework, technology sharing by
licensing and increased competition in the market, leading to, high performance
interoperable devices, at competitive prices. Thus standards are key to inclusive
development for any nation. An efficient and balanced IP regime ensures that
innovation cycle and long-term public interest are safeguarded. Thus, worldwide
judiciaries and policy makers aim to strike a balance between the need to compensate
IP owners on the one hand, and to successfully implement standards on the other.
Fig. 4 Forecasted data created per year. (David Reinsel, John Gantz and John Rydning, ‘Data
Age 2025: The Evolution of Data to Life-Critical Don’t Focus on Big Data; Focus on the Data
That’s Big’ (IDC White Paper, 2017) <https://www.seagate.com/www-content/our-story/trends/
files/Seagate-WP-DataAge2025-March-2017.pdf>)
21‘E-commerce Generates $1.2 million Revenue Every 30 secs: Study’ (Gadget News, 19 August
2015) <http://www.gadgetsnow.com/tech-news/E-commerce-generates-1-2-million-revenue-
every-30-secondsStudy/articleshow/48543392.cms>.
22‘Total WW Data to Reach 163ZB by 2025: Ten Times More Than Today’ (Storage Newsletter,
March 2017) <https://www.storagenewsletter.com/2017/04/05/total-ww-data-to-reach-163-
zettabytes-by-2025-idc/>.
23Ankit Tyagi and Sheetal Chopra, ‘Standard Essential Patents (SEP’s)—Issues and Challenges in
Developing Economies’ (2017) 22 JIPR 121–135.
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FRAND is to be determined by the parties in bilateral negotiations. This allows
the parties to address the specific circumstance of each individual case. However,
when parties cannot agree on FRAND terms, they may end up in court. While there
are several aspects surrounding the licensing of SEPs, one of the most important is
the need for good faith negotiations24 between parties to arrive at a FRAND
licensing agreement. In other words, FRAND licensing is a two-way street,25 where
two symmetrical risks, hold-up and hold-out must be considered. Specifically,
hold-out refers to an unwilling licensee of a SEP successfully avoiding a license or
forcing the SEP holder to accept royalties below FRAND rates by adopting
delaying tactics, whereas hold-up refers to an SEP owner extracting royalties above
FRAND under the threat of an injunction.26
Hold-out is seen by judicial and academic representatives as equally harmful as
hold-up when it comes to negotiations between parties.27 In Unwired Planet v
Huawei,28 the UK High Court recognized both risks and attempted in its decision to
adopt an approach to obviate them. In Apple v Motorola,29 dissenting US Federal
Circuit Chief Judge Rader defined the terms hold-out v hold-up and commented
that hold-out is equally as likely and as disruptive as a hold-up. The practical impact
of hold-up and hold-out can, however, significantly vary.
While courts for years have too often focused on patent hold-up, the literature
supporting such risk in the context of standards has mostly been theoretical.30 If
hold-up would exist the market would have experienced stagnant innovation, rising
prices and limited market entry. However, as explained above, the data shows
exactly the opposite. Moreover, in relevant markets such as India, China, Europe
and US, there is no real threat of injunctions for SEPs for willing licensees. In fact,
24ibid.
25In his post-trial opinion dated 6 August 2013, US District Court Judge Davis noted that initial
offers should be viewed as a starting point in the negotiations and that FRAND licensing is a
two-way street that requires good faith by both parties, Ericsson v D-Link, Memorandum Opinion
and Order dated 6 August 2013, Case no. 6:10-CV-473; Court of Justice of the European Union
has also enumerated obligations for both, SEP holders and SEP users, to obtain or avoid an
injunctive relief respectively. See Case C-170/13 Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v ZTE Corp., ZTE
Deutschland GmbH (2017) ECLI:EU:C:2015:477.
26Vincent Angwenyi, ‘Hold-up, Hold-out and F/RAND: The Quest for Balance’ (2017) 12(12)
JIPLP 1012.
27Some critical academic voices warning about hold-out effects are Gregor Langus, Vilen Lipatov
and Damien Neven, ‘Standard Essential Patents: Who is Really Holding-up (and when)?’ (2013) 9
(2) Journal of Competition Law & Economics 253–284; Anne Layne-Farrar, ‘Why Patent
Hold-out is Not Just a Fancy’ (Competition Policy International, February 2016); Richard Epstein
and KB Noroozi, ‘Why Incentives for 'Patent Hold-out’ Threaten to Dismantle FRAND, and Why
it Matters’ (2017) 32 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1381.
28See Unwired Planet International v Huawei Technologies (2017) EWHC 711 (Pat).
29Apple Inc. v Motorola Inc. (2014) US Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit, 757 F.3d 1286 1333.
30See analysis of lack of evidence supporting hold-up at Anne Layne Farrar, ‘Hold-up & Royalty
Stacking: Theory & Evidence’ (2014) OECD Discussion on Competition, Intellectual Property and
Standard Setting.
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analyzing the 20 smartphone manufacturers more active in the US from 2000–2012,
Gupta and Snyder showed that no single injunction has ever been granted for
patents that were determined to be a SEP.31 Also a German court has pointed out
that ‘it is questionable in principle how much the threat of a claim for injunctive
relief can (inadmissibly) affect license agreement negotiations’ since several deci-
sions in Europe ‘could be and can be invoked against inappropriate demands that
are in breach of antitrust law’.32
The situation of hold-out is, however, very different. SEP owners, relying on a
FRAND compensation in a timely manner, usually invest heavily in R&D costs
ex-ante. Thus, the stakes are higher for SEP owners because delayed or no license
agreements would mean no ROI. On the other hand, there is often no potential
downside for unwilling licensees in case they indulge in hold-out, because an
unfavorable court order rendered several years later may result in paying the same
royalty fees that they should have otherwise paid.33 Knowing this, some imple-
menters engage in ‘hold-out’ or ‘reverse hold-up’, by deliberately choosing not to
engage in a FRAND license negotiation. Typically, hold-out practices are combined
with the challenge of validity and essentiality of SEPs in a court. To avoid the latter,
the CJEU has indicated that these challenges must take place in parallel
proceedings.
Hold-out, contrary to hold-up, is not a theoretical risk. A recent study by the
professors Bowman Heiden and Nicolas Petit34 concludes that patent hold-out is a
‘significant phenomenon’. Despite explosive growth in the global smartphone
market (340% growth for smaller entrants in 2011–2015), SEP licensors have
experienced a significant reduction in licensing revenue because of delay (44%) and
non-payment (39%). In addition, the study documents a dramatic and steady
reduction in licensing coverage for this market (from 73% in 2006 to 39% in 2016).
Courts across the world lay considerable weightage to the conduct of both
parties during the licensing process in their decisions. The CJEU, for example, in its
decision in Huawei v ZTE emphasized the need for good faith negotiations, and
allowed for injunctive relief for SEPs under certain circumstances: Firstly, the SEP
holder must alert the alleged infringer by specifying the patent and the way it has
been or is being infringed; secondly, if the alleged infringer has expressed a will-
ingness to conclude a license agreement on FRAND terms, the SEP holder must
present a specific, written offer for a license on FRAND terms to the alleged
infringer. On the other hand, for the alleged infringer to avoid an injunction it must
31Kirti Gupta and Mark Snyder, ‘Smart Phone Litigation and Standard Essential Patents’ (2014)
Hoover IP² Working Paper Series No. 14006 <https://hooverip2.org/working-paper/wp14006/>.
32See Case No. 4a O 73/14 Saint Lawrence v Vodafone LG Düsseldorf, Judgement dated 31
March 2016.
33There is no concept of treble or punitive damages in India and hence no potential downside for
unwilling licensees.
34Bowman Heiden and N. Petit, ‘Patent Trespass and the Royalty Gap: Exploring the Nature and
Impact of ‘Patent Hold-out’’ (2017) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2981577>.
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diligently respond in good faith to the offer made by the SEP holder, with an
acceptance or a counter offer; and, if the SEP holder rejects the counter offer the
standard user must provide appropriate security for the payment of royalties and
render accounts for the use of the SEP/s in question.
The determination of good faith in negotiations to avoid injunctions is based on
many factors, such as the demonstration of diligence, conduct, timeliness, and
willingness to conclude a licensing agreement by both parties. While courts have
clarified that the time to declare willingness to conclude a license agreement on
FRAND terms depends on the circumstances of each individual case. German
courts dealing with large companies considered that five and even three months of
delay in negotiating a SEP license showed unwillingness on the part of the licen-
see.35 Additionally, on the question of a timely counter offer, the German district
courts held that six months36 and eighteen months37 after the initial offer were
untimely. As a result, an alleged infringer can only raise the FRAND defense, if the
counteroffer is made without delay considering the circumstances of the particular
case.
Following such reasoning, injunctions have been granted in a few jurisdictions
where it was proven that technology users were ‘unwilling’. In the ZTE v Vringo38
case, the Hague District Court held that ZTE was not a willing licensee. Similarly,
the Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) held39 that Apple was not a willing
licensee based on a series of reasons: it initiated a patent infringement action against
Samsung while negotiations were still underway; it proposed licensing terms that
devalued Samsung’s patent, and it engaged in reverse hold-up as supported by the
fact that it did not intend to pay out any royalties until the litigation was concluded.
In the US (Apple v Motorola)40 the Federal Circuit rejected a per se rule against
granting injunctive relief to standard essential patent holders. The FC argued that
where an infringer unilaterally refuses a FRAND royalty or unreasonably delays
negotiations to the same effect, the patent holder no longer bears singular respon-
sibility for concluding a contract. Thus, the SEP holder should receive in such
situations appropriate relief for infringement. In an interim court order the Delhi
35See Case No. 2 O 106/14 Saint Lawrence v Deutsche Telekom (2015) LG Mannheim, Judgement
dated 27 November 2015; Saint Lawrence (n 32); See Case No. 7 O 66/15 NTT DoCoMo v HTC
(2016) LG Mannheim, Judgement dated 29 January 2016.
36Saint Lawrence (n 32).
37NTT DoCoMo (n 35).
38Vringo made ZTE an ultimate licensing offer in June 2014, after their request for a customs
seizure was accepted. Only a month into the proceedings, did ZTE make a counteroffer to Vringo.
The court denied ZTE’s claims, stating that ZTE could not be considered a willing licensee under
FRAND, Case No. C/09/470109/KG ZA 14-870 ZTE v Vringo The Hague District Court,
Judgement dated 24 October 2014.
39Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., Judgement dated 26
February 2014.
40Apple Inc. (n 29).
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High court41 also highlighted how unwilling licensees continue to infringe on
patents and how they entered in delaying tactics by filing a case before the
Competition Commission of India (CCI), while the negotiations were still active
and ongoing for more than four years.
As can be seen in jurisdictions around the world, there is significant jurispru-
dence on the conduct of parties, particularly on how to incentivize good faith
negotiations between them, penalizing bad faith negotiation.
5 Industry Best Practices and the Role of Injunctions
In the recent debate on FRAND licensing, we are witnessing an increased scrutiny
and refusal of consolidated industry practices based on supposedly economic effi-
ciencies. Critics of current licensing best-practices assert that the current licensing
framework is no longer fit for the purpose it is meant to serve. Despite the lack of
evidence that the current regime is harming competition and consumers, some are
questioning practices such as: (i) FRAND-based access to standardized technolo-
gies at the end user device level, (ii) valuation methodologies built on comparable
agreements and use-based licensing as a function of elasticity of demand and value
added by the patented technology, and (iii) negotiations focusing on portfolio
license aimed at guaranteeing freedom to operate.
These three claims will be examined in more detail in the following parts,
including the role of injunctions in a functioning licensing environment. Anti-patent
rhetoric tries to turn market efficiency—where negotiations between a patent owner
and an implementer aim at providing freedom to operate in a streamlined and
economically efficient fashion—into some sort of unjustified behavior.
5.1 ‘Access for All’ Against ‘License to All’
What happens, if industry practices based on efficiency are subverted, and licenses have
to be granted at chip manufacturers level? What is licensed and what is not? As a
product manufacturer, do I have freedom to operate? What happens, if a licensed
chipset for standard implementation ends up in a competitive, proprietary, non-standard
device? These are all valid questions that arise when licensees, policy makers or other
stakeholders try to define the Non-Discriminatory (ND) prong of FRAND as an
obligation to license across the supply chain, the so-called ‘license to all42’ obligation.
41Micromax Informatics Limited v Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (Publ) (2013) Competition
Commission of India, Case 50/2013; Intex Technologies (India) Limited v Telefonaktiebolaget LM
Ericsson (Publ) (2013) Competition Commission of India, Case 76/2013.
42Various terms are used to describe the concept, including ‘license to all’, ‘refusal to license’,
‘licensing level discrimination’, ‘compulsory licensing’.
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Telecommunications standards define the air interface between user equipment and
the network. Some inventions may even cover both ends of the interface, i.e. both the
user equipment as well as the base station is covered by patent claims in a sender—
receiver fashion. The landscape of patent claims covering the standard and the contin-
uous evolution of the standard creates a very dynamic situation. On top of these two
moving parts, some features of the standard are mandatory and some are optional, adding
even more complexity to how the standard is implemented in fully compliant products.
Economic efficiencies have identified, at least in the mobile industry, the end
user device as the suitable attachment point, in order to license one level of the
supply chain in a simple, transparent, and cost-effective (for both patent owners and
licensees) way. A single license at the device level ensures access to the technology
for the whole supply chain. The fact that there is only a single license provides
obvious benefits in terms of simplicity and efficiency.
The pace of innovation, that standards based on FRAND and consolidated
licensing practices have created, is unprecedented. Also, the competitive level of
the mobile industry (with new entrants and falling prices) is a testament to the
vitality and dynamism of the ICT sector, and proof of availability and affordability
of the technology to all. Consolidated industry practices have facilitated a suc-
cessful licensing framework that has brought us 2G, 3G and 4G, and which is
bringing 5G on an accelerated timeline.
A proposed compulsory ‘license to all’ obligation for SEPs basically requires a
patent holder to grant a license to any party that requests so, regardless of where in
the value chain that party operates. Many levels of a value chain price their com-
ponents based upon manufacturing costs and a slim margin. Thus, industry practice
is and has been not to license at the component level, so that such business models
do not account or support FRAND royalties. Moreover, efficiency requires a simple
licensing regime, ideally with a single patent license allowing access for all in the
value chain. A single license at the user device level provides access to the patented
technology to all suppliers and component manufacturers upstream.
Conversely, an obligation to license at different levels of the value chain would
inevitably result in several inefficiencies, including:
• Licenses at upstream levels would result in patent exhaustion in the downstream
market. Since it is not allowed to license the same patent twice in a product,
licensing to a chipset manufacturer (upstream) would avoid the license to the
smartphone (downstream).
• Licenses granted at component level could result in the patent owner having to
negotiate separate licenses with different manufacturers for the same user
device. This would inevitably result in inefficiencies and complexity, leading to
increased costs for both licensor and licensees and, ultimately, higher prices for
consumers.
• Licenses at upstream levels could easily result in licenses to components which
end up in non-standardized products or in products built to competing standards.
• Licenses would be granted at a level which does not support FRAND royalties.
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• Licenses could be granted at a level which does not provide effective reciprocity
for the licensor and the licensee, which is a key element to protect FRAND
licensors.
5.2 Use-Based Licensing v Smallest Saleable Patent
Practicing Unit (SSPPU)
There is a fundamental difference between value and cost. Economists conceive
innovation as a productivity improvement from an increase in capital—that is, the
incremental value that the patented invention adds to the end product. It is, thus,
impossible to properly express the economic effect of an innovation without ref-
erence to the product price and to the quantities of other inputs available for
production.
Royalties follow market-based price elasticity of demand. They reflect the price
a consumer is willing to pay for the features enabled by the technology, and
different verticals exhibit different elasticity and willingness to pay for the tech-
nology (for example, the value of cellular technology on a car is much higher than
on a smart meter). Several approaches can be utilized to determine the value of a
new technology, for instance the upcoming 5G, and the associated aggregate roy-
alty level before any comparable licenses exist.43 For example, with respect to 5G,
the following methodologies can be used:
• Valuing expected technical benefits of 5G over prior standard generations;
• Analyzing studies and court decisions regarding 4G royalty stack;
• Mobile device pricing comparison.
As argued by scholars and judges alike, the value of a book does not equal the
cost of the paper. The value of a technology has nothing to do with the cost of a
component. The value added to the user (and to the manufacturer, in this IoT era)
should guide valuation. Focusing on cost is a short-term, short-sighted strategy that
goes against the very principle of patent law. i.e., guaranteeing investments in
future innovation. Antitrust is inevitably focusing on the present, while patent law
focuses on the future.
Static efficiency (the now) is not always the right framework to analyze patent
cases. Dynamic efficiency (the future), on the other hand accepts, for example, that
monopolist positions now can lead to increased investments and innovation in the
future. And yet a patent is hardly a monopoly. ‘At best, a patent gives one the
opportunity to charge monopoly profits. […] Furthermore, others are allowed to
43David Kennedy and Larry Tedesco, ‘5G SEPs—How Can Early Implementers Predict
Aggregate Royalties?’ (iam, 2018) <http://www.iam-media.com/Intelligence/IAM-Yearbook/
2018/Country-by-country/5G-SEPs-how-can-early-implementers-predict-aggregate-royalties>.
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improve the product and block the original patent owner’. This is especially true for
(F)RAND assured essential patent.
5.3 Portfolio as Welfare Enhancing
Consolidated industry practices are generally based on portfolio licenses that cover
all essential patents by the licensor for a specific standardized technology and in a
specific field of use. This approach guarantees freedom to operate for licensees in
said field of use.
Some potential licensees, often to stall or delay negotiations, are suggesting a
lengthy patent-by-patent negotiation, and often argue over validity, infringement
and value for each patent. This behavior has become more and more prevalent. This
is true, particularly in the developing world, but also increasingly in the developed
world. Incidentally, the new patent policy by the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers (IEEE),44 has led to a huge decrease of willingness to license
under such policy.45 IEEE policy recommends that negotiations, and possibly
adjudication proceedings, follow precisely a patent-by-patent approach.46
When faced with litigation, to delay or stall negotiations, some unwilling
licensees are increasingly requesting the court to determine FRAND royalties based
on the patents in suit instead of the whole portfolio, and only for the coverage of the
44IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws <http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/bylaws/Sect6-7.
html>.
45According to Mallinson, following the adoption of the new IPR Policy favoring standard users’
position:
almost three quarters (i.e. 73%) of LOAs [Letters of Assurance] for the IEEE flagship
802.11 WiFi standard, accepted by IEEE and posted on its website in the 18-month period
to June 2017, are ‘negative’ LOAs, indicating the submitter’s legitimate ex ante refusal to
pledge [F]RAND licensing under the new patent policy. Nearly half (i.e. 47%) of all
accepted LOAs posted on the IEEE website over the same period are negative LOAs. More
than one third (i.e. 42%) of companies portrayed as leaders with LOAs to IEEE standards
are unwilling to pledge their SEPs under the new patent policy or have not provided LOAs
when asked to do so.
See Keith Mallinson, ‘Development of Innovative New Standards Jeopardized by IEEE Patent
Policy’ (4iPCouncil, September 2017) <http://www.4ipcouncil.com/application/files/6015/0479/
2147/Mallinson_IEEE_LOA_report.pdf>.
46The IEEE, through a process that did not seek consensus among participants but instead was
conducted with a lack of transparency, decided to substantially change its patent policy in 2015.
The new policy favors certain business models and devalues the technologies developed and
contributed by several technology providers that rely on licensing to foster further R&D and
participation. Keith Mallinson and Wise Harbor describes some of the most controversial changes
that the new policy introduced, highlight significant side effects to the whole industry, and looks at
some specific facts that demonstrates the negative impact of the policy on participation to the
standardization efforts. Mallinson (n 45).
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country where the suit takes place. This is what has been called a patent-by-patent
strategy, which would force SEP holders to choose between endless litigation or
agreeing to royalties that are below FRAND. Such conduct has been qualified as
‘unfair’ in Europe,47 where courts have recognized that worldwide portfolio
licensing is a well-established industry practice.48 Moreover, in some courts an
unwilling licensee could face an injunction if it is infringing worldwide patents that
are essential to a particular standard.49
5.4 The Role of Injunctions
As the acting Chair of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Maureen Ohlhausen
has recently argued that:
The cost of an overbroad antitrust rule in the standard-setting space—one that effectively
prevents SEP owners from even asking for injunctions—is hold-out and patentee
under-compensation. That is a danger that antitrust agencies have overlooked.50
Without deterring factors, or at least the threat of it, SEP users unwilling to get a
license would gain considerable advantage vis-à-vis the competition by freeriding.
Injunction is a tool to avoid such behavior. Free riders not only use technologies
developed by others without retribution, hence limiting the developers’ ROI, but
they are also unfair to their competitors. By paying no royalty, they can price their
products, for instance mobile phones, below those manufactured by competitors.
Ultimately innovation will suffer and the market may fail.
We should note that a voluntary FRAND commitment cannot become a com-
pulsory license scheme that violates the very principle of patent rights as well as
international trade agreements. This has been supported by antitrust agencies. For
instance, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) Assistant Attorney General
(AAG) Makan Delrahim recently delivered speech at the University of Southern
California (USC).51 Delrahim made it abundantly clear that patent holders have the
right to enforce their patents and that a FRAND commitment cannot be unilaterally
used to violate such right:
47Saint Lawrence (n 32).
48Case 29437/3/2015 Vringo v ZTE (2015) Bucharest Court of Appeal 4th Civil Division,
Judgement dated 28 October 2015; Case No. 7 O 97/14 LG Mannheim, Judgement dated 4 March
2016. Saint Lawrence (n 32); ibid; Unwired Planet (n 28) 157.
49Unwired Planet (n 28) 97.
50Maureen K Ohlhausen, ‘The Elusive Role Of Competition In The Standard-Setting Antitrust
Debate’ (2017) 20 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 93.
51Department of Justice, ‘Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim Delivers Remarks at the
USC Gould School of Law’s Center for Transnational Law and Business Conference’ (The United
States Department of Justice, 10 November 2017) <https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-
attorney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-remarks-usc-gould-school-laws-center>.
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The enforcement of valid patent rights should not be a violation of antitrust law. A patent
holder cannot violate the antitrust laws by properly exercising the rights patents confer, such
as seeking an injunction or refusing to license such a patent. […] We should not transform
commitments to license on FRAND terms into a compulsory licensing scheme. Indeed, we
have had strong policies against compulsory licensing, which effectively devalues intellectual
property rights, including in most of our trade agreements, such as the TRIPS agreement of
the WTO. If an SSO [Standards Setting Organization] requires innovators to submit to such a
scheme as a condition for inclusion in a standard, we should view the SSO’s rule and the
process leading to it with suspicion, and certainly not condemn the use of such injunctive
relief as an antitrust violation where a contract remedy is perfectly adequate.
Delrahim’s speech also signals a significant shift in the approach the DOJ has
had towards certain SDOs, most notably the IEEE. Delrahim encourages SDOs to
maintain internal antitrust compliance programs to monitor whether their policies
are or may become anticompetitive.
5.5 Enhanced Damages for Unwilling Licensees
Recent court cases, especially the CJEU decision in Huawei v ZTE, have helped
determining a framework to identify good-faith negotiation tactics vis-à-vis abusive
behavior or unwillingness. On the contrary, other court cases52 have failed to determine
appropriate remedies when faced with an unwilling licensee, and have often erred by
focusing excessively on possible abuses or discriminatory behavior by the licensor.53
As Wong-Ervin explains:
[I]n the case of an infringer who is engaged in hold-up or hold-out, enhanced damages may
be appropriate and necessary to deter such conduct and adequately compensate the SEP
holder. Indeed, if the worst penalty a SEP infringer faces is merely paying, after an
adjudication, the FRAND royalty it should have agreed to pay when first asked, then
hold-up and hold-out give implementers a profitable way to defer payment.54
52See for example Unwired Planet (n 28); TCL Mobile Limited, and TCT Mobile v
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (2018) District Court for the Central District of California, Case
No. 8:14-CV-00341-JVS-DFM.
53Alexander Galetovic and Stephen Haber, ‘The Fallacies of Patent Hold-up Theory’ (2016)
Hoover IP² Working Paper No. 16009 <http://hooverip2.org/working-paper/wp16009/>. The
debate around FRAND licensing has put an unreasonable weight on combating the hold-up
problem (which has been demonstrated to be relatively nuance and non-systemic) while condoning
hold-outs and efficient infringement (for a discussion on ‘efficient infringement’); See, for
example, Gene Quinn, ‘A Patent Owner Defending Property Rights is not a Bully’ (IPwatchdog,
16 December 2015) <http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/12/16/patent-owner-defending-property-
rights-not-bully/id=63900/>. Quinn points out to a real problem that is threatening the ICT
industry.
54Anne Layne-Farrar and Koren Wong-Ervin, ‘Methodologies for Calculating FRAND Damages:
An Economic and Comparative Analysis of the Case Law from China, the European Union, India,
and the United States’ (2017) 8(2) Jindal Global Law School Law Review 127.
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6 Royalty Stacking—A Unicorn that Does not Exist
SEPs have been instrumental in the growth of the global telephony market and the
revenue and jobs generated from it across the world. Royalty stacking appears when
the cumulative royalty rate for all SEPs needed to manufacture a smartphone is
unaffordable. According to their proponents due to the large number of SEPs
contained in a smartphone the cumulative royalty rate for such a device could easily
achieve royalty stacking, even if the SEP holders would request separately a
FRAND rate.
As already pointed out, FRAND licensing has given a substantial lift to the entry
and growth of businesses across the world, and this can be seen from the fact that
profits have tripled55 from 2007 to 2013. Consumer adoption of 3G and 4G stan-
dards has outpaced that of all other technologies, growing to nearly three billion
connections in less than 15 years, and projected to exceed eight billion connections
by 2020.56 India has also seen a phenomenal growth of its handset manufacturing
business, as can be seen in the graph below. The net worth of the Indian
handset-manufacturing sector grew 115%, going from INR 45,000 crores
(6.9 billion USD) in 2014 to INR 97,000 crores (15 billion USD) in 2016
(Fig. 5).57
The fact that royalty stacking is theoretical has also been acknowledged in the
Ericsson v D-Link case by the US Federal Circuit court. In this case,58 defendants
brought up royalty stacking as being a problem, but ultimately failed to convince
the court of any real evidence of harmful stacking. In the appeal proceedings, when
the defendants claimed that the Chief Judge Davis had failed to inform the jury to
make consideration for the possibility of patent hold-up and royalty stacking, the
Federal Circuit court found that Chief Judge Davis did not have a responsibility to
do that, since no empirical evidence of that conjecture existed.59 In this particular
case, sound scepticism to alleged stacking problems was clearly expressed by the
court.
55Richard J Stark, ‘Debunking the Smallest Saleable Unit Theory’ (2015) 2 CPI Antitrust
Chronicle 2–10. Start states that ‘the size of the handset market has greatly expanded, as global
revenues have doubled in the last six years. According to Credit Suisse, handset manufacturer
operating profits tripled between 2007 and 2013, reaching US $51 billion’.
56BCG (n 2).
57Karan Kashyap, ‘Here's How India Is Becoming A Hub For Smartphone Manufacturing In South
Asia’ (Forbes, 22 February 2017) <https://www.forbes.com/sites/krnkashyap/2017/02/22/heres-
how-india-is-becoming-a-hub-for-smartphone-manufacturing-in-south-asia/#4c2827923be8>.
58Ericsson, Inc. v D-Link Sys., Inc. (2014) US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 773 F. 3d
1201, 1225–29.
59ibid 1235.
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Several research reports have proven that the global aggregate royalty rate for
mobile handsets has been reasonable. This is also reflected by growing competition
with more than hundred brands selling their phones through both online and offline
sales.60 A report by Keith Mallison clearly establishes that the ‘[c]umulative mobile
Standard Essential Patents-royalty payments as no more than around 5% of mobile
handset sales’.61 Haber states that the global royalty yield as a percentage of the
average sales price have been less than 3.5%.62
A study of the smartphone industry in India has shown trends like those that
have been seen across the world, debunking the myth, that royalty stacking has
caused enormous pressure on businesses in India. The assumption that excessive
royalty payments are made leading to increased prices of telecom equipment,63 is
not correct considering the annual reports of companies submitted to the Ministry of
Corporate Affairs (MCA),64 which clearly show that royalty payments are not at all
problematic.
The MCA filings made by 19 telecom equipment manufacturing companies,65
which can be seen in the table below, reveal that for the fiscal year 2015–16, at least
Fig. 5 Net worth of the
Indian handset manufacturing
business. (Karan Kashyap,
‘Here’s How India Is
Becoming A Hub For
Smartphone Manufacturing In









61Keith Mallinson, ‘Smartphone Revolution’ IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine (April
2015) 60.
62Galetovic (n 53); Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber and Ross Levine, ‘An Empirical
Examination of Patent Hold-up’ (2015) 11 (3) Journal of Competition Law & Economics 549.
Keith Mallinson, ‘Cumulative Mobile-SEP Royalty Payments no More Than Around 5% of
Mobile Handset Revenues’ (IP Finance, August 2015) <http://www.ip.finance/2015/08/
cumulative-mobile-sep-royalty-payments.html>.
63Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) highlights that the telecom equipment manu-
facturers expend large amounts on royalty payments. TRAI, ‘Consultation Paper on Promoting
Local Telecom Equipment Manufacturing’ (New Delhi, 18 September 2017).
64Available from the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) website.
65These 19 telecom equipment manufacturing companies were selected on the basis of market
capitalization. Annual submissions made by these companies to MCA reveals following data:
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14 of the 19 companies showed zero expenditure on royalty payments. The annual
returns of an additional four were unavailable on the MCA website. Only two
companies (MYMO wireless and Nelco) showed royalty payments made on their
financials. Nelco made the payments to Centre for Development of Telematics
(CDOT). This data shows that the issue of royalty stacking is irrelevant, as far as the
telecom equipment manufacturers are concerned (Table 1).
Additionally, there is an assumption that handset manufacturers pay excessive
amounts in royalty payments. Looking at the companies’ annual returns filed with
the MCA66 one can see that seven large handset manufacturers,67 made no royalty
payments from FY11–12 to FY14–15, except for Micromax, which made royalty
‘provisions’68 (not payments). This data shows that the assumption that royalty
payments are driving up the costs of manufacturing for handset manufacturers is not
correct (Table 2).
The entry of new Indian businesses into the market as well as their exponential
market growth is a clear evidence of the fact that there is no systemic abuse. There
has not been any appreciable adverse effect on competition, as the market has more
players than ever before. The astronomical growth of the Indian
handset-manufacturing sector shows that companies have the capability to pay for
reasonable royalties. However, their willingness to pay for it seems to be lacking
despite how essential IPR is to development of new technologies.
7 Price Differentiation and Economic Efficiencies
Charging different prices for the same product or service is defined in economic
literature as price discrimination. It has been argued by a few that the
non-discriminatory part of a FRAND commitment implies that a patent owner
should offer the same licensing rates for the same standardized technology to all
licensees.69 Although at a first glance, this may sound logical, such assertion
Tejas Networks (which has a license for optical technologies from CDOT) paid Rs. 0.15 crores
(0.036% of the total revenue) in 2013–14 and Rs. 0.09 crores (0.022% of the total revenue) in
2014–15, and Nelco paid Rs. 1153 lacs (to CDOT) (8.324% of the total revenue) in 2015–16.
For FY 2015–16.
66MCA (n 64).
67The seven companies referred to above are—Celkon, Intex Technologies, Karbonn, Lava
International, Maxx Mobiles, Micromax Informatics, and Spice Digital.
68Micromax made provisions for royalty in FY13–14 (Rs. 1500 million) and FY14–15
(Rs. 1092.41 million) according to the annual returns filed with MCA.
69See Fair Standards Alliance <http://www.fair-standards.org/>.
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Table 1 Data synthesized from annual reports submitted by the companies to MCA (Ministry of
Corporate Affairs)
S. No. Name of company Royalty payments made during FY2015–16
1 Tejas Networks NAa (Rs. 0.09 crs. in FY 14–15)
2 MYMO Wireless 4.9 lacs
3 Saankhya Labs NA
4 Vihaan Networks NA
5 Coral Communications NA (Rs. 0.00 in FY14–15)
6 Bharti Infratel Ltd. 0
7 Honeywell Automation India Ltd. 0
8 Nelco Rs. 1153 lacs (to DOT)
9 Astra Microwave Products Ltd. 0
10 MIC Electronics Ltd. 0
11 Aishwarya Tech. and Telecom Ltd. 0
12 GTL Ltd. 0
13 Punjab Communications Ltd. 0
14 Valient Communications Ltd. 0
15 Precision Electronics Ltd. 0
16 HFCL 0
17 ITI Ltd. 0
18 GTL Infrastructure Ltd. 0
19 Aplab Ltd. 0
These 19 telecom equipment manufacturing companies were selected on the basis of market
capitalization. Annual submissions made by these companies to MCA reveals following data:
Tejas Networks (which has a license for optical technologies from CDOT) paid Rs. 0.15 crores
(0.036% of the total revenue) in 2013–14 and Rs. 0.09 crores (0.022% of the total revenue) in
2014–15, and Nelco paid Rs. 1153 lacs (to CDOT) (8.324% of the total revenue) in 2015–16.
For FY 2015–16
aRoyalty payments made by Tejas Networks to CDOT in year 14–15
Table 2 Data synthesized from annual reports submitted by the companies to MCA (Ministry of
Corporate Affairs)
Manufacturer FY 11–12 FY 12–13 FY 13–14 FY 14–15
Celkon 0 0 0 0
Intex Technologies 0 0 0 0
Karbonn NA NA 0 0
Lava International 0 NA 0 0
Maxx Mobile 0 0 NA
Micromax
Informatics




Spice Digital 0 0 0 0
Annual reports available at MCA (Ministry of Corporate Affairs) website
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contradicts decades of successful licensing practices and it goes against basic
economic principles.70
Economic literature has demonstrated that price differentiation can increase
efficiency, increase output, promote investments in innovation and improve con-
sumer welfare.71 Under some circumstances, by charging a unique price to a unique
customer, or different prices to different groups of customers, output increases and
markets become entirely efficient, even in the presence of market power.72
Price differentiation is common in most industries and sectors. For instance,
movie theaters offer discounted tickets to students in off-peak hours to spread fixed
costs among a larger users base; airlines charge different prices for very similar
seats and identical services according to complex algorithms that account for a lot
of parameters such as seat availability and customer willingness to pay; game
console manufacturers often price consoles below market price to attract a larger
community and differentiate on the price of games; and software developers
sometimes decide to release code for free charging different prices to different
customers for added services or maintenance. Ultimately, price discrimination
reflects the fundamental economic principle of demand elasticity: the price of a
specific service, product or technology is a function of the actual and perceived
surplus by the user and its willingness to pay for that service, product or
technology.
The concept of price differentiation in technology licensing is particularly
important as it applies to IoT, where the use of the technology, the associated
requirements and ultimately the value added by said technology will differ widely
from one vertical to another. In the IoT, an estimated of 25 billion devices will be
connected by 2020. Cellular standards in the IoT will be incorporated in non-ICT
sectors such as agriculture, banking and finance, maritime trade, and transporta-
tion.73 These sectors, not familiar with licensing in the ICT sector would benefit
from a transparent licensing platform, which reflects in its licensing the value that
the standardized technology brings to the end product. In an effort to achieve broad
dissemination of IoT in a fair manner, Ericsson and other major contributors of
cellular technology have created an independent industry patent licensing platform
for IoT called Avanci.74 Avanci is a one-of-a-kind platform designed to efficiently
and predictably license standard essential patents for the cellular standards to all of
70It should be noted that it is also discriminatory to charge the same price to costumers when costs
differ, Anne Layne-Farrar, ‘Nondiscriminatory Pricing, Is Standard Setting Different?’ (2010) 6(4)
Journal of Competition Law & Economics 811.
71ibid.
72Lars Stole, ‘Price Discrimination and Competition’ in Mark Armstrong and Robert
(eds), Handbook of Industrial Organization vol. 3 (Elsevier 2007).
73Haris Tsilikas and Claudia Tapia, ‘The Internet of Things: Big Data, New Patent Licensing
Models and the Role of Standardization’ (The Patent Lawyer, 2018).
74Avanci <http://avanci.com/>.
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the industries and products that exist and will be created in the IoT. It provides
manufacturers of connected products with an open and streamlined way to license
essential wireless technology, making it possible for companies to access all the
technology they need with a single license for a flat fee per unit.75 At the same time,
it enables the companies and research institutions that create this technology to
recoup their significant investments in R&D.
The concept and motivation behind Avanci recognizes the challenges when
products uses and capabilities differ. For instance, fully autonomous vehicles
require consistent and high-bandwidth coverage, where data transfer occurs in
milliseconds (i.e. low latency). The quality of service in terms of speed and volume
needs to be very high. However, other vertical uses and devices like smart meters
are far less demanding. Therefore, Avanci is an example of the advantages and
fairness of price differentiation. Such differentiation, based on the elasticity of
different verticals and the contribution of the technology to the end user device,
reflects the value of the technology to end users.
A market-driven, efficiency-enhancing and industry-led approach to licensing in
the IoT will achieve a win-win solution for technology users, technology devel-
opers and consumers. The cost of the license will strike the optimal tradeoff
between market adoption and a fair return to those who are developing the tech-
nology. 4G evolution and 5G will introduce connectivity in new use products
beyond the traditional uses. This is projected to unlock tremendous value and create
benefits for new industries and their consumers.76 As explained above, those
products or services enjoying a higher value from patented 5G connectivity, e.g.
remote surgery, autonomous vehicles, industrial real-time applications, will pay a
higher royalty than those with strict performance requirements that consequently
are not using some of the features in the 5G specification, such as simple sensors.
Contrary to this market-led approach based on price differentiation, setting the
same price for a technology across verticals would inevitably result in inefficiencies.
If innovators were forced to price 5G equally across different applications irre-
spective of the value added of the technology, that price would result to be too high
for some players, e.g. smart meters, forcing manufacturers not to incorporate such
innovative technology. On the other hand, autonomous vehicles would pay far less
than what consumers are willing to pay and are currently paying to automotive
industry.
75For example, for connected cars Avanci offers its large SEPs’ portfolio for USD 3 for eCall,
USD 9 for eCall, 2G and 3G, and USD 15 for eCall and 2G to 4G per vehicle, Pricing <http://
avanci.com/pricing/>.
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Under this background it is important to resist lobbying initiatives led by groups
of implementers, in favor of charging the same price for a standardized technology
independently of the value it brings to the end product. Naturally, some legal
scholars have investigated the risks associated with ‘buyers’ cartels’ in the context
of SDOs, and their effects on innovation and R&D investments. Lo Bue,77 in an
analysis of possible antitrust concerns related to the new IEEE patent policy,78
states that:
[t]he purchasers of technology aim to achieve different objectives compared to SEP holders.
Indeed, they want to lower the royalty fees under which access to the standard-essential
technology is granted and lobby heavily to reach this goal. Purchasers of technology have
strongly campaigned over the years in favour of clearer policies which help to define what
FRAND terms are, and they seem to have accomplished their mission on February 9, 2015.
Delrahim also warns against the so-called monopsony effect:
[E]nforcers should carefully examine and recognize the risk that SSO participants might
engage in a form of buyer’s cartel, what economists call a monopsony effect. […] I
therefore urge antitrust enforcers […] to take a fresh look at concerted actions within SSOs
that cause competitive harm to the dynamic innovation process.79
8 Antitrust Considerations
The US antitrust agencies have widely acknowledged industry standards ‘to be one
of the engines driving the modern economy’80 and that:
[s]tandards can make products less costly for firms to produce and more valuable to
consumers. They can increase innovation, efficiency, and consumer choice; foster public
health and safety; and serve as a ‘fundamental building block for international trade.
Standards make networks, such as the Internet and wireless telecommunications, more
valuable by allowing products to interoperate.81
Similarly, antitrust enforcers have explained that:
77Marco Lo Bue, ‘Patent Hold-up and Hold-out Under the New IEEE's IP Policy: Are These
Breaches of Competition Law?’ (2016) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2885364>.
78IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws (n 44).
79Department of Justice (n 51).
80Department Of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, ‘Antitrust Enforcement And Intellectual
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[t]he justification for cooperatively setting a standard, as opposed to letting standards
develop accidentally or from the technological solutions proposed by individual firms, is
that collaboratively-set standards can be more useful to society. In the long run, they may
provide a more optimal balance of choosing more advanced technology, costing less to
create and implement, and getting to market faster.82
The agencies have also recognized that antitrust issues may arise from collab-
orative standard [development] when standards incorporate technologies that are
protected by IPRs. Such issues could involve the perceived potential for ‘hold-up’
by contributors of technology to standards after the standard has been finalized.83
However, multiple data points over the past 22 years, including from the antitrust
agencies themselves, have suggested that such issues are a rare exception, rather
than a systemic problem. This part reviews some of these data points.
First, the agencies themselves have recognized multiple market-based factors
that may mitigate the risk of hold-up, including the following:
[P]atent holders that are frequent participants in standard-setting activities may incur rep-
utational and business costs that could be sufficiently large to deter fraudulent behavior.
Patent holders may also enjoy a first-mover advantage if its technology is adopted as the
standard.
As a result, patent holders who manufacture products using the standardized
technology:
may find it more profitable to offer attractive licensing terms in order to promote the
adoption of the product using the standard, increasing demand for its product rather than
extracting high royalties.
Finally, the agencies have recognized that patent holders that have broad
cross-licensing agreements with the SEP-owner may be protected from hold-up.84
Second, multiple market players have provided public comments to US antitrust
agencies, explaining that collaborative industry standards assured through FRAND
assurances generally worked well. In response to a 2011 FTC workshop on patents
in standards, dozens of companies and experts have made this point.85 To take two
examples of these, Intel Corporation has explained that:
82ibid. Hill Wellford, [then] Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, US
Department of Justice Antitrust Issues in Standard-Setting.
83ibid.
84Federal Trade Commission, ‘Prepared Statement of The Federal Trade Commission Before the
United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy
and Consumer Rights Concerning ‘Standard Essential Patent Disputes and Antitrust Law’
(Washington, D.C., 30 July 2013) 6. <https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_
statements/prepared-statement-federal-trade-commission-concerning-standard-essential-patent-
disputes-and/130730standardessentialpatents.pdf>.
85Federal Trade Commission, ‘#382: FTC Issues Agenda for Workshop to Explore the Role of
Patented Technology in Collaborative Industry Standards; FTC Project No. P111204’ (2011)
<https://www.ftc.gov/policy/public-comments/2013/08/initiative-382>.
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the evidence shows that standard-setting processes generally work well. Thousands of
standards are developed every year, generally without incident, and they are normally
followed by significant price drops year after year in almost all industry sectors where
standards are used. Intel is unaware of any systemic problems of patentees misleading
standard-setting organizations (SSOs) or refusing to abide by previous licensing commit-
ments made to those organizations, including commitments to license on reasonable and
nondiscriminatory (RAND) terms. To be sure, a few well-publicized disputes have arisen,
but they have been the rare exception to the general rule.86
Microsoft has explained that:
[t]here are literally thousands of ICT standards in existence today. Hundreds of these
standards have been referenced in eGovernment Interoperability Frameworks, with no
apparent documented problems relating to IPR issues. There have been a relatively small
number of noteworthy litigations that have been commenced when two parties have been
unable to agree on whether proffered licensing terms were RAND and/or otherwise met the
requirements of the applicable SSO’s IPR policy. These are very much the exception, not
the rule.87
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the US antitrust agencies enforcement
record demonstrates that there has not been a single instance of an antitrust vio-
lation resulting from hold-up. This includes a three-year period between 2012–
2015, when the Division showed special advocacy interest in this area.
The FTC did bring seven enforcement matters in this area, in the twenty-two
years between 1995–2017. However, thus far it has never won such a case in
litigation. All these cases were settled by the FTC, a few of them under the parallel
pressures of a pending merger. Only one matter, the Rambus case, was fully liti-
gated, ending in a loss for the FTC. See table summarizing these cases (Table 3).
To summarize, US antitrust agencies and industry have both recognized that
hold-up is an exception, not a systemic problem. The agencies’ interest in standard
development cases to date has not translated into any successfully litigated antitrust
cases.
Finally, we would be remiss without reminding that Makan Delrahim, who
assumed his role in the fall of 2017, appears to take a keen interest in standard
development issues. His concern appears to be mostly with collaborative violations.
In a seminal 10 November 2017 speech, AAG Delrahim detailed his views in this
area,88 that can be summarized as follows:
86Earl Nied, ‘Intel Corporation’s Response to the Commission's Request for Comments in
Connection with Its Patent Standards Workshop, Project No. Pll-1204’ (5 August 2011) <https://
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_comments/request-comments-and-announcement-wor
kshop-standard-setting-issues-project-no.p111204-00042/00042-80174.pdf>.
87David Heiner, ‘Microsoft comments in connection with Federal Trade Commission Workshop
on Standard-Setting Issues, Project No. P111204’ (14 June 2011) <https://www.ftc.gov/policy/
public-comments/comment-00009-28>.
88Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney General, ‘Take It To The Limit: Respecting Innovation
Incentives In The Application Of Antitrust Law’ (Speech at the USC Gould School of Law, 10
November 2017) <https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1010746/download>.
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• FRAND commitment is not a compulsory licensing scheme. There is no duty to
license SEP.
• Hold-out is a more serious antitrust risk than hold-up.
• Collective hold-out (reverse hold-up) is a more serious impediment to innova-
tion and is now a DOJ priority.
• Enforcement of patents, whether essential to a standard or not, including
through seeking an injunction, is not an antitrust violation.
• Violation of a FRAND commitment is not an antitrust violation and should be
dealt with through contract law.
• Patents are a form of property, and the right to exclude is at their core.
• Risk of technology-buyers’ cartel in SDOs.
• DOJ Antitrust division is sceptical of imbalanced SSO patent policies; elements
of the new IEEE patent policy used to demonstrate an example of an imbalanced
policy.
• Freely negotiated licenses and cross-licenses are the solution.
It would be interesting to watch antitrust enforcement over the next few years, to
see where these priorities take US antitrust enforcement.
9 Conclusion
The notion that patents cripple innovation is strongly counterintuitive. Erosion of
patent rights can only result in the commoditization of technology, where a few
monopsonies control the whole value chain. This would harm innovation and,
ultimately, consumers, with fewer choices due to lock-ins. The increasing number
of manufacturing companies that disrespect IPR (from copyright to patents),
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privacy and taxes is bringing ever decreasing margins and revenues for all sup-
pliers, including content providers, authors, musicians and technology providers.
This chapter has shown the relevance of IPR and the enormous success of
standardization thanks to the accessibility of SEPs under FRAND terms. Indeed,
standardization has led to interoperable and high performance products at a con-
tinuously decreasing price to the benefit of consumers. Standardization is not only
nowadays indispensable for a successful economic growth in a country. It will also
play a key role for the IoT, as billions of devices will be connected thanks to
cellular standards.
There is a need for policy makers in India to support a balance of interests
between those using and those contributing standardized technology.
Although FRAND is to be determined by the parties in bilateral negotiations, policy
makers should reinforce good faith negotiations between parties. In the presence of
an unwilling licensee, courts could also identify solutions that can discourage bad
behavior. This is relevant as the courts have ordered unwilling licensees to pay only
the FRAND rate for past infringement. This in a way incentivises hold-out
behavior.89 Hold-out itself can lead to less investment in R&D. On the other hand,
if courts discourage hold-out, for example, when presented with multiple offers by
the patent owner with no counter-offer by the unwilling licensee or other bad faith
negotiation tactics from the SEP infringer, courts could grant an injunction and/or
order high damages. Another way courts could support quick, binding and trans-
parent solutions to encourage good faith negotiations would be if they would
initially make an interim and provisionary decision on FRAND (to decide whether
or not to grant injunction) and make a final and definitive decision on FRAND at a
later stage. This would exert pressure on the parties to engage in negotiation in a
timely manner and in good faith.90
Disclosure The views presented reflect the individual views of the authors. They do not neces-
sarily reflect Ericsson positions.
89Why would an unwilling licensee negotiate a license when it can freely infringe and wait until it
gets sued in the court? Royalty required to be paid by such an unwilling licensee after the court
ruling would also be on FRAND rates, especially in jurisdictions that do not impose damages for
such unwilling conduct.
90Haksoo Ko, ‘Facilitating Negotiation for Licensing Standard Essential Patents in the Shadow of
Injunctive Relief Possibilities’ (2013) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267280>.
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statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
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Chapter 4
The Role of the European Commission
in the Development of the ETSI IPR




There is a large body of research on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory
(FRAND) focused on the licensing of Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) after a
standard has been released to the public and implemented into products, but sur-
prisingly little attention has been given to important role FRAND plays in the
development of standards themselves. This chapter provides an overview of the
European Commission’s (EC) involvement in the development of the European
Telecommunications Standard Institute’s (ETSI) Intellectual Property Right (IPR)
Policy which illuminates on the vital role that FRAND plays in the process of
standards development.
FRAND is usually presented as a bi-lateral matter between SEP holders and
licensees of SEPs which arises after standards have been implemented into prod-
ucts, but there is another absolutely fundamental aspect of FRAND which must not
be over-looked and this is FRAND’s practical and useful role in the rapid devel-
opment and deployment of Information and Communications Technology
(ICT) standards. For students of public policy, a review of the EC’s role in the
creation of ETSI and the EC’s hands-on involvement in the development of ETSI’s
benchmark IPR Policy provides an example of successful—and limited—regula-
tory intervention and enables a deeper understanding of the problems associated
with SEP licensing and the nature of the FRAND obligation.
E. L. Stasik (&)
Avvika AB, Stockholm, Sweden
e-mail: eric.stasik@avvika.com
© The Author(s) 2018
A. Bharadwaj et al. (eds.),Multi-dimensional Approaches Towards New Technology,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1232-8_4
73
2 European Union’s Initiative
The EC is the European Union’s (EU) executive branch. It is the only body in the
EU that promotes the general interest of the EU and takes decisions on the EU’s
political and strategic direction. Green Papers are documents published by the EC to
stimulate discussion on given topics at the European Level. The EC’s Green Papers
initiate a consultation process amongst relevant parties and may also give rise to
legislative actions.1
Thirty years ago, Europe’s telecommunications landscape was a patchwork of
national state-owned monopolies which excluded competition, stifled innovation,
and reeked of economic inefficiency. In 1987, the EC issued a Green Paper on the
Development of the Common Market for Telecommunication Services and
Equipment (COM(87) 290 final) which proposed to liberalize and harmonize the
telecommunications market within the EU.2 There were three components to the
EC’s telecommunications policy; the creation of common technical standards at the
EU level; progressive liberalization of the equipment and services market across the
EU; and the gradual privatization of state-owned telecommunication monopolies
which would be handled at a national level.3 The ambitions of this policy were as
much political as economic. As the EC’s Green Paper observed, not only would ‘a
technically advanced, Europe-wide and low-cost telecommunications network’
improve European competitiveness, it would achieve priority Community goals of
fostering the Internal Market and strengthening Community cohesion.4 It was also
simply a matter of timing. In its Green paper, the EC recognized that an ‘inevitable
trend’ towards ‘the convergence of telecommunications, computing, and applica-
tions of electronics in general’ was already being manifested in ‘the convergence of
certain trends at nation levels’ such as steps already taken ‘to ensure the interoper-
ability of networks, terminals, and services by actively promoting the standardization
policy conducted at European level since 1984.’5 In this light, the EC’s actions could
be seen as an effort to get in front of (or to simply catch up with) policy shifts that
already had their own organic momentum. With regard to the nascent mobile
communications industry, however, the EC took a commanding lead noting that ‘five
different incompatible systems’ were implemented in member states and
1Glossary of Summaries: Green Paper (EUR-Lex) <http://eurlex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/
green_paper.html>.
2European Commission, Green Paper On The Development Of The Common Market For
Telecommunications Services And Equipment (COM(87) 290) final.
3Micheal Blauberger, The Political Economy Of European Union Competition Policy: A Case
Study Of The Telecommunications Industry-By T. Baskoy (2009) 47(4) Journal of Common
Market Studies 919.
4European Commission (n 2) 12.
5ibid 3.
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commenting critically that ‘mobile systems have been one of the worst examples of
lack of Community-wide compatibility’.6 To redress this hodgepodge of mobile
networks, the EC called for the ‘creation of a Community-wide market for terminals
and equipment’ noting that ‘this concerns in particular the promotion of Europe-wide
open standards, in order to give equal opportunity to all market participants’.7
A sense of urgency was provided by the Community goal to complete the Single
Market before 1 January 1993.8 The EC stressed that ‘the time it takes for the
establishment and common application of international standards must be substantially
reduced, in order to maintain future network integrity and to promote the availability
and interoperability of efficient Europe-wide and worldwide services.’9 The EC pro-
posed that the development of harmonized specifications for this liberalized market
would be facilitated by the creation of a new European standardization body ‘based on
the current cooperation of the Telecommunications Administrations within Conference
of Postal and Telecommunications Administration (CEPT) and CEN-CENELEC’,10 but
also having a fair representation of all relevant actors.11
3 Setting up of ETSI
In response to the EC’s proposal, ETSI was set up in 1988 by the European CEPT,
but outside of the CEN-CENELEC framework suggested by the EC. With the
January 1993 deadline rapidly approaching, the EC issued another of its Green
Papers (COM(90) 456 final) recommending that the process of technological inte-
gration had to be accelerated noting that ETSI ‘represented a radical change in
approach to European standardization insofar as it provided for the direct partici-
pation at European level of all interested parties in standardization work rather than
for representation through national delegations headed by the national standards
body’.12 National delegations headed by national standards bodies developed the
CEN-CENELEC framework originally envisaged by the EC. By departing from the
existing model ETSI offered the EC and European industry a choice: ‘… accept the
present structure of standardization in Europe, from which European standards will
emerge relatively slowly over the next few years, or it can decide to commit itself
6ibid, para 4.4.2, 88.
7ibid, s II A, 5.
8European Commission, ‘Single Market Act – Frequently Asked Question’ (2010) <http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_MEMO-10-528_en.htm>; The Single European Act which came into force in
July 1987 set out a timeline for establishing the Single Market over a period up to the end of 1992.
9European Commission (n 2) 13.
10ibid 22.
11Rudi Bekkers and Isabelle Liotard, ‘European Standards For Mobile Communications’ (1999) 3
EIPR 110.
12European Commission, ‘Green Paper on the Development of European Standardization: Action
for Faster Technological Integration in Europe’ COM (90) 456 final, paras 23, 16.
4 The Role of the EC in the Development of ETSI IPR Policy 75
whole-heartedly to the rapid development of common European standards’.13 As the
EC pointed out ‘Efficiency in the production of European standards is, from the EC’s
point-of-view, the highest priority; the operation of Community product legislation
depends upon it’.
The departure from the CEN/CENELEC framework and the introduction of
manufacturers and other interested parties into the standardization process signifi-
cantly complicated matters with regard to intellectual property rights. As the EC
noted in COM(90) 456:
The problem of industrial and [IPRs] as well as patents has become a serious issue within
the context of standardization. Inclusion of such elements within a standard can lead to
reinforcement of a dominant position within the market unless satisfactory conditions for
use of such property have been agreed. In many cases, the lack of adequate procedures to
resolve such problems has slowed down work and hampered the convergence toward
harmonized solutions.14
The EC urged standards bodies ‘to develop practical rules’ and to find ‘adequate
solutions and practical means to resolve IPR and patent issues.’ In particular, the
EC explained:
Whenever a contribution to a European standardization body is covered by IPR or patents,
sufficient information should be provided to allow the experts at the working group level to
base their opinion as to whether to include specifications covered by IPR or patent rights on
the actual situation, including, when appropriate, the applicable licensing conditions. Public
inquiry should be envisaged only if fair and reasonable conditions have been achieved and
duly noted.15
The EC summarized this by concluding: ‘The inclusion of IPR and patents
within standards should be subject to clear rules, which provide for the right of use
of IPR and patents either free or on fair and reasonable terms.’16
The original ETSI Directives issued in March 1988 did not include an IPR
Policy.17 On 16 December 1991, the EC published a follow-up (COM(91) 521
final) to the above-mentioned Green Paper on standards (COM(87) 290 final) in
which it was stated (at paragraph xi) that the EC would welcome the development
by standards bodies ‘of clear conditions for the inclusion of [IPRs] in standards.’
The EC added that, ‘[i]n view of the importance and complexity of the issue for
13ibid, paras 32, 21.
14European Commission (n 12), paras 92, 46.
15ibid.
16ibid, para V, s B (ix), 53.
17‘A proposal for an IPR Policy by the group of incumbent operators known as the GSM
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) ‘that suppliers must grant operators a free worldwide
license for all patents they held to implement GSM, and indemnify operators for all claims of
patent infringement by third parties’ was quickly rejected.’ See Rudi Bekkers and Joel West, ‘IPR
Standardization Policies And Strategic Patenting In UMTS’ (25th Conference on Entrepreneurship
and Innovation, Copenhagen, June 2008).
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[IPR], standardization, competition and trade policy, the EC intend[ed] to produce a
separate communication on the subject.’18
On 27 October 1992, the European Commission published its promised
Communication on Intellectual Property Rights and Standardization (COM(92) 445
final). This Communication set forth ‘a number of principles which [the EC]
believes should form the basis of any internal rules which standards bodies may
wish to elaborate.’19
In COM(92) 445 final, the EC explained that in the event that the rightholder
(i.e., patent holder) agrees to make licenses for SEPs available, ‘the terms for
licenses must be fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory.’ The EC did not elaborate
on what the terms ‘fair and reasonable’ might mean and indeed the EC warned: ‘It
is not feasible or appropriate to be more specific as to what constitutes ‘fairness’ or
‘reasonableness’ since these are subjective factors determined by the circumstances
surrounding the negotiation.’20
The EC also opined that: The terms which the rightholder offers for use of his
rights should be flexible enough to include the possibility, if the parties agree, of
cross-licensing arrangements.21
4 ETSI’s IPR Policy
ETSI’s first attempt at an IPR Policy—the 1993 ETSI IPR Policy and Undertaking—
was approved by the ETSI General Assembly held between 16th and 18th March
1993. From the beginning, the fundamental objective of ETSI’s IPR Policy has been
to enable the production and availability of telecommunication standards ‘based on
solutions which best meet the technical objectives of the European telecommuni-
cations sector….’22 This is important. ETSI’s mandate was not to achieve agreement
on an existing set of standards—such as deciding on which existing national stan-
dards should prevail in the whole common market—ETSI’s mandate was to produce
new standards based on a set of commonly agreed technical objectives. This meant
drawing from the best available existing technology and taking in new innovations,
including technical solutions covered by patents and other IPR. ETSI standards and
technical specifications were, from the beginning, expected to include solutions
covered by patents and other IPRs (those of ETSI members and others).
18European Commission, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Standardization’ COM (92) 445 final,
Brussels, s 1.1.2.
19ibid, s 1.1.4.
20EC (n 18), para 4.3.3.
21ibid, para 4.3.4.
22ETSI Directives, ‘ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy’ (ETSI, 1993) s 2.1.
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There is an important distinction to be made between a Standards Setting
Organization (SSO) and a Standards Development Organization (SDO). SSOs are
primarily concerned with achieving interoperability (such as selecting a standard
railway gauge, defining a unit of weight or measure, or mandating the use of certain
radio frequencies). In contrast, an SDO such as ETSI is concerned both with
achieving interoperability as well as the development of new technologies and
solutions in order to achieve certain performance objectives. Unresolved IPR issues
in SDOs can present significant hindrances to the production of new standards.
The 1993 ETSI IPR Policy and Undertaking was crafted to reduce the risk to
ETSI, Members, and others applying ETSI Standards, that ‘investment in the
preparation, adoption and applications of STANDARDS could be wasted as a result
of an Essential IPR for a standard being unavailable’.23 Patents incorporated into
standards which are not available for license under any terms, or which were not
available for license under FRAND terms and conditions would effectively block
use of the standard frustrating the entire goal of standardization.
The 1993 ETSI IPR Policy also included an Undertaking which, beyond
requiring that licenses granted ‘be non-exclusive, on fair, reasonable, and
non-discriminatory terms and conditions’, imposed a list of items to be included in
the scope of license and the disclosure of licensing terms, including ‘the maximum
royalty rate it will demand for the grant of licenses…’.24
The attempt to define FRAND more specifically within the context of stan-
dardization was met with almost immediate opposition.
These and other arrangements gave rise to a complaint lodged on 22 June 1993 by the
Computer and Business Equipment Manufacturers Association (CBEMA), most of whose
members are also members of ETSI, alleging infringement of both Articles 85 and 86
resulting from… the obligation to sign the undertaking which in CBEMA’s view amounted
to a compulsory licensing scheme.25
The issues raised by the 1993 ETSI IPR Policy and Undertaking were never decided on formally
by the EC, in view of the fact that the undertaking and any reference thereto in the policy were
abandoned by ETSI’s General Assembly of 22 and 23 November 1994 in order to achieve
greater consensus amongst ETSI members, and the complaint subsequently withdrawn.26
23EC (n 18), ss 2.1.12, 4. ‘These economic objectives can, of course, only be realized insofar as
standards are made known and available to the widest possible number of interested parties on fair
and reasonable terms. Consequently, a standard is by definition a publicly-available document and
the technical specification which is not available to all potential users is not a standard.’
24ETSI (n 22) Version 005.
25Articles 85 and 86 are the two fundamental provisions of European competition law as defined
by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. These were renumbered as Articles 81 and 82 by the Treaty of
Amsterdam in 1997, and renumbered once again to the present Articles 101 and 102 by the Treaty
of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) ratified in 2007. Article 101 (formerly 85 and
then 81) prohibits cartels and anticompetitive agreements; Article 102 (formerly 86 and then 82)
prohibits the abuse of a dominant position.
26Official Journal of the European Communities No. C 76/5, Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of
Council Regulation No. 17 concerning case No. IV/35.006 – ETSI interim IPR policy, 28 March
1995.
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ETSI itself found a solution before the EC could take action and the solution was
to use, verbatim, the licensing conditions proposed by the EC in COM(92) 445
final.
The ETSI Interim IPR Policy approved by the ETSI General Assembly at its
specially convened meeting held on 23 November 1994, in Nice, France abandoned
the Undertaking and replaced it with Section 6.1 on the availability of licenses:
‘6.1 When an ESSENTIAL IPR relating to a particular STANDARD is brought to the
attention of ETSI, the Director of ETSI shall immediately request the owner to give within
three months an undertaking in writing that it is prepared to grant irrevocable licences on
fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms and conditions under such IPR to at least the
following extent:
MANUFACTURE, including the right to make or have made customised components and
sub-systems to the licensee’s own design for use in MANUFACTURE;
sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of EQUIPMENT so MANUFACTURED;
repair, use, or operate EQUIPMENT; and
use METHODS.
The above undertaking may be made subject to the condition that those who seek licences
agree to reciprocate.’
The language of Section 6.1 has proven to be durable. In the most current
version of the ETSI IPR Policy (5 April 2017) is reproduced below with changes
from the 1994 version in italics.
6.1 When an ESSENTIAL IPR relating to a particular STANDARD or TECHNICAL
SPECIFICATION is brought to the attention of ETSI, the Director-General of ETSI shall
immediately request the owner to give within three months an irrevocable undertaking in
writing that it is prepared to grant irrevocable licences on fair, reasonable, and
non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms and conditions under such IPR to at least the following
extent:
MANUFACTURE, including the right to make or have made customized components and
sub-systems to the licensee’s own design for use in MANUFACTURE;
sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of EQUIPMENT so MANUFACTURED;
repair, use, or operate EQUIPMENT; and
use METHODS.
The above undertaking may be made subject to the condition that those who
seek licences agree to reciprocate.
Since the 1993 Undertaking was abandoned, and the availability of licenses
under FRAND governed by Section 6.1, ETSI has resisted all attempts to further
define ‘fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory’ beyond the plain, literal meaning
of those words as they were handed down from the EC and placed into the
ETSI IPR Policy.27 The ETSI Guide on IPRs explains that ‘commercial terms are a
27Roger Brooks and Damien Geradin, ‘Interpreting And Enforcing The Voluntary FRAND
Commitment’ (20 July 2010) International Journal of IT Standards and Standardization Research.
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matter for discussion between the IPR holder and the potential licensee, outside of
ETSI.’ members are reminded that ‘Specific licensing terms and negotiations are
commercial issues between the companies and shall not be addressed within
ETSI.’28 The ETSI Guide on IPRs also reminds the chairs of technical bodies that
‘the Chairman shall not allow any discussion on commercial issues in the Technical
Bodies, in particular but not limited to discussions on details of specific licensing
terms and conditions.’29 ETSI’s Guidelines for Antitrust Compliance reminds
participants in ETSI Technical Committees and Working Groups to (please) not
‘Discuss any disclosure of licensing price or terms, product or service price or
terms, pricing methods, profits, profit margins, cost data, production plans, market
share or territories in the course of any ETSI activity.’30 The Horizontal Guidelines
state ‘where participation in standard-setting is unrestricted and the procedure for
adopting the standard is transparent, standardization agreements which … provide
access to the standard on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms will nor-
mally not restrict competition within the meaning of Article 101(1).’31 It has to be
remembered that ETSI consists largely of groups of competitors and ETSI’s own
work is subject to the rules of competition law.32 Moreover, in addition to having to
comply with anti-competition guidelines, as a wholly practical matter ETSI’s
technical working groups are ill-equipped to handle commercial licensing issues.
The EC’s view expressed in COM(92) 445 final that ‘It is not feasible or
appropriate to be more specific as to what constitutes ‘fairness’ or ‘reasonableness’
since these are subjective factors determined by the circumstances surrounding the
negotiation’ proved to be prophetic, practicable, and durable. The explanation is
simple: FRAND promotes the work of standards bodies. FRAND may be an
incomplete solution for the licensing of SEPs (as intended), but it is a complete
solution to the problem of rapidly producing standards which incorporate SEPs and
this is what many SEP users seem to take for granted. ETSI does not determine
what FRAND is because this is expressly not the job of ETSI. ETSI’s job is to
rapidly produce technically advanced standards which are available for public use.
When developing something as complex, large, ambitious and cutting-edge as a
complete mobile telecommunications system, contentious commercial IPR licens-
ing issues are unavoidable. The potential for commercial conflict arising from the
protection of IPR implemented in products and services that comply with ETSI
28‘ETSI Guidelines On IPRs’ (ETSI, 2013) s 4.1.
29ibid, s 2.3.
30‘ETSI Guidelines For Antitrust Compliance’ (ETSI, 2011); ‘ETSI Directives Version 36’ (ETSI,
2016) <https://portal.etsi.org/directives/36_directives_jun_2016.pdf>.
31‘Guidelines On The Applicability Of Article 101 Of The Treaty Of The Functioning Of The
European Union To Horizontal Co-Operation Agreements’ (2011) C11/1-72, s 280.
32‘Regulation (EU) No. 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and Council of 25 October 2002’
(2012) L 316/12-33; ‘The European standardization organizations are subject to competition law to
the extent that they can be considered to be an undertaking or an association of undertakings
within the meaning of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.’
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standards is compounded by ETSI’s large and heterogeneous membership,33 but
thanks to FRAND, the ETSI IPR Policy, and the resulting hands-off treatment of
SEP licensing matters by ETSI as described above, SEP licensing issues do not
themselves present any hinderance to the work of standards development. It is not
difficult to imagine the chaos which would be introduced in the standardization
process if the ‘smartphone patent wars’ were to be fought out during the process of
standardization. In this regard, FRAND is a constructive ambiguity34 which enables
new standards to be peacefully developed and released on a rapid and regular basis
leaving it to implementers, both licensors and licensees, of the standard to solve any
commercial licensing issues once the standard is available for use. This is a feature
of FRAND, not a flaw and this practical side of FRAND is the absolute keystone of
the arch when it comes to producing high-quality standards in quick succession and
getting goods and services available to consumers.
The success of the EC’s creation of ETSI, its role in the development of ETSI’s
IPR Policy, and its limited intervention in defining FRAND is plainly evident. At
the end of 1992, there were six million mobile subscribers in Europe.35 In 2015, the
GSMA reported 430 m unique mobile subscriptions across Europe and a total of
684 m connections (excluding M2M). The GSMA estimates that the whole
ecosystem of the mobile communications industry contributed €500 bn to Europe’s
GDP in 2014 (3.2% of GDP), generated operator revenues in 2015 of €150 bn,
provided 2.3 m direct jobs, and an additional 1.5 m indirect jobs. In terms of
consumer benefit, the GSMA reported: ‘Based on unique subscribers, Europe is the
most penetrated region globally, with a near-saturation level of 78%, nearly 10
percentage points above both North America and CIS.’36 At present, worldwide,
there are nearly five billion unique mobile subscribers and over eight billion mobile
connections (including M2M), producing annual revenues of $1.06 T.37 The World
33‘Current Members’ (ETSI) <http://www.etsi.org/membership/current-members>; ETSI today has
over 800 members from 68 countries across five continents. ‘Amongst our present members are the
biggest players in ICT and there are many government and regulatory bodies. But ETSI is the
home of small companies, universities and research bodies too. Size is unimportant because our
members work together as partners in the standardization process.’
34Drazen Pehar, ‘Use of Ambiguities in Peace Agreements’ in J. Kurbalija and H. Slavik (eds),
Language and Diplomacy (Malta 2001). ‘Constructive ambiguity’ is a term coined in the 1970s by
former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to describe the negotiating tactic where ambiguous
language is inserted into agreements in order to overcome an impasse so that further negotiations
can take place.
35‘Annual Economic Report’ (European Telecommunications Network Operaror’s Association,
2012); N.B. ETNO’s membership of 38 operators in 35 countries is larger than the expanded
Union and includes Turkey, Switzerland, and Norway.
36‘The Mobile Economy Europe’ (GSMA, 2015) <https://www.gsma.com/mobileeconomy/
archive/GSMAMEEurope_2015.pdf>.
37‘Definitive data and analysis for the mobile industry’ (GSMA Intelligence, 2018) https://www.
gsmaintelligence.com accessed 10 May 2017.
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Bank estimates that 96% of the world’s population is covered by mobile radio
services and globally there are 93 mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 people.38
5 Conclusion
The introduction of new generations of mobile standards has been rapid and
relentless—and led from Europe. The world’s first GSM (2G) call was made on 1
July 1991 in a European capital (Helsinki) using equipment supplied by Nokia. In
2001, the world’s first voice call over WCDMA (3G) was made in the UK by
Ericsson and Vodafone.39 The world’s first commercial LTE (4G) network was
turned on in another European capital (Stockholm) in 2009 using equipment sup-
plied by Ericsson.40 As 3GPP noted about LTE (4G): ‘Never before has a new radio
technology made it to the market so quickly and widely after the finalization of the
first version of the standards.’41 In July 2016, the major European operators pub-
lished a 5G manifesto which indicated a target of launching 5G in at least one city
in each of the European member states by 2020.42 Telecom Italia announced that
the world’s first nationwide 5G network will be installed in the micro-state of San
Marino during 2018.43 It is predicted that 5G networks will cover a third of the
world’s population by 2025.44
The primary goal of ETSI’s IPR Policy has been the rapid creation and avail-
ability of new technical standards such as 2G, 3G, 4G, and 5G. In this regard, the
ETSI IPR Policy—and in particular the FRAND licensing commitment—is a
proven, durable and successful result of a sagacious public policy.
38‘World Development Indicators: Power And Communications’ (The World Bank) <http://wdi.
worldbank.org/table/5.11>; Of course, statistics on the number of subscriptions per capita do not
account for people who have multiple phones, or a phone plus a tablet, eReader, or PC with a
cellular connection.
39‘Årsredovisning’ (Ericsson, 2001): ‘After having started production of commercial radio base
stations in March, we completed the world’s first successful call in the field using 3GPP release 99
in April in Vodafone’s network’.
40‘World’s First 4GLTE Network Goes Live Today in Stolkhom’ (Ericsson, 2009) <https://www.
ericsson.com/en/press-releases/2009/12/1360881-worlds-first-4glte-network-goes-live-today-in-
stockholm>.
41Kevin Flynn, ‘3GPP System Standards Heading Into The 5G Era’ (3GPP, 2018) <http://www.
3gpp.org/news-events/3gpp-news/1614-sa_5g>.
42‘The Mobile Economy’ (GSMA, 2017).
43Nic Fildes, ‘San Marino Set To Become First Country Upgraded To 5G Nationwide’ Financial
Times (17 July 2017) <http://mvnoblog.com/san-marino-set-to-become-first-country-upgraded-to-
5g-nationwide-financial-times/>.
44ibid.
82 E. L. Stasik
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this book are included in the book’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the book’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
4 The Role of the EC in the Development of ETSI IPR Policy 83
Chapter 5
All Good Things Mustn’t Come
to an End: Reigniting the Debate
on Patent Policy and Standard Setting
Ashish Bharadwaj, Manveen Singh and Srajan Jain
1 Introduction
The mobile evolution has transformed into a digital revolution. People around the
world, along with hundreds of objects surrounding them, will be connected to
networks as well as to one another, through significantly faster, more robust and
secure wireless communications. A range of industrial sectors will ride on this
transformative digital wave, from automotive, healthcare and energy, to urban
infrastructure, agriculture and entertainment. To facilitate this inevitable change,
reliable networks running on technology standards enabling them, will be needed.
This brings to center stage the critical role of the patent system that incentivizes
technology innovation, and the antitrust laws that ensure that market competition
facilitating innovation is safeguarded. Therefore, compatibility and standardization
are important for most internet-enabled and internet technology products and ser-
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vices which exhibit network effects. Often, the successful diffusion of these prod-
ucts is based on the emergence of a single standard.1 Therefore, network exter-
nalities can be termed as guiding force behind the pathologies in standard setting.2
On a fundamental level, standards are sets of technical descriptions and protocols of
product features that enable interoperability.3
Interoperability is an important requirement for many products embedded with
advanced technologies, to operate seamlessly across various users.4 The last two
decades have witnessed the exponential increase in the number of communication
devices around the world, including smartphones, which has led to increase in the value
of devices to each user.5 Over the past two decades, consensus-driven associations have
been developing interoperability standards, which work in partnership within the
standard setting organization (SSO).6 It is no secret that, these SSOs have played a key
role in changing the landscape of the information and technology industry. They are
tasked with the responsibility of fostering a regime of rapid technological innovation by
balancing the interests of their members. Their membership comprising of standard
essential patent (SEP) holders or licensors on one hand and implementers or licensees
on the other. However, the composition of all the participants can vary greatly in size.
While the SEP holders are involved in research and development (R&D), and look to
maximize their earnings from licensing out their SEPs, the implementers look to seek
licenses from SEP holders on terms that are fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory
(FRAND), in order to use the patented technology in the manufacturing of
standard-compliant end-use products. However, at least in theory, an SEP holder can
always engage in opportunistic behavior in order to charge extra royalty from the
implementor for licensing the standard than the real worth of the standard at the time of
creation of the standard by the SSO.7 SSOs, such as the Institute of Electrical and
Electronic Engineers Standards Association (IEEE-SA) aid in facilitating the interop-
erability of systems.8 Published SSOs standards outline technical requirements that
1Nicholas Economides and Lawrence White, ‘One-Way Networks, Two-Way Networks,
Compatibility, and Public Policy’ in David Gabel and David F. Weiman (eds), Opening Networks
To Competition: The Regulation and Pricing of Access (Springer 1998).
2ibid 14–15.
3ibid 5.
4Ashish Bhardwaj and Manveen Singh, ‘A Single Spark can start A Prairie Fire: Implications of
the 2015 Amendments to IEEE-SA’s Patent Policy’ (2018) 46(4) Capital University Law Review
(forthcoming).
5Max Miceli, ‘Smartphones Are Taking Over the US’ (US News & World Republic, 30 October
2015) <https://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-mine/2015/10/30/smartphones-are-taking-over-
the-us> accessed 24 March 2018.
6ICF, ‘Standards and Interoperability In Electric Distribution Systems’ (2016) US Department of
Energy 7.
7Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro, ‘Patent Hold-up and Royalty Stacking’ (2007) 85 Texas Law
Review 1992.
8IEEE 2030-2011 (American National Standards Institute 2013); ANSI/IEEE 1420.1-1995
(American National Standards Institute 2002); IEEE 1849-2016 (American National Standards
Institute 2018); The quantity of standards set forth just by the IEEE are extensive.
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guarantee interoperability across and within devices that utilize the standardized tech-
nologies.9 The success of a standard’s implementation in the future is dependent upon
the SSOs inclination to disclose and license their SEPs. In order to minimize the
potential ex-post hold-up situation, the SSOs place themselves as a fundamental part of
the standard setting process.10 Therefore, the patent holders adequately disclose the
licensing of their SEPs on FRAND terms.11 The patent holders follow the patent
policies developed by the SSO which require the participants to disclose all their SEPs
during the process of standard development.12 The policies are based on the operating
performance and the impact in the market for standards, technologies, and products.13
According to the policy for licensing, the patent holders are required to grant licenses of
their SEPs to implementers on FRAND terms.14 These commitments guarantee that
implementers are able to obtain SEP licenses to sell their standards-compliant products
under SEPs.15
The SSOs formed in the US are best considered ‘quasi-formal’ groups that are
typically large, international organizations that ‘share many of the characteristics of
formally-recognized groups.’16 Their significance is to enable virtually all products
on which people depend in modern society to interoperate with one another and to
consequently encourage informed consumer choice, higher efficiency, and further
innovation. This takes the shape of essential products like communication equip-
ment, telecommunication devices, electrical mechanisms and other mechanical
systems to interoperate. SSOs, such as the IEEE-SA, the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), and the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU), facilitate this by developing and managing
9Patrick Curran, ‘Standard-setting Organizations: Patents, Price Fixing, and Per Se Legality’
(2003) 70 University of Chicago Law Review 983; ‘Technical standards, and the SSOs that
develop them, are a common and essential element of the modem economy. As early as 1987,
more than four hundred standard-setting groups had developed approximately thirty thousand
voluntary standards. Because standard setting requires particular expertise in specialized product
areas, new SSOs are constantly forming to meet the needs of niche markets.’
10Josh Lerner, ‘Patent Disclosures and Standard-Setting’ (2016) 2 National Bureau of Economic
Research, Working Paper No. w22768 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2851539>.
11ibid.
12Joseph Farrell, ‘Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-up’ (2007) 74 Antitrust Law Journal 603.
13Neil Gandal and Pierre Regibeau, ‘Standard Setting Organizations’ in Panagiotis Delimatsis (ed),
The Law, Economics and Politics of International Standardization (Cambridge University Press
2015) 394–395.
14ibid 609.
15Jorge Contreras, ‘National Disparities and Standards Essential Patents: Considerations for India’
in Ashish Bharadwaj, Vishwas H. Devaiah and Indranath Gupta (eds) Complications and
Quandaries In The ICT Sector (ebook, Springer 2018) 1, 5 <https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.
1007/978-981-10-6011-3_1#citeas>.
16Jorge Contreras, ‘Technical Standards, Standards-setting Organizations and Intellectual
Property: A Survey of the Literature (with an Emphasis on Empirical Approaches)’ in Peter S.
Menell & David Schwartz (eds) Research Handbooks on the Economics of Intellectual Property
Law: Analytical Methods (Edward Elgar 2017) 3 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2900540>.
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technical standards, which are essentially technical requirements for products implanted
with patented inventions.17 While standards themselves are not patentable, standard
compliant products i.e. products manufactured in accordance with provided standards,
‘generally satisfy the statutory requirements for patent protection.’18 The overarching
objective of standards bodies is to ensure availability of standardized technologies to
any implementer under licensing terms that vary across standards and standards bodies.
This chapter attempts to explain the details of amendments to the patent policy of
IEEE-SA implemented in early 2015 in order to analyze the impact of these amend-
ments on incentives for innovation and dissemination of innovation in essential tech-
nologies that are enabled by a well-functioning SSO. Broadly, the policy changes
redefined the prevailing meaning and terms of how SEP licensing will be carried out.
This includes the obligation set by IEEE that an SEP holder has to accept in the form of
a Letter of Assurance (LoA), a promise to license its essential patents on FRAND terms
to any implementer of a standard administered by IEEE.19 Part one shall begin with a
brief introduction to standard setting, followed by an explanation to importance of
standard setting for the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) industry in
part two. Part three discusses the WiFi standard and the developments that led to the
IEEE-SA’s policy changes. Part four shall discuss the changes introduced by the 2015
policy, while placing emphasis on the core issues of royalty rates, injunctive relief, and
reciprocal licensing, followed by the reactions to the revised policy from various
stakeholders. Part five elucidates on the implications of the 2015 amendments, followed
by the shift in US antitrust enforcement vis-à-vis SSO IPR policy in part six. Finally,
part seven of the chapter presents the conclusion to the chapter.
2 Importance of Standards Setting
Standardization is set through two main mechanisms: the explicit co-ordination of
product designs around generally agreed technological measurements, and the de
facto market dominance of a particular technology.20 Standards in technology has
various purposes, ‘including reducing product variety, maintaining product quality
and performance, measurement, codifying knowledge, assuring compatibility,
articulating a vision of the industry, assuring health and safety, and controlling
17ibid; ‘About ETSI’ (ETSI) <http://www.etsi.org/about>; ‘About International Telecommunication
Union’ (ITU) <https://www.itu.int/en/about/Pages/default.aspx>.
18Contreras (n 16) 8.
19Art MacCord, ‘Standard Essential Patents: The IEEE Approach’ IEEE Power Electronics
Magazine (September 2015) 10; the patent holder can alternatively circumvent by declining to
submit an LoA or submitting a negative LoA expressing their noncommitment to license SEPs.
20Justus Baron and Daniel Spulber, ‘Technology Standards and Standards Organizations: Introduction
to the Searle Centre Database’ (2015) 3 Northwestern Law & Economic Research Paper No. 17-16
<http://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-faculty/searlecenter/innovationeconomics/documents/Baron
_Spulber_Searle%20Center_Database.pdf>.
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environmental quality.’21 In order to witness the success of standards, implementers
must have access to patented technologies in which they receive returns on their
investments. Patent holders deserve a market reward, without which they are
unlikely to further invest in future innovation and future standards setting.
There are two types of patents in standardization- minor or non-essential patents,
and essential patents. The minor or non-essential patents relates to the technology,
for which an alternative exist.22 On the other hand, it is not possible to bypass the
essential patent because they require the operation of a standard in order to func-
tion.23 Much like patents, there are two types of disclosures: generic and specific.
The former relates to cost containment and therefore the need for thorough patent
search is avoided.24 Whereas, the latter i.e. specific disclosures are required to
disclose all the relevant Intellectual Property (IP) because they invite concerns
about antitrust claims.25 ‘If the firm neglects to include all IP that could be relevant,
even if the omission was unintentional, the firm may be vulnerable to antitrust
claims if it seeks to enforce its patent portfolio.’26 Unlike the case for specific
disclosures, generic disclosures guarantee ‘that all relevant patents will be available
on FRAND terms.’27 The challenge lies with valuing the patented technologies.
Scholars have argued that government intervention is required on the grounds that
clarity is required with respect to the meaning of FRAND.28 There is a need for
government intervention through policy recommendations.29 In order to improve
the standards setting process, transparency should be made viable by either the
standards developing organizations (SDOs) or the regulators. Until a transparent
system is in place, the implementers may continue to face challenges in identifying
the parties from whom they must seek the SEP.30
The process of licensing all the patents going into a standard is remarkably
complex. The main issue in the context of standards setting is that of collective
adoption defects or collective action. Theoretically, adoption of products which has
21ibid 1.






28David Teece and Edward Sherry, ‘The IEEE’s New IPR Policy: Did the IEEE Shoot Itself in the
Foot and Harm Innovation?’ (2016) Tusher Center for the Management of Intellectual Capital
Working Paper Series No. 13, 6. <http://businessinnovation.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2014/07/Tusher-Center-Working-Paper-No.-13.pdf>.
29European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission on Standards Essential Patents
for a European digitalised economy’ COM (2017) 712 final <https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-
regulation/initiatives/ares-2017-1906931_en>.
30Kirti Gupta and others, ‘Highlights and Economic Analysis’ (IP LeadershIP, Brussels, 2017)
<https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/CPI-Gupta-Wong-
Ervin-Coniglio-Naegele.pdf>.
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interoperability issues are prone to the collective action problems such as excess
inertia, where a prevailing standard which requires to be displaced is not displaced
because of user commitments and path dependency. Further, excess momentum,
which takes place when an old standard is not sustained or maintained due to other
alternatives also hinders the adoption of products which exhibit network exter-
nalities. These collective action issues, in the existence of network externalities, are
mainly the result of spillovers across users that are not essentially internalized
correctly. The collective interest of the standards implementers gives way to the
private interest of the SEP holders and there is a potential likelihood of the latter
being able to exploit its position to extract more favorable rate of royalties ex-post,
due to the vagueness of FRAND terms. This phenomenon is commonly referred to
as ‘patent hold-up’ and has led to calls for a more precise definition of FRAND in
the IPR policies of SSOs.
Most SSOs require their members to license patents essential to the imple-
mentation of the standard, i.e., the SEPs, on FRAND terms. The problems of
potential anticompetitive harm are addressed by FRAND commitments.31 These
commitments reflect an ex-ante competitive commitment by the SEP holder to the
implementer of the standard.32 This gives SEP holders the ability to engage in
‘hold-up’ and ex-post market power.33 Shapiro has said that ‘[t]he need to navigate
the patent thicket and hold-up is especially pronounced in industries such as
telecommunications and computing in which formal standard setting is a core part
of bringing new technologies to market.’34 Therefore, once the technology
involving patents is locked into a standard and investments towards the develop-
ment of standard compliant products have been made, working around the tech-
nology, or switching over to an alternative may become difficult for the technology
implementers, leading to an increase in the bargaining power of the SEP holders.
However, this area of contention has been the theory and empirical evidence of
hold-up are at odds with each other, due to there being almost no empirical evi-
dence of hold-up, since the very inception of the term in the context of standard-
ization. Claims that SEP holders abuse their market position has been found to lack
empirical rigor, which fails to establish patent hold-up as an institutional practice
that needs a regulatory correction. Recent scholarly work, including research done
by Stephen Haber, Alexander Galetovic and Ross Levine suggests that the concept
of patent hold-up is based on an incorrect or fallacious understanding of the
31Janusz Ordover and Allan Shampine, ‘Implementing the FRAND Commitment’ (2014) 14(1)




34Carl Shapiro, ‘Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard
Setting’ (2001) 1 Innovation Policy and the Economy 119.
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underlying economic principles in the domain of SEP markets.35 The stakeholders
around the world have failed to point out to any solid evidence of market failure and
instead, there has been a tendency to draw conclusions based on merely few
examples of abuse to support broad regulations with no or little attention given to
the potential adverse impacts.36 When implementers fail to undertake investment in
R&D of new technologies or make commercial use of the existing technology
without proper licenses, the entire ecosystem of innovation and technological
progress comes under stress. An excessive scrutiny of the actions of SEP holders in
the past few years has resulted in the imposition of unilateral good faith obligations
on the SEP holders, while the implementers enjoy lower liability to comply with
FRAND terms in such patent licensing contracts.
However, there exists concerns that specific SEP holders may look to prohibit
rivals from pertinent downstream markets by either imposing discriminatory terms
or declining to license the IP which is important for the practice of the standard.37
Further, it is asserted that few SEP holders are likely to abuse their additionally
gained market power by including their IP in the standard to charge inordinate
prices.38 The last two decades has witnessed a substantial increase in the number of
patents covering standardized technologies which has led to alleged threats of
stacking and patent hold-up and thus a sequence of policy measures have been
proposed to address these issues.39 Therefore, one would be led into believing that
bargaining power is concentrated in the hands of technology developers, with none
lying with the technology implementers. However, there is also a possibility of
opportunistic conduct on behalf of technology implementers in the form of ‘reverse
hold-up’ or ‘hold-out’. ‘Reverse hold-up’ or ‘hold-out’ situations arise on the
refusal of technology implementers to pay royalties to SEP holders at a reasonable
rate, after the standard has been set and significant R&D costs have been incurred
by the SEP holders. Since it is obligatory on the part of licensors to charge royalties
based on FRAND terms, even on successful litigation by the SEP holders, the
maximum royalties recovered from licensees are, what they would have paid to the
licensors in the first place, had they not indulged in hold-out. In such a scenario, one
would like to believe that there is a significant incentive for technology imple-
menters to hold-out and refuse to pay royalties to the SEP holders. In order to get
35Alexander Galetovic and Stephen Haber, ‘The Fallacies of Patent- Hold-up Theory’ (2017) 13
(1) Journal of Competition Law & Economics 1; Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber and Ross
Levine, ‘An Empirical Examination of Patent Hold-up’ (2015) 11(3) Journal of Competition Law
& Economics 549.
36Anne Layne-Farrar, ‘Patent Hold-up and Royalty Stacking Theory and Evidence: Where Do We
Stand After 15 Years of History?’(2014) OECD DAF/COMP/WD (2014) 84.
37Roberto Grasso, ‘Selected Issues in SEP Licensing in Europe: The Antitrust Perspective’ in
Ashish Bharadwaj, Vishwas H. Devaiah and Indranath Gupta (eds), Complications and
Quandaries In The ICT Sector (ebook, Springer 2018) 79–81 <https://link.springer.com/chapter/
10.1007/978-981-10-6011-3_1#citeas>.
38ibid.
39Contreras (n 16) 5.
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returns on its investment, the SEP holder will either have to litigate to obtain any
royalties or simply give up on the royalties and let the implementer freeload on their
SEPs. Such a behavior on the part of implementers has been duly recognized by
antitrust agencies globally.40 The issue lies in there being no definite definition of
FRAND, as SSOs have disclaimed their role in interpreting, adjudicating or
establishing boundaries of FRAND licensing terms.41 This lack of conviction has
lead to recent litigation over FRAND commitments and thus it has contributed to
leaving the details of licensing arrangements over to bilateral negotiations among
the potential licensees and patent holders.42 In order to successfully implement the
standard, the implementers are required to have access to patented technologies for
which they receive returns on their investments. The patent holders who have
invested in the development of the IP deserve a market reward, without which they
are unlikely to further invest, and contribute innovative technologies to future
standard developing process.
3 IEEE-SA 2015 IPR Policy Change and the WiFi
Standard
3.1 Importance of 802.11 (The WiFi Standard)
A considerable number of standards for wireless telecommunications were devel-
oped under coordination of the IEEE-SA platform.43 The set of specifications for
WiFi chipset that enables interoperability of electronics connected via wireless
network can also be referred as IEEE 802.11 WLAN standard.44 IEEE-SA Standard
802.11 is the main WiFi standard that has a dedicated long list of companies that
have vowed their patents to be utilized in the development and utilization of the
standard.45 The procedure of asking for guarantees from SEP holders and
40Richard Epstein and Kavyan Noroozi, ‘Why Incentives for ‘Patent Hold-out’ Threaten to
Dismantle FRAND and Why it Matters’ (2017) Berkeley Technology Law Journal.
41Jorge Contreras, ‘A Brief History of FRAND: Analysing Current Debates in Standard Setting
and Antitrust Through a Historical Lens’ (2015) 80 Antitrust Law Journal 39.
42ibid.
43Nicolo Zingales and Olia Kanevskaia, ‘The IEEE-SA patent policy update under the lens of EU
competition law’ (2016) 12(2–3) European Competition Journal 195.
44IEEE 802.11tm Wireless Local Area Networks The Working Group for WLAN Standards
<http://www.ieee802.org/11/>.
45‘Response of Cisco Sys., Hewlett-Packard Co., Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., & Research in Motion
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standard’s subsequent upgrades are detailed on IEEE-SA’s website.46 The written
guarantee given by each SEP holder, called a Letter of Assurance (LoA), enu-
merates the terms on which the patent is committed to the SSO.47 Figure 1 (Total
number of individual companies making declarations to IEEE for 802.11 WiFi
Standard) depicting the number of companies that have pledged their patents to
IEEE for the development of 802.11 WiFi standard. The graph indicates that there
is a substantial rise in both negative LoAs and in missing LoAs where the IEEE did
not receive an LoA in response. There is an 83% decline in the net average supply
rate of nonduplicate LoAs for the IEEE 802.11 k and h standards.48
The IEEE-SA within its regulatory framework develops a set of rules that
ensures standard-setting activity is guided by minimum procedural safeguard.49 The
IEEE-SA standards development stage which includes the proposal to standardize,
approval of a standard, defining the technical conditions of the standard etc. are
guided by openness, due process, balance and right of appeal.50
However, a substantial number of IEEE-SA members who had pledged their
patented technology for the development of high value standards raised disap-
provals to the substance of the proposed amendments and expressed their objections
for the manner in which the process of forming the new policy took place.51 This
strong opposition came from key patented technology developers such as
Qualcomn, Nokia, Ericsson, GE, IBM etc. These key patent developers contributed
an aggregate of 45% of all IEEE declared SEPs in 2007–2013 and further con-
tributed an aggregate of 36% of all IEEE LoA during 2007–2013.52 The ‘Other’
companies accounted for about 64% of rest of the SEPs. The graphical represen-
tation of fraction of IEEE LoAs contributed in 2007–2013 has been produced
46‘Submitting a Project Request’ (IEEE-SA) <http://standards.ieee.org/develop/par.html>.




50Standards Board Bylaws, art 2.1, 5.3.3, ‘IEEE-SA Standards Board Operations Manual’
(IEEE-SA, December 2015) <http://standards.ieee.org/develop/policies/opman/sb_om.pdf>.
51‘Email from Qualcomm, Nokia, NSN, & Blackberry to the Members of the SASB’ (Email)
(IEEE, 9 June 2014) <http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/pp-dialog/email/msg00287.html>; (describ-
ing that the deliberations of the Patent Committee Ad Hoc were not open to non-members and
there was no public announcement of any vote taken by the Ad Hoc, but that they did receive a
number of comments and responded to them). The email known as the ‘Four Company Letter’ lays
out grievances on behalf of Qualcomm, Inc., Nokia Solutions, Networks Oy, Nokia Oy, and
Blackberry Ltd. and illustrates, in their view, how the policy and its formation was wholly
inconsistent with the SASB’s principles of ‘consensus, due process, openness, and balance.’
52Ron Katznelson, ‘The IEEE Controversial Policy on Standard Essential Patents: The Empirical
Record Since Adoption’ (Symposium on Antitrust, Standard Essential Patents, and the Fallacy of
the Anticommons Tragedy, Berkeley, California, 29 October 2016) <https://works.bepress.com/
rkatznelson/80/>.
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hereinbelow in Fig. 2 (Key Patented Technology Developers contribution to all
IEEE licensing LoAs in 2007–2013).53
Among the many issues and complaints raised by the critics of the policy, was
the arrangement of the committee not taking account of the interests of the patent
owners and most of their suggestions and comments were not considered.54 Rather,
the amendment to the policy was used by some of the major technology imple-
menters to accommodate their own commercial interests, and any involvement on
the part of patent holders was left to the final stages of the standardization process.55
Fig. 1 Total number of individual companies making declarations to IEEE for 802.11 WiFi
Standard. Source: Authors’ calculations based on IEEE-SA Standards Board (PatCom) records of
letters of assurance for IEEE standard 802.11 and amendments (‘IEEE 802.11 and Amendments
Patent Letters of Assurance’ (IEEE-SA) <http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/pat802_11.
html>)
53ibid.
54Email (n 51); they express their view that the basic principles of due process were not adhered to.
They complained that the consensus—the bedrock of the standard-setting process of IEEE tech-
nical standards—was missing from the deliberations and formulation stage of the new policy.
55ibid.
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3.2 Developments Leading to the IEEE-SA’s IPR Policy
Change
In 2015, IEEE revised its policy and became the first SSO in the world to establish
regulation of FRAND royalties. In a post Rambus world, the US courts have
necessarily enforced FRAND commitments between SEP holders and implementers
to avoid opportunistic behavior by parties.56
The patent policy was a series of important developments that eventually led to
the changes to the patent policy being implemented by IEEE. It started off with the
IEEE’s attorney highlighting the insufficiency of the 2007 patent policy in dealing
with the problem regarding the vagueness of FRAND—especially since the SEP
holders had only twice made use of the opportunity to disclose the most restrictive
terms—out of a possible forty occasions in which an LoA committing to license on
FRAND terms was issued.57 This was followed by the Board of Governors of
IEEE-SA giving its approval to the changes in December 2014.58 Finally, in
February 2015, the Antitrust Division of the US in a Business Review Letter sent
by the Department of Justice (DOJ) to the IEEE, communicated their intent to not
Fig. 2 Key patented technology developers contribution to all IEEE licensing LoAs in 2007–
2013. Source Ron Katznelson, ‘The IEEE controversial policy on Standard Essential Patents the
empirical record since adoption’
56Ericsson Inc. v D-Link System Inc. (2014) Federeal Circuit, 773 F.3d 1201, 1231; Microsoft
Corp. v Motorola Inc. (2015) 9th Circuit, C-14-35393 (citing Microsoft Corp. v Motorola, Inc.
(2013) W.D. Wash No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 2111217, 2).
57Zingales (n 43) 21–22.
58‘Board of Governors Resolutions’ (IEEE-SA) <https://standards.ieee.org/about/bog/resolutions.
html>.
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challenge the proposed patent amendments.59 The IEEE has asked for Business
Review Letter because of concerns raised by few members with respect to the
policy changes in addition to the procedure that was followed by IEEE-SA to draft
and approve the amendments, thereby raising concerns of antitrust investigation of
the organization.60 Apparently, the DOJ seemingly based its inference regarding the
policy changes resulting in ‘pro-competitive effects on policy preferences rather
than a careful rule of reason analysis’.61
Thus, on 8 February 2015, the Standards Board, the Board of Directors, the
Board of Governors, and the Patent Committee (PatCom) of the IEEE, voted to
approve the amendments to the patent policy of IEEE-SA.62 The updates to
IEEE-SA went into effect on 15 March 2015 and received a lot of feedback and
criticism.63 The updates see, inter alia, essentially decreased royalty fees from large
manufacturers especially in the ICT sector, and compensation for a company’s IP
was no longer corresponded on the value of the end device, but instead on a
percentage of the price of the component that is patented.64 This re-examined
approach to calculate royalties is viewed as a realistic and practical approach to
define FRAND licensing as it pertains to SEPs, to an extent that the innovators get a
fair return for their sizable investment in the development of innovation, while
taking into account easy entry for new suppliers and new products.65 However,
some proponents of the update are of the opinion that it could possibly hinder
59‘Response to Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Incorporated’ (US Department of
Justice, 2 February 2015) <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/311470.html>.
60Letter from Michael Lindsay, Esq., Dorsey & Whitney LLP, on behalf of IEEE, to Hon. William
Baer, Assistant Attorney General US DOJ (30 September 2014) <https://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/atr/legacy/2015/02/17/311483.pdf>; (requesting a business review letter pursuant to
the Department’s business review procedure, 28 C.F.R. s 50.6).
61Stuart Chemtob, ‘Carte Blanche for SSOs?: The Antitrust Division’s Business Review Letter on
the IEEE’s Patent Policy Update’ (March 2015) 1 Competition Policy International Antitrust
Chronicle 2 <https://www.wsgr.com/publications/PDFSearch/chemtob-0315.pdf>; (The DOJ’s
devaluing of concerns about harm to innovation incentives has serious implications that will affect
the choices made by other SSOs, as well as enforcement policies of foreign competition authorities
looking to US antitrust law for guidance on the proper relationship between antitrust laws and IP
laws).
62Rudi Bekkers, ‘Concerns and Evidence for Ex-post Hold-up with Essential Patents’ (2015)
Eindhoven University of Technology, Working Paper <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2663939>.
63ibid; Benjamin Li, ‘The Global Convergence of FRAND Licensing Practices: Towards
‘Inoperable’ Legal Standards’ (2016) 31 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 429 (discussing the
mixed reviews received by the new policy); Deepa Sundararaman, ‘Inside the IEEE’s Important
Changes to Patent Policy’ (Law 360, 3 April 2015) <https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/
3ca3eb00-8a2a-4ebb-b031-53e17586f8be/?context=1000516> accessed 24 March 2018 (dis-
cussing the split reactions of patent holders). The author notes that the policy has support from
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innovation.66 The antitrust division of the US DOJ absolutely failed to check, and,
in fact, blessed the amendments made by IEEE to its by-laws that include policies
that govern use of patents in IEEE standards. These amendments seek to reduce the
royalty rates demanded by SEP holders in addition to diminishing the ability of SEP
holders to enforce their patent rights. The antitrust division, applauding the efforts
of the IEEE, entirely ignored the possible effects of these amendments that may
potentially facilitate collusion among implementers.67 The amendments seem to
have addressed certain ambiguities, yet created a potential to lower the leverage for
patent owners by undermining their patents, which can potentially lead to an
explosion of litigation. It appeared that the ad hoc committee in charge of drafting
the policy changes met in closed sessions and sought remarks and comments on the
draft from members.68
4 Key Changes and Reactions to the IPR Policy
Amendments
4.1 Key Changes to the IEEE IPR Policy
The 2015 IEEE-SA patent policy significantly changed the meaning of FRAND.
Among the many amendments, the core amendments seeked to waive the right of
injunction from the SEP holder until the SEP holder has successfully litigated the
claim of infringement against the unlicensed implementor in the court of appeals.
Another major amendment was made in relation to the royalties based on ‘smallest
saleable’ implementation of any portion of the standard. Further, the SEP holders
were also made to agree to not require reciprocal cross-licensing except of the same
standard. Hereinbelow, the authors will discuss the changes brought by the policy
with special reference given to the core issues, i.e. royalty rates, injunctive relief
and reciprocal licensing.
4.1.1 Royalty Rate
Article 6.1 of the IEEE’s IP policy defines the term ‘compliant implementation’ as
‘any product (e.g., component, sub-assembly, or end-product) or service that
conforms to any mandatory or optional portion of a normative clause of an IEEE
66Li (n 63) 463–464; ibid.
67Bharadwaj (n 4).
68Email from Qualcomm, Nokia, NSN and Blackberry to the Members of the SASB (9 June 2014)
<http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/pp-dialog/email/msg00287.html> (describing that the deliberations
of the Patent Committee Ad Hoc were not open to non-members and there was no public
announcement of any vote taken by the Ad Hoc, but that they did receive a number of comments
and responded to them).
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Standard.’69 Therefore, it takes into account the product components and other
sub-assemblies as products for the purpose of standard-compliant implementa-
tion.70 The amended policy defines ‘reasonable rate’ as follows:
Reasonable Rate shall mean appropriate compensation to the patent holder for
the practice of an Essential Patent Claim excluding the value, if any, resulting from
the inclusion of that Essential Patent Claim’s technology in the IEEE Standard. In
addition, determination of such Reasonable Rates should include, but need not be
limited to, the consideration of:
• The value that the functionality of the claimed invention or inventive feature
within the Essential Patent Claim contributes to the value of the relevant
functionality of the smallest saleable Compliant Implementation that practices
the Essential Patent Claim.
• The value that the Essential Patent Claim contributes to the smallest saleable
Compliant Implementation that practices that claim, in light of the value con-
tributed by all Essential Patent Claims for the same IEEE Standard practiced in
that Compliant Implementation.
• Existing licenses covering use of the Essential Patent Claim, where such
licenses were not obtained under the explicit or implicit threat of a Prohibitive
Order, and where the circumstances and resulting license are otherwise suffi-
ciently comparable to the circumstances of the contemplated license.71
Instead of leaving the parties with liberty to calculate the royalties, with this
policy change, the IEEE, endorses a royalty calculation method based on the value
of the chipset, despite knowing the fact that there is a possibility of several other
functions of the device using the contributed technology.72 This change in the
method of calculation of the royalty base is a derivation from the Smallest Saleable
Patent Practicing Unit (SSPPU) concept, that is widespread predominantly in the
US73 and is indeed a severely disputed rule as the new rule vis-à-vis royalties would
lead to a reduced royalty being paid by large manufacturers, especially in the
wireless sector.74 However, the IEEE’s endorsement of the smallest saleable
69IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws, s 6.1 (IEEE 2017) <http://standards.ieee.org/develop/
policies/bylaws/sb_bylaws.pdf>.
70Sai Deepak, ‘Standard essential Patents: Comparing IP Rights Policies’ (International Law
Office, 29 February 2016) <http://www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/Intellectual-
Property/International/Saikrishna-Associates/Standard-essential-patents-comparing-IP-rights-
policies>.
71IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws (n 69).
72Bill Merritt, ‘Why We Disagree with the IEEE’s Patent Policy’ (EE Times Blog, 27 March 2015)
<http://www.eetimes.com/author.asp?doc_id=1326144>.
73Anne Layne-Farrar, ‘The Practicalities and Pitfalls of the Smallest Saleable Patent Practicing
Unit Doctrine: A Review of Teece and Sherry’ (2016) 4 Les Nouvelles- Journal of the Licensing
Executives Society <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2855148>.
74John Walko, ‘IEEE Waves Through Controversial Patent Policy’ (EE Times Blog, 17 February
2015) <http://www.eetimes.com/author.asp?section_id=36&doc_id=1325706>.
98 A. Bharadwaj et al.
compliant implementation lacks lustre, since the concept of SSPPU was imple-
mented in the US in order to avoid undue bias and jury disarray in jury trials.75 It
has been described as ‘a ‘term of art’ that was developed through judicial decision
in patent infringement cases in the US.’76 The jury in such cases weighed several
competing and prospective patent valuation techniques (for the infringed patent) to
arrive at SSPPU as one way to assign a value to a patent.77 Moreover, the SSPPU
model is not a prevalent rule in the US, as has been emphasized in many cases in
the past; one of them being Ericsson v D-Link, wherein the Federal Circuit held the
licenses to be negotiated without taking into account any consideration of the
entire-market-value rule (EMVR) or the SSPPU model and rather adhering to
comparable licenses based on the value of the end product.78 The Ericsson case
follows the rule laid down in Virnetx Inc. v Cisco Systems79 with respect to the
royalty rate.80 It was held that ‘though there were undoubtedly differences between
the licenses at issue and the circumstances of the hypothetical negotiation, the jury
was entitled to hear the expert testimony and decide for itself what to accept or
reject.’81 The ultimate advantage resulting from a patent and the reasonableness of
the licensing terms is majorly dependent on the specificity of the patent and the
product to be licensed rather than the smallest saleable value derived from the end
product.82
It is highly improbable for the baseband component to carry the value of all the
essential patents. Few courts around the world have ruled out that the baseband
component is able to capture most of the essential features, while on the other hand,
other courts have ruled that the value of the SEP far exceeds the value baseband
75Keith Mallinson, ‘Free and Fair Trade in IP Would Be Crushed by Compulsory Chip-based SEP
Licensing’ (IP Finance Blog, 9 September 2016) <http://www.wiseharbor.com/pdfs/Mallinson%
20licensing%20based%20on%20device%20or%20SSPPU%2009Sept2016.pdf>.
76ibid.
77ibid; Mallinson states that in a typical patent infringement case, where only a handful of patent
rights are at issue and the scope of the claims of each patent is defined by the court, it might be
possible to establish the value of SSPPU. However, it is not a substitute for how a patent licensor
and licensee value an entire portfolio of patents. Mallinson claims that SSPPU ‘ignores realities of
licensing’, and even if it is applied, in value terms, it would eventually come close to the value of
the entire device.
78Ericsson (n 56); David Long, ‘Federal Circuit Gives Guidance on Litigating RAND Royalty
(Ericsson v. D-Link)’ (Essential Patent Blog, 5 December 2014) <https://www.essentialpatentblog.
com/2014/12/federal-circuit-gives-guidance-on-litigating-rand-obligation-ericsson-v-d-link/>.
79Virnetx Inc. v Cisco Systems (2014) Federal Circuit, 767 F.3d 1308.
80David Long, ‘Patent Case: Federal Circuit Provides Guidance on Damages That Eschews Use of
Nash Bargaining Solution (Virnetx v Cisco)’ (Essential patent Blog, 17 September 2014) <http://
www.essentialpatentblog.com/2014/09/patent-case-federal-circuit-provide-damages-guidance-that-
eschews-use-of-nash-bargaining-solution-virnetx-v-cisco/>.
81Virnetx (n 79) 1331.
82ibid 1327.
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components.83 Further, many of the essential features have never been litigated and
there is nothing available on public record to ascertain their value. Using the same
as a base for real-world arm’s-length negotiations between sophisticated market
players84 and circumscribing the terms of licensing negotiations was never going to
be well-received by members of the association.85 The change in the policy might
lead to a situation wherein the SEP owners draft claims in order to broaden what
constitutes a ‘Compliant Implementation’. Therefore, what constitutes a ‘reason-
able’ royalty may still need to be ascertained, taking into account the specific patent
and its use in issue, instead of the smallest saleable Compliant Implementation. The
best way to fix the issue of the calculation of royalty base might just be best catered
by a continued case-by-case basis of what is deemed as reasonable.86
4.1.2 Injunctive Relief
The exclusion of an SEP holder from seeking injunctive relief against an unwilling
licensee was another drastic change brought by the change in policy.87 However,
the only exception was the scenario involving the litigation based on FRAND
royalty and the initial stage of appeal being exhausted.88 The amendment regarding
the injunctive relief is phrased as:
A statement that the Submitter will make available a license for Essential Patent Claims to
an unrestricted number of Applicants on a worldwide basis without compensation or under
Reasonable Rates, with other reasonable terms and conditions that are demonstrably free of
any unfair discrimination to make, have made, use, sell, offer to sell, or import any
Compliant Implementation that practiced the Essential Patent Claims for use in conforming
with the IEEE Standard. An Accepted LoA that contains such a statement signifies that
reasonable terms and conditions, including without compensation or under Reasonable
Rates, are sufficient compensation for a license to use those Essential Patent Claims and
preclude seeking, or seeking to enforce, a Prohibitive Order except as provided in this
policy. The Submitter of an Accepted LoA who has committed to make available a license
for one or more Essential Patent Claims agrees that it shall neither seek nor seek to enforce
a Prohibitive Order based on such Essential Patent Claim(s) in a jurisdiction unless the
implementer fails to participate in, or to comply with the outcome of, an adjudication,
including an affirming first-level appellate review, if sought by any party within applicable
deadlines, in that jurisdiction by one or more courts that have the authority to: determine
Reasonable Rates and other reasonable terms and conditions; adjudicate patent validity,
enforceability, essentiality, and infringement; award monetary damages; and resolve any
83Farrar (n 73).
84Alden Abbott, ‘Patent Policy Change Would Undermine Property Rights and Innovation’ (The
Heritage Foundation, 4 March 2015) <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/03/patent-
policy-change-would-undermine-property-rights-and-innovation>.
85ibid.
86Virnetx (n 79) 1333.
87Sundararaman (n 63).
88ibid.
100 A. Bharadwaj et al.
defenses and counterclaims. In jurisdictions where the failure to request a Prohibitive Order
in a pleading waives the right to seek a Prohibitive Order at a later time, a Submitter may
conditionally plead the right to seek a Prohibitive Order to preserve its right to do so later, if
and when this policy’s conditions for seeking, or seeking to enforce, a Prohibitive Order are
met.89
The above amendment in the policy is in opposition to the universally
acknowledged availability of injunctive relief to SEP holders against unwilling
licensees.90 Under the revised policy, the right to injunctive relief is available to the
SEP holder only in case the implementer of a standard fails to abide by the decision
of an arbitral tribunal or the court.91 This has led to a further reduction of the
leverage held by the SEP holder over unwilling licencees/infringers. Furthermore, it
can also result in increased litigation between SEP holders and implementers,92
which is in complete contrast to administrative decisions that have reflected upon
the right of SEP holders to seek injunctive relief and conclusively acknowledged
that it should be made available against unwilling licensees/infringers.93 In the case
of Apple, Inc. v Motorola Inc., the Federal Circuit opined that there was no per se
rule prohibiting a party from seeking injunctive relief on an SEP covered by an
agreement to license on FRAND terms.94 The court further held that ‘an injunction
may be justified where an infringer unilaterally refuses a FRAND royalty or
unreasonably delays negotiations to the same effect.’95 Further, in the Apple case
and in the consent decree settlement in the case of Google/Motorola, the United
States Federal Trade Commission (USFTC) called out for injunctive relief to be
available against unwilling licensees/infringers in limited situations.96
By making the right to seek injunctive relief conditional, the new policy fails to
provide an viable explanation as to its exclusion or conditional availability to patent
holders who have made commitments in compliance with FRAND terms,97 pro-
vided that it forms part of the patent enforcement system in the US. For example,
89IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws, s 6.1 (n 69).
90Micheal Frohlich, ‘Report-Work Plan Item 5: Availability of Injunctive Relief for




92Thomas Stromberg and Marc Roualet, ‘New IEEE Policy Affects Standard Essential Patent
Holders’ (Lexology, 1 April 2015) <http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b145d1e6-
f42d-4655-813f-de1490a980e5>.
93Frohlich (n 90).
94ibid 9; Apple, Inc. v Motorola, Inc. (2014) Federal Circuit, Case No. 12-1548.
95ibid 1332.
96Motorola Mobility L.L.C. v Google Inc. (2013) Federal Trade Commission 121-0120.
97IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws, s 6.1 (IEEE, Draft No. 39 2014) (IEEE-SA Draft Standards)
<http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/pp-dialog/drafts_comments/SBBylaws_100614_redline_current.
pdf>.
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often SEP holders seek injunctions against implementers when they have infringed
their IP without seeking licenses from the SEP owner.98 The possibility of refusal to
pay royalties or patent hold-out or refusal to enter into good faith negotiations is
often disregarded.99 As Administrative Law Judge Theodore Essex commented in
the public version of his initial determination in the ITC Investigation,
…standards implementers using the technology incorporated in the standard but without
seeking a license or without engaging in licensing negotiations can lead to SEP holders
filing a suit against and the standards implementers being forced to pay royalties at the
FRAND rate, the same FRAND rate at which they were willing to pay the royalties in the
first place.100
Such a behavior by the SEP implementers might lead to shift in the entire risk
associated with the licensing negotiations onto the SEP holders.101 In the words of
Judge Essex, ‘taking away the right to seek injunctive relief from SEP holders not
only “puts the risk of loss entirely on the side of the patent holder,” but also
“encourages patent hold-out”, which is as unsettling to a fair solution as any patent
hold-up might be.’102
4.1.3 Reciprocal Licensing
The third significant change introduced in the new policy concerns reciprocal
licensing. ‘Reciprocal Licensing’ as defined under the new policy means:
…that the Submitter of an LoA has conditioned its granting of a license 67 for its Essential
Patent Claims upon the Applicant’s agreement to grant a license to the Submitter with
Reasonable Rates and other reasonable licensing terms and conditions to the Applicant’s
Essential Patent Claims, if any, for the referenced IEEE Standard, including any amend-
ments, corrigenda, editions, and revisions. If an LoA references an amendment or corri-
gendum, the scope of reciprocity includes the base IEEE Standard and its amendments,
corrigenda, editions, and revisions.103
There is a preclusion for the SEP holder from conditioning the grant of a license
on a reciprocal access to the negotiator’s non-SEP patents.104 The SEP holder is
now at a disadvantageous position as the access to key standardized technology
98Daryl Lim, ‘Standard Essential Patents, Trolls, and the Smartphone Wars: Triangulating the End
Game’ (2014) 119 Penn State Law Review 1.
99Teece (n 28).
100In re Certain Wireless Devices with 3G and/or 4G Capabilities and Components Thereof
(2014) United States International Trade Commission, Inv. No. 337-TA-868 113–14.
101ibid 114.
102ibid; Sandra Badin, ‘Patent Hold-up or Patent Hold-out? Judge Essex adds his voice to the
SEP-FRAND Debate’ (Intellectual Property Alert, 10 July 2014) <https://www.mintz.com/
newsletter/2014/Advisories/4096-0714-NAT-IP/4096-0714-NAT-IP.pdf>.
103IEEE-SA Standards Board Bylaws s 6.1 (n 69).
104Sundararaman (n 63).
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must be granted without having a reciprocal access to other party’s technology as
this aspect becomes the vital part with respect to commercialization of that SEP
holder’s products.105 This scenario will most likely leave the owners of multiple
SEP’s in an unfavorable position as compared to those involved in non-SEP
patenting. Further, large scale businesses have the risk of disincentivizing from
developing and investing in such patents which can possibly elevate the quality of
standards setting, resulting in the lower level of usefulness of such vital standard.106
This will most definitely lead to royalty stacking where, there will be a dis-
ruption of existing licensing practices which in turn comprises of cross licensing
negotiations, leading to a possibility of higher downstream prices. In essence, it is a
manifestation of the ‘Cournot Complements’ principle, which states that the overall
price of complimentary inputs sold by different firms is likely to be higher, as
opposed to the inputs being sold by a single entity.107
The process Cross-Licensing addresses this issue, where two firms will have
smooth negotiations between holders of complimentary patents, subsequently
lowering the making cost for standards-compliant products. It is essential for
bringing the royalty claim down and ensuring freedom to operate. But, this policy
update may most likely result in consumers paying a higher cost for products, while
strangulating innovation efforts.108
4.2 Major Reactions to the IPR Policy Changes
There has been a lot of disdain with regards to the policy changes by the high
technology industries personnels as it has completely altered the terms on which
patents can be made available to implementers of patented technology.109
According to Irwin Jacobs, CEO of Emeritus, ‘[T]he proposed changes, and the
process that has been followed, threaten the reputation and future of the IEEE as a
developer of advanced technology’.110 Many other CEOs have voiced their opinion
against the policy changes and believe that the changes provide short-term com-
mercial benefits to investors by lowering fees that could create long-term effects and
thus reduce the incentive for R&D.111
105IEEE-SA Draft Standards (n 97).
106Abbott (n 84).
107Ramon Casadesus-Masanell, ‘Competing Complements’ (2008) 1 Harvard Business School





5 Reigniting the Debate on Patent Policy and Standard Setting 103
Royalties that are based on the smallest saleable compliant implementation rule
is the biggest and most arguable change that has been brought about by this new
policy.112 Some of the most convincing claims against the use of this model for
calculation of royalty are as follows:
First, the return value received by an implementor is not a true reflection of the
smallest saleable unit to that particular product, this usually is different at most
times. It is indeed a fact that the entire process of negotiation between the SEP
holders and implementers centers on the true value of the patented technology to the
implementer.113 The value can be considered to be in between the smallest saleable
unit and compliant implementations.114 Thus, it can be argued considering the
smallest saleable compliant implementation model, if considered as the base for
royalty determination will put the implementor in an advantageous position over the
technology provider, which is unfair. According to David Teece and Edward
Sherry, there lies a ‘synergistic value’ between the smallest saleable unit and other
compliant implementations. These ‘synergic values’, at times which probably flows
from smallest saleable unit and this provides an additional value to the product
which further leads to increased returns on the products to the implementer.115 The
focus if given to the smallest saleable unit will mean undue focus and hence
ignorance of this ‘synergistic value’(which can be considered in certain cases) and
its share not being transferred to the SEP holder..
In the case of Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial Research Organisation
(CSIRO) v Cisco Systems, Inc., involving WLAN cellular technology, Justice Davis
stated:
The benefit of the patent lies in the [technological] idea, not in the small amount of silicon
that happens to be where that idea is physically implemented. … Basing a royalty solely on
chip price is like valuing a copyrighted book based only on the costs of the binding, paper,
and ink needed to actually produce the physical product. While such a calculation captures
the cost of the physical product, it provides no indication of its actual value.116
In a similar manner, it might be a far fetched idea to consider basing the cal-
culation of royalties on chipset prices would adequately compensate the SEP
holder, especially in those cases where the calculation of royalties based on chipset
value was not made adequately. Therefore, in all likelihood, there is a possibility of
patent holders unable to receive adequate royalties reflected from the prices of
112David Long, ‘IEEE’s Controversial Proposed Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Policy
Amendments’ (Essential Patent Blog, 3 February 2015) <https://www.essentialpatentblog.com/
2015/02/ieee/>.
113Teece (n 28) 3–4.
114ibid.
115ibid 8.
116CSIRO v CISCO Systems, Inc. (2015) United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit 809 F.3d
1295,1300 quoting CSIRO v CISCO Systems, Inc. (2014) E.D. Tex. No. 6:11-cv-343, 2014 WL
3805817, 11; Jorge Contreras, ‘CSIRO v CISCO: The Convergence of RAND and Non-RAND
Royalties for Standards-essential Patents’ (Patently-o, 7 December 2015) <http://patentlyo.com/
patent/2015/12/convergence-royalties-standards.html>.
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chipset or profit margins.117 From the economic perspective and public policy, the
amendments to the IEEE policy have attracted a lot of criticism amounting to
FRAND benefiting the implementers at the expense of patent holders.118
5 Policy Implications and the Post 2015 Era at IEEE
Since the implementation of new IEEE patent policy on 15 March 2015, the SSO
has received a number of duplicate, negative and missing LoAs. The duplicate
LoAs are counted as LoA restatements filed for amendments, standards, or revi-
sions to LoAs which were previously accepted from the same patent holder. On the
other hand, negative LoAs means accepted LoA in which the patent holder refuses
to license under the new IEEE patent policy. Further, missing LoA means a dis-
closed essential patent claim which was sought by IEEE but did not receive an
Accepted LoA as of 30 September 2016. The 2015 amendments to the IEEE IPR
policy led to a notable decrease in non-duplicate LoAs.119 An 86% surge has been
observed in the submission of negative LoAs by the patent owners with respect to
the IEEE flagship 802.11 WiFi standard.120 As a result, one can substantiate, that
the patent holders are unwilling to invest in R&D and licence their SEPs under the
new policy. The graphical representation hereinbelow in Fig. 3 (Changes in the
number of LoA after 2015 IEEE policy change) reflects upon the changes in the
number of LoAs after IEEE policy change in 2015.121
Figure 3 illustrates the changes in the number of LoAs after 2015 IEEE policy
change. It can be seen that the average number of positive LoA’s per year before the
policy change of 2015 stood at 22.8.122 However, this number declined signifi-
cantly to an average of only two (2) LoAs per year after the policy change in
2015.123 Further, one can also substantiate that there was 91% reduction of positive
LoA’s after the policy change.124 The 10 negative LoA’s submitted after the policy
change were made by companies such as Nokia (6), Ericsson (2), Interdigital
(1) and Orange (1).125
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A total number of fourty (40) LoAs have been submitted after the policy change.
Figure 4 (802.11 LoAs submitted after policy change) depicting the inflation in the
number of positive LoAs due to gross counting of submitted LoAs.126
Figure 4 showcases the total number of LoAs that have been submitted after the
policy change. We can see that since the change in policy in 2015, the submission
rate of LoAs has significantly decreased. Since the policy change in 2015, 22 LoAs
have been repeated, 12 LoAs are negative and only six LoAs are new positive.127
Overall, empirical data suggests that post-March 2015, 85% of LoAs are either
repeat or negative.128
The standard participants, at the time of standard setting do not have a sense of
the market value that will gradually grow making it rather difficult to agree on the
value of standard technology or the essential patents to that product. In this scenario
the parties have no other option than to agree to a framework of use which is also in
Fig. 3 Changes in the number of LoA after 2015 IEEE policy change (after removing duplicates
and repeats). Source Kirti Gupta, ‘IEEE Patent Policy Revisions: An Empirical Examination of
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simple terms knows as FRAND licensing terms. Figure 5 below shows the changes
in the LoAs received by IEEE-SA for the different versions of the 802.11 standard
during 2011–2017.129
Figure 5 is sourced from the PatCom Board meetings from 2011 to PatCom Board
meetings held on 4 December 2017.130 PatCom posted the number of LoA’s that it
received and accepted. In the meeting held on 6 June 2012 one negative LoA was
submitted131 and overall, a total number of ten negative LoA’s were received last year
i.e. 2017.132 Further, PatCom held their last meeting on 6 March 2018 and it was
reported that a total of 12 LoAs were accepted since the December 2017 meeting, out
of which three LoAs were negative.133
Fig. 4 802.11 LoAs submitted after policy change. Source Kirti Gupta, ‘IEEE Patent Policy
Revisions: An Empirical Examination of Impact’ (American Bar Association)
129‘IEEE 802.11 and Amendments Patent Letters of Assurance’ (IEEE-SA) <http://standards.ieee.
org/about/sasb/patcom/pat802_11.html>.
130‘PatCom Meeting Information’ (IEEE-SA) <http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/
meetings.html>.
131‘PatCom Meeting Minutes’ (IEEE-SA, June 2012) <http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/
patcom/0612mins.pdf>.
132‘PatCom Meeting Minutes’ (IEEE-SA, December 2016). <http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/
patcom/1216patmins.pdf>; ‘PatCom Meeting Minutes’ (IEEE-SA, September 2016) <http://
standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/0916patmins.pdf>; ‘PatCom Meeting Minutes’ (IEEE-SA,
June 2016) <http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/0616patmins.pdf>; ‘PatCom Meeting
Minutes’ (IEEE-SA, March 2016) <http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/0316patmins.pdf>.
133‘PatCom Meeting Minutes’ (IEEE-SA, March 2018).
5 Reigniting the Debate on Patent Policy and Standard Setting 107
Another major change caused by the IEEE policy change in 2015 which has
found empirical evidence is the decline in the number of 802 Project Authorization
Requests (PARs).134 PARs is the means by which all standards projects gets ini-
tiated within the IEEE-SA.135 They define the scope, purpose and contact points for
the new project.136 They kickstart the progress of new standards, amendments or
revisions for all 802 Working-Groups (WGs).137 Figure 6138 (No. of 802 Project
Authorization Requests) depicting empirical evidence on decrease in the number of
802 PaRs after the policy change.
Figure 6 illustrates the IEEE 802 PAR dataset within the period of 2009–2017.
A careful analysis of these findings showcases a decline of (4.2%) in new PARs in
the 802 WGs after the policy change.139
The Innovation Alliance has called for a reversal to the policy changes, as they
suggest it would ‘arbitrarily reduce the level of protection given to WiFi related
Fig. 5 Change in the LoAs received by IEEE-SA for 802.11 during 2011–17. Source Authors’
calculations based on minutes of meeting of IEEE-SA Standards
134Gupta (n 121).
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patents, impose unconstitutional limits on patent rights, and end the traditional
market-based negotiation process for these patents by imposing what amount to de
facto compulsory licensing.’140 The IEEE has failed to give any definitive clause on
how they plan to deal with known but unpledged SEPs. However, FAQ 13 states
that the PatCom ‘will review the circumstances and make a recommendation to the
IEEE-SA Standards Board.’141
6 Shift in US Antitrust Enforcement vis-à-vis SSO IPR
Policies
A series of recent developments on competition policy and antitrust enforcement, in
the US, coupled with the views echoed by the newly appointed Assistant Attorney
General (AAG) of the US Department of Justice, Makan Delrahim, carve out a
fresh strategy to embrace technological changes led by innovation, patents and
digitization. Some of the speeches delivered by the new antitrust chief are so
powerful that they have come to not just redefine a new path for policymaking in
antitrust and IP, but to also reignite the fire on technology and innovation. Since his
confirmation as the new AAG on 27 September 2017, Mr. Delrahim has made nine
Fig. 6 No. of 802 Project Authorization Requests. Source Kirti Gupta, ‘IEEE Patent Policy
Revisions: An Empirical Examination of Impact’ (American Bar Association)
140Walko (n 74).
141Katznelson (n 52).
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speeches, out of which he has touched upon several aspects of the current IP policy
of the US antitrust division in at least five of them. Introducing the new IP policy
for the first time in November 2017, the AAG stressed the need to revive appre-
ciation of the rights of innovators to boost innovation.142 In the context of SEPs, he
recognized that leaning of the US. Department of Justice towards implementers of
standards could potentially damage future innovation, and that competition
authority ‘must exercise greater humility’ in the application of antitrust laws to
SEPs.143 Building upon his ideas in his address at the US Embassy in Beijing in
February 2018, the AAG noted that the focus of competition authorities must be on
the promotion and growth of innovation rather to short term pricing. He built upon
the idea of protection and promotion of rights of SEP holders, which is at the core
of the new policy. The policy change envisages that competition laws should not
work to stifle innovation by creating disincentives for innovation. In furtherance of
this view, he also placed emphasis on IP courts, as they would be better equipped to
resolve disputes between implementers and SEP holders.
The right of SEP holders to exclude others from the use of their patented
technology has long been lost in the tussle between implementers, innovators and
standards setting bodies. In a series of recent speeches, the head of the Antitrust
Division, Makan Delrahim, has claimed that patentees have an absolute ‘property
right to exclude’ that is automatically followed by an injunction. He has questioned
the existence of patent hold-up (by which patentees demand supracompetitive
royalties after their patents are incorporated into industry standards). Because these
views represent a significant divergence from the broad, bipartisan consensus that
has emerged over the past decade, former FTC Chairman Tim Muris and Michael
Carrier from Rutgers Law School have written a three-page letter in response.144
AAG Delrahim reinstated this principle and was of the belief that:
patents are a form of property, and the right to exclude is one of the most fundamental
bargaining rights a property owner possesses. Rules that deprive a patent holder from
exercising this right—whether imposed by an SSO or by a court—to innovate and worsen
the problem of hold-out.145
142Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, US Department of Justice,
‘Competition, Intellectual Property and Economic Prosperity’ (Speech delivered at US Embassy,
Beijing, 1 February 2018) <https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1030496/download>.
143Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, US Department of Justice,
‘Take It to the Limit: Respecting Innovation Incentives in the Application of Antitrust Law’
(Speech delivered at USC Gould School of Law, California, 10 November 2017) <https://www.
justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1010746/download> 10.
144Michael Carrier and Timothy Muris letter to Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney General,
Antitrust Division, US Department of Justice.
145Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, US Department of Justice,
‘Good Times, Bad Times, Trust Will Take Us Far: Competition Enforcement and the Relationship
Between Washington and Brussels’ (Speech delivered at College of Europe, Brussels, 21 February
2018) 4.
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He observed that if the innovators are deprived of rights over their property by
means of controlling their licensing agreements and use of information without
correct licensing, then such practices will have a severe impact on the quality and
quantity of innovation. In the case of SEPs, many a times the SEP holders have
been deprived of their right to exclude under the garb of FRAND licensing, and
have also been denied their right to injunctions, making FRAND a unilateral
obligation. In Mr. Delrahim’s view, this right of exclusion granted by IP law should
not be taken away in the name of utilitarian policies of technical standardization.
This trend is also problematic as the innovators of standardized technologies are
faced with a lower value and unfair commercialization of their invention. In the
long run, lower returns on patents that are critical to the working of key technical
standards are likely to reduce investment in future innovation.
Subsequently, the AAG’s delivered remarks in Brussels where he acknowledged
that bridging the gap between ‘policy and substance’ is essential for enforcement of
competition laws in the European Union (EU) and US.146 He stressed on the goal of
competition policy in protection of consumers and market competition, rather than
protection of competitors, which is a policy stand espoused by both the EU and US
antitrust establishments. Reiterating the long-standing view of the antitrust division
of DOJ that (a) patent laws incentivize innovation for the benefit of consumers, and
(b) licensing of patent rights is generally pro-competitive, the AAG indicated an
approach that is quite different from the one that prevailed during the Obama
administration. He underscored the fact that antitrust enforcement in the current and
earlier regimes has ‘strayed too far’147 in their protection of the rights of imple-
menters (of patent-based technical standards), at the expense of rights of innovators
(holders of patents that become a part of the standard).
In his latest speech in March, the AAG drew attention to the enduring belief
underlying the American innovation ecosystem that the rights over IP belongs to the
inventor as much as they belong to the public. He referred to a ‘new Madison
approach’, after James Madison, who is considered by the AAG to be the true
founding father of US patent law.148 The AAG is attempting to recreate an envi-
ronment where the rights of patent holders are respected, in order to move away
from a ‘retro-Jefferson’ view that patents confer too much power that should be
curbed.149 The new Madison approach seeks to regulate the innovation environ-
ment in a way that preserves sufficient incentives to innovate. He relates the premise
of Madison’s theory with issues around SEP licensing, regulation of SSOs, and the
role of antitrust law in regulating patents. The Madison approach forms part of the
146ibid 13.
147Delrahim (n 142).
148Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, US Department of Justice,
‘The “New Madison” Approach to Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law’ (Speech delivered at
University of Pennsylvania Law School, Philadelphia, March 16, 2018).
149ibid 3–4.
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basic argument of Delrahim, which is centered on the fundamental right of the
patent holder to exclude.150
In addressing the misplaced role of antitrust law in policing the hold-up problem,
the AAG restates that when antitrust agencies scrutinize private contracts in the
context of patent licensing, it adversely affects innovation and market competi-
tion.151 The AAG succinctly alluded to the following:152 First, that application of
antitrust laws to the issue of hold-up has, so far remained devoid of empirical data,
and, therefore, an evidence-based enforcement of antitrust is called for. Second,
antitrust law enforcement bodies should ensure that their actions do not transform a
private voluntary licensing regime for SEPs into a regime of compulsory licensing.
Third, in line with the Madison approach, it is important to look at regulation of
SSOs to deter any possibility of collusive behavior.
What is put forth now is a new evidence-based approach in the application of
antitrust law to the needs and concerns of both implementers and SEP holders to
facilitate a symmetric application of the law. This brings a significant change in the
industry by introducing much needed clarity in the roles of implementers and
innovators. It also brings to the fore the often neglected issue of ‘hold-out’.153
According to Mr. Delrahim, patent hold-out poses a more serious challenge than
hold-up as it arises due to under-investment by implementers or their refusal to take
a license. He states, ‘It is important to recognize that innovators make an investment
before they know whether that investment will ever pay off. If the implementers
hold-out, the innovator has no recourse, even if the innovation is successful.’154 The
potentially serious impact on the market and on the consumers of such opportunistic
behavior in the industry is a critical issue that will be focused upon in the new
policy. Mr. Delrahim’s emphasis on the symmetric nature of patent hold-up and
hold-out as a recurring issue in his speeches throws light on several
thought-provoking issues. If implemented, not only is it likely to broaden the scope
of antitrust scrutiny, it would also restore balance to an otherwise imbalanced
discourse prevailing today. The actions of implementers, including unnecessary
delays in the licensing process, patent trespassing, unresponsiveness to negotiation
and placing all liability of FRAND on the innovators, will also be under the
scanner, as proposed by the AAG. The earlier stand of DOJ was that the
involvement of antitrust agency was necessary in investigating FRAND commit-
ment for SEPs to judge the actions of SEP holders,155 but now the department is
150ibid 5.
151Delrahim (n 148) 9.
152Delrahim (n 145) 4.
153Ashish Bharadwaj, ‘A Note on the Neglected Issue Of Reverse Patent Hold-up’ (2018) 13(2)
Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 3.
154Delrahim (n 145) 6.
155Dell Computer Corp. (1996) Federal Trade Commission 121 F.T.C. 616; Union Oil Company
of California (2005) Federal Trade Commission 140 F.T.C. 123; Rambus Inc. (2006) Federal
Trade Commission 142 F.T.C. 98.
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seeking to regulate the actions of SSOs. Intervention by an antitrust agency is called
for where anticompetitive actions and collusive behavior by prospective licensees is
detected, including restricting royalty rates and diluting right to seek injunctive
relief by SSOs. Other than minimizing unnecessary intervention by antitrust
authorities, such narrowing of the scope of antitrust investigation is said to open the
larger market to more competition and innovation. The aim of correcting market
distortions arising from any asymmetry in bargaining power may not be fulfilled
using antitrust law, and may, in fact, may lead to an adverse impact on innovation.
Under the new policy highlighted by the AAG, focus will shift to include the
actions of SSOs and implementers, which may be anticompetitive, and require
interference of antitrust authorities. This will see the antitrust authorities taking
cognizance of, and carefully scrutinizing any anticompetitive behavior of imple-
menters and SEP holders.
The new policy change also focuses on ‘other remedies’, including civil and
contractual reliefs, in place of antitrust law. Observing unwarranted involvement of
antitrust agencies in certain disputes related to patents in high technology, AAG
Delrahim stated that remedies, other than those offered under antitrust law, could be
relied upon to ensure that interests of all parties are preserved. The reason is that
several issues involving implementers and SEP holders are largely associated with
some form of contractual arrangement. In cases where such contracts are breached
or contractual duties are reneged, damages and injunctions should be the primary
source of relief instead of antitrust remedies under common law. Common law
remedies for contractual disputes (including those around licensing of essential
patents under terms that are fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory) allow both
parties a chance to present their case and have a dialogue on the interpretation and
implication of each prong of ‘FRAND’.156 Common law remedies allowing set-
tlement of a contractual dispute between private individuals better serves the
interests of the parties without an interference of public regulatory bodies.
AAG’s remarks rekindles the belief that public law regulation of private con-
tracts may create more market distortions, including the problem of
under-investment or reverse patent hold-up, instead of solving them. The inter-
vention of antitrust enforcers should be limited or ‘exercised with humility’ to avoid
any adverse effect on market competition. Antitrust law should be expanded to
include ‘non-competition public interest factors that balance competition and
non-competition factors with equity.’157 It can also be inferred from Mr. Delrahim’s
speeches that his new policy proposal supports self-regulation of SSOs.
A regulatory approach followed by the SSOs that is more precautionary of
156Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v Mercury Electronics & Anr (2014) High Court of Delhi, I.A
No. 3825 of 2013 and I.A No. 4694 of 2013 in Civil Suit (Original Side) No. 442 of 2013;
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (Publ) v Intex Technologies (India) Limited (2015) (62)PTC90
(Del); Microsoft (n 56).
157Koren W. Wong-Ervin, ‘Protecting Intellectual Property Rights Abroad: Due Process, Public
Interest Factors, and Extra-Jurisdictional Remedies’ George Mason University Law & Economics
Research Paper Series 17-18.
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assessing their own rules vis-à-vis antirust laws would result in less intrusion of
antitrust authorities in standard setting and development processes. In sharp contrast
to the beliefs of Mr. Delrahim’s predecessors, the new approach restores faith in
free market and throws light on equality in the treatment of parties. The new
approach lays emphasis on a harmonious application of both these principles to
allow the market to function smoothly without an overreach of antitrust laws to
unilateral conduct of implementers and innovators.158
7 Conclusion
While it cannot be denied that innovation is the driving force behind economic
growth in ICT and allied sectors, it is a fact that in spite of this, the patent holders
receive only a small fraction of the social benefits attached to their patented
inventions. Hence, any potential situation leading to the reduced return on these
inventions would automatically result in an adverse effect on innovation ecosystem
in ways that might be societally undesirable.159 The benefit that a claimed invention
can offer to an end product seems to have been ignored by the changes made in the
existing policy.
It has also excluded the value of Essential Patent Claim’s technology in the IEEE
standard from the scope of ‘reasonable rates’.160 This may possibly result in all the
implementers being benefited, leaving patent holders at loss with respect to the
gains from standardization. This will be a huge blow on the patent holder as their
investment in research and development of technology will not gain them any
profit. This will inevitably lead to patent holders settling for rates negotiated
ex-ante, before the incorporation of the technology in the standard. One may argue
this is a possible way of shutting down a hold-up, but nonetheless it is unfair and
undesirable as the fair share in overall gains is denied.161
The changes in the policy creates an imbalance between the rights of innovators,
in which they lose value on their patents, and the implementers of technologies.
This may lead to market imbalance as there is interference in the market processes
by incongruously restricting the terms of licensing negotiations. The incentives to
create technology then becomes considerably less which is a matter of concern. The
consequences of which is reduced economic incentives to contribute technology to
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The need of the hour is to strike the right balance, in both government intervention
and SSO’s IPR policies between the interest of implementors and innovators.163 The
balance is important in order to determine ‘a practical and fair definition of what fair
and reasonable is and what amounts really to non-discriminatory licensing’.164 In the
absence of balance, the investments will not be made in open standards which will
result in a lot of proprietary standards instead of proprietary technologies.165 The
imbalance will lead to reverse hold-up or hold-out, increased SEP litigation, a
reduction in SSO participation, reduced arm’s length SEP licensing and cutting of
R&D expenditure from SEPs to unencumbered non-essential technologies.
The importance of IPR policies of SSOs should never be ignored while consid-
ering the entire system of things involving standardization. In case of an imbalance of
incentives between the patent holders and the implementers, then there is a likelihood
of some of the foremost contributors of technological advancement and standard-
ization becoming unresponsive in future standard setting process of a SSO, and in
few cases, there persist a risk of these contributors diverting their technological
contributions to standard setting activities in other SSO’s.
Acknowledgements The authors thank Tohru Yoshioka-Kobayashi, Kirti Gupta, Byeongwoo
Kang, and Eric Stasik for their inputs. The authors acknowledge excellent research assistance from
Dushyant Kaul at Jindal Global Law School.
Disclosure Opinions expressed in the work are independent of any research grants received from
governmental, intergovernmental and private organisations. The authors’ opinions are personal,





5 Reigniting the Debate on Patent Policy and Standard Setting 115
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this book are included in the book’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the book’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
116 A. Bharadwaj et al.
Part II
Evolving Jurisprudence in Standard
Essential Patents
Chapter 6
Interpreting the ‘FRAND’ in FRAND
Licensing: Licensing and Competition
Law Ramifications of the 2017 Unwired




Professors, pundits, patentees and practitioners around the world have spent nearly
a year (as of the publication of this book) trying to decipher the significance of the
UK High Court’s judgements in the Unwired Planet v Huawei case.1 No one can
seriously doubt that Mr. Justice Birss, who presided over both the technical and
economic trials in the Unwired Planet cases, has added helpfully to the corpus of
common law relating to FRAND licensing. Many also have attempted to tease out
of these judgements new guidance under competition law as it relates to patent
licensing post the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) judgement in
Huawei v ZTE.2
This chapter provides perspectives of a licensing practitioner. As discussed here,
the Unwired Planet judgements should be read first and foremost as clarifications of
(1) what fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) means; (2) how to
assess what is FRAND in a particular context; and (3) how to derive FRAND in the
face of evolving telecoms standards and licensing practices. The competition law
points in the case, while interesting to many, ultimately were distant secondary
considerations in the court’s judgement. However, those points are discussed below
mainly to show that the court was careful to build a record reflecting its consideration
N. D. Mesel (&)
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of the CJEU’s elaboration of the process parties must follow in FRAND patent
licensing cases where injunctive relief is a possibility.
Much literature exists already applying familiar antitrust-oriented economic
analysis to the process of FRAND licensing. As a practical matter, however,
competition law constructs and analysis only come into play when a licensing
dispute ends up in court. Parties that practice the inventions in patents but do not
want to pay a fair royalty invoke terms such as ‘dominant position’ and ‘patent
hold-up’. What happens in the marketplace during license negotiations, though,
rarely involves a conscious application of competition economics theory. Rather,
the parties will—as Unwired and Huawei did here—fight it out in hard-nosed
negotiations until one of them (usually the patentee) seeks judicial relief.
In court, the experts bandy economic terms and hypothetical pricing models to
argue their clients’ respective cases as to the meaning of FRAND. Some of the
economic and pricing models might resonate with antitrust lexicology. Despite
efforts to make the entire case sound like a competition law proposition, as the
recalcitrant licensee is prone to do, the overlap of competition and patent law here is
very narrow. Pricing discrimination, as a competition law concept, and the
‘non-discriminatory’ prong of patent licensing FRAND law are the only areas of
overlap in the legal Venn Diagram.
Certainly, some of the most interesting and provocative analysis of the Unwired
Planet judgements come from commentators who are much better versed in anti-
trust economics than this author. But those authors possibly are not aware, or have
not considered, some of the nuances that inform how Justice Birss approached his
reasoning and reached his conclusions in the two judgements.
Here is where this chapter attempts to shed additional light. Building on the
author’s perspective as General Counsel of Unwired Planet as the economic case
was developed, this chapter lays out in Part two the context leading up to the
economic trial, presents in Part three an analysis of the High Court’s two judge-
ments after the economic case, and contends in Part four that the court is mostly
right but in parts wrong on how FRAND, as matter of patent licensing practice and
competition law, should be applied going forward. Also in Part five, the author
suggests the ultimate significance of the Unwired Planet judgements and evaluates
other published critiques.
2 What Led to the Unwired Planet Decisions?
2.1 A Brief History of Unwired Planet
Justice Birss’ judgements are best understood in the context of the facts he was very
familiar with by the time of the economic trial. This part will start with a short
history of Unwired Planet’s role in the market, and how it engaged in the negoti-
ations against some of the world’s largest telecom equipment suppliers before and
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during this litigation is informative. Unwired Planet, formerly a product company
called Openwave Systems, Inc., had lost its market when smartphones became the
de facto standard in 2007–08.3
As a result of its product lines becoming largely obsolete, Unwired Planet
became, in the parlance of patent practitioners, non-practicing entity—or less
politely a ‘troll.’ However, with just a few hundred patents, it was not a particularly
formidable patent asserter in a market where the potential licensees and patentees
are companies like Apple, Google, Huawei, and Samsung, among others—ele-
phants on the savannah compared to Unwired Planet’s field mouse. Unwired
Planet’s board and management saw the need to bulk up if they were to establish
themselves as a credible licensing force to be reckoned with. Accordingly, they
entered discussions with Ericsson4 about purchasing a substantial subset of
Ericsson’s mobile phone patent portfolio.
2.2 Commencement of Licensing Campaign by Unwired
Planet
In January 2013, The two companies eventually negotiated the terms of a Master
Sale Agreement (the MSA) under which Unwired Planet purchased over 2,000
Ericsson patents, with additional patents to be added annually to the list of sold
patents and/or swapped with Unwired Planet.5 Under the MSA’s terms, Unwired
was to initiate an active licensing program in part for Ericsson’s benefit.6 Any
proceeds from the licensing program would be shared with Ericsson according to a
formula stated in the MSA. Many other details of the arrangement were also
3Openwave Systems, Inc., developed a technology called Web Application Protocol (WAP),
which enabled feature phones to communicate with other devices on the Internet. WAP enjoyed a
massive 90% worldwide market share until the advent of the modern Blackberry, iPhone, and
Android-based phones in 2007–08. Then Openwave’s market for WAP disappeared within a
matter of months. Openwave eventually sold off its software products, and was left with a few
hundred of its own patents and large balance in its bank accounts.
4Ericsson AB, based in Sweden, is one of the world’s largest communications equipment man-
ufacturers. The company holds over 42,000 patents. See ‘Patents and Licensing’ (Ericsson, 2017)
<https://www.ericsson.com/en/networked-society/innovation/patents-and-licensing> accessed 8
January 2018.
5A redacted version of the MSA is publicly available on the US Securities and Exchange
Commission website. See Securities Exchange Commission, ‘Master Sale Agreement’ (2017)
<https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1082506/000119312513012058/d466328dex102.htm>
accessed 15 October 2017.
6In such an arrangement, the party in Unwired Planet’s position is commonly referred to as a
‘privateer,’ evoking the pirates of the mid-1600’s in Europe who were commissioned by gov-
ernments to use their privately-owned ships to fight or capture enemy ships.
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dictated by Ericsson in the MSA.7 In the words of Mr. Justice Birss, ‘Ericsson were
in control of the process.’8 Ericsson’s role later became an issue in the competition
case, as will be discussed below.
Unwired’s management in the US immediately began a licensing campaign
based upon the Openwave portfolio as well as the much larger Ericsson portfolio
they had acquired. They aggressively pursued patent licenses from Huawei,
Samsung and others. Perhaps not surprisingly, the large telecoms went through the
motions of meeting to discuss potential licenses. But after months, and after mul-
tiple face-to-face and telephone meetings, none of the negotiations had made any
meaningful progress. Just five months after beginning its effort to engage Huawei in
serious licensing discussions, Unwired Planet, Inc.’s CEO told Ericsson in October
2013, ‘…we are having to initiate new litigation due to lack of any licensing
happening.’9 The much larger companies apparently had decided they would wait
out Unwired, which had no other revenue source than patent licenses, and let
Unwired run out of funds. But the larger companies miscalculated.
2.3 Failure of Licensing and Commencement of Litigation
By early 2014, it was clear to Unwired that Huawei and Samsung had no intention
of paying a license fee unless they were compelled to do so. Unwired responded by
filing claims of patent infringement against Huawei, Samsung, Google and others in
the UK High Court (Chancery Division, Patents court) and in Germany (in the
Dusseldorf regional court).10 The claim in the UK alleged that defendants infringed
six patents, five of which were standards-essential patents (SEPs) reading on the
2G, 3G and 4G (LTE) standards promulgated by the European Telecommunications
Standards Institute (ETSI). In the UK action, Huawei and Samsung filed counter-
claims, alleging inter alia, that Unwired, and Ericsson had acted in breach of Article
102 of the European Competition Law.11 Notably, Unwired never sought
pre-judgement injunctions against any of the defendants.12 (Keep in mind that the
CJEU’s hearing on Huawei v ZTE was not heard until 11 September 2014.)
After the UK action commenced, throughout the time during which the
infringement/validity trials occurred, and up to the time of the FRAND/competition
trial, the parties continued to exchange offers; however, they were unsuccessful.
Indeed, based upon the public record, it is fair to say that the negotiations that began
in June 2013 and continued at least through mid-2016 (to the author’s knowledge),
7Unwired Planet I (n 1), paras 62–64.
8ibid, para 63.
9ibid, para 73.
10For purposes of this discussion, only the UK case is covered.
11Unwired Planet I (n 1), para 688.
12Potential rationales for this decision are discussed in Part three.
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took the form of: offer, then very different counter-offer, repeatedly for the three
year period, with no real progress towards a voluntary license.13
The High Court acted with its typical efficiency. Infringement and validity for
the six patents in suit were to be litigated over the course of five trials beginning in
October 2015 and July 2016.14 The trial on damages (if any) and other economic
issues would be heard beginning in October 2016. By early 2016, after three of the
trials, Unwired had won two and lost one trial; of the four patents considered in the
trials, two were found valid and infringed, and two were found invalid.15 All of
the judgements were under appeal at the time the court handed down judgement in
the economic trial.16
As the parties were awaiting the court’s judgement in the third technical trial, the
Unwired corporate group was in negotiations with another patent holding company,
PanOptis Equity Holdings LLC (PanOptis), to sell the business. Unwired Planet’s
patent holding companies remained intact, and became subsidiaries of PanOptis. It
was decided that there was a sufficient record, with wins on two of the SEPs in suit,
to proceed to the economic trial without the need to litigate additional technical
trials. Samsung and Huawei agreed to take the two remaining technical trials off
calendar.
Not long after the closing of the Unwired Planet-PanOptis transaction, Samsung
settled with Unwired Planet in July 2016, leaving Huawei as the sole remaining
defendant in the economic trial.
3 The Unwired Planet Judgements: What Do They Mean
and What Do They Add?
3.1 The 5 April 2017 Judgement
On 5 April 2017, Mr. Justice Birss handed down a judgement (the Unwired Planet
I) that largely gave Unwired Planet the victory it had sought. The court evaluated
the parties’ conduct, the testimony of each side’s experts, a number of comparable
license agreements and then reached a number of conclusions. First, on the issue of
what is a FRAND license rate, the court found that neither Unwired Planet nor
Huawei’s offers during the three years of negotiations were ‘FRAND’ in his
opinion.17 It was possible to ascribe a specific relative value to the 2G, 3G and 4G
patents in the Unwired portfolio which came out of the Ericsson portfolio, and the
13Unwired Planet I (n 1), paras 70–82.
14Before the first technical trial, Google settled with Unwired Planet as to the SEPs, and did not
participate further in the UK litigation. See Unwired Planet I, para 9.
15Unwired Planet I (n 1), para 9.
16ibid.
17ibid, paras 807(1), (2).
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court enumerated those values.18 Of the various licenses suggested as ‘comparable,’
the court deemed the Ericsson-Huawei 2014 license and other Ericsson licenses as
the best comparables.19 A FRAND license should not be limited to the UK; it
should be a worldwide license.20
Next, on the issue of competition law, the court studiously followed the CJEU’s
Huawei v ZTE analysis to the facts of this case. Unwired Planet, as the holder of
SEPs, is in a dominant position for purposes of applying competition law.21 The
court reviewed the applicability of the ‘hard-nosed non-discrimination’ and ruled
that Unwired did not abuse their dominant position in seeking injunctive relief,
seeking a worldwide license, by attempting to impose ‘unfair’ prices or by bundling
SEPs and non-SEPs.22 Because Unwired holds valid and infringed patents, and
Huawei ‘have not been prepared to take a license on the terms I have found to be
FRAND, and since Unwired Planet are not in breach of competition law,’ a final
injunction was granted.23
3.2 The 7 June 2017 Judgement
The 7 June 2017 judgement (the Unwired Planet II) is best described as a settling of
accounts on open points related to matters resolved in the Unwired Planet I
judgement. First, the court confirmed its ruling that Unwired Planet was entitled to
an injunction unless Huawei entered the form of license as ordered by the court in
April.24 Second, the court awarded costs to Unwired Planet as the prevailing
party.25 Third, the court addressed specific arguments raised by the parties for
purposes of positioning the case for their respective appeals.26
Really the most striking aspect of the Unwired Planet II judgement is the court’s
decision to publish the full text (minus the actual rates) of what it calls the Settled
License.27 This may be a first in published patent judgements in Europe and the US.
This precedent establishes an important milestone in promoting transparency of
licensing terms for others negotiating FRAND licenses for SEPs. While the tables
18ibid, paras 807(4), (5), (8) and (9).
19ibid, para 807(6).
20ibid, para 807(11).
21ibid, para 807(16). In a point that will be covered below, the court prefaced its conclusion
regarding Unwired’s being in a ‘dominant position’ by stating, ‘if a proper economic analysis had
been done the answer might be different’.
22ibid, 807(17).
23ibid, para 807(18).
24Unwired Planet II (n 1), paras 3–4, 23, 25.
25ibid, paras 39–61. Huawei was ordered to pay £2.9 million out of Unwired Planet’s total
£8.5 million in trial costs.
26ibid, paras 62–69.
27ibid, 16–40.
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for the license fees remain blank in this license, anyone can import what the court
has already adjudged to be FRAND rates—for Major Market, Other Markets (in-
cluding China) and broken down even further by the various cellular standards set
by ETSI (2G, 3G and 4G).
3.3 FRAND—New Guidance from the Unwired Judgement
A number of key issues were raised and resolved (at least preliminarily) in the High
Court’s April and June 2017 judgements:
(1) What does ‘FRAND’ mean?
• Is FRAND a worldwide rate or just a national rate?
• Is a FRAND rate a range or a specific number?
• Is FRAND a value or a process?
• What does a FRAND license look like?
(2) How should the court evaluate FRAND in a particular context? Is a Top-Down
or a Comparable License Analysis more reliable?
• Do FRAND offers and counter-offers inform whether the parties are acting
reasonably?
• How do ‘comparable licenses’ inform whether the parties’ offers and
counter-offers are FRAND (or not)?
(3) How should the court interpret ‘FRAND’ taking into account evolving tele-
coms standards?
These three interrelated issues and their sub-parts are explored in the following
subsections.
3.3.1 ‘FRAND’ Means Worldwide
Patent owners, licensees and litigators have been asking courts in the UK,
Germany, the US, India and elsewhere for clarity on the meaning of FRAND in
both the valuation and procedural dimensions. Practically speaking, straightforward
answers to this question and its component parts will guide negotiations norma-
tively. Licensors and their counsel realize that failed negotiations likely will land
the parties in court, where a judge will apply tests of fairness, reasonableness, and
non-discrimination to the parties conduct. Assuming that parties want their conduct
to be adjudged as reasonable, they will follow rules that are clearly stated.
In this respect, Mr. Justice Birss does not disappoint. In perhaps the judgement’s
most important application of FRAND to a license for a multi-national portfolio of
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SEPs being offered to a worldwide telecom vendor, FRAND means a worldwide
license rate. The court begins its analysis by noting:
Aside from the rate, the question of scope is the most significant point in the case. The
parties are diametrically opposed. Huawei are willing to take a licence under Unwired
Planet’s UK patent portfolio, but only the UK portfolio. Unwired Planet wish to grant a
worldwide licence and contend that they are entitled to insist on it.28
The court then proceeds with a detailed, analysis of the facts and the law.
Huawei makes and sells its equipment in multiple jurisdictions.29 Patentee such as
Unwired Planet should not be forced to chase an infringer in multiple jurisdictions
to enforce its patent rights adequately. Otherwise, the purpose of the standard
setting organization (SSO) and the FRAND commitment are undermined by the
recalcitrant licensee. While a court may only have power to grant an injunction in
the country in which that court resides, once it is determined that a SEP is valid and
infringed, the court’s coercive power may be used to impose a result that is
extra-territorial.30 Accordingly, the court…
…conclude[d] that a worldwide licence would not be contrary to competition law. Willing
and reasonable parties would agree on a worldwide licence. It is the FRAND licence for a
portfolio like Unwired Planet’s and an implementer like Huawei. Therefore, Unwired
Planet are entitled to insist on it.31
This is indeed a landmark ruling. No prior court had determined that FRAND is,
by definition, a worldwide licensing scheme when the patentee’s portfolio is
worldwide in nature. Now that patentees and prospective licensees have this
guidance, this should eliminate much of the haggling that characterized the
Unwired Planet—Huawei negotiations.
3.3.2 FRAND—Top-Down and Comparable License Analyses: Is One
Superior to the Other?
A major point of contention between Unwired Planet and Huawei was the question
of whether either party had offered a FRAND rate during negotiations.32 To
establish a framework for assessing the FRAND-ness of the parties’ respective
offers, the court considered two methodologies: the so-called ‘top-down’ approach
and a review of comparable-licenses.33
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Top-Down Models—Only Good So Long as They Are Objective
A generic top-down approach to determining FRAND licensing rates for SEPs
starts by assuming the total royalty burden (or T for total) for a given standard, then
determines a particular patentee’s proportionate share (or S for share) of the total
based upon the fraction of the total number of patents applicable to the standard
held by that patentee. Multiply T  S, and one should get the total royalty rate due
to the patentee.34 Both Unwired Planet and Huawei had devised top-down
methodologies to get to the percentage of the total SEP pool held by the different
patentees of note—Ericsson, Huawei, Nokia, Qualcomm, Samsung, and Unwired
Planet among others.35
The court dissects, critiques and largely debunks many aspects of both the
Unwired Planet MNPA and the Huawei HPA methodologies.36 In short, Unwired’s
claimed FRAND rate was too high and Huawei’s was too low.37 As the lengthy
analysis reflects, there are many reasons why these top-down approaches are infirm,
some objective and mathematical, some more subjective. For example, a model like
the MNPA tends to overstate the importance of SEPs in a smaller portfolio like
Unwired Planet’s by virtue of how the MNPA calculates the ration of ‘Relevant
SEPs’ to the whole portfolio.38 Furthermore, any top-down model that attempts to
ascribe ‘importance’ or that claims to mathematically determine an ‘essentiality
rate’ ultimately relies upon subjective judgement to define what is ‘important’ and
what patents are ‘truly essential.’39
What motivates a party to build specific rationales into its top-down royalty
model imposes yet another layer of subjectivity in the process. Knowing that
motivation informs how trustworthy such a model is as a probative economic tool.
Huawei first claimed that its HPA was undertaken to respond to the supposed flaws
in Unwired Planet’s MNPA.40 In fact, at a later point in the trial it was disclosed
that the HPA was created as a filtering tool for one of Huawei’s experts to evaluate
34ibid, para 178.
35Unwired Planet’s method is referred to as the Modified Numeric Proportionality Approach
(MNPA) and Huawei’s is called the Huawei Patent Analysis (HPA) ibid, para 199. The MNPA
was originally constructed by Unwired Planet for the purpose of determining what a reasonable
royalty rate proposal would be for purposes of licensing discussions prior to the filing of any
litigation. A revised MNPA was prepared specifically to submit as evidence in the economic trial.
36ibid, paras 198–371.
37ibid, paras 522 and 807(3).
38ibid, para 299.
39ibid, para 303. The court identifies other issues with the revised MNPA prepared for the trial.
40ibid, para 293.
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patents during an earlier arbitration between Huawei and Ericsson—not to derive a
FRAND license right.41
After analyzing the MNPA and the HPA, Mr. Justice Birss decided that neither
generated completely accurate or legally satisfactory royalty rates.42 However the
two competing top-down approaches provided a cross-check against each other as
well as a sanity check against the comparable license approach. This is one aspect
of the judgement in which the court’s conclusions appear inconsistent yet ultimately
form the basis for its judgement. On one hand, although neither the Unwired Planet
nor the Huawei method accurately reaches the correct royalty rate, the court finds
they are somewhat consistent in defining a range of possible royalties.43 So the
judgement appears to say at one point that there is a range in which one can
establish a FRAND rate.44 However the court ultimately reverses course and states
that a FRAND rate is a specific number.45 So what is that rate? And absent a
reliable top-down method, how does one determine that rate?
Comparable Licenses—Superficially Good but Problematic Idea
Turning then to the comparable license approach as a way to answer that
question, the court reviewed several licenses disclosed by the parties pre-trial.46 It is
difficult to fully compare these licenses or to comment on the court’s findings
specifically for the simple reason that the documents are confidential and the details
of those licenses were redacted from the published opinion.47 Indeed, anyone
searching the April 2017 Unwired Planet judgement for useful data on which to
understand the comparable licenses does so in vain. This section of the judgement
might as well have been written in invisible ink.48
As best can be explained from the judgement, the parties and Ericsson had
provided pre-trial disclosure of multiple license agreements. Not surprisingly, each
41ibid, para 341. Mr. Justice Birss was very critical of what he believed was an intentional
misrepresentation by Huawei about this point in its pre-trial statement of the case:
The way the HPA was presented by Huawei in these proceedings in the FRAND Statement of
Case was wrong and should not have happened … What has happened is that the truth about how
the HPA was devised and the reasons for it were not presented properly from the outset. Although
more came out at trial I am not satisfied the full picture has been presented to the court.
42The process of determining reasonable royalty rates is covered in numerous law and economics
journals. A good example of this perspective is provided by Contreras. Jorge L Contreras, ‘A New
Perspective on FRAND Royalties: Unwired Planet v Huawei’ (2017) <https://papers.ssrn.com/





47See, e.g., ibid, para 383, describing the 2014 Unwired Planet-Lenovo license, but redacting the
royalty numbers.
48ibid, paras 383–468.
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party argued that one or more licenses it disclosed were the better precedents on
which to rely.49 The court took evidence from the parties’ experts and eventually
concluded that the 2014 license between Ericsson and Samsung is ‘the best place to
start, but other Ericsson licenses are relevant.’50 Using the data from these Ericsson
licenses and from a separate analysis of Unwired Planet’s share of all SEPs, the
court found that specific benchmark FRAND rates applied to Unwired Planet’s
portfolio.51
For the reasons elaborated in Part four, it is unlikely that the data from any of
these licenses could be helpful in assisting the court to establish what other licenses
suggest are FRAND rates.
3.3.3 The Meaning of FRAND in Light of Evolving Standards
Another factor contributing to the complexity of the court’s valuation exercise is the
manner in which telecommunications standards have evolved over time, and the
impact of this evolution on FRAND rates. The court addresses this problem in part
by noting how the Unwired Planet patents may apply in varying ways to the 2G, 3G
and 4G standards.52 A few challenges related to the evolution of the standards exist
in establishing FRAND rates for Huawei’s different mobile phone products. Some
phones are 2G/GSM only. Some are 2G and 3G/UMTS. Others also have 4G/LTE
capabilities.53 As the court observes, ‘it is impossible to be consistent’.
What the court never resolves is what happens over the life span of a multi-year
license as an older standard becomes less used or eventually obsolete. And what
happens to the value of the most current standard when industry deploys equipment
based upon a new standard? One standard not at issue in the case, 5G, will be
implemented during the first term of the expected Unwired Planet-Huawei license.
Left hanging in the discussion of rates associated with specific standards is the
question of the basis on which parties should set SEP royalty rates when the
underlying standard is used less or become obsolete.
The Competition Law Points—No News is Good News?
Although the worldwide patent licensing community may have wanted a new
elaboration of the path to seeking injunctive relief after Huawei v ZTE CJEU
decision, the Unwired Planet I analysis of the competition law points does not so




52See, e.g., ibid, paras 770-771.
53ibid, para 5.
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Mr. Justice Birss contributes a typically British common law jurisprudential
interpretation when he states:
I am not persuaded that the CJEU in Huawei v ZTE sought to set out a series of rigid
predefined rules, compliance with which is never abusive whereas deviation from which is
always abusive, all regardless of the circumstances. Abuse of dominance is a serious matter
and the court will have had well in mind that circumstances can vary.54
Put differently, the facts and circumstances matter. Therefore, given the facts of
the case before the court, the main issues addressed that are of general interest to the
licensing community are:
(1) How does injunctive relief in this case fit into the analysis under the CJEU’s
2016 Huawei v ZTE judgement?
(2) Did the asserted SEP patents from Ericsson put Unwired in a dominant posi-
tion, as defined by the CJEU’s United Brands application of EU competition
law, and did Unwired Planet abuse that dominant position?55
(3) What effect, if any, did the ‘bundling’ of non-SEPs with the SEPs, have on the
competition law issues?
Injunctive Relief in Favor of Unwired Planet: Pre-trial Notification
Huawei argued at trial against an injunction prohibiting it from selling its phones
on the grounds that Unwired Planet abused its dominant market position and had
not offered a FRAND rate for the UK before initiating litigation.56 The dominant
position element of the argument is discussed in the next part. The court
acknowledges that Unwired Planet did not provide its FRAND terms to Huawei
before bringing the claims in the case, but did so within a very short time after
commencing the proceedings.57 Indeed, the court recognizes that Huawei is a
‘sophisticated organization well versed in technology and licensing’58 and there had
been plenty of prior contact between the parties and Ericsson, so Huawei was
hardly caught off-guard when Unwired Planet commenced proceedings seeking as
one form of relief an injunction on sales of infringing products.59 The main point
here is that the court will not let a large recalcitrant licensee try to use a strict
construction of the Huawei v ZTE judgement to avoid a common sense interpre-
tation of the factual history.
The court also distinguished the German line of cases that followed Huawei v
ZTE based upon the German and English courts’ fundamentally different
54ibid, para 741.
55Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission [1978] ECR 207.
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approaches to patent infringement proceedings. Because German courts try
infringement and validity separately (infringement first), and patentees are entitled
to injunctive relief upon finding of infringement but before validity is tried, it
matters much earlier in the German system whether an injunction is issued at the
end of the infringement trial.60 But in Unwired Planet, not only did the patentee not
seek a prejudgement injunction, it was willing to forego injunctive relief entirely if
Huawei was ordered to pay fair royalties.
Abuse of Dominant Position
For recalcitrant licensees, the Unwired Planet I may be a case of bad facts
making bad law. The court held that while Unwired Planet’s efforts to license SEPs
put it in a dominant position, the patentee did not abuse its position based upon the
facts before the court.61 Unwired Planet did seek injunctive relief if Huawei per-
sisted in its unwillingness to enter into a FRAND license.62 Unwired Planet con-
sistently maintained its position that it was willing to enter a ‘FRAND’—meaning
worldwide—portfolio license.63 However ‘Huawei have never made an unqualified
commitment to enter into a FRAND license.’64 As noted in Part 3.3.1 above, the
court determined that on the facts of the case, a FRAND license was a worldwide
portfolio license.65 Huawei would only agree, though, to a patent-by-patent license
for any patent found valid and infringed—in the UK.66
Huawei’s nit-picky approach and non-standard approach to FRAND licensing
did not impress the court. The court reviewed nearly the entire course of the parties’
negotiations dating from 2013 to 2016.67 Time-after-time Huawei refused to engage
with Unwired Planet on a worldwide portfolio license basis. As the court deter-
mined that only a worldwide license is FRAND in these circumstances, and so
Huawei never came close to meeting its obligations under the Huawei v ZTE
framework. Thus the court gave Huawei no deference and found that Unwired
Planet had not abused its position as a SEP-holder in connection with its action to
obtain injunctive relief.
The court also found that there is no mathematical benchmark to define unfair or
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what constitutes unfair pricing under Article 102(a).69 While Unwired Planet’s
price proposals might have been higher than a proper FRAND rate (Justice Birss
found that they were), it does not necessarily mean that those offers, which were
made for negotiation purposes violated Article 102(a). Accordingly, the court
rejected Huawei’s case on unfair competition based upon competition law.70
Bundling SEPs, Non-SEPs
Little Unwired Planet helped its cause considerably when the much-bigger
Huawei demanded that SEPs and non-SEPs be separated for licensing purposes,
and Unwired Planet did so.71 ‘These are not the actions of a party trying to use its
market power’ by bundling SEPs and non-SEPs.72 The court rejected the bundling
argument with ease. This specific argument is an excellent example of how the
court looked deeply into the actual facts presented at trial and resisted an overly
formulaic application of the Huawei v ZTE abuse of market dominance analysis to
reach a reasoned conclusion.
4 Unwired Planet’s Significance Going Forward: Points
for Consideration
4.1 FRAND Means Worldwide
Perhaps the best news for practitioners is the court’s determination that in a
worldwide industry with patents granted in multiple jurisdictions, and with products
across the planet, a FRAND license is, de facto, a worldwide rate. This is a par-
ticularly good precedent for patentees who have had to chase unwilling licensees
around the planet in order to achieve patent peace. Although this aspect of Unwired
Planet I is currently under appeal, it seems unlikely that the court of Appeal will
overturn this part of the judgement. Mr. Justice Birss’ explanation that sophisticated
companies such as Huawei should expect to take a worldwide license is practical.
And his mechanism for enforcing a worldwide FRAND license is clever – he states
simply that he will enjoin sales of Huawei products in the UK if they do not comply
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At least one commentator disagrees with the concept that for SEPs in the cellular
technology field, FRAND terms necessarily mean a worldwide portfolio license.73
Choudhry argues against this result because he disagrees with the concept of
portfolio licensing in general. Portfolio licenses disregard differences in claims
between patents granted in different countries and because patents expire.74 This
critique is superficial and inaccurate in at least three practical respects. First, all of
the major licenses between parties in the cellular industry reviewed by the Unwired
Planet court are portfolio licenses, including SEPs and non-SEPs. The argument
that licenses should be negotiated only after infringement and validity are
court-tested is an un-economic approach to licensing. In that model, the only parties
sure to profit from testing patents are the patent litigation solicitors and barristers.75
Second, the differences between SEPs granted in different countries are largely
irrelevant. If the parties negotiate a consensual license, they implicitly concede that
the licensee is practicing the standard. Any critique on this point ignores the
business imperative to conclude reasonable license deals in order to avoid costly
litigation.
Third, portfolio licenses are generally written to avoid the pitfalls and expense of
valuing individual patents that come into existence and that expire during the
license period. A typical patent license would grant the licensee rights to use,
manufacture, etc. the invention(s) described in the portfolio in the designated field
of use during the term of the license. It is further understood that patents may be
added to the portfolio during that time as well as that some patents may expire. But
the scope of the license permits the licensee to obtain patent peace during the term
of the agreement. This is why licenses in the cellular industry have five to seven
year terms. Everyone understands that standards change, and therefore the SEPs in
the portfolio will have increasing or decreasing value depending upon the standard
to which they read.
For all of these reasons a FRAND license needs to be a worldwide portfolio
license.
4.2 FRAND Should Be a Range, not a Fixed Number
Where the Unwired Planet I judgement veers off course is the determination that
FRAND is a fixed number. Several points raised in the judgement support this
view. As the court notes, at least three rates comprise what one would deem the
73See Rajiv K Choudhry, ‘A Critique of the Decision in Unwired Planet v Huawei’ (Spicy IP,
2017) < https://spicyip.com/2017/04/a-critique-of-the-decision-in-unwired-planet-v-huawei.html>.
74ibid.
75Indeed, the consequence of the overly-litigious approach to patent licensing has now surfaced in
the Unwired Planet-Huawei dispute. Dissatisfied with the outcome in the UK, Huawei has now
initiated proceedings in China, and Unwired Planet has responded by bringing a claim in Mexico.
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‘FRAND rate’: the benchmark rate,76 the ‘Major Markets’ rate and the ‘Other
Markets (including China)’ rate.77 While one might interpret each rate to be a fixed
number, the reality is that no single rate is a FRAND rate. Thus by the court’s own
reasoning, a FRAND rate spans a range. The court even accepts the broad statement that
‘different prices and terms are ubiquitous in real-world markets, which means that the
practical scope of a strict non-discrimination rule would enormous’ and ‘the impracticality
of rules that would insist on uniform prices and terms is obvious.’78
In addition, the court finds that competition law ‘does not seek to prohibit
different prices being charged to different customers.’79
Contreras agrees that a FRAND range, not a fixed rate, is a more practical rule.80
A FRAND range is in keeping with how parties conduct the standards-setting
process and creates a more definite framework for assessing parties’ compliance
with their FRAND commitments. A range also allows licensors to take into account
the size of the licensee, the location, the types of applications the licensee will have
for the invention, and a host of other variables.
4.3 Transparency Is the Key to Meaningful Application
of FRAND
Ultimately, the only way for licensing parties and their lawyers to know whether a
particular offer is FRAND is for there to be greater transparency in the system.
Greater access to data that shows exactly what the market rates for licenses to SEPs
have been will assure that parties are giving and getting non-discriminatory rates
that are, according to market pressures, fair and reasonable. No longer could it be
alleged in a virtual vacuum that a licensor’s rates are greatly in excess of FRAND
and violate competition law. Similarly, allegations that unwilling licensees’ pro-
posed rates are too low could be held to a widely known measuring stick.
However, that degree of transparency is unlikely to happen in today’s global
SEP licensing market.81 Licensors and licensees each want to be able to claim that
they have gotten the better end of the deal in a given situation. So, they write the
licenses in a manner most likely to give both parties to the agreement the maximum
flexibility in making their arguments. This phenomenon remains the most
76ibid, para 807(8).
77See ibid, para 807(13).
78ibid, para 492, citing Robert O’Donoghue and Jorge Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article
102 TFEU (2nd edn, Hart 2013), ch 15.1.
79ibid, para 501.
80Contreras (n 42) 3.
81The one exception to this opacity is patent licensing pools, such as those that exist for Blu-Ray
licensing. The pools will publish rates and other terms, and any licensee is welcome to take a
license on those terms.
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solution-resistant aspect of modern patent licensing practice. Given the enormous
financial stakes—hundreds of millions of US dollars annually—there are huge
incentives not to promote transparency.
5 Conclusion
Mr. Justice Birss’ judgement in Unwired Planet v Huawei thoughtfully establishes
new law on several key points related to licensing SEPs in the context of the
FRAND commitments and reaffirms the basic procedural competition law
requirements announced in the CJEU’s Huawei v ZTE judgement. Most impor-
tantly, FRAND licenses are worldwide licenses when the parties have multinational
portfolios and operate in a global industry. While his rationale may not withstand
scrutiny by the Court of Appeal in London, Justice Birss defines a FRAND rate as a
specific rate, not a range. This seems contrary to practice and to the principles of
competition law, and is also contradicted in part by the Unwired Planet I judge-
ment. What would be most helpful, but very elusive, is an opening up of the process
so that participants are able to see what prevailing license rates for SEPs are in the
market. That would settle the matter with great certainty. However, the incentive to
continue cloaking the process with secrecy remains too great.
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Inc. The opinions and analysis in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
those of Unwired Planet.
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Chapter 7
Evolving Huawei Framework: SEPs
and Grant of Injunctions
Indranath Gupta, Vishwas H. Devaiah, Dipesh A. Jain
and Vishal Shrivastava
1 Introduction
There have been certain developments with the emergence of the European
Commission’s Communication Paper (EC paper) titled ‘Setting out the EU approach
to Standard Essential Patents’.1 The EC paper, which was addressed to the European
Parliament, reflected upon the broad contours of the licensing of standard essential
patents (SEPs) in the age of Internet of Things (IoT). It identified the difficult phases
including granting of injunctions in the process of licensing the SEPs.
The Huawei case decided by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
had in fact proposed a framework for the SEP holder before a claim could be raised
for an injunction.2 The chapter identifies such framework as suggested by CJEU in
the Huawei judgement with further reference to cases that have been decided in
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Germany and in the UK. While there is a general adherence to the framework
identified in Huawei, subsequent cases have helped in developing the framework
further. There have been cases of inconsistencies and it seems that the issue of
overall conduct of the parties in the negotiation process becomes crucial before
deciding the grant of injunctions in the licensing of SEPs. Towards that end, the
first part of the chapter considers the EC Paper followed by the second part iden-
tifying the framework proposed in the Huawei judgement. The third part, which
includes cases from Germany and UK, reflects on the changes that are happening in
relation to the framework developed in the Huawei judgement.
2 EC Communication Paper to the European Parliament
The EC paper was made with the objective of reducing the uncertainty already
existing in the current SEP regulatory environment for the development of IoT
products in the near future.3 The EC paper identified several concerns related to SEPs
that require immediate attention so that the potential growth seen in IoT sector is not
hindered due to the issues that have emerged in the Information and Communications
Technology (ICT) sector.4 The EC paper has rightly pointed out that these uncer-
tainties would be sensitive given that ‘players coming from new industrial sectors’
emerge as they would have no prior experience of dealing in ICT technologies.5
As per the EC paper, the unclear and diverging interpretations of fair, reasonable,
and non-discriminatory (FRAND) hampered the licensing process.6 Moreover,
there is a need to provide a stable licensing environment to be able to guide parties
in their negotiations.7 The EC paper identifies negotiations in SEP licensing as an
important step in furthering the above objectives.8 Any potential delay in such
negotiations might delay the use of standard technologies. This may result in
hampering the development of interconnected products in Europe further affecting
the competitiveness of the European Union’s (EU) economy. Failed negotiation is
one of the major reasons for the increase in SEP disputes.
To this end, the EC paper discussed inter alia the obligations cast upon parties
during pre-licensing negotiations for licensing of SEPs on FRAND terms.9 The EC
paper has derived such obligations from the behavioral criteria as determined in the
Huawei judgement.10 The EC paper provides that parties are best placed to arrive at







10ibid, para 3.1; Huawei (n 2).
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a common understanding of what are fair licensing conditions and fair rates by
indulging in good faith negotiations.11
3 Steps Prior to Granting Injunctions in SEP Cases
In case the parties are not able to negotiate a licensing deal and at the same time, the
implementer continues to make use of the SEPs, then the SEP holder, having left
with no other option, would most likely file a case seeking an injunction on the
infringement and for appropriate royalty. Further, the implementers might take a
defense that the SEP holder is abusing his dominant position in the market. The
courts will then have to rule on these issues while assessing the negotiations that
took place between the SEP holder and implementer.
3.1 The Huawei Guidelines
The CJEU in Huawei talks about the ideal behavior of SEP holder and implementer
in negotiation process.12 The case sets out certain expectations, which an SEP
holder is expected to follow before making itself eligible to file an action for
seeking injunction for patent infringement or for recall of products against the
alleged infringer without violating Article 102 of TFEU.13 In the process, Huawei
also recommends the standards implementer to follow certain steps before relying
on the plea of abuse of dominant position by the SEP holder. The Huawei case has
only provided instances where the actions of the SEP holder will amount to an
abuse and it does not go beyond that.14 The CJEU has failed to take into consid-
eration the possibility that the SEP holder might be abusing its dominant position
even if it notifies the implementer.15
At the outset, the patent holder should raise a complaint about the infringement
by notifying the implementer about the SEPs that are infringed and the manner in
which they are infringed (Notice Stage).16 As a second step, the SEP holder should
present a specific offer to the implementer to conclude a licensing agreement on
FRAND terms including amount of royalty and details of its calculations (Offer
stage).17 This step is subject to express willingness on the part of the implementer to
11EC Paper (n 1), para 2.
12Huawei (n 2).
13ibid.
14Unwired Planet v Huawei [2017] EWHC 711, para 44.
15ibid, para 744.
16Huawei (n 2), para 61.
17Huawei (n 2), para 63.
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enter into negotiations with the SEP holder and conclude the licensing agreement
on FRAND terms.18
As a third step, the implementer should respond to the specific offer extended by
SEP holder in good faith and in a diligent manner, keeping in mind the recognized
commercial practices, thereby refraining from any delaying tactics (Response
Stage).19 Such response can be in the form of an acceptance, enquiry, counter offer
or rejection.
The fourth step provides that in case the implementer wants to rely on ‘abusive
nature of an action of prohibitory injunction or for the recall of products’, it can do
so but only after it has submitted to the SEP holder, a specific counter offer that
corresponds to FRAND terms (Counter offer stage).20 If the implementer has been
using the SEP before a licensing agreement has been concluded, then it should
provide appropriate security, in accordance with the recognized commercial prac-
tices from the point when its counter offer was rejected.21
If the parties fail to reach an agreement on FRAND terms, they may decide to
approach an independent third party for determining the amount of royalty.22
While the Huawei ruling offered a general framework of expectations, there were
issues, which remained unanswered requiring further clarifications.
The Huawei ruling recommended the SEP holder to make an offer to a willing
implementer to take the license on FRAND terms. Consequently, if the imple-
menter shows unwillingness, then the SEP holder would have no other choice but to
file a legal action for infringement and other necessary remedies such as recall of
products, unpaid royalties, or for determination of royalty rates by court. The point
of contention in many cases have been the reasonable period within which the
communication of willingness by an implementer is expected. Huawei also left
unclear as to what would constitute adequate or sufficient willingness.
At the stage of extending an offer, the contents of such offer should relate to the
undertaking given to an SSO. For instance, the European Telecommunications
Standards Institute’s (ETSI) Intellectual Property Rights Policy requires SEP holder
to sign an undertaking stating that it is prepared to license the patents included in
the standard on FRAND terms to willing licensees.23 Additionally, Huawei requires
an offer to specify the amount of royalty and details mentioning the calculation of
royalty rates.24 The judgement does not provide much clarity about the extent of
comprehensiveness of information present in such offer.
18Huawei (n 2), para 63.
19Huawei (n 2), para 65.
20Huawei (n 2), para 67.
21ibid.
22Huawei (n 2), para 68.
23European Telecommunications Standards Institute, ‘ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy’
(2017) <http://www.etsi.org/images/files/ipr/etsi-ipr-policy.pdf> accessed 10 May 2018.
24Huawei (n 2), para 63.
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At the stage of responding to the offer, going by recognized commercial prac-
tices the response of an implementer can range from (i) accepting the offer as it is,
(ii) rejecting the offer, (iii) making further enquiries or negotiating an NDA or
pricing, and (iv) making a counter offer. It may be implied from Huawei that an
implementer opting for any of the four steps must do so (i) diligently, (ii) in
accordance with recognized commercial practices in the industry, (iii) in good faith,
and (iv) without adopting any delaying tactic.25 Huawei specifies that in case the
implementer chooses to reject the offer made by the SEP holder, it must make a
specific counter offer on FRAND terms to defend itself from future legal actions
initiated by the SEP holder.26 In this context, even while making enquiries about the
offer extended by the SEP holder there is ample opportunity for an implementer of
technology to prolong the whole process of negotiation by using dilatory conduct.
In a commercial transaction, there can be multiple cycles of offer, counter offers
or enquiries before an agreement can be reached between the parties. However, this
aspect of business negotiation was not considered in Huawei.
Some of the above issues were taken up and discussed by the courts in the
member states. Part 3.2 discusses the clarifications and different interpretations
emerging from post-Huawei cases in Germany.
3.2 Implementation of Huawei Guidelines in Subsequent
SEP Cases
Huawei judgement resulted when the Dusseldorf court wanted a clarification from
the CJEU about existing standards in form of the Orange Book Standard27 or the
more advanced approach set by the European Commission in its Samsung and
Motorola decisions.28
25“… it is for the alleged infringer diligently to respond to that offer in accordance with recognized
commercial practices in the field and in good faith, a point which must be established on the basis
of objective factors and which implies, in particular, that there are no delaying tactics”; Huawei (n
2), para 65.
26Huawei (n 2), para 66.
27Case No. KZR 39/06O Orange-Book-Standard Bundesgerichtshof, Judgement dated 6 May
2009.
28C(2014) 2891 final Case AT.39939—Samsung—Enforcement of UMTS standard essential
patents, European Commission’s decision dated 29 April 2014; C(2014) 2892 final Case
AT.39985—Motorola—Enforcement of GPRS standard essential patents, European
Commission’s decision dated 29 April 2014.
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The Huawei guidelines covering the concept of willingness and negotiation
process have been considered in several cases in Germany.29 Courts in Germany
have considered the obligations expressed under Huawei and broadly looked at the
steps of the negotiation process. The Regional Court in Dusseldorf provided that
action of notice is to be understood as service by which information about subse-
quent legal action is given. It does not depend on the submission but on the service
of the action.30 Although the decision provided by the CJEU in Huawei provides a
general framework for SEP owners looking for injunctive relief, overall, the
decision has led to various interpretations by German courts because of absence of
precise direction or formal requirements in the Huawei framework.
The first step under the Huawei framework is to ensure that SEP holders reach
out to the implementer or alleged infringer and inform them regarding their acts of
infringement.31 The German courts in cases like Pioneer v Acer,32 Saint Lawrence v
Vodafone,33 Sisvel v Haier,34 granted SEP holders a ‘transition time period’ as these
were the cases, which were filed prior to the decision in Huawei, during which the
SEP holders did not apply the formal requirements of Huawei.35 In such ‘transi-
tional cases’, the infringement notice, even though served later after the complaint
for infringement was filed, would be considered as sufficient notice. It was the
reasoning of German courts that it would be wrong to retrospectively fault the SEP
holder for not having given notice, and where the parties have progressed to offer
and counter offer steps.36 The notice is served for informational purpose and in
transitional cases, the courts found the knowledge of implementer about SEP was
undisputable at a stage where the legal proceedings have already started.37
The Dusseldorf court in Pioneer v Acer suggested that the Huawei framework
should not be understood as a purely formal criteria, but as a behavioral test to
29Case No. 4a O 93/14 Sisvel v Haier (2015) LG Dusseldorf; Case No. 2 O 106/14 Saint Lawrence
v Deutsche Telekom (2015) LG Mannheim; Case No. 4a O 74/14 Saint Lawrence v Vodafone
(2016) LG Dusseldorf; Case No. 7 O 66/15 NTT DoCoMo v HTC (2016) LG Mannheim; Case
No. 7 O 96/14 Pioneer v Acer (2016) LG Mannheim, Judgement dated 8 January 2016; Case
No. 7 209/15 Philips v Archos (2016) LG Mannheim.
30Case No. 4a O 126/14 Saint Lawrence v Vodafone LG Dusseldorf, Judgement dated 31 March
2016, para 35.
31Huawei (n 2), para 61.
32Pioneer (n 29), para 94.
33Saint Lawrence (n 30), para 232.
34Case No. 4a O 144/14 Sisvel v Haier (2015) LG Dusseldorf, Judgement dated 3 November 2015,
29.
35Pioneer (n 29); Saint Lawrence (n 29); Sisvel (n 34).
36Jorge Contreras, The Cambridge Handbook of Technical Standardization Law (Cambridge
University Press 2017) 427.
37ibid 427.
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ensure that the parties, which assert themselves to be willing to license or take a
license under FRAND conditions verbally, are serious.38
The Huawei guidelines covering the concept of willingness and negotiation
process have been considered in several cases in Germany.
The German courts have clarified the requirement of notice of infringement.
The LG Mannheim court in NTT DoCoMo and Pioneer suggested that the SEP
holder should inform the implementer about the infringement by way of identifying
and specifying the SEPs in question.39 The Regional Court in NTT DoCoMo notes
that the notice must make it clear to the implementer about the standard and the
circumstances leading up to the infringement.40 The court also remarked that the
details of a notice can be decided on a case-by-case basis.41 With regard to the
information relating to the SEP in question, the Dusseldorf court in Saint Lawrence
v Vodafone suggested that at least the publication number of the patent in dispute
and the alleged use should be mentioned in the notice.42 The Dusseldorf court
further stated that, to comply with the Huawei framework relating to the require-
ment of notice of infringement ‘before bringing the action’, the SEP holder must
send such a notice before the filing of the claim, and at least before the advance
payment on costs has been made by the SEP holder to the court for the injunction.43
Once the SEP holder has given notice to the implementer, it becomes the duty of
the implementer then to respond to that notice and show willingness to engage in
negotiations to obtain a license. Such response must be given within a reasonable
period. In cases like Saint Lawrence v Deutsche Telekom, Sisvel v Haier and Saint
Lawrence v Vodafone, the court took note of the time taken to respond to the notice
from the SEP holder.44 In Deutsche Telekom, the court ruled that the period of more
than three months was too long for showing willingness to license.45 Further, in Saint
Lawrence v Vodafone, it was the Regional Court’s view that the implementer is
required to declare his willingness to enter into a licensing agreement immediately
and in this situation, the delay of five months was considered too long.46 The
Regional Court in Saint Lawrence v Vodafone also suggested that the timeline before
declaring a licensee ‘unwilling’ will depend on specific circumstances of a case and
the information given by the SEP holder in the notice of infringement must also be
taken into account.47 For instance, the expectation of timely response to declare
‘willingness’ by an implementer would depend on the details provided in the notice
38Pioneer (n 29), para 87.
39NTT DoCoMo (n 29), para 57; Pioneer (n 29), para 74; Huawei (n 2), para 61.
40NTT DoCoMo (n 29), para 57.
41ibid, para 57.
42Saint Lawrence (n 30), para 219.
43ibid, para 223.
44Deutsche Telekom (n 29); Sisvel (n 34); Saint Lawrence (n 30).
45Deutsche Telekom (n 29).
46Saint Lawrence (n 30).
47ibid, para 245.
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of infringement.48 In Pioneer v Acer, the court suggested that the overall behavior of
the implementer or its parent company was not favorable to the Huawei guideline.49
In Sisvel v Haier, the Higher Regional Court decided that the question of willingness
should be decided bearing in mind the licensee’s overall conduct during the licensing
procedure.50 Once the implementer gives adequate and unconditional willingness to
take a licence on FRAND terms, it is for the SEP holder to provide to the imple-
menter an offer containing the royalty and details of its calculations.51
The Regional Court of Dusseldorf, while determining whether the offer given by an
SEP holder corresponds to FRAND terms, held that comparable license agreements are
a significant indicator of the adequacy of offered license conditions. Similarities in
licensing conditions create a stronger presumption that royalties offered by the SEP
holder complied with FRAND requirement.52 The courts have favored looking at the
licenses of same quality and scope to make a comparison of the FRAND aspect of the
offer. On the issue of royalty rate the Regional Court in Saint Lawrence v Vodafone
further stated that there is no need for the SEP holder to provide a mathematical
derivation of the royalties, as there is no single royalty that is solely considered as
FRAND, rather a range of values will be fair, equitable and non-discriminatory.53 It
must be sufficient for the SEP holder to specify the essential considerations that con-
stitute the licensing fees.54 According to the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe, the
SEP owner has a wide discretion in determining the FRAND conditions.55 The court in
Philips, provides that an offer cannot be termed as FRAND if the method of calculation
of royalties is not comprehensible.56
Once the SEP holder has issued an offer, which encompass FRAND norm, it is
the duty of the implementer to react promptly without adopting any delaying tac-
tics.57 The Regional Court of Mannheim in Pioneer provides that the implementer
must react to an offer, even if it does not comply with FRAND norm.58 In some
instances, the courts have refused to determine whether the offer made to an
implementer followed the FRAND norm when the implementer has failed to
demonstrate willingness to conclude the license on FRAND terms.59 A similar
approach was adopted in Sisvel v Haier.60 The courts have decided Sisvel v Haier
48ibid, para 252.
49Pioneer (n 29).
50Case No. I-15 U 66/15 Sisvel v Haier OLG Dusseldorf, Judgement dated 13 January 2016.
51Huawei (n 2), para 63.
52Saint Lawrence (n 30), para 267.
53ibid, para 314.
54ibid, para 313.
55Case No. 6 U 58/16 2016, OLG Karlsruhe Resolution of 8 September 2016, para 36.
56Philips (n 29), para 112.
57Huawei (n 2), para 65.
58Pioneer (n 29), para 77.
59ibid; Sisvel (n 34).
60Sisvel (n 34) 30.
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based on the response of the parties by looking into their behavior or on the nature
of response given by the implementer. In Saint Lawrence v Deutsche Telekom, the
court ruled that a restrictive counter offer would not correspond with FRAND
conditions because the implementer instead of responding to the offer for a
worldwide license, restricted its offer only to Germany.61 In fact, the absence of an
indication of the royalty rate in the counter offer will not constitute a ‘concrete
counter offer’.62 The reasoning behind such qualification as given by the Mannheim
Regional court is that the implementer will not be able to furnish guarantee during
the negotiations because of absence of a fixed rate.63 The court in NTT DoCoMo v
HTC considered that the implementer failed in its obligation to react by means of a
written counter offer as it was sent more than one and a half years after the SEP
holder had sent the offer.64
Negotiation is a continuous process and there need not be a counter offer directly
after an offer is made by the SEP holder. There could be a possible stage where an
implementer can raise an inquiry on the offer of SEP holder or out rightly reject the
offer. The Huawei guidelines provide that if the SEP holder rejects the counter offer
of the implementer, the latter must deposit appropriate security, in accordance with
recognized commercial practices.65 Following the Huawei guidelines, there have
been instances where the courts have highlighted the importance of depositing
appropriate security to the SEP holder within reasonable time. In Sisvel v Haier, the
court took note of the fact that even after the rejection of counter offer the imple-
menter never rendered an account on a timely basis or provided security as per the
Huawei guidelines.66 The court was of the view that by merely providing counter
offers, implementers are not absolved from their responsibilities towards the SEP
holder.67 This obligation arises from the point when the first counter offer is
rejected.68 The court in the Sisvel case considered that a time of around one year
from the rejection of the counter offer was late for providing security and rendering
of accounts. The court recommended that the Huawei requirement ‘from the time its
counteroffer was rejected’ must be interpreted in a narrow manner.69 A delay in
rendering of accounts and security seems to be an expression of delaying tactic.70 In
Pioneer, the court stated that the implementer must show all seriousness towards
61Deutsche (n 29), para 59.
62ibid, para 59.
63ibid, para 232.
64NTT DoCoMo (n 29), para 73.
65Huawei (n 2), para 67.
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taking the license.71 This includes providing security, which is necessary after the
rejection of the counter offer and may result in invalidating antitrust claims.
3.3 The Judgement in Unwired Planet
Unwired Planet v Huawei has tried to deal with unresolved FRAND issues and
competition concerns in SEP licensing disputes.72 The court dealt with abuse of
dominant allegations against the SEP holders in the market by assessing the
FRAND licensing terms and by proceeding with the ambitious task of determining
a global FRAND royalty rate. The court while trying to assess FRAND stated that
determining what a willing licensor and a willing licensee should do in the relevant
circumstances would help in deciding the question. Justice Birss has termed the
entire concept of FRAND as a process and discussed the pre-licensing behaviour of
licensing parties. He stated that FRAND commitment requires the SEP holder to
behave in particular ways.73
According to Unwired Planet, the Huawei requirement of ‘willingness’ to enter
into a license refers to an unqualified willingness.74 Justice Birss stated that Huawei
requires a willing licensee to show unqualified willingness to take a FRAND license
on terms that would constitute as FRAND.75
At the offer stage, the Huawei guidelines require that the SEP holder should
make an offer containing the exact calculation of royalty rate.76 The decision in
Unwired Planet case provides that it would not be a case of abuse of dominant
position, if the rates offered were not FRAND. The reasons given by the court were
threefold. The first reason was that the offers were made in the process of negoti-
ation and as per the court’s observation it is a common market practice to initiate
negotiations at a higher rate so that the license can be concluded at a lower rate.77
The court observed that a very high rate would force the implementer to refuse to
negotiate further.78 This observation was different from what happened in Huawei
as Huawei did not deal with SEP holder providing a non-FRAND rate. The second
reason is that offers were not significantly higher than FRAND.79 The court
71Pioneer (n 29), para 87.




76Huawei (n 2), para 63.
77Unwired Planet (n 14), para 163.
78ibid, para 163.
79ibid, paras 163–164.
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provided the third reason that there was no economic evidence and analysis of
distortion of competition in the market.80
Further, insistence by an implementer on a license that is limited to a single
territory will not be FRAND compliant.81 FRAND is a process and in every case,
there is only one set of terms which comply with FRAND. The rates offered by the
SEP holders are usually ‘higher’ than the FRAND rate but this approach is not
always abusive because there is a legitimate expectation that during the negotiation
process the rates may change.82
The Unwired case has further clarified the meaning associated with FRAND
royalty rate and abuse of dominant position. There have been contentious issues
about offering license to implementers based on worldwide portfolio.83 Justice Birss
said that asking an implementer to accept a worldwide license would not be con-
sidered abusive, as it has efficiency benefits and given the fact that calculation of
SEP portfolio values on a country-by-country basis would involve complexities.84
4 Conclusion
Licensing of SEPs can be foreseen as a major concern in the background of
emerging IoT products and services. SEP holders, after the failure of licensing
negotiations seek injunctive relief against the implementer. This threat of injunctive
relief becomes the basis for an antitrust complaint by the implementers. To inval-
idate such antitrust concerns, there is an emerging jurisprudence requiring parties to
take certain precautions.
The Huawei case developed a framework to deal with the general behavior of the
parties that ought to be followed in pre-licensing negotiations of SEPs. Further
clarifications have emerged from the post-Huawei cases in Germany and in the UK.
As an obvious outcome of an evolving jurisprudence, courts in different jurisdic-
tions have not been able to fix an objective framework which may be used in latter
cases. From the perceived inconsistences, it seems that the overall conduct of the
parties would play a major role before granting injunctive relief to SEP holders. The
Huawei framework, however, provided enough freedom to maneuver and steer
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Chapter 8
The Development and Theoretical




Standards are part of our everyday lives, which enable products to communicate
with each other and frequently give rise to substantial consumer benefits. Nowadays
tens of thousands of standards are established by Standard Setting Organizations
(SSO). About 80% of global merchandise trade is affected by standards and by
regulations that embody standards.1 In terms of the United States (US)-European
economic relationship, standards influence an estimated $200 billion in transatlantic
trade.2 Standards frequently make reference to technologies that are protected by
patents. A patent that protects technology essential to a standard is called a standard
essential patent (SEP). Nowadays, it is impossible to manufacture
standard-compliant products without using technologies covered by one or more
SEPs. Licensing from the patent owner of an SEP is a must for those
standard-compliant products’ manufacturers. The process of licensing of those
SEPs has always been a big issue from practical and theoretical perspective. This
chapter will elaborate on why licensing of an SEP is particularly challenging, the
judicial and practical controversies surrounding SEP licensing, and the possible
solution for future SEP licensing in China.
Y. Cao (&)
Shanghai University of Political Science and Law, Shanghai, China
e-mail: philcao@hotmail.com
1Raymond G. Kammer, ‘The Role of Standards in Today’s Society and In The Future’ (NIST,
2000) <https://www.nist.gov/speech-testimony/role-standards-todays-society-and-future> acces-
sed 14 December 2017.
2ibid.
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2 Problem with SEP Licensing
All implementers of SEP are required to obtain a license from the patent holders.
When a patent is a part of standard, the patent owner has to explicitly permit the use
of an SEP on a fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) basis. This is
called a FRAND commitment. Those SEP patent holders are then required to agree
that they will make available the SEP to the public on FRAND terms. The effect of
agreeing to FRAND is still unknown. From the Chinese Civil law perspective,
some courts think that this kind of commitment confer a unilateral obligation on
SEP holders.3 But the truth is FRAND commitment not only confers duty on SEP
holders but also constrains the behavior of implementers of SEP. So, the FRAND
commitment cannot be only regarded as a unilateral obligation. From a perspective
of Chinese Contract Law, some scholars think FRAND commitment as a contract
for third party’s interest. Under the FRAND commitment, the SEP holder and a
standard organization sign a contract and the contract stipulates that the SEP holder
has the obligation to license his patents on FRAND basis.4 Though FRAND can be
explained fairly clearly, putting them into practice gets complicated because of
so-called lock-in and reverse lock-in effects.
FRAND commitments are designed to prevent the exploitation of unearned
market power that patentees may gain from the incorporation of their patents into
industry standards. Adoption of a standard thus greatly strengthens the bargaining
position of an SEP holder relative to potential licensees and there is a possibility to
obtain reasonable royalties from a large body of standard implementers. SEP
holders also benefit when their technologies are adopted in a standard because it is
generally easier to make compliant products utilizing one’s own technology as
opposed to those developed by some other party. A SEP holder’s bargaining power
surges because a prospective licensee has no alternative to licensing the patent and
he is at the patentee’s mercy.5 Without a FRAND commitment an SEP holder may
engage in patent hold-up (the exploitation of the locked-in position of standard
implementers) to obtain supra-competitive royalties that are significantly higher
than what the SEP holder could have obtained before its patent was incorporated
into the standard.6 “The purpose of the FRAND requirements … is to confine the
patentee’s royalty demand to the value conferred by the patent itself as distinct from
the additional value—the lock-in value—conferred by the patent’s being designated
as standard-essential.”7 The nature of the FRAND commitment, however, leaves
3Iwncomm v Sony (2017) Beijing IP Court: No 1194 of Zhiminchuzhi.
4Liu Ying, ‘Legal Meanings of FRAND commitment’ (2017) 6 Electronic Intellectual Property.
5Apple Corp v Motorola Mobility (2012) United States District Court, ND Illinois, Eastern
Division, 869 F Supp 2d 901.
6Joseph Farell and others, ‘Standard Setting, Patents, And Hold-Up’ (2007) 74 Antitrust Law
Journal 603.
7Research In Motion Ltd v Motorola, Inc (2008) District Court, ND Texas 644 F Supp 2d 788.
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room for interpretation and creates the opportunity for SEP holders to renege on
their commitments in order to capture the hold-up value of their patents.8
In SEP licensing environment, the bad behaviors of SEP holders are always
carefully watched, but the implementer is not always innocent. They can reverse
hold-up the SEP and get unfair advantage from SEP holders. Whereas alleged
‘patent lock-in’ supposedly results in excessive royalties, ‘patent reverse lock-in’ is
undermining licensors attempts even to achieve FRAND terms or to complete any
licensing.9 Normally a seller of a product can restrict practical access to his or her
goods without payment just by refusing to sell them, but the holder of an intel-
lectual property right like an SEP holder cannot restrict the implementers’ access to
the SEP technology which is freely available in the standards. SEP holder also
cannot refuse to license. That is of course why the right to exclude given by the
injunction plays such a significant part of intellectual property disputes, because it is
the means by which the law seeks to put the intellectual property owner into the
analogous position to an owner of tangible property such as a product or land.10
Thus, if a FRAND commitment prevents a SEP holder from ever seeking an
injunction, SEP holders will have no means of pushing infringers to the negotiation
table or to avoid licensee’s hold-out. Put differently, standards are published pub-
licly, so that the patented technologies comprising a standard are easy to infringe
and the SEP holder has no strong tool to prevent the implementers to explore the
SEP in bad faith.
Despite many years of speculation and recently adjusted claims, there is no
empirical support for the theory of ‘patent lock-in.’ Various eminent experts refute
allegations of systemic ‘patent lock-in.’ It is likely that ‘patent lock-in’ has not
occurred in the context of standards and licensing of SEPs because of the FRAND
licensing contracts and available recourse to the courts have ensured that licensees
cannot be forced to pay ‘excessive’ licensing fees.11 ‘Reverse Lock-in’, which is
also sometimes referred to as ‘reverse hold-up’, rather than ‘patent lock-in’ may
instead be a prevalent problem. But the picture seems different in China. Recently,
we see growing ‘lock-in’ and ‘reverse lock-in’ practices in China.
8Joe Kattan and Chris Wood, ‘Standard Essential Patents and the Problem of Hold-Up’ (2013)
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=2370113 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2370113> accessed 12
October 2017.
9Anne Layne-Farrar, ‘The Economies of FRAND’ in Daniel Sokol (ed), Antitrust Intellectual
Property and High Tech Handbook (Cambridge University Press 2016) <https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2725959> accessed 23 October 2017.
10Unwired Planet v Huawei Technologies [2017] EWHC 711 (Pat).
11Keith Mallinson, ‘Patent Hold-up and Hold-out’ (IP Finance, 2016) <http://www.wiseharbor.
com/pdfs/Mallinson%20on%20Holdup%20and%20Holdout%20for%20IP%20Finance%2016%
20Aug%202016.pdf> accessed 13 September 2017.
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3 SEP Licensing Practice and Regulations in China
3.1 Guidelines and Judicial Practice Related to SEP
Licensing
To avoid the ‘lock-in’ and ‘reverse lock-in’ in SEP licensing, the Chinese courts at
different levels established number of rules and guidelines. It is worth noting that all
those rules and guidelines are focused on the negotiation process, few of which mention
how to calculate the royalties. Article 24 of the Interpretations (II) of the Supreme
People’s Court (SPC) on Several Issues concerning the Application of Law in the Trial
of Patent Infringement Dispute Cases (effective as of April 1, 2016, SPC Interpretation
(II)) provides that in an SEP licensing negotiation process, if the SEP holder deliberately
avoids its FRAND obligations, causing failure to reach licensing agreement, and the
accused infringer has no apparent fault for that failure, the court shall not uphold an
injunction claim. That means during the SEP licensing process, both parties have to act
in good faith and the injunctive relief is unavailable for an unwilling licensor against a
willing licensee. However, the SPC Interpretation (II) does not address the availability of
injunction under other circumstances, such as where both parties were negotiating in
good faith, or both had fault, or the patent holder was acting in good faith and the
implementer was acting in bad faith. Moreover, the SPC Interpretation (II) specifically
refers to recommended national and industrial standards, without mentioning compul-
sory standards or international standards such as LTE and IEEE. According to the
clarifications made by the SPC spokesman for publicizing the SPC Interpretation (II),
there were controversial issues relating to SEP. Only provisions without dissenting
opinions were included in the SPC Interpretation (II), and the remaining issues were left
open to be resolved through judicial practices.12
On 20 April 2017, the Beijing High Court issued a Guideline for Patent
Infringement (2017) (2017 Guideline). Articles 149–153 are SEP-related provisions
under the sub-title of Non-infringement Defense. Articles 152–153 specifically set
forth how injunctive relief is applicable where neither party is at fault, or both of them
are at fault during SEP licensing negotiation. The 2017 Guideline provides that when
neither party is at fault, to avoid an injunction, the implementer shall timely deposit
an amount of its proposed royalty or provide guarantee to the court. This additional
deposit requirement upon potential licensees was a result of intensive advocacy of
some influential SEP owners. One of the major concerns of the SEP owners was that
if injunctive relief is generally barred without any limitation as long as implementers
had no fault in negotiations, it would ultimately harm further FRAND negotiations by
increasing the bargaining power of the implementers.13 Guangdong High Court
issued a Working Guideline for the Trial of Standard Essential Patent Dispute Cases
12Yin LI, Hui Zhang and James Yan, ‘New Developments on SEP-Related Disputes in China’
(Kluwer IP Law, 2017) <http://patentblog.kluweriplaw.com/2017/07/03/new-developments-sep-
related-disputes-china/> accessed 24 October 2017.
13ibid.
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(for trial implementation) on 26 April 2018, which is primarily concerned with SEP
disputes in the telecommunications sector. This Guideline established a fault-based
test for injunctive relief and specified the particular aspects which should be taken
into account when determining FRAND royalty rates.
From the above-mentioned interpretation and guidelines, we can see that Chinese
courts are trying to solve the problem of lock-in and reverse lock-in through nego-
tiation process. Generally courts require all parties in the negotiation process to act in
good faith to avoid lock-in and reverse lock-in problem. Some kinds of behavior are
sure to be deemed as acting in bad faith by the courts. The above interpretations and
rules focus too much on the attitudes of the negotiating parties, but they do not solve
substantial issues of SEP licensing i.e. the royalties. Except in very few circum-
stances, most SEP negotiations are centered around the amount of royalties. Because
of the lock-in and reverse lock-in problems, it seems everyone is in an advantageous
positions to harvest preferential results, and at the same time no one is in a good
position to get a good result. So amount of royalties will always be a big issue.
3.2 Injunction Issues for Failure of SEP Licensing
There are lots of controversies surrounding an injunction granted for an SEP. In
2013, in a high-profile antitrust case between Huawei v InterDigital Corporation
(IDC),14 the SEP holder IDC was found to have abused its dominant position in the
licensing market during its unsuccessful negotiation with the potential licensee,
Huawei, and in its subsequent patent infringement actions against Huawei in
overseas jurisdictions. The Chinese court held that IDC acted unlawfully when it
sought injunctive relief against Huawei, in circumstances where Huawei had
expressed its willingness to obtain a FRAND license and had acted in good faith
during their license negotiation. On 22 March 2017, the Beijing IP Court handed
down a landmark decision for Iwncomm v Sony (Sony case),15 concerning an SEP in
a designated national standard wireless communication. In this case, the Beijing IP
Court set forth its views on the availability of injunction for SEP holders under
three circumstances that were not provided by the SPC Interpretation (II). The court
stated that an injunction could be granted to prevent a ‘reverse lock-in’ when the
SEP holder had no fault and the implementer was acting in bad faith. The court also
held that no injunction would be granted if both parties acted in good faith, and in
the case where both parties are at fault leading to a failed license negotiation, it
would assess and weigh the degree of each party’s fault to determine whether to
grant an injunction. The Beijing IP Court found Sony liable for not agreeing to a
FRAND license and being an unwilling licensee. The court in this case granted the
first FRAND-encumbered injunction in favor of an SEP holder in China. A most
14Huawei v InterDigital (2013) Guangdong High Court, No 305 of Mingsanzhongzi.
15Watchdata v Hengbao (2017) Beijing IP Court, No 1194 of Zhiminchuzh.
8 The Development and Theoretical Controversy of SEP Licensing … 153
recent case the court granted injunction for the SEP holder is Huawei v Samsung
(Samsung case).16 This case is about two 4G related SEP owned by Huawei. The court
held that Huawei took a very active attitude toward the cross licensing of 4G related
SEP owned respectively and Samsung intentionally delayed the negotiation, and
Samsung has fault. So, Samsung should stop its infringing activity.
It seems that in Huawei v IDC the Chinese courts constrained injunctive relief to
narrow circumstances, and warned SEP holders to be very cautious before seeking
injunction to avoid raising any competition law issues. Such pro-licensee approach
was altered in the Sony and Samsung case. So from the current practices, no Chinese
courts exclude the possibility of granting injunction for SEP licensing situations. It
means that the possible users of SEP must first seek a license. An SEP holder’s
commitment to grant licenses on FRAND terms creates a legitimate expectation that
the SEP holder will in fact grant such licenses, a refusal by the SEP holder to grant
those licenses may constitute an abuse of dominance.17 So SEP holders will also have
a duty to act in good faith and in a transparent manner. Judge Posner says that an
injunction is inappropriate even if a defendant makes no counter-offer at all, given
that a FRAND pledge is not conditioned on such behavior.18 Posner wrote:
By committing to license its patents on FRAND terms, Motorola committed to license the
898 [patent] to anyone willing to pay a FRAND royalty and thus implicitly acknowledged
that a royalty is adequate compensation for a license to use that patent. How could it do
otherwise? How could it be permitted to enjoin Apple from using an invention that it
contends Apple must use if it wants to make a cell phone with UMTS telecommunications
capability—without which it would not be a cell phone.19
Obviously, almost all SEP disputes center on money issues. Generally an
injunction is often conditioned on irreparable harm in China. Many Chinese courts
have held that pure monetary damages may not amount to irreparable harm. So, it
seems that the injunction granted in Sony case is a very unique situation. In the long
run, injunction in an SEP situation would be rarely granted. In 2008, the Supreme
Court held that currently the Chinese SSOs have not established rules for disclosing
and using of patent information in standard, if a patent holder has participated in
standard setting process or consented to incorporate his patent into national,
industrial or local standards, it means a patent holder has implicitly agreed to
license his patents and the third party’s exploitation of patent is legal and no
violation of patent rights.20 Now this public disclosure or usage rule is available,
but it is not clear if the Supreme Court still hold the same position.
16Huawei v Samsung (2016) Shenzhen Intermediate Court, N0 816 of Guangdong 03 MINCHU.
17Case C-170/13 Huawei Technologies v ZTE Corp (2015) Judgement Of The Court (Fifth
Chamber) ECLI:EU:C:2015:477.
18Apple v Motorola (2012) United States District Court For The Northern District Of Illinois
Eastern Division, No 1:11-cv-08540.
19ibid.
20(2008) Supreme Court of China, No 4 of Mingsantazi.
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3.3 Negotiation Process of SEP Licensing
Because of lock-in and reverse lock-in problem in SEP licensing, Chinese courts
always require the licensing parties to act in good faith. The Chinese courts have
put forward some guidelines on how good faith can be inferred from the negotiation
process. But what constitutes good faith is still unclear. Generally if the potential
licensee explicitly expresses his willingness to have a bilateral negotiation, the SEP
patent holder has the duty to provide patent information or provide specific con-
ditions of license to the potential licensee in written form and in accordance with
business and trading practices. The licensor shall give the licensee a time period to
respond in accordance with the business practice and the trading custom. The SEP
holder cannot obstruct or interrupt the process of negotiation without adequate
reasons during the process of negotiation and cannot intentionally propose a clearly
unreasonable condition, which results in a failed licensing agreement. According to
the opinions in the Huawei case, a SEP holder must treat ‘similarly situated’
licensees in a similar manner. Overcharging one party for similar licensing con-
dition is discriminatory.21 To avoid a reverse lock-in situation, the Chinese courts
usually require the potential licensee to diligently respond within a reasonable time
clearly stating the acceptability or unacceptability of the terms of the license.
A licensee unable to accept specific conditions in a license should propose new
conditions in the form of a counter offer. It means that a potential licensee cannot
just ignore the licensing offer and he must clearly express whether he is willing to
accept the terms of the license. If he refuses the offer, he must provide the licensor
with a counter-offer. As a part of the counter-offer he cannot propose an apparently
unreasonable condition. Obstructing, delaying or refusing to participate in a license
negotiation without adequate reasons is deemed to be a serious issue in a SEP
licensing matter.
Surely, the Chinese courts have very clear idea of the ‘lock-in’ and ‘reverse
lock-in’ problems in SEP licensing process. Any party refusing to cooperate will be
surely punished leading up to the possibility of granting an injunction. From the
current practices, if the parties are willing to cooperate and actively participate in
the negotiation process, they can be considered to act in good faith. In this regard,
the licensing fee is always a key issue in the negotiation process and the court
requires both the licensor and licensee to propose reasonable price. In Samsung
case, the Shenzhen International Court held that Samsung’s offer for 4G relate SEP
licensing rate is unreasonable in case that Samsung offered a rate three times higher
than Huawei offered when Huawei and Samsung are evenly matched on quality and
quantity of 4G SEPs they held. In contrast, Huawei’s offer to Samsung is reasonable
considering the 3G and 4G related SEPs’ strength of Huawei, the market price of
Samsung 3G and 4G mobile phones and 3G and 4G related SEPs’ aggregate
licensing rate. The court held that the SEP licensing rate cannot be too high to
surpass the normal profit level in that industry, and must make sure the licensees to
21Huawei (n 14).
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harvest reasonable operation profits. Currently, no guideline of what constitutes
reasonableness is available in China. It is unclear as to what kind of royalty pro-
posal will be regarded unreasonable. Further, it is not clear what standards are to be
used to decide royalty rates. It seems, reasonableness means that the licensing
parties acting as reasonable person in the same shoes believe that the price they
proposed is proper. It is worth noting that reasonableness does not mean that the
proposed price has to be same with the late court decided rate, which can be
comparably similar. Justice Birss once held that a licensee cannot challenge a
license allegedly granted on FRAND terms if it later discovers that a
similarly-situated implementer received a lower royalty rate unless the difference
would ‘distort competition’ between the two licensees.22 If both parties act in good
faith and propose some reasonable price for the licensing, and still cannot agree on
the royalty rate, the court then is required to decide what royalties are proper.
3.4 Royalty Issues in SEP Licensing
What amount of royalty meets FRAND is always a challenging question to answer.
It seems that Chinese courts have taken different views on the issue of royalty. In
2008, the Supreme Court held that if a patent is incorporated into national,
industrial or local standard, the patent holder can ask the implementers of the patent
to pay a certain amount of fees, which should be apparently lower than the normal
licensing fee.23 There is no additional help provided to understand the scope of
‘normal licensing fee’. It seems, it is the licensing fee that the patent holder would
get before a patent becomes essential. The question however remains as to why the
royalty should be lower than the normal licensing fee? One possible explanation is
that because the patent is incorporated into a standard, the patent holder is sure to
have more potential users and this will certainly increase the amount of royalties.
So, the patent holder can only ask for royalty less than normal licensing fee. The
Chinese Supreme Court provides us with a very interesting way to calculate royalty.
In 2016, the Chinese Supreme Court held that the following factors should be
considered before deciding the royalty rate: degree of innovation of the patent and
its role in the standard, the technical field to which the standard belongs, the nature
of the standard, the regional scope of exploitation and the relevant licensing con-
ditions, etc.24 In Huawei case in China, the court used InterDigital’s license with
Samsung, Apple, and others as comparable licenses to determine whether the
royalty rate InterDigital offered to Huawei was discriminatory. This was also used
as a possible reference point to calculate the appropriate FRAND royalty rate that
should be charged to Huawei, which was determined to be no more than 0.019%.
The question remains when several licensing rates are available for reference, which
22Unwired Planet (n 10).
23Supreme Court of China (n 20).
24Supreme People’s Court Interpretation (II), art 24.
156 Y. Cao
one shall the court adopt? In the above Huawei case, the Chinese courts adopted a
so-called possible lowest rate policy.25 Clearly, Chinese courts rely heavily on
comparable license agreements to determine FRAND. The comparable license fees
are always important reference points in determining FRAND rate, but the court
will adjust the fees in a reasonable manner. The Guangdong High Court in Huawei
Case held that the following factors should be weighed in while considering the
FRAND rate: first, the amount of royalties should take into account the profits
derived from the implementation of the patent or similar patent and the proportion
of the above profit to the whole profit or sales revenue of the licensee’s related
products. The technology, capital, licensee’s operating labor and other factors
together contribute to the final profit of a product. The patent royalty can only be
part of the product’s profit and not all, and the patentee does not provide all the
technology the product needed. So, the patentee only has the right to receive a
portion of the profit corresponding to his patent value in product. Second, the
contribution made by the patentee is its innovative technology. The patentee can
only obtain the additional benefits because of his patent technology not the stan-
dard. Third, the amount of royalty shall take into account the patentee’s effective
patent in the standard. It is unreasonable to require standard implementers to pay
royalties for non-SEPs present in the standard. Fourth, royalties should not exceed a
certain percentage of product profits, and should be reasonably distributed amongst
SEP holders. In the US, the Georgia-Pacific case26 provides the most common
framework for deciding damages in patent infringement cases. FTC recommended
that courts use the concept of the hypothetical negotiation as the proper framework
to determine reasonable royalties and suggested treating the other Georgia-Pacific
factors as categories of information that might be relevant in predicting the outcome
of the hypothetical negotiation.27 The judge in that case called for evaluating a
‘hypothetical negotiation’ between the two parties assuming they were both willing
to conclude a license. He also listed a set of 14 other ‘factors’ that should be
accounted for. US courts have relied on the Georgia-Pacific framework for over
40 years and it provided a framework for SEP license assessments.28 In Microsoft v
25According to the evidence of the case, IDC Company signed a license contract with Apple
Company for a term of seven years in 2007 and adopted a one-time payment method. The license
fee is calculated at a license rate of 0.0187%. IDC Company proposed license rates to Huawei a
hundred times higher than Apple (which is about 2%). IDC gives Samsung a royalty rate of about
0.19%.
26Georgia-Pacific Corp v United States Plywood Corp (1970) United States District Court, S D
New York, 318 F Supp 1116.; modified sub nom. Georgia-pacific Corporation v U S Plywood
(1971) US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 446 F2d 295.
27Federal Trade Commission, ‘The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice And
Remedies With Competition’ (FTC, 2011) <https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
reports/evolving-ip-marketplace-aligning-patent-notice-and-remedies-competition-report-federal-
trade/110307patentreport.pdf> accessed 8 June 2017.
28Anne Layne-Farrar and Koren W. Wong-Ervin, ‘Methodologies for Calculating FRAND
Damages: An Economic and Comparative Analysis of the Case Law from China, the European
Union, India, and the United States’ (2018) 8 Jindal Global Law Review.
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Motorola, Judge Robart modified the traditional Georgia-Pacific factors to deter-
mine a FRAND royalty rate.29 Several federal district courts in US have weighed in
on a framework for determining a reasonable royalty for FRAND-encumbered
SEPs. These courts have employed various methodologies, including using a
modified version of the Georgia-Pacific factors that accounts for the value of the
SEPs that contribute to the standard, the importance of that standard to the
infringing products, and the aggregate royalty demands for firms implementing a
complex standard with many essential patented technologies, typically known as
the ‘royalty-stack.’30 In Unwired Planet v Huawei, Justice Colin Birss offers two
possible methods of calculating the FRAND royalty: one based on an analysis of
comparable license rates, and the other based on a top-down analysis of the total
aggregate royalty that should be attributable to the standards and SEPs at issue. In
addition to disregarding the US Georgia-Pacific framework, which clearly has no
place in a UK decision, Justice Birss rejects another touchstone of US FRAND
analysis. The notion that a FRAND royalty should reflect the ex-ante value of the
patented technology without considering any value attributable to the adoption of the
technology in a standard.31 Without the baggage of Georgia-Pacific to clutter
the analytical exercise, Justice Birss focussed on the actual task at hand: computing
the value of the patented technology as compared to the standard and product at issue.
In sum, the following methods are used in deciding royalty rate worldwide:
1. Comparable Method
This approach, seen in rulings from China, the UK, and the US thus far focuses
on just two of the Georgia-Pacific factors: factors 1 and 2 on comparable licenses.
This method attempts to assess the value of asserted SEPs in isolation using
comparable license agreements and other methodologies but without significant
reference to other patents covering the same standard.32
2. Top-Down Methodology
Under the top-down method, the FRAND royalty equals T  S. T is the total
aggregate SEP royalty burden of a particular standard on a product, and S is the
share of that aggregate royalty that is allocable to the SEP holder. The top-down
approach involves firstly to determine the aggregate royalty that should be paid for
29Microsoft v Motorola (2012) United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 696 F3d 872.
30Edith Ramirez, ‘Standard Essential Patents and Licensing: An Antitrust Enforcement
Perspective’ (FTC, 2014) <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/
582451/140915 georgetownlaw.pdf> accessed 26 July 2017.
31Jorge Contreras, ‘Unwired Planet v Huawei: An English Perspective on FRAND Royalties’
(Patently-O, 2017) <https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/04/unwired-perspective-royalties.html>
accessed 23 October 2017.
32‘Jorge Contreras: TCL V. Ericsson: The First Major US Top-Down FRAND Royalty Decision’
(Patently-O, 2017) <https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/12/contreras-ericsson-decision.html?utm_
source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+PatentlyO+%28Dennis
+Crouch%27s+Patently-O%29> accessed 29 December 2017.
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all SEPs covering a particular standard, and then to allocate an appropriate portion
of the total to the asserted SEPs.33
3. Hypothetical Negotiations
The purpose of conducting hypothetical negotiation is to ascertain the royalty
upon which the parties would have agreed had they successfully negotiated an
agreement just before infringement began. The court must try to recreate the ex-ante
licensing negotiation scenario and describe the resulting agreement.34 When using
this method, a few differences have to be noticed.
Whether a FRAND royalty should reflect the ex-ante value of the patented
technology? Justice Birss rejected the notion that a FRAND royalty should reflect
the ex-ante value of the patented technology, without considering any value attri-
butable to the adoption of the technology in a standard. Judge Robart in the
Motorola case held that the exercise must reconstruct the negotiation that would
have taken place between the parties prior to the date on which the patented
invention was adopted as a part of the industry standard.
The courts in US apply a modified version of the Georgia-Pacific factors to
address the unique circumstances of SEP licensing to recreate a hypothetical
negotiation between the parties as the best starting point for FRAND assessments.
The Chinese courts on the other hand seems to be adopting a more narrow factor to
determine royalty rate.
A FRAND license must be non-discriminatory. This means that the licensor must
not discriminate against similarly-situated licensees. So comparable method is an
important method in determining royalty rate. Comparable method however will only
provide a base for calculating royalty rate. The prohibition on discrimination would
mean very little if the largest, most profitable firms could always be a category unto
themselves simply because they were the largest and most profitable firm.35
Generally, comparable method is always a good method for determining
non-discrimination. The comparable method usually provides an appropriate base for
valuing royalty rate, but what rate is fair and reasonable must be decided by other
way. The Chinese courts clearly use the Top-Down Methodology and Hypothetical
negotiations simultaneously. The Guangdong High Court clearly points out that the
royalty rate should be decided on technology per se and should not harvest
supra-competitive profits because of it being incorporated into a standard. It surely
borrows some ideas from Hypothetical Negotiations method. To decide the specific
amount of royalty rate, the court also uses the top-down methodology in considering
the contribution that the SEP made to the profits and allocating an appropriate portion
33ibid.
34In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation (2013) United States District Court, N.D.
Illinois, Eastern Division, MDL Docket No. 2303 Case No. 11 C 9308.
35TCL Communications v Ericsson (2017) United States District Court Central District Of
California, Case No: SACV 14-341 JVS (DFMx) and CV 15-2370 JVS (DFMx).
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of the total to the asserted SEPs.36 The Chinese courts seem to take a more flexible
method in justifying its royalty decision. But we did not see what specific method the
court had adopted in calculating specific royalty rate.
Some scholars think that a court should not adjudicate the pure FRAND royalties
dispute.37 The freedom of contract is essential to good and sound operation of
market economy. If the parties cannot reach to an agreement on specific price of
royalty, a court-determined FRAND rate is a breach of freedom of contract and
sometimes it is rather difficult for the court to ascertain because of the complex
royalty licensing calculation. But the courts are surely not agreeing with these
holdings and believed that they have the legal obligations to adjudicate any dispute
arising from SEP licensing issues.
4 Solution to SEP Licensing Lock-in Problems
It is difficult to ascertain the exact royalty rate in a given situation. Rather than the
court the licensing parties would know the optimal rate. All those methods adopted
by different courts are causing controversy and do have certain shortcomings. The
use of comparable licenses has been criticized on the basis that most licenses are not
really comparable to the desired FRAND license.38 This method does not reflect the
diversity and evolving dynamics of SEP markets. So what is the possible solution to
this impossible mission? Empirical study shows that in a SEP licensing situation the
patent holders are always actively participating in the negotiation process and have
strong desire to reach an agreement because most courts are somewhat hostile to
SEP holders and never grant excessive damages even in cases of infringement.39 So
from practical point of view, the ‘reverse lock-in’ problem should be the focus of
regulations. In that situation the SEP users intentionally ignore their duty of
negotiation and are unwilling to pay the royalty rate on FRAND basis. In fact, the
SEP holders have very limited options to push the SEP users to the negotiation table
and force them to pay the licensing fees. One of the powerful tools the SEP holders
have is injunction. In China, most courts are unwilling to grant injunction for the
unlicensed use of SEP. Until now only two cases (Iwncomm v Sony and Huawei
v Samsung) have granted injunction for the unlicensed uses. Hopefully, more
injunctions will be granted in SEP licensing situation to push SEP users to the
negotiation table. In Samsung case, the Shenzhen Intermediate Court held that the
injunction relief in SEP case should differ from Non-SEP case. The court states that
36Huawei (n 14).
37Ma Haisheng, ‘The Impossibility of Judicial Determination of Royalty Rate’ Intellectual
Property Magazine (2016) 12.
38Jonathan S. Masur, ‘The Use And Misuse Of Patent Licenses’ (2015) 110 Northwestern
University Law Review 115.
39Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber and Ross Levine, ‘An Empirical Examination Of Patent
Hold-Up’ (2015) 11 Journal of Competition Law & Economic 549.
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because of the nature of these cases involve 4G SEPs, the parties may continue to
negotiate after the decisions become effective. If the parties reach an agreement and
request the court not to execute the court order, such request should be granted.
Generally, the licensing royalties should be negotiated on the basis that is
mutually beneficial to the SEP holder and the licensee. If the patented technology
allows the licensee to drastically reduce costs or increase sales over competing
technologies, the licensee should be willing to pay more.40 Surely the SEP holders
are also willing to license their patents and the potential licensors have to use the
SEP, so both parties have strong desire to reach a mutually beneficial agreement.
The licensing contract is sure to leave both the parties in a better position if agreed
on voluntary base. So, the courts should constrain from determining the royalty
rate. The current regulation should focus on how the participants act in the nego-
tiation process. The Chinese Contract Law clearly specifies that all participants
must act in good faith. The breach of good faith duty is liable for culpa in con-
trahendo. Besides, the existing rules in contract law are highly recommended for a
relevant authority to establish national rules for SEP licensing negotiation. There
are no national rules for negotiation process and some rules are scattered at different
places. The national rule shall infuse more clarity and flexibility by highlighting the
bilateral negotiation as the principal forum for determining FRAND.
The courts shall decide a specific royalty rate only if both participants failed to
reach an agreement even after acting in good faith. Due to difficulty in rates
determination, the author thinks it may be best for the court to emphasize on the
FRAND range instead of rates. The courts can narrow rates to a certain range
between willing-to-pay and willing to accept and push the participants to have
further negotiation on that base. The courts may point out to some rules that the
negotiators must follow such as: good faith, no discrimination against similarly
situated licensees41 the way of determining the aggregate SEP royalty applicable to
a standard, and the proportion of profits allocable to the asserted SEPs. In the
process of narrowing the rates in the scope of bargaining range, the courts would
have taken into account interests of both parties.
5 Conclusion
SEP royalty rate will always be a big topic in technology licensing field. ‘Lock-in’
and ‘Reverse Lock-in’ are obstacles both parties have to overcome. Both parties
have strong desires to conclude an agreement concerning SEP licensing. What kind
of measures should be taken to push the licensing parties to negotiation table and
40Ramirez (n 30).
41TCL Communication (n 35); The court held that low-end vendors would be compared with
high-end vendors like as to FRAND rates, giving low-end vendors the benefit of favorable rate
packages that high-end vendors have been able to negotiate with respect to far more expensive
products.
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expedite the SEP negotiation process should be key concerns in SEP licensing
situations. What the Chinese courts did currently is to confer a duty of good faith on
both parties. But a good faith duty is still not enough to bring a good result.
Deadlock sometimes seems inevitable even when both parties have no bad faith.
So, the future job should be focused on solving that deadlock. The court always has
no such capacity to decide the specific amount of royalty. When both parties
exhaust efforts to arrive at a royalty rate on FRAND terms but are not successful,
then it is better to allow independent experts or organizations to decide the royalty
rate.
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Regulating Abuse of SEPs in Mobile
Communications Market: Reviewing
1st and 2nd Qualcomm Cases in Korea
Dae-Sik Hong
1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the 1st and 2nd Qualcomm cases of the
Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) from a legal perspective. A core element of
Qualcomm’s business model lies in its licensing policies. Qualcomm is a vertically
integrated enterprise that engages both in patent licensing and modem chipset
businesses. It is divided into the patent licensing division (QTL) and the chipset
division (QCT). The KFTC rendered a resolution on the 1st Qualcomm case on July
2009. In this case, the KFTC only reviewed discriminatory factors or conditional
rebate factors included in the method of calculating royalty without touching on
Qualcomm’s business model. With the court proceedings relating to the 1st case
still pending, the KFTC initiated another investigation into Qualcomm and sanc-
tioned Qualcomm again in December 2016, which is the 2nd Qualcomm case. In
this case, the intrinsic actions that constitute Qualcomm’s business model were
concerned such as the refusal or restrictions of standard essential patents (SEPs)
licenses, the linkage of chipset supply with patent license, and the imposition of
unfair and unreasonable licensing terms with the handset manufacturers.1
This chapter examines and analyzes some of the competition law issues raised in
the two cases. The review consists of the following four parts: the issue of defining
relevant markets, the criteria for determining whether there is a violation or evasion
D. Hong (&)
Sogang University Law School, Seoul, Republic of Korea
e-mail: dshong@sogang.ac.kr
1‘Joint Comments of the American Bar Association Sections of Antitrust Law, Intellectual
Property Law, International Law, and Science And Technology Law on Revisions to the Korea
Fair Trade Commission’s Review Guidelines on Unfair Exercise of Intellectual Property Rights’
(American Bar Association, October 2015) <https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/antitrust_law/at_comments_20151030_ip_guidelines.authcheckdam.pdf>.
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of fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) commitment, the competition
law assessment of FRAND commitment infringements, and the theories and
establishment of competitive harm. The chapter ends with the comparison with
other jurisdictions.
2 Overview of the 1st and 2nd Qualcomm Cases
2.1 Overview of Qualcomm
Qualcomm consists of three companies that operates two main businesses. The
three companies are Qualcomm Incorporated (QI), a US-based patent licensing
business operator, Qualcomm Technologies (QTI), a 100% subsidiary of QI,
operating a modem chipset business, and CDMA Technologies Asia-Pacific PTE
Limited (QCTAP) that sells a modem chipset as a wholly owned subsidiary of QI.
The two main businesses are patent licensing business and modem chipset business.
The patent licensing business is a business that collects royalties from licensees
while maintaining SEPs in the mobile communications industry. Modem chipset
business is a business that manufactures and sells modem chipsets using SEPs.
Given the finding of the facts in the KFTC decision, Qualcomm’s business
model is characterized as integration of two main businesses. One of the key finding
is that Qualcomm is a vertically integrated enterprise that engage both in patent
licensing and modem chipset businesses. Another key finding is about Qualcomm’s
licensing policies according to which Qualcomm refuses or restricts to license SEPs
to rival chipset makers while it licenses only to cellphone manufacturers. Some call
this practice ‘level discrimination’ between component level and device level.2
Qualcomm was accused of using this business model as a leveraging tool in
competition and negotiations. Qualcomm manufactures modem chipsets using an
internal patent license, but competitors should manufacture such chipsets without a
patent license. As a result, Qualcomm has a competitive advantage over its com-
petitors. Cellphone manufacturers using competitors’ modem chipsets are vulner-
able to Qualcomm’s threat of patent infringement. In addition, Qualcomm will have
increased bargaining power with cellphone manufacturers, allowing it to sell their
modem chipsets or license SEPs to cellphone manufacturers on favorable terms.
2.2 Summary of the 1st Qualcomm Case
The KFTC’s 1st Qualcomm case investigation was launched in February 2006. In
April 2006, on-site investigation was conducted on Qualcomm Korea and domestic
2Sang-Seung Yi, ‘Responsibilities of FRAND- Encumbered SEP Owners under Competition Law’
(AsLEA 12th Annual Conference, Seoul, June 2016).
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handset manufacturers. In April and June 2006, the KFTC received complaints
against Qualcomm from two domestic companies and two foreign companies3 for
alleged violations of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA) of
Korea and sent an examination report4 to Qualcomm in February 2009. The
KFTC’s full commission held six deliberation meetings from May 2009 to July
2009. On 23 July 2009, Qualcomm was imposed with a fine of 273.1 billion won
(approximately 218 million US dollars) with corrective measures. The written
decision on this case was completed on 30 December 2009.5
The Seoul High Court, which has exclusive jurisdiction in the first instance,
heard an appeal filed by Qualcomm, and rendered a ruling on 19 June 2013.6 As a
result of the ruling, most of Qualcomm’s claims were dismissed except to cancel a
little part of the corrective actions. The case is currently pending in the Korean
Supreme Court.
2.3 Summary of the 2nd Qualcomm Case
While 1st case is still pending in the Korean Supreme Court, the KFTC initiated
another investigation into Qualcomm. This time the major opponent was a domestic
company, Samsung. The KFTC’s 2nd Qualcomm case investigation was launched
in August 2014, and on-site investigation of Qualcomm Korea was conducted in
March 2015. The KFTC sent an examination report to Qualcomm in November
2015. Qualcomm submitted a written opinion in May 2016, and the KFTC held
four deliberation meetings from June to October 2016. The KFTC was concerned as
being seen favorable to the domestic company at first. However, as the case pro-
gressed, foreign companies such as US-based Intel, Apple, NVidia, Taiwan-based
MediaTek, and China-based Huawei cooperated with the KFTC, which helped the
KFTC feel comfortable. Qualcomm filed a motion for consent decree in November
2016, which was dismissed from the KFTC in December 2016. The KFTC imposed
a fine of 1.03 trillion won (approximately 850 milion US dollars) with corrective
measures on 21 December 2016. The written decision on this case was completed
on 20 January 2017.7
In February 2017, Qualcomm filed an appeal lawsuit and application for sus-
pension of enforcement with the Seoul High Court against the decision. The Seoul
High Court dismissed the application for suspension on 4 September 2017. The
appeal lawsuit is currently ongoing at the Seoul High Court.
3Those are Qualcomm’s rival US modem chipset companies like Broadcom and Texas Instrument
which had interest in entering the modem chipset market.
4The report corresponds to a Statement of Objections in the European Union (EU).
5KFTC Decision, No. 2009-281, 2009Jisik0329 (S. Kor.).
6Seoul High Court 2010 Nu3932, Order dated 19 June 2013 (S. Kor.).
7KFTC Decision, No. 2017-025, 2015Sigam2118 (S. Kor.).
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2.4 Background of the Cases
The 1st and 2nd Korean Qualcomm cases have been set at different stages of mobile
communications standard technology developments. Mobile communications
standard technologies have been developed from the 1st generation through the 2nd
and the 3rd generation to the 4th generation. With regard to the 2nd generation,
South Korea was deeply associated with and highly dependent on Qualcomm’s
technologies. At the time of the first adoption of CDMA technology in Korea,
Qualcomm was a small company. But it grew significantly in the market as Korea’s
market expanded.
In 2009, when the 1st Qualcomm case decision was made, services based on the
CDMA standard, the 2nd generation mobile communications technology, and
services based on the CDMA2000 and WCDMA standard, the 3rd generation
mobile communications technology coexisted. Qualcomm has been a leader in
CDMA technology since its foundation in 1985. Korea selected the CDMA system
as the 2nd generation mobile communications system in 1993. SK Telecom,
Korea’s number 1 mobile communications provider, succeeded in commercializa-
tion of the world’s first CDMA based mobile communications service in 1996. The
Telecommunications for Technology Association (TTA) in Korea established
CDMA mobile communications standards based on seven patents held by
Qualcomm in 1996. Qualcomm has 90% of SEPs in CDMA technology.
Korea’s mobile operators are actively involved in the introduction of 3rd gen-
eration mobile communications services. In December 2000, three operators, SK
Telecom, KTF and LG Telecom participated in the service provision project using
the IMT-2000 standard based on CDMA2000. SK Telecom and KTF have begun to
provide 3rd generation mobile communications services based on WCDMA stan-
dard. Qualcomm accounts for 27% of SEPs in WCDMA technology. However, at
the time of 2009, 3rd generation mobile communications services were not yet
active, and Qualcomm’s SEPs accounted for a significant portion of the CDMA
standard used in 2nd generation mobile communications services, which still had
high utilization rates. In this context, the 1st Qualcomm case focused on
Qualcomm’s patents included in the CDMA standard as the relevant technology
market, and the relevant component market was limited to domestic CDMA modem
chipset market and domestic CDMA RF chip market.
The 2nd Qualcomm case decision was made in 2016, when mobile services were
transitioning from 3rd generation mobile communications based on WCDMA
standard to 4th generation mobile communications based on the LTE standard. The
development of the 4th generation mobile communications technology originated
from the WiMax standard developed by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (IEEE) since 2004, which influenced the 3rd Generation Partnership
Project (3GPP) to establish the LTE standard in 2008. In Korea, LTE service started
in July 2011. Qualcomm has 16% of the SEPs included in the LTE standard.
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The proportion of Qualcomm’s patents in mobile telecommunications standards
has been gradually decreasing from 2nd generation to 3rd generation, and the
proportion of modem chipsets in handsets is decreasing as handsets evolve into
smartphones. Nonetheless, there was growing dissatisfaction with the chipset
makers and handset makers as Qualcomm continued to maintain its superiority in
patent licensing negotiations while achieving high royalty revenues. Under this
circumstance, in the 2nd Qualcomm case, Qualcomm’s mobile SEP license markets
for CDMA, WCDMA and LTE standards were examined as a relevant technology
market respectively, and the modem chipset markets for CDMA, WCDMA and
LTE standards were considered as a relevant component market, correspondingly.
3 Conduct Types in Question
3.1 Conduct in 1st Case
In the 1st Qualcomm case, there were two types of conduct related to licensing for
handset manufacturers and one type of conduct related to selling handset compo-
nents. The types of behaviors related to licensing for handset manufacturers are
(1) discrimination on collecting royalties for licenses, (2) conditional rebates on
modem chipsets and RF chips, and the type of behavior associated with selling
handset components and (3) imposition of royalties even after expiration of patents.
3.1.1 Discrimination in Collecting Royalties
The KFTC concerned three types of acts for discrimination. This is due to:
(i) discrimination against domestic-model handset using non-Qualcomm chipsets
by price-netting program; (ii) discrimination against export-model handset using
non-Qualcomm chipsets by royalty rate discount program; and (iii) discrimination
against non-Qualcomm chipset users by royalty cap program.8 The KFTC
acknowledged that these practices produced discriminatory effects between
Qualcomm’s modem chipsets and its competitors’ modem chipsets to handset
makers even if it is the same handset maker by making them pay higher royalties
when using modem chipsets other than Qualcomm’s.
This conduct type is related to the non-discriminatory element of FRAND. In
order to determine whether the conduct in question constitutes an act of
8Shiwon Ryu, ‘Regulation of Anticompetitive IP Licensing Practices Studied in Qualcomm Case’
(2011) 9 Korea University Law Review 81 <http://koreauniversitylawreview.korea.ac.kr/xe/?
module=file&act=procFileDownload&file_srl=997&sid=731549d1e80c4c3ce235d9d83d4cf712&
module_srl=115>.
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discrimination in price or trading conditions under the MRFTA, a separate analysis
is required to determine the ‘discriminatory’ conduct element. The KFTC’s
Guidelines for Review of Abuse of Market Dominant Position (Abuse Guidelines)
does not include any standards by which to judge the behavioral element of dis-
crimination. However, the KFTC referred to the standards specified in the
Guidelines on Review of Unfair Trade Practice (UTP Guidelines) in reaching a
decision even though the analysis of unfair trade practices may be less rigorous than
that of abuse of dominance.9
3.1.2 Conditional Rebates on Modem Chipsets and RF Chips
In this case, the problematic rebate payment method is a retrospective, progressive
payment imposed on handset manufacturers on the condition that Qualcomm
chipsets are purchased at a certain rate or on a certain scale. The KFTC
acknowledged that this act caused cumulative exclusionary effects along with
royalty discrimination on competitors that manufacture modem chipsets and RF
chipsets.
3.1.3 Imposition of Royalties Even After Expiration of Patents
Qualcomm set up and maintained a provision that imposed royalties as much as
50% of the applicable royalty rate for invalid or expired patents. The KFTC
acknowledged that it would lead to a disadvantageous effect on the counterparts by
increasing the risk of being taken unfair gains when implemented.
3.2 Conduct in 2nd Case
In the 2nd Qualcomm case, there was one type of behavior related to the conditions
under which licensing to the rival modem chipset manufacturers is allowed, and
two types of behavior related to the conditions under which the licenses for the
handset manufacturers are given. The conduct type related to the licensing of rival
modem chipset manufacturers is (1) an act of refusing or restricting to license SEPs
to rival chipset makers, and the types of conduct related to the licenses for the
handset manufacturers are (2) an act of linking chipset supply with patent license
with handset makers and (3) an act of imposing unfair and unreasonable licensing
terms with handset makers.
9Mark Furse, Antitrust Law in China, Korea and Vietnam (Oxford University Press 2009) 259.
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3.2.1 Refusing or Restricting to License SEPs to Rival Chipset Makers
Before 2008, while licensing to both rival modem chipset makers and handset
manufacturers, Qualcomm has not closed the possibility of licensing to rival chipset
makers but restricted the scope of the license to them by imposing post-sale
restriction on the right to use chipset, allowing to sell only to handset makers having
license agreement with Qualcomm. It can be explained as multi-level licensing10
strategy in order to prevent the application of the patent exhaustion principle.11
However, after 2008, it refuses to license rivals and only offers agreements not to
file lawsuits or to reserve lawsuits (covenant not to sue, covenant to exhaust or
stand still). The change in policy in 2008 seems to be a response to the uncertainty
in the applicability of patent exhaustion principle caused by the decision in Quanta
case by the Supreme Court of the US in 2008.12
3.2.2 Linking Chipset Supply with Patent License with Handset
Makers
Qualcomm licenses SEPs to licensees only when it supplies its modem chipsets to
them, refusing to supply chipsets when licensees do not enter into the patent license
agreement. This can be summarized as a policy that there are no chips without a
prior license which is also called ‘no license, no chips’ policy.13 The KFTC
acknowledged that Qualcomm actually used the threat of terminating the supply of
10Multi-level licensing refers to a practice that a patentee offers to license to a chipset maker or
component maker on condition that it sells only to end-user equipment makers who have them-
selves paid for a license. Karl D. Belgum, ‘The Next Battle Over FRAND: The Definition of
FRAND Terms and Multi-Level Licensing’ (2014) Berkeley Law <https://www.law.berkeley.edu/
files/Belgum_Karl__IPSC_paper_2014.pdf>.
11Roberto Grasso, ‘Selected Issues In SEP Licensing In Europe: The Antitrust Perspective’ in
Ashish Bharadwaj, Vishwas H. Devaiah and Indranath Gupta (eds) Complications and
Quandaries in the ICT Sector (Springer Singapore 2017) 86 <https://www.springer.com/in/book/
9789811060106> (stating that the strategic refusal to license at component level is based on the
patent exhaustion doctrine); Under patent exhaustion principle, one who purchases from a patentee
or licensee in an authorized sale obtains the patented product free and clear of patent rights;
Quanta Computer, Inc. v LG Electronics, Inc. (2008) Supreme Court of the United States, 553 US
617.
12In Quanta, the court held that ‘[t]he longstanding doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that the
initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item’. But it remains
unclear as to what extent a patentee can use a conditional license to impose restrictions on
downstream purchasers; Richard Stern, ‘Quanta Computer Inc v LGE Electronics Inc: Comments
on the Reaffirmance of the Exhaustion Doctrine in the United States’ (2008) European Intellectual
Property Review 527.
13Greg Sivinski, ‘District Court Denies Motion to Dismiss FTC Section 5 Complaint Against
Qualcomm’ (Competition Policy International, 2017) <https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.
com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/North-America-Column-August-Full-4.pdf>.
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modem chipsets as negotiation leverage in the process of license negotiations with
handset companies.14
3.2.3 Imposing Unfair and Unreasonable Licensing Terms
Roughly speaking, unfairness element refers to transparency and good faith in the
negotiation process and unreasonableness element refers to balancing mechanism
with conflicting interests. The unfairness or unreasonableness of arrangements
made with handset makers has been examined in three aspects. The first aspect is
that Qualcomm does not present the list of patents when licensing and providing
portfolio licenses including SEPs and other non-SEPs (comprehensive portfolio
license). The second aspect is that it does not provide good faith negotiation pro-
cedures and imposes unilaterally-decided licensing terms in which royalties are
based on the entire handset sales prices (unilateral licensing terms). The third aspect
is that handset makers are required to license their patents to Qualcomm’s cus-
tomers without fair compensation (royalty-free cross-grant terms).
3.3 Relationship Between Conduct Types of Two
Qualcomm Cases
Of the types of conduct covered in the 2nd Qualcomm case, there are issues not
covered in the 1st Qualcomm case because the 2nd case reflects changed situations.
However, some issues from the conducts of the 2nd case arise from the continuing
situation in the 1st case and have close relationship with the conduct types of the 1st
case.
The 2nd case conduct type of refusing or restricting to license SEPs to rival
chipset makers has been strengthened since 2008 resulting from change in licensing
policy from ‘component-level and device-level parallel policy’ (multi-level
licensing) to ‘device-level only policy’ (level discrimination), which was not
reviewed in the 1st case. Practice of linking chipset supply with patent license with
handset makers in the 2nd case started from 1993, but was not dealt with in the 1st
case.
Qualcomm’s practice of calculating royalties based on the entire handset sales
prices (entire market value rule) existed in both the 1st and 2nd cases. In relation to
this practice, royalty calculation formula and its adoption process were reviewed in
the 2nd case, while only discriminatory factors or conditional rebate factors
included in the method of calculating royalty were reviewed in the 1st case.




The KFTC rested its findings on the provision prohibiting ‘unfair interference
with another’s business activities’ under Article 3-2(1) (Abuse of Market
Dominance) of MRFTA and Article 5(3) of the Enforcement Decree. In some
conduct types, ‘abuse of superior trading position’ under Article 23(1) (Unfair
Trade Practices) of the MRFTA and Article 36(1) of the Enforcement Decree was
also applied.
3.4 Expected Effects on Qualcomm’ Business Model
In the 1st case, Qualcomm’s business model was not influenced, only methods of
operation being affected. The remedies of the 1st case could not address problems
of entry barrier for potential entrants into modem chipset markets effectively, which
brought about additional complaints from the competitors despite the outcome of
the 1st case.
In contrast, the remedies of the 2nd case impact directly on Qualcomm’s busi-
ness model. To comply with the remedies requiring Qualcomm to engage in good
faith negotiation with rival model chipset makers and handset makers, Qualcomm
should change its licensing policy fundamentally. The required policy change may
affect the methods to calculate royalty fees which are the key for Qualcomm to earn
a lot of profits despite decreasing influence of Qualcomm in the LTE standard.
4 Some Competition Law Issues
4.1 Issue of Defining Relevant Markets
A common feature of the 1st and 2nd cases related to the relevant market definition
is distinction between technology market and goods market. Main goal of market
definition is to understand the competitive constraints systemically and thus the
degree of market power.15 As Qualcomm is a vertically integrating enterprise active
in both technology and goods markets, the market definition is required to make
distinction between two markets.
Two issues have been raised regarding Qualcomm’s SEPs license markets. One
issue is whether to define a separate market for each mobile telecommunications
technology standard. Another issue is whether to consider a number of Qualcomm’s
SEPs included in one technical standard as the same relevant market. The KFTC
decided that different communications standards would make different markets
based on the fact that CDMA, WCDMA and LTE standards cannot be replaced
15David Evans, ‘Lightening Up on Market Definition’ in Einer Elhauge (eds), Research Handbook
on the Economics of Antitrust Law (Edward Elgar 2010).
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with one another. In addition, the KFTC determined that Qualcomm’s SEPs should
constitute a cluster market, not a discrete market within the standard. That’s because
each of Qualcomm’s technology included in the same standard has a relationship of
technical and transactional complements with one another.
Regarding the delineation of the relevant geographical market, there is a ques-
tion of whether the geographical area is domestic or international. While the geo-
graphical area was domestic in the 1st case where only CDMA standard was
reviewed, it was the international market in the 2nd case where all of the CDMA,
WCDMA, and LTE standards were reviewed. What makes the difference is that the
CDMA standard could not be replaced outside the domestic market, but the
WCDMA or LTE Standards have been internationally recognized with few
substitutes.
4.2 Determining Whether FRAND Commitment Is Violated
or Evaded
A FRAND commitment is made when the patent owner commits to the standard
setting organization (SSO) that it will negotiate on FRAND terms for licensing of
patented technology prior to the selection of the patented technologies for inclusion
in the standard. A FRAND-encumbered SEP holder is under a pre-contractual
obligation to negotiate the license in good faith, not under a contractual duty to
grant a FRAND license to any potential licensee.16
Generally speaking, the specific meaning of FRAND can only be established in
concrete situations, in particular taking into account the positions of the licensor and
the licensee.17 The elements that make up the FRAND terms can be divided into
fairness and unreasonableness elements and non-discriminatory element. The
non-discriminatory element of FRAND was reviewed in the 1st case, while the
fairness and unreasonableness elements of FRAND were reviewed in the 2nd case.
With regard to whether Qualcomm’s conduct in the 1st case violated
non-discriminatory element of FRAND, the KFTC regarded its finding of dis-
crimination as a violation of FRAND commitment. It appears not to have precisely
interpreted the boundary of Qualcomm’s FRAND obligation, nor it did provide
clear guidance as to how Qualcomm’s royalty scheme was a FRAND violation.18
The separate issue is whether setting a different price to even a single firm pursuant
16Dae-Sik Hong, ‘A Review of Korean Competition Law and Guidelines for Exercise of
Standard-related Patents’ (2015) The Journal of Korean Law 127.
17Damien Geradin and Miguel Rato, ‘Can Standard-Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse? A
Dissonant View on Patent Hold-Up, Royalty Stacking and the Meaning of FRAND’ (2007)
European Competition Journal 101.
18Yoonhee Kim and Hui-Jin Yang, ‘A Brief Overview of Qualcomm v Korea Fair Trade
Commission’ (2015) 1 Competition Policy International Antitrust Chronicle <https://www.
competitionpolicyinternational.com/file/view/7352>.
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to specific conditions may count as discrimination. Both the KFTC and the Seoul
High Court decided in the affirmative, but based on different reasons.19
The issue that Qualcomm’s conduct in the 2nd case violated fairness and
unreasonableness elements was illuminated in three respects. The first is normality
of licensing method. The KFTC acknowledged the fact that the market-dominant
vertically integrated operator in both technology markets (especially SEPs) and
goods market refuses to license modem chipset makers only licensing to handset
makers does not correspond to normal trading practices.
The second is fairness in negotiation and set-up or modification of prices or other
trading conditions. This is a review of Qualcomm’s compliance with the FRAND
commitment from the perspective of the trading process. The KFTC considered that
the practice of linking modem chipset supplies with licensing agreements is against
a duty of complying with good faith negotiation process.
The third is the reasonableness of prices or other trading conditions. This is to
assess the rationality of the trading contents. The KFTC determined that the
licensing terms were unreasonable in light of comprehensive portfolio licensing,
unilaterally-defined royalty terms, and royalty-free cross-grant terms.
4.3 Competition Law Assessment on FRAND Commitment
It is questionable whether FRAND commitment infringements are anticompetitive
per se or presumptively anticompetitive subject to rebuttal. This is a question of
whether additional stage is needed to assess anti-competitiveness after the FRAND
commitment infringements are found out. The KFTC views that infringing FRAND
commitment is likely to be anticompetitive by itself, but it goes further to assess
anti-competitiveness.
Argument that FRAND commitment infringements are anticompetitive bases the
understanding that FRAND commitments are institutional competitive constraints
by itself. Essentiality means that there are no substitutes in specific technologies.
Once standard setting is made, it results in disappearance of competitive constraints
in the same standard market. Other substitutable technologies before the standard
setting, if any, are excluded artificially by standard setting that would have other-
wise existed as competitive constraints in the process of competition to be included
in the specific technology standard.
19For critics for deciding whether there is discrimination based on comparison of different prices to
‘one buyer’ conditioned upon the amount of purchases, see Jinyul Ju, ‘Recent developments in
Korean antirust cases concerning FRAND-encumbered standard essential patents’ (2015) 8(2)
Jindal Global Law Review 221.
However, in this case, it can be argued that discrimination is based on the fact that the effects
are attributed to Qualcomm and its competitors in the modem chipset markets in a discriminatory
way.
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Influence of SEPs can be lessened when (i) standard is not the only one but with
substitutable standard already existing and/or (ii) competition with goods not using
such standard is available or entry of new goods are possible in the market. Before
the adoption of the new standard, there might be competition between substitutable
technologies for the inclusion of the new standard. This is competition ‘for the
market’ as opposed to competition ‘in the market’. Despite the end of competition
for the same market with the adoption of the new standard, there could still be
competitive pressures from inter-standard competition. But there remains no
competition in the market if there is no inter-standard competition at all. This is
what happened to mobile communications standard technology in the 4th genera-
tion. In the mobile communications market, inter-standard competition existed in
the 2nd generation standard (CDMA-19%, GSM-81%), then such competition was
weakened in the 3rd generation (WCDMA-85%, CDMA 2000-13%,
TD-SCDMA-2%), and disappeared by being unified to LTE in the 4th generation
standard. Especially, in the LTE standard there are no alternative standards nor
components alternative to modem chipsets using the LTE standard. Thus, an SEP
holder has incentive and capacity to abuse SEPs after selected as a standard tech-
nology. In this situation, FRAND commitment becomes more and more significant
because it can play a role as an institutional complement for competitive constraints
which are artificially removed.
In order to harmonize with patent law objectives, it is necessary to require
proving of exceptional circumstances supporting anti-competitiveness. However,
the degree of proving could be eased in the situations of FRAND commitment
infringements.20
4.4 Theories and establishment of Competitive Harm
4.4.1 Theories of Competitive Harm
Theories of competitive harm means theoretical frameworks explaining mechanism
that the effects on markets arising from an enterprise’s conduct give rise to
weakening of competitive constraints or competitive pressure deriving from com-
petitors or trading partners. Such theories should (i) be logically consistent,
(ii) reflect the incentives that various parties face, (iii) be in line with the available
empirical evidence, and (iv) articulate how consumers have been/will be harmed.21
20Bjorn Lundqvist, ‘The Interface between Competition Law and Standard Essential Patents -
Some Early Comments on the Huawei Case’ (2015) European Competition Journal 371 <https://
ssrn.com/abstract=2688257> (stating that the situation in which an SEP holder subject to FRAND
commitment refuses to license on FRAND terms triggers new exceptional circumstance doctrine).
21Hans Zenger and Mike Walker, ‘Theories of Harm in European Competition Law: A Progress
Report’ in Jacques Bourgeois and Denis Waelbroeck (eds), Ten Years of Effects-Based Approach
in EU Competition Law (Bruylant 2012).
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Such theories are also combined with counterfactual method by which the current
situation is compared with the hypothetical competitive situation.22
Theories of competitive harm can be classified as follows. More economic
theories include predation analysis framework, raising rivals’ cost analysis frame-
work, anticompetitive foreclosure analysis framework, and leveraging of market
dominance analysis framework. More normative theories include discrimination
analysis framework, entry barrier analysis framework, exclusivity analysis frame-
work, and essential elements analysis framework.
In two cases, the KFTC attempted to explain the competitive constraints by using
various theories of competitive harm. In the 2nd case, based on raising rivals’ costs
analysis framework,23 the KFTC presented an increase in competitors’ costs resulting
from Qualcomm’s threats of attack on patent infringements and patent umbrella
effects24 as one of the grounds for anticompetitive effects. The leveraging of market
dominance analysis framework25 was used in both cases. One-way leveraging was
concerned in the 1st case (leveraging from the technology market to the component
market), while cross leveraging was contemplated in the 2nd case (leveraging from
the technology market to the component market and vice versa). In the 2nd case, both
offensive leveraging and defensive leveraging26 were also concerned.
Discrimination analysis framework was primarily concerned with the 1st case of
infringements of the non-discriminatory element of FRAND, but in the 2nd case,
this framework was also relied upon as the effect of discriminating between
Qualcomm’s modem chipset purchasers with patent umbrella and purchasers of
rival companies without it. The KFTC also used the essential elements analysis
framework, which is based on recognizing SEPs as essential elements.27
22For a general explanation about the use of the counterfactual method in EU competition law, See
Damien Geradin and Ianis Girgenson, ‘The Counterfactual Method in EU Competition Law: The
Cornerstone of the Effects-Based Approach’ (December 2011) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1970917>.
23Steven Salop and David Scheffman, ‘Raising Rivals Costs’ (1983) 73 American Economic
Review 267; Thomas G. Kattenmaker and Steven C. Salop, ‘Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising
Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price’ (1986) 96 Yale Law Journal 209.
24KFTC (n 14) 9.
25Daniel L. Rubinfeld, ‘Antitrust Enforcement in Dynamic Network Industries’ (1998) Berkeley
Law Scholarship Repository 859 (explaining that leveraging occurs when a firm uses its advantage
from operating in one market to gain an advantage in selling into one or more other, generally
related markets).
26Offensive leveraging is about reaping additional monopoly rent from a second market, while
defensive leveraging is about an attempt to defend the primary dominant position;
Directorate-General for Internal Policies, ‘Challenges For Competition Policy in a Digitalised
Economy’ (Study, July 2015) <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/290429309_Challenges_
for_Competition_Policy_in_a_Digitalised_Economy>.
27This seems to be a change from an earlier position in Samsung v Apple, in which the KFTC held
that telecommunications SEPs were not an essential element, explaining that SEP holders are
subject to a FRAND licensing obligation, and that since there are multiple SEP holders and
thousands of SEPs for a cellular standard, it is different from a case where there is only a single
essential element; Korea Fair Trade Commission, ‘KFTC Determines That Samsung Electronics’
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The KFTC also considered these adverse effects collectively because it has the
effect of reinforcing each other through the feedback effect. The KFTC even
attempted to compare Qualcomm’s practice with SEP holder’s injunction against
willing licensees.28 In view of the KFTC, Qualcomm’s practice is worse than such
an injunctive measure in terms of the nature and degree of competitive harm.
4.4.2 Extent of Proving Competitive Harm
The KFTC focuses on exclusionary effects as opposed to exploitative effects.
Finding special circumstances in both cases may have affected articulating theories
of competitive harms as well as setting up the extent of proving. The KFTC con-
sidered that three characteristics in relation to Qualcomm’s business position and
nature of conducts increased the likelihood that applicable theories of competitive
harms could be really applied and thus decreased the extent of its proving. The three
characteristics are (1) that the Qualcomm acquires dominant position through
standard-setting and FRAND commitments, (2) that Qualcomm is vertically inte-
grating enterprise dominant both in the technology market and the goods market,
and (3) that breach of FRAND commitments results in elimination of institutional
competitive constraints remaining in the SEPs license markets.
5 Comparison with Other Jurisdictions
Qualcomm cases have also been investigated and sanctioned by other competition
authorities outside of Korea. Japan is the first country to deal with Qualcomm case.
The Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) acknowledged that in 2009,
Qualcomm’s conducts infringed the Japanese Antimonopoly Act (AMA).29 The
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), one of China’s three
competition agencies, determined in 2015 that Qualcomm’s conducts violated
China’s Antimonopoly Law (AML).30 In early 2017, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) of the US filed a complaint against Qualcomm in Northern
Injunction Claim against Apple for Infringement of Standard Patents is not a Breach of the
MRFTA’ (2014).
28Case C-170/13 Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v ZTE Corp. EU:C:2015:477.
29Japan Fair Trade Commission, ‘Cease and Desist Order against QUALCOMM Incorporated’
(30 September 2009) <http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-2009/sep/individual-000038.
html>.
30Liyang Hou, ‘Qualcomm: How China has Invalidated Traditional Business Models on Standard
Essential Patents’ (2015) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 686.
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District Court of California for violating Section 5 of the FTC Act.31 The Taiwan
Fair Trade Commission (TFTC) joined the forces by imposing record fines of 23.4
billion Taiwan dollars (approximately 7.75 million US dollars) on Qualcomm for
the violation of the Taiwan Fair Trade Act (TFTA) in October 2017.32 Most
recently, the European Commission (EC) fines Qualcomm 997 million Euro for
abuse of dominant market position by making significant payments to a key cus-
tomer on condition it would not buy from rivals.33
In the following, the author compares the types of behaviors in Korea with
Japan, China, and the US in turn, and examine the commonalities and differences
between the four competition authorities in terms of theories of competitive harm.
5.1 Korea in Comparison with Japan
In comparison with Korea, Japan’s focus was narrowed down to specific restrictive
trading conditions such as provisions of royalty-free license to Qualcomm and
non-assertion of patents against Qualcomm and, customers of Qualcomm imposed
on Japanese manufacturers of subscriber units or base stations, many of which have
been engaged in the research and development of wireless telecommunications
technologies. This conduct type can correspond to imposing royalty-free
cross-grant terms in Korean 2nd case which was determined as unfair and unrea-
sonable (Table 1).
5.2 Korea in Comparison with China
In China, three types of abusive behavior were examined, which were respectively
(1) charging unfair high royalties, (2) tying non-SEPs license with license to SEPs,
and (3) imposing unreasonable conditions in the sale of baseband chipsets. The first
31Federal Trade Commission, 'FTC Charges Qualcomm With Monopolizing Key Semiconductor
Device Used in Cell Phones (17 January 2017) <http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-release/
2017/ftc-charges-qualcomm-monopolizing-key-semiconductor-device-used>; Sivinski (n 13).
32Andy C. M. Chen, ‘Investigation Competition Cases In Taiwan: Procedural Perspective’
(Competition Policy International, 2017) <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316685925_
Investigating_Competition_Cases_in_Taiwan_the_Inquisitorial_Principle_and_the_Abuse_of_
Superior_Bargaining_Position>. The types of behaviors in the TFTC case are (1) refusing to
license competing chip makers its SEPs, (2) conditioning the sale of its chips to device manu-
facturers on their signing the patent licensing agreement, and (3) forcing competing chip makers to
accept unfavorable terms, which are much the same as in the KFTC case.
33European Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission Fines Qualcomm €997 Million For Abuse Of
Dominant Market Position’ (24 January 2018) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-421_
en.htm>. Qualcomm’s practices in this case are similar to the conduct of imposing conditional
rebate in the first Korean case.
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and second types of conduct find their equivalents in Korean cases. With regard to
the first conduct type of charging unfair high royalties, two issues of charging
royalties over expired wireless SEPs and requiring free cross-license from licensees
made a basis of declaring Qualcomm’s price as excessive. This can be compared
with Korea’s approach not relating the issues to excessive pricing. The second
conduct type corresponds to comprehensive portfolio license issue as a part of the
conduct type of unfair and unreasonable licensing terms with handset makers in
Korean 2nd case, which the KFTC did not label as tying. The third type of conduct
includes the condition in the sale of baseband chipsets requiring not to challenge the
patent licensing agreement, which was not explicitly considered in Korea (Table 2).
Table 1 Comparison between Korea and Japan
Korea (2009, 2017) Japan (2009)
Charging discriminatory royalties
Imposing conditional rebates
Charging royalties over expired
patents
Refusal or restriction of license to
competing chipset makers
Linking chipset supply with license
to handset makers
Imposing unfair and unreasonable
terms with handset makers
Royalty-free license and non-assertion-of-patent
provisions for manufacturers of semiconductor
integrated circuits etc.
Table 2 Comparison between Korea and China
Korea (2009, 2017) China (2015)
Charging discriminatory royalties
Imposing conditional rebates




Refusal or restriction of license to
competing chipset makers
Linking chipset supply with license to
handset makers






Tying non-SEPs license with license to SEPs
Imposing unreasonable conditions in chip sales
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5.3 Korea in Comparison with US: Conduct Types
The FTC’s complaint makes three major allegations concerning Qualcomm’s
anticompetitive behavior, which refers to (1) refusal to license at component level,
(2) no license, no chips policy, and (3) de facto exclusive dealing with Apple. The
first and second types of conduct can be matched with those of the Korean 2nd case.
Both authorities adopt similar approach in that they derive theories of harm through
Qualcomm’s course of conduct.34 The third type of conduct is a specific issue in the
US (Table 3).
6 Conclusion
In terms of theories of harm, Korea focuses on exclusionary effects with Japan and
US, while China focuses on exploitative effects. Korea, Japan and US focus on
exclusionary effects in common, but differ in emphasis.
Korea applied the abuse of dominance clause under the MRFTA and challenged
the SEPs license markets and chipset markets. In the US, the FTC alleged that
Qualcomm’s conducts were to maintain monopoly power or foreclose competition,
and the allegation was that the conducts would constitute the stand-alone violation
of unfair methods of competition provision under the Section 5 of the FTC Act.
Both authorities have the common ground in that they found harm to competition
from a refusal to license at the component level.35 In contrast, Japan challenged
Table 3 Comparison between Korea and US
Korea (2009, 2017) US Allegation (2017)
Charging discriminatory royalties
Imposing conditional rebates
Charging royalties over expired patents
Refusal to or restriction on license to
competing chipset makers
Refusal to license at component
level
Linking chipset supply with license to handset makers No license, no chips policy
Imposing unfair and unreasonable terms
with handset makers
De facto exclusive dealing with Apple
34Koren Wong and others, ‘A Comparative and Economic Analysis of the US FTC’s Complaint
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Qualcomm’s behavior as impediment of fair competition in the technology market
because the JFTC applied the unfair trade practices clause under the AMA.
China focuses on exploitative effects unlike other countries. The reason seems to
be that the NDRC mainly covers price-related antitrust enforcement. Exploitative
effects on handset makers were recognized, taking various factors such as facili-
tating price increase (including expired SEPs) and preventing price decrease
(excluding cross-license fee) into consideration. Exclusionary abuse character was
also found, but unclear on whom it affects.
Disclosure This work was supported from the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea
and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2016S1A3A2923769).
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Chapter 10
Regulating Standard Essential Patents
in Implementer-Oriented Countries:
Insights from India and Japan
Ashish Bharadwaj and Tohru Yoshioka-Kobayashi
1 Introduction
Growing diffusion of internationally standardized digital products dramatically has
changed the global manufacturing industry. Today, very few firms are able to gain a
significant market share or earn from patent royalties. To illustrate, in the smart-
phone industry, Samsung, Apple, and Huawei dominate 40% of global sales,1 and
Qualcomm makes a billion dollar only from patent licensing. A technology stan-
dard is one of the drivers of the global market creation. In the case of smartphones,
wireless telecommunication standards play a key role. However, standards them-
selves do not determine the market power of the individual firms. Rather, it is the
strategic use of Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) that affects the competitiveness of
firms.
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As widely reported, this decade has experienced many legal disputes over SEPs.
Courts, antitrust bodies, and government agencies as well as Standard Setting
Organizations (SSOs), have discussed in length about issues of license refusals,
reasonable royalty rates, and injunctive reliefs on infringements of the license of the
SEPs.2 Major policy actions have been taken in Europe and the United States (US).
Antitrust bodies, like DG competition and Federal Trade Commission (FTC), have
actively published various reports on SEP issues and have implemented several
regulations.
Approaching from a policy perspective, the drafters should not merely extend
their regulations to the rest of the world without understanding the specificities of
our setting. There is a significant difference in the market realities. Initially, Europe,
Japan, and the US had major SEP holders, especially in wireless communication
standards but now, the rapid emergence of Chinese and Korean SEP holders has
resulted in a staggering decline in the numbers of SEPs owned by the Japanese
firms. In contrast with the increasing impact of Chinese companies, India, one of
the largest emerging market, has seen very few SEP holders. Such differences may
affect the policy decisions on regulation of SEPs.
This chapter discusses the SEP regulation in implementer-oriented countries, by
comparing the recent policy change in India and Japan. In past five years, both these
two countries have taken serious measures to introduce a series of regulations on
SEPs. Their experiences provide various implications for public policies concern-
ing the SEP issues.
Before entering into a specific discussion, it is important to clarify the general
background of SEP issues, especially in the smart phone market. Smart phones are
categorized upon the basis of standards that are required to classify a smartphone as
2G, 3G or 4G. These standards are set by the SSOs, which are important institutions
that set out various technical standards in the field of technology. These standards
are to be adhered by all the companies that are members of these SSOs. SSOs have
been playing a major role in bringing a harmonization amongst the different market
players, by making them voluntarily participate in maintenance of these standards.
SSOs play a major role in making available the SEPs to all the new entrants at
fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) rates. They prevent the SEP
holders from abusing their dominating positions by ensuring that they trade their
licenses only on FRAND terms. As the FRAND commitment does not specify any
specific royalty rates, it forms a subject of dispute between various SEP holders and
implementers. Nevertheless, SSOs have not yet touched royalty issues since any
SSOs’ actions requesting specific royalties potentially constitute a buyers’ cartel.
As an inevitable result, national courts and competition law authorities have
ruled on this issue. However, their decisions are not uniform. In India, for example,
both the courts and the Competition Commission of India (CCI), a competition
2Ashish Bharadwaj, Indranath Gupta and Sunita Tripathy, ‘Introduction to the JGLR special issue
on standardization, patents and competition issues: global developments and perspectives’ (2017)
8(2) Jindal Global Law Review 117.
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regulatory authority, have taken completely different approaches. While the CCI
alludes to Smallest Saleable Patent Practicing Unit (SSPPU) as an appropriate base
for royalty calculations, the Delhi High Court has relied on the end market price of
the device. In Japan, only a single case has been decided on a reasonable royalty
rate by multiplying the end market price of the device, contributions of the focal
standard, and contributions of litigated patents.
Other than reasonable royalties, there are several legal issues over SEPs. Patent
hold-ups, patent hold-outs, aggregated royalties, and an injunctive relief for
FRAND committed SEPs are some of them. In the next two parts, the authors
review case laws over SEPs in both India and Japan.
2 Indian Cases and Their Background
2.1 Overview of the SEP Cases in India
2.1.1 Global SEP Owners v Local SEP Implementers
Beginning of SEP litigation in India was marked by the case of Philips v
Bhagirathi.3 For the first time, Delhi High Court used interim measures as a remedy
and directed the defendant to deposit ` 45 per DVD player. Not a long time has
passed since smartphone litigation has started in India particularly, Ericsson has
filed a number of infringement suits against the Indian manufacturers.4 In Ericsson
v Kingtech,5 Ericsson had filed an application before the Commissioner of Customs,
complaining against the goods imported by Kingtech. It was reported that the said
goods infringed several of the SEPs owned by Ericsson. As a result, the commis-
sioner detained those goods. Aggrieved by these restrictions, Kingtech approached
the Delhi High Court, which decided against Ericsson on two grounds: (i) the
commissioner in this case did not have the authority to make such determinations
and (ii) the due procedure was not followed by Ericsson. Consequently, Ericsson
filed for an appeal against this order and got a decision in its favour. It was decided
that a fresh order be issued by the commissioner recording an adequate reason to
believe that Kingtech’s goods infringed the patent rights owned by Ericsson. Later,
the High Court passed an order restraining Kingtech from importing any goods that
could infringe Ericsson’s patent rights.
Interestingly, there are many cases between Ericsson and various other market
players concerning the same issue of SEP infringements. It is important to see how
3Koniklijke Phillips N.V v Bhagirathi Electronis & Ors. (2017) Delhi High Court, CS (OS) 1082/
2009.
4Ashish Bharadwaj, ‘A note on the neglected issue of reverse patent hold-up’ (2018) 13 (7) Journal
of Intellectual Property Law & Practice <https://doi.org/10.1093/jiplp/jpx224> accessed 3 May 2018.
5Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (PUBL) & Ors. v Kingtech Electronics (India) & Ors.
(2016) Delhi High Court, CS (COMM) 239/2016.
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the Indian jurisprudence has evolved over time, attempting to reconcile the market
realities with policy discourse. Following the Kingtech case, Ericsson filed another
case against Micromax Informatics Limited claiming an infringement of eight of its
SEPs including 3G, AMR and Edge technologies. The High Court of Delhi passed
an interim relief in its favor directing Micromax to pay adequate royalties.6 Post
this; Micromax approached the CCI, complaining against the abusive use of power
by Ericsson. The CCI challenged the said order in the High Court, which decided
that while deciding this case the CCI has overstepped its authority as defined under
the Competition Act. It prevented the CCI from passing any final order on this
matter until the court proceedings were completed and an interim royalty was fixed
that was to be paid during the pendency of the suit. Meanwhile, Ericsson made
several complaints of non-compliance by Micromax. In 2016, the High Court of
Delhi finally decided favorably on the competence of CCI to conduct investigation
in this case. This highlights an intersection between the The Competition Act 2002
and Intellectual Property (IP) provisions. Courts have suggested a harmonious
reading of both the Acts as they provide for different recourse. IP Act aims
exclusively at protecting the individual rights, where as, on the other hand, the
Competition Act is set up to regulate the market so as to introduce a fair play
mechanism.7 Recently, on 5 February 2018, Delhi High Court passed an order
stating that Ericsson and Micromax have entered into a Global Patent License
Agreement on 26 January 2017. Both the parties have agreed to withdraw all their
pending disputes. Court also held that the amounts agreed should be released as
decided by the parties.8 In 2016, Ericsson also sued Gionee,9 a Chinese vendor over
the infringement of the same eight SEPs as in Micromax. Hereby an interim royalty
was fixed by the Delhi High Court, calculated on the basis of the royalty rates
awarded in the case of Micromax.
In a similar case of Ericsson v Intex,10 a complaint was filed against Ericsson for
abusing its dominant position to the deterrence of other players in the market. It was
argued that the licensing terms proposed by Ericsson were discriminatory and
unreasonable. Intex claimed that the non-disclosure agreement as required by
Ericsson constituted undue restraints. It also prevented Intex from evaluating its
licensing terms as opposed to any other company dealing with Ericsson for the
6Micromax Informatics Limited v Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (PUBL) & Ors. (2016) Delhi
High Court, FAO(OS) 75/2016.
7Sahithya, ‘Ericsson v Micromax—A Kick-Start to SEP-FRAND Antitrust Jurisprudence in India’
(Kluwer Competition Law Blog, 13 July 2016) <http://competitionlawblog.kluwercompetitionlaw.
com/2016/07/13/ericsson-v-micromax-a-kick-start-to-the-sep-frand-antitrust-jurisprudence-in-
india/> accessed 4 May 2018.
8Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (PUBL) v Mercury Electronics & Anr. (2017) Delhi High
Court, CS (COMM) No. 155/2017.
9Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (PUBL) and Ors. v Gionee Communication Equipment Co. Ltd
& Anr. (2016) Delhi High Court, CS(COMM) No. 1533/2016.
10Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (PUBL) and Ors. v Intex Technologies(India) Ltd (2014) Delhi
High Court, CS(OS) No. 1024/2014.
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same license. On the aforementioned basis, the CCI decided to investigate the
matter against Ericsson. It was convinced about a prima facie case of abuse of
dominance by Ericsson. This decision was then appealed in the High Court of Delhi
contending the jurisdiction of the CCI on this matter. Ericsson argued that any issue
regarding a claim for royalty would fall exclusively within the scope of Patents Act
1970. Following from the judgement of Micromax, the court decided that nothing in
the IP Act ousts the jurisdiction of the CCI and hence both the acts have parallel
application. However, while deciding on the issue of patent infringement by Intex,
the court decided in the favour of Ericsson and ordered that royalties be paid by Intex.
In another case of Ericsson v Xiaomi,11 an infringement claim was filed against
Xiaomi for using various SEPs owned by Ericsson without acquiring a license for
the same. As a result, an interim injunction was imposed on Xiaomi for further
selling its products which infringed the said SEPs. Xiaomi appealed this order and
got a decision in its favour. On 22 April 2016, while deciding this case Delhi High
Court found out that Xiaomi already had a license from Qualcomm, which in turn
had a license with Ericsson. Hence, a decision was passed in the favour of Xiaomi.
Recently, Ericsson filed a case against Lava claiming an infringement of the
eight SEPs. Rejecting the defence presented by Lava, the Delhi High Court decided
in favour of Ericsson.12 It was recorded that Ericsson had produced a prima facie
case of the essentiality of its patent and was willing to negotiate with Lava on
FRAND terms. On enquiry, it was found that Lava itself was responsible for
delaying an amicable contract.
In another case, Best IT World (India) Private Limited (iBall) brought a com-
plaint against Ericsson before the CCI. It was alleged that through its exorbitant
royalty rates and inflexible non-disclosure agreement, Ericsson was attempting to
abuse its dominant position in the market.13 On perusal of the facts and evidence,
the Commission decided that Ericsson was not complying with its FRAND obli-
gations and was in contravention with Section 4 of the Competition Act.14 It was
found that the royalty rates demanded by Ericsson was not based on an objective
evaluation of the functionality of their product but on the final price of the product
on which the patented product is used. The case was finally settled outside the
court.
11Xiaomi Technology and Anr. v Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (PUBL) and Ors. (2016) Delhi
High Court, FAO(OS), 2016.
12Lava International Limited v Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (PUBL) (2016) Delhi High
Court, FAO(OS) (COMM) 45/2016.
13Best IT World(India) Private Ltd v Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (2015) Competition
Commission of India, Case No. 4 of 015, Order dated 12 May 2015.
14The Competition Act 2002, s 4.
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2.1.2 Litigations from Indian SEP Holders
Apart from Ericsson, there are several other players who have managed to set their
foot in the Indian IP market and have added substantially to the understanding of
SEP litigation herein. In 2014, Vringo Infrastructure Incorporation filed a patent
infringement suit against ZTE and its Indian subsidiaries alleging infringement of
their patent titled ‘a method and a device for making a handover decision in a
mobile communication system’.15 Similar suits were filed by Vringo against ZTE in
various other jurisdictions. Initially, the Delhi High Court granted an ad interim ex
parte injunction on the manufacture, import, sale, use, or advertisement of ZTE’s
infringing products. However, ZTE challenged the injunction and received an order
in its favour. The court agreed with ZTE that Vringo was unable to make a prima
facie case and that despite being aware of the infringement it did not take any action
against ZTE for a long time. The court decided that the balance of convenience fell
in favour of ZTE and that no irreparable harm was caused to the plaintiff. Hence,
the Injunction granted to Vringo was vacated. However, conditions of bank guar-
antees were levied on ZTE.16 The matter was finally resolved outside of court when
ZTE paid a sum of $21.5 million to Vringo in order to acquire a non-exclusive right
over its SEP portfolio.
In another case, Vringo sued AsusTek Computer Inc. and one of its distributors
for infringement of a non-SEP, entitled ‘Method and system for providing wireless
communication using a context for message compression’.17 In its response, Asus
claimed that the technology it was using was licensed to it by Google. Later,
Google requested for attachment as a party to the suit. However, the case was
withdrawn in late 2016, as the parties decided to reach a settlement outside of court.
In 2016, Dolby filed a suit against two major Chinese companies namely,
Oppo18 and Vivo.19 Dolby claimed that both these companies infringed its patent
rights by using its audio technologies without having acquired a license for the
same. As per the order passed by the Delhi High Court, both the companies were
directed to pay the arrears to Dolby at a royalty rate of ` 34 per handset. In return,
15Vringo Infrastructure Inc, & Anr. v ZTE Corporation & Ors. (2014) Delhi High Court,
FAO(OS) 369/2014.
16ibid.
17Vringo Infrastructure Inc, & Anr. v ZTE Corporation & Ors. (2014) Delhi High Court, CS(OS)
1050/2014.
18Dolby International AB & Anr. v GDN Enterprises Private Limited & Ors. (2016) Delhi High
Court, CS(COMM) 1425/2016.
19ibid.
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they were allowed to continue selling and manufacturing. Meanwhile, parties
decided to refer to mediation for setting up of further licensing terms of their
contract.20
2.1.3 Discussions on Case Laws
The aforementioned case laws highlight the constantly evolving SEP jurisprudence
in India. While many new players are entering the domestic market, it is important
to clarify the Indian legal position on some relevant issues. As seen above, the
Delhi High Court and CCI have often taken different positions on various issues.
They gain their jurisdiction from two different statues namely, The Patent Act 1970
and The Competition Act 2002. Both the institutions have different objectives
which in turn leads to completely different outcomes. CCI uses the approach of
Smallest Saleable Patent Practicing Component (SSPPC) while the Delhi High
Court has relied upon the net price of the Downstream Product and also resorting to
the comparison of the licenses.
It is difficult to set a standard for deciding the interim royalty rates. However, it
is important that courts also consider necessities of the domestic market in order to
come up with effective solutions to these disputes. Most of the Indian litigants are
licensees and not the patent holders. If an interim injunction is provided every time
a complaint is filed, it will keep the prices of the products high and will act as a
deterrent for the consumers.21
2.2 Adjudication Process/Legal Framework in India
There are five key SSOs in India namely, the Telecom Standard Development
Society of India (TSDSI), Telecommunication Engineering Centre (TEC), Bureau
of Indian Standards (BIS), The Global ICT Standardization Forum for India
(GISFI) and the Development Organization of Standards for Telecommunications
in India (DOSTI). TSDSI is public-private partnership entity run by participation of
all the stakeholders together, the government, service providers, manufacturer,
researchers and vendors. It evaluates and works on customised standardised solu-
tions for the Indian telecom market.22 TEC unlike TSDSI, is a completely
20Anjana, ‘Patent Infringement Suit by Dolby against Oppo and Vivo’ (Khurana & Khurana, 27
December 2016). <http://www.khuranaandkhurana.com/2016/12/27/patent-infringment-suit-by-
dolby-against-oppo-and-vivo/?utm_source=mondaq&utm_medium=syndication&utm_campaign=
view-original> accessed 18 February 2018.
21Raghavi, ‘Demystifying the Indian FRAND Regime: The Interplay of Competition and
Intellectual Property’ (2016) 21 Journal of Intellectual Property Rights 89.
22Telecom Standard Development Society of India <http://www.tsdsi.org/> accessed 21 February
2018.
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government based organisation and develops standards for the telecom equipment
and services. It also coordinates with the other SSO worldwide and participates in
the global standardisation.23 BIS on the other hand, is the National Standard Body
of India established under the BIS Act 1986. It operates various industries, each
through a division council. Currently, it works with 14 Division Councils and over
650 Technical Committees that have so far developed over 19,000 Indian
Standards.24 GISIF is another organisation that seeks to ensure a coherent stan-
dardisation regime for information and communications technology (ICT) sector.
Its participants include domestic and foreign firms, policy makers, academicians
and regulators.25 DOSTI is a private SSO working on the development of standards.
Its members include market players within India and outside. All of these institu-
tions promote negotiations based on FRAND terms.
In case of non-compliance, parties have an option of reaching out to regulatory
bodies. In India, there are two main regulatory bodies, the Intellectual Property
Appellate Board (IPAB) and the CCI. The IPAB exercises its jurisdiction over
matters pertaining to Trademarks, Patents, Geographical Indications and Copyright.26
Section 77 of the Patents Act 1970 empowers the controller with certain powers of a
Civil Court.27 IPAB was formed for speedy disposal of appeals and applications, for
the rectification of registered trademarks and the decisions passed by the Controller,
which then lay before the High Courts.28 Injunctions are granted if the plaintiff can
prove a prima facie case of infringement, a balance of convenience in its favour and
an irreparable loss that it would incur in case the injunction is not granted.29
Competition Commission on the other hand, stems from the antitrust legislation
aimed at ensuring accessibility of goods to the wider consumer base and main-
taining a healthy competition in the market in order to regulate the industry. Both
the institutions have a parallel jurisdiction. The aforementioned Section on the
Indian case laws is indicative of the different approaches adopted by the two
institutions for similar issues. While the CCI has taken a stringent view on
anti-domination policies, the High Court has made attempts to balance the antitrust
concerns with the market realities. This tussle between the two institutions points
towards the inconsistency in the Indian position.30 It is important to protect the
domestic Non-SEP holding companies and the foreign portfolio holders.
23Telecommunication Engineering Centre <http://www.tec.gov.in/> accessed 18 February 2018.
24Bureau of India Standards <http://www.bis.gov.in/> accessed 21 February 2018.
25The Global ICT Standardization Forum for India (GISFI) <http://www.gisfi.org/> accessed 21
February 2018.
26Intellectual Property Appellate Board <https://ipabindia.org/Jurisdiction.aspx> accessed 21
February 2018.
27The Patent Act 1970, s 77.
28GISFI (n 25).
29Code of Civil Procedure 1908, Order 39 rule 1.
30J. Gregory Sidak, ‘FRAND in India: The Delhi High Court’s emerging jurisprudence on royalties
for Standard Essential patents’ (2015) 10 Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 609.
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Time is of key importance in any Intellectual Property Right (IPR) dispute and
hence new developments have been made in the judicial system to accommodate
such needs. The Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial
Appellate Division of High Courts Act 2015 (CC Act) has been enacted by the
Indian Parliament to hear commercial disputes, including IPR disputes related to
patents.31 It provides with strict time limits and involvement of expertise in the field
of commercial law. However, it is important to note that the requirement of
expertise is limited to the knowledge of commercial law with no specific experience
in IP or any other concerned issues.
2.3 Recent Policy Developments in India
2.3.1 DIPP Discussion Paper on SEPs (2016)
On 1 March 2016, the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) came
up with its Discussion paper on SEPs and their availability on FRAND terms, with
an objective of inviting views and suggestions from various stakeholders in order to
develop a suitable policy framework to define the obligations of SEP holders and
their licensees.32 It undertakes an in-depth analysis of the approach taken by various
other jurisdictions in order to understand the issues that lie before the Indian system.
They invite responses on various issues, namely:
(i) The need for additional legislation apart from the existing Patent Act 1970 and the
antitrust legislation; (ii) the requirement of an IPR policy to be used by the SSOs for
developing standards for telecommunication sector and the other sectors in which SEPs are
used; (iii) the need for prescribing guidelines for the working of these SSOs; (iv) the issue
of prescribing a guideline for deciding the royalty rates with respect to SEPs by the
Government of India or any other relevant authority; (v) the basis on which the afore-
mentioned royalty rates need to be decided; (vi) the need to cap the total payment of royalty
in case of particular product and the authority which can make such decisions; (vii) the use
of non-disclosure agreement to misuse the dominant position in the market; (viii) the
appropriate mode and remedy for settlement of disputes in matters related to SEPs, espe-
cially while deciding FRAND terms, focusing specifically on the remedy of injunction;
(ix) methods that can be taken to make the practice of cross-licensing effective so as to
ensure that the royalty rates are fair and reasonable; (x) steps that could be taken to ensure a
transparent practice of patent pooling; (xi) tools to be used to determine whether a patent
declared as SEP is actually an essential patent, particularly when bouquets of patents are
used in one device; (xii) a need of setting up of an independent expert body to determine
FRAND terms for SEPs and devising a methodology for such purpose; (xiii) a process to
31Shamnad Basheer, ‘Specialised Courts (III): Commercialising the High Courts?’ (SpicyIP, 17
February 2016) <https://spicyip.com/2016/02/specialised-courts-iii-commercialising-the-high-
courts.html> accessed 12 May 2018.
32Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP), Government of India, ‘Discussion Paper
on Standard Essential Patent and their availability on FRAND terms’ (2016) 3.
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declassify such an SEP, in case where certain standards can be met without infringing any
particular SEP, for instance by use of some alternative technology or because the patent is
no longer in force.33
Several institutions have submitted their comments on the aforementioned issue
put forth by the DIPP. In the response submitted by George Mason University
School of Law, they have highlighted some of the key problems with the Indian
way of understanding the issue of SEP litigation.34 Most of the responses make an
argument against the need of introducing a new legislation in order to deal with
FRAND related problems. Antitrust laws as they exist today provide enough space
for a case-to-case solution based on a uniform methodology grounded in economic
analysis of the fact situation.35 Furthermore, it is argued that imperfection in the
market should not be a substantial reason for regulation unless the said regulation is
capable of increasing the efficiency substantially.36
On the issue of IPR policy, while most of the institutes insist on a structural
change of the system to enhance transparency and efficiency of the licensing
mechanism, they also propose against the idea of providing a particular set of
guidelines for the working of the SSO. The reason being that it will prevent the SSO
from approaching the cases as per their specific needs.37 Some of the key issues that
SSOs need to consider include the essentiality of an SEP, disclosure rules requiring
a timely provision of the information about an SEP to the SSO, need of interference
by the SSOs to prevent the abuse of FRAND allowances by the licensees and
promotion of negotiation as a tool to resolve the disputes over royalty.38
On the question of royalty rates, most of the institutions emphasize on the
importance of party autonomy in deciding the issues. They argue that capping the
royalty rate will meddle with the market forces and discourage innovation and
business acumen. Many institutions have laid down their own standards for
deciding the basis on which royalty rates in SEPs should be decided.39 In cases
where numerous SEPs are used in one particular device, it is suggested that certain
factors be considered. For instance, it is important to differentiate between the
cumulative value of the SEPs included in a given standard and the aggregate royalty
burden that includes at least some supra-FRAND rates.40 Perhaps the risk of
hold-ups can be reduced by proper apportionment, that is, if the multi-component
products are priced according to the value of each patent’s contribution to the end
33ibid 26–27.
34George Mason University School of Law, ‘Comment on the Discussion Paper on Standard
Essential Patents’ (2016).
35Jindal Initiative on Research in IP and Competition, ‘Response to the questions raised in the
Discussion Papers released by DIPP’ (2016).
36DIPP (n 32).
37ibid.
38George Mason (n 34).
39DIPP (n 32).
40ibid.
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product. Hence, the entire market value rule (EMVR) would be the preferred
measure to determine royalties as it would account for the functional value of an
SEP and it would also take into account the value added by the portfolio to an end
device. It is also important to pay attention on the number of SEP holders instead of
the number of SEPs. If most of the SEPs are held by one player, then the risk of
monopoly increases. Even if the SEPs are held by different players, they might be
more inclined to cooperate with each other, together they have an interest in
standardisation of their product.
The next issue that they deal with is the use of non-disclosure agreement by the
patent holders to assert their dominating position in the market. Delhi High Court’s
decision in Ericsson v Intex,41 favours NDA as a legitimate constraint and considers
it to be important to maintain the confidentiality regarding some sensitive issues. It
is important to strike a balance between the desire for transparency and the fact that
patent licenses often include the confidential business information of both the
licensor and licensee.42 For the similar reason, they also argue against the trans-
parency of patent pooling and cross-licensing. This information can easily be
requested in specific instances but to require the companies to share such infor-
mation in public might affect their business strategies. Discriminatory licensing
might, in fact, serve legitimate purpose of increasing the consumer welfare and
helping the innovating company recoup their development cost.43
An injunction has always been seen as an important tool in patent licensing. It
protects the right of the patent holder in case of any infringement. Unavailability of
this remedy might promote the infringers to abuse the SEP system by demanding
for rates less than the FRAND terms. It might be regulated in order to ensure a
remedy to the SEP holder, in case the infringer is not willing to enter into a license
on FRAND terms.44 Regarding the issue of an adequate dispute resolution mech-
anism, the institutions have looked upon arbitration as a successful method that
would provide flexibility and means for parties to arbitrate and resolve issues
mutually by engaging experts in various subject matters instead of opting for
complicated judicial procedures.45
2.3.2 TRAI Discussion Paper on SEPs (2017)
In 2017, another consultation paper was published by the Telecom Regulatory
Authority of India (TRAI) inviting responses on key issues affecting the local
41Intex (n 10).
42‘Joint Comments of the American Bar Association Section of Anti-trust law, Intellectual
Property Law, International Law, and Science & Technology Law on the Government of India’s




45George Mason (n 34).
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telecom manufacturing unit. It discusses in detail the concerns that currently pre-
vent the industry from growing. Telecom industry around the world is growing at
an increasing pace and local manufacturers find it difficult to catch-up with the
rapidly changing technology.46 They also face heavy competition from the foreign
companies who are able to provide products at a cheaper price. The industry is
stuck in a vicious circle with zero import duties and high cost of domestic pro-
tection. In a previous recommendation submitted by TRAI in 2011, it suggested tax
reliefs for the hardware-manufacturing units. However, no such benefits have been
provided till date. Apart from this, lack of clarity on IPR issues is another problem
that heavily impedes the growth of local industries.47
Post liberalisation, Government took various steps to enhance the efficiency of
the telecom industry. This was a big step from a closed government-run sector to
completely open market. In 1994, first National Telecom Policy (NTP) was
introduced with the aim of opening up competition in the market for basic and other
value-added services. In the next NTP of 1999, the objective was to increase the
accessibility of affordable and efficient communication services to a larger con-
sumer base. The idea was to encourage development of telecommunication in all
the remote, hilly and tribal areas. In 2012, NTP finally started to focus on the
manufacturing and standardisation of the telecommunication equipment by the local
companies. Investments were made to promote indigenous research and develop-
ment. The vision was to make India a hub of telecom equipment manufacturing.
Another Policy on Electronics was formulated in the same year, in order to boost
the domestic manufacturing units and improve their presence in the global market.
In order to cater to the ever-growing need for research and development, an
Electronic Development Fund was established. Apart from this, various other steps
including creation of a joint task force on mobile manufacturing unit, laying down
of skill development policies and encouragement of local manufacturers through
preferential market access schemes, were also taken to ensure a structural change.48
In light of these advancements, TRAI proposed several issues that need to be
dealt with in order to achieve its goal of boosting the local manufacturing units.
Following are the issues put forth for consultation:
(i) Reasons behind the lack of investments in the telecom equipment sector and the poor
performance of local telecom manufacturing industry in spite of numerous initiatives by the
government/industry; (ii) Required measures to boost innovation and productivity of local
telecom manufacturing; (iii) Sufficiency of the existing patent laws in India to address the
issues of local manufacturers; (iv) Adequacy of the existing mechanism of Standardisation,
Certification and Testing of Telecom Equipment to support the local telecom manufac-
turing; (v) Suggestion for appropriate dispute resolution mechanism for determination of
46Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, ‘Consultation Paper on Promoting Local Telecom
Equipment Manufacturing’ (Consultation Paper No. 12/2017), ch 2.
47ibid.
48ibid, ch 3.
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royalty distribution based on FRAND terms; (vi) Sufficiency of the current fiscal incentives;
(vii) Determination of other issues under ITA which need to be addressed for making the
local Telecom Manufacturing more competitive and robust; (viii) Suggestion to increase
foreign investments in order to promote innovation and (ix) evaluation of the current
preferential market access regime.49
Responses submitted by the stake holding institutions have a detailed analysis of
each of these issues. It has been argued that the poor performance of the manu-
facturing industry is because of the unproportionate consumer demands in the
sector. Although, the demands are expected to increase in the coming years, the
present demand rates do not justify a substantial investment. Hence, introduction of
export-friendly mechanism would be a better approach.50 For a very long time
Indian markets have followed standards developed by the international institutions.
This creates an additional pressure on the local industry to meet those standards.
Instead, it is important to work on customised standards for the Indian market.51
Changes are not required in the existing patent regime. They incorporate a wise
range of provisions to deal with the concerned issues. However, policies can be
made to strengthen the mechanism of Standardisation, Certification and Testing of
Telecom Equipments adequate to support the local telecom manufacturing.
Although this might help improve the standard of products in the market, and also
expected to increase the end costs.52
The consultation paper raises some very important questions regarding royalty
rates and efficiency of the existing system. However, certain wordings of the paper
suggest a lack of understanding of TRAI on the core issues. The paper assumes that
SEP holder is obliged to provide a FRAND undertaking. It is important to
acknowledge that FRAND commitments are entered into voluntarily by the patent
holders.53 Royalty rates are at the core of any SEP-related issues. Amongst the
responses submitted, there’s a consensus that arbitration would be an appropriate
mechanism for dealing with these issues. It provides with a confidential environ-
ment, expert engagement and is based on a party autonomy model.54 Other
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) methods including negotiation and media-
tion, based on party centric models, would also be preferable.
49ibid, ch 4.
50Europe India Chamber of Commerce, ‘Written comments on the Consultation Paper “Promoting
Local Telecom Equipment Manufacturing”’ (2017).
51Jindal Initiative on Research in IP and Competition, ‘Response to the questions raised in the
Consultation paper on promoting local telecom equipment manufacturing’ (2017) 3.
52Intex (n 10) 11.
53Fraunhofer- Gesellschaft, ‘Consultation paper on promoting local telecom equipment manu-
facturing (Response)’ (2017) 4.
54ibid; Intex (n 52); George Mason (n 34).
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3 Japanese Policy Changes and their Background
3.1 Legal Framework in Japan
In contrast to India, Japan has adopted the continental legal framework. Three
written codes set the majority rules in this field. The Patent Law lays down the legal
rights of patent holders. The Anti-Monopoly Act regulates the general principles
against monopoly and unfair trades. Detailed principles on unfair trades are dis-
closed in Designation of Unfair Trade Practices (Designation) and multiple
guidelines specify criteria for implementation of Anti-Monopoly Act and the
Designation.
The Patent Law is silent about the technology standard. However, a couple of
provisions are related to SEPs. Article 92 of the law defines a compulsory license
for the improvement of inventions and Article 93 set up another type of compulsory
license based on public interest. There are no specific rules or ordinances on Article
93, but lawyers and policymakers refer to a report published in 1968 from an
experts group under Foreign Capital Council. The report states that such license
should be permitted only when it is directly connected to lives of the citizens and
the refusal of the license would result in crippling the development of the related
industries. Their interpretation emphasizes limited applications of this compulsory
license. Also, Article 92 has been substantially suspended in accordance with the
US-Japan Agreement in 1994. The Agreement stipulates that any compulsory
license based on improvement inventions should not be ordered without a court or
administrative decision, which proclaims the violation of anti-monopoly laws. As a
result of these strict conditions, no compulsory license has been directed so far.55
The anti-monopoly laws regulate some part of the SEP issues. In 2007, Japan
Fair Trade Commission (JFTC), a government body which has jurisdiction on
anti-monopoly regulations, published a new guideline on the assertion of IPRs,
titled ‘Guidelines for the Use of Intellectual Property under the Antimonopoly Act’.
The guideline, prefacing that the license refusal in principle does not always con-
stitute a monopoly, referred that in case of any assertions, which deviate from the
nature of IPR protection, can be constituted as an unfair trade practice. However,
there was no direct mention of SEPs before 2016.
55Japan Patent Office, ‘Wagakuniniokerusaiteiseidonitsuite [Reports on compulsory license of
patents in Japan]’ (Report, 2004) <https://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou/toushin/shingikai/pdf/strategy_
wg07/paper08.pdf> accessed 4 January 2018 (In Japanese).
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3.2 Cases Over SEPs
3.2.1 Apple v Samsung Tokyo District Court Decision and IP High
Court Decision
The first of SEP litigation in Japan appeared in 2011. As a part of global smart-
phone patent war, Apple and Samsung battled in Japanese courts. In April 2011,
Samsung filed a lawsuit, which claims a temporary injunction to stop infringement
of Samsung’s SEPs of UMTS standard. These SEPs are under FRAND declaration
of European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). Apple soon offered a
license agreement and two parties sat at the negotiation table, but to no avail. In
September, Apple filed a counterclaim requesting a confirmation of the absence of
any damage to Samsung. Apple raised several arguments to support their request.
Firstly, Apple claimed that they did not implement concerning SEPs. Secondly,
even if they implemented it, Apple does not infringe these SEPs due to the
exhaustion doctrine. These SEPs are implemented on a baseband chipset, which
was allegedly sold by Intel. Thirdly, they advocate that Samsung already entered
into a licensing agreement due to their FRAND declaration. Finally, Apple claimed
abuse of dominance by Samsung on the grounds that it breached its obligation to
negotiate in good faith and of timely disclosure of SEPs, and violated the
anti-monopoly laws. Apple’s argument on good faith negotiation was based on
Article 6.1 of the ETSI’s IPR Policy.
Tokyo District Court on 28 February 2013 found that, based on ETSI’s IPR
Policy, Samsung was obliged to disclose their SEPs at the right time and to
negotiate in good faith with those willing to obtain license, but the company
breached both its obligations. The court also added that Samsung’s lawsuit for a
temporary injunction could engage them in patent hold-up. Regarding the good
faith negotiation obligation, Samsung refuted Apple’s willingness to license since
their proposed royalty rate was far from Samsung’s request and thus it did not make
an offer based on FRAND terms. However, the court did not mention whether the
proposal satisfies FRAND condition.
These decisions have received a wide range of criticism against the validity of
their conclusion and their unpredictability. According to the decision, SEP holders
cannot claim any royalty once they have breached the obligation. Subsequently,
Samsung appealed to IP High Court.
In its appeal, Chief Judge Iimura made a challenging attempt. The court
announced an invitation of public comments on restrictions of injunctions and
damages of SEPs. It is similar to an amicus brief, as known to the common law
jurisprudence. Japan, however, does not have any such system officially.56
59 opinions were submitted from academia, IP experts, lawyers, business firms, and
individuals. These comments included both the industrial and legal concerns. Many
56For the sake of formality, public opinions were submitted to attorneys of both plaintiff and
defendant, and they presented them to the court.
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of the debates on Japanese law interpretation, mention three legal basis to restrict
injunctions or excessive royalty requests—based on FRAND committed SEPs; a
third-party beneficiary contract and immanent limitations of patent injunctions, and
an abuse of patent rights.57 These comments confirmed the legal discussion raised
by leading scholars.58
The Grand Panel of IP High Court, on 16 May 2014, dismissed Samsung’s
request for injunctions against the willing licensees, regarding it is an abuse of their
patent rights. The decision considered both the reasonable expectation of the
licensers and willingness of the licensees of these FRAND committed SEPs. It
pointed towards the negative influence of the injunction of these SEPs to the sane
development of the industry.
The panel also prohibited claiming damage outside of FRAND condition.59 In
other words, contrary to District Court decision, the court ordered royalty payment
within FRAND condition. To calculate FRAND royalty rate, the bench firstly
computed the proportion of contributions of UMTS standards according to their use
in Apple’s products. Secondly, the ratio of contribution of focal SEPs is estimated
within the proportion. Subsequently, the court set the maximum rate to prevent
excessive aggregate royalty. Finally, the ratio is multiplied by the number of
Samsung’s SEP families per total SEPs’ families. In this case, the ratio is stated as
5% of contribution of UMTS. Calculated royalty was almost 10 million Japanese
Yen (approximately 10 thousand US dollars).
3.2.2 One Blue Case
The second SEP case in Japan was decided in 2017. Imation Co., a US-based
Blu-ray disc manufacturer, had been negotiating with One Blue LLC to receive a
license. While One Blue requested the same royalty rate with all the other licensees,
Imation claimed lower royalties within the FRAND condition. In 2013, One Blue
sent warning letters to distributors of Imation’s products to suspend the sales of
Blu-ray discs. These recipients soon stopped selling Imation’s products. Imation
filed a suit against One Blue in the District Court of Tokyo requesting the court to
57Toshifumi Futamata and Shogo Matsunaga Shogo, ‘Apple v Samsung daigougi hanketsu
ikensho no gaiyou to bunseki [An analysis of public comments on Apple v Samsung IP High
Court Grand Panel Decision]’ (2015) 55(3) Journal of LES Japan 113 (In Japanese).
58Institute of Intellectual Property, ‘Hyouzyun kikaku hissu tokkyo no kenri koushi ni kansuru
chosa kenkyu [Research on the assertion of SEPs]’ (2011) <https://www.iip.or.jp/summary/pdf/
detail11j/23_iip_main.pdf> accessed 4 May 2018 (In Japanese); Institute of Intellectual Property,
‘Hyouzyun kikaku hissu tokkyo no kenri koushi ni kansuru chosa kenkyu (II) [Research on the
assertion of SEPs (II)]’ (2012) <https://www.iip.or.jp/summary/pdf/detail12j/24_01_full.pdf>
accessed 4 May 2018 (In Japanese).
59Imation v One Blue (2014) Intellectual Property High Court, Case No. 10043(ne) of 2013, Order
dated 16 May 2014.
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prevent them from sending these letters. They claimed that these warning letters to
the distributors of Imation were to demonstrate their right of injunction of SEPs, are
an abuse of rights and amounts to a false allegation of infringement of relevant
patent rights, which is prohibited under Unfair Competition Prevention Act.
Before the court passed its decision, JFTC announced a closing of investigation
in an Anti-Monopoly case.60 JFTC regarded One Blue’s behaviour as amounting to
interference with the competitor’s transaction, which violates the Unfair Trade
Practices. However, they also found that there was no on-going violation after April
2016, thus they did not grant any cease and desist orders.
Tokyo District Court, on 18 February 2017, decided that the warning letters
amounted to a false allegation.61 The court while referring to IP High Court
Decision in Apple v Samsung case, prohibited injunctions against willing licensees.
The judge also applied the criterion of a willing licensee presented at the decision.
In this case, the court concluded that Imation is a willing licensee, considering that
Imation proposed a specific royalty rate but One Blue substantially rejected any
negotiations.
In contrast to India, very few SEP litigations were filed in Japan. Both cases
emphasized upon the good faith negotiation. However, these decisions did not show
a concrete criterion of faithful negotiation.
3.3 Amendment of Guideline on Antimonopoly Law
The first policy change happened in Japan was in 2015. JFTC, recognizing the
importance of clarification of criteria for regulating SEP issues, announced the draft
of partial amendment of ‘Guidelines for the Use of Intellectual Property under the
Antimonopoly Act’. The agency also collected public opinions. They received 54
comments from various stakeholders including government agencies (FTC, and
Fraunhofer Society), IP expert societies (American Intellectual Property Law
Association, Intellectual Property Owners Association, and Licensing Executive
Society Japan), firms, lawyers, and scholars. Multiple organisations commented on
its broad definition of SEPs and several other ambiguous phrases.
As a reaction to these opinions, JFTC published a modified amendment in
January 2016. The amendment clarifies that a refusal of license or request of
injunction against willing licensees can be an interference with a competitor’s
transaction and would constitute a violation of the Designation. The document also
states that a willing licensee is determined by individual situations of license
60The Japan Fair Trade Commission, ‘Closing the investigation on the suspected violation by
One-Blue, LLC of the Antimonopoly Act’ (18 November 2016) <http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/
pressreleases/yearly-2016/November/161118.html> accessed 2 May 2018.
61Tokyo District Court, Case No. 2138(wa) of 2013,Order dated 18 February 2017.
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negotiations, based on various factors such as disclosure of exact SEPs in concern
and actual conditions of these implementations, presenting of license terms and
their reasonable grounds, immediate response to these proposals and provide a
rational alternative, and whether their attitude is faithful. It is notable that original
draft described that a refusal of license or injunction to willing licensees constitutes
a violation. However, the modified draft has relaxed this criterion.
3.4 Intellectual Property Dispute Resolution System Review
Committee62
While JFTC referred to the abuse of injunctive relief, IP experts debated extensively
the restrictions on injunctions. In 2015, following the trend, Intellectual Property
Strategy Promotion Headquarters, an advisory board under the Prime Minister of
Japan, set the issue as the point of discussion for its special committee, i.e. the IP
Dispute Resolution System Review Committee. The committee aimed at discussing
all the major issues in an IP dispute like evidence collection procedures, damage
calculation, and restrictions on injunctions.
Even this topic was combined with the issues from patent assertion entities. The
final report of the committee, published in March 2016, did not support any unified
restrictions. Instead, they concluded that no legal change was needed and that the
restrictions should be judged on a case-by-case basis. Regarding SEPs, the report
mentions that unified restrictions may, in fact, reduce incentives for the standard-
ization and induce a weaker patent protection regime in emerging economies.
3.5 Intellectual Property System Study Group for the 4th
Industrial Revolution63
The rapid growth of ‘Internet of Things (IoT)’, ‘Industries 4.0’, or ‘connected
industries’ raises further concern about SEPs. They have been an issue mainly in
the wireless telecommunication industry, but in the IoT era entities involved in
automobiles, home electronics appliances, and industrial equipment industries are
predicted to be involved in SEP disputes more frequently. Ministry of Economy,
62Intellectual Property Dispute Resolution System Review Committee <http://www.kantei.go.jp/
jp/singi/titeki2/tyousakai/kensho_hyoka_kikaku/2016/dai5/sankou2.pdf> accessed 4 January 2018
(In Japanese).
63Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, ‘Intellectual Property System in Consideration
of the Fourth Industrial Revolution’ (April 2017) <http://www.meti.go.jp/press/2017/04/
20170419002/20170419002.html> or <http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2017/0419_001.html>
accessed 5 January 2018.
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Trade and Industry (METI) established a study group on IP system in 2016. This
group covered a wide range of IP issues, such as the legal protection of data, the IP
protection on Artificial Intelligence (AI) creations, and resolutions of SEP disputes.
In April 2017, the study group published a report, which mentions two concerns
regarding SEPs. Firstly, a growing number of SEPs and limited coverage of patent
pools over SEPs that increases the cost of license negotiations and patent disputes.
This cost erects a barrier to entry for Small and Medium Entities (SMEs). They are
also anxious about the social cost from these patent transactions as the IoT can be
an essential part of the social infrastructures. Secondly, non-practising entities
(NPEs) could probably disrupt the SEP licensing market. Even though NPEs are not
active in Japan, many Japanese firms reported the influence of NPEs.
At the same time, the report from IP Dispute Resolution Committee quoted they
are sceptical about uniform restrictions of injunctions based on SEPs. Instead, they
propose an ADR system, in which the government decides the reasonable royalty.
Their report argues as follows:
It will be necessary to take initiatives to deal with SEPs, which will become a part of public
infrastructure in line with the popularization of IoT. We will need to find ways to reduce the
costs of licensing negotiations and settling disputes that may hinder the smooth use of the
SEPs.
First, the government will consider introducing an ADR system (licensing award system for
SEPs) designed to deal with disputes on licensing of SEPs, which have a significant
influence on society. Under this system, government will work on disputes between patent
holders and possible licensees based on request by the latter, when the parties cannot reach
agreements on licensing, deciding appropriate licensing fees of SEPs with due care of not
unfairly harm the interests of the patent holders.64
3.6 Recent Policy Developments in Japan
3.6.1 Intellectual Property Strategic Program 201765
Following the report from the study group, in May 2017, the Intellectual Property
Strategy Headquarters announced that the government started a policy considera-
tion on the special ADR system for SEPs. In their ‘Intellectual Property Strategic
Program 2017’, they requested the METI to discuss the necessity and design of
such a resolution, which determine a reasonable royalty of SEPs. The new ADR is
scheduled to be under discussion in the next year. The policy document also
64ibid 21.
65Intellectual Property Strategy Headquarters, ‘Intellectual Property Strategic Plan 2017 (2017)
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/titeki2/kettei/chizaikeikaku20170516_e.pdf> accessed 4 February
2018.
10 Regulating SEPs in Implementer-Oriented Countries … 201
requests to give the same attention to the right of SEP holders as the benefit of
potential licensees.
Amidst the spreading of IoT, for the promotion of smooth use of standard specifications for
technologies to serve as social infrastructure, reach specific conclusions as to the
prospective legal measures within FY2017 and take necessary measures for an ADR system
for determining reasonable license fees for standard essential patents with significant social
impact (standard essential patent awarding system), while paying attention not to give
undue impact on the right of patentees, with a view to submitting a bill to the next ordinary
session of the Diet.66
Although the document is silent about the governing body of the ADR, a
Japanese newspaper leaked out that the Japan Patent Office (JPO) will establish a
new ‘adjudication’ system.67 This choice of words followed the argument in Patent
System Subcommittee.
3.6.2 Patent System Subcommittee of Industrial Structure Council
As a response to the report from Intellectual Property System Study Group for the
Fourth Industrial Revolution, JPO started a policy discussion in Patent System
Subcommittee of Industrial Structure Council, an advisory board. In the 20th
meeting, held in April 2017, JPO proposed two distinct ADRs: an ADR, which
would determine the reasonable royalty rate of SEPs, and a general ADR for patent
disputes. Regarding the former ADR, JPO named it as SEP adjudication.
This proposal initiated a heated debate in the committee. Several committee
members from the industry or patent attorney association supported an introduction
of SEP adjudication.68,69 However, some industrial associations raised their dis-
comfort with the said idea. Their main concerns are regarding effectiveness and
social impact of this new proposition.70 Firstly, the coverage of this adjudication
will be too small in the current business environment. It will cover only Japanese
patent while the vast majority of SEPs have multiple international patent families.
Secondly, it increases the complexity of legal dispute resolution process. As long as
there are no special restrictions, SEP holders can bring a patent infringement
66ibid 28–29.
67‘License ryo kuni ga saitei: hyouzyun kikaku ni saiyou no tokkyo [The government arbitrage the
royalty rate of SEPs]’ Nikkei Newspaper (April 27 2017) 4 (In Japanese).
68Japan Patent Office, ‘Shorthand notes of the 20th meeting of Patent System Subcommittee of
Industrial Structure Council’ <https://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou/toushin/shingikai/pdf/tokkyo_seido_
menu/newtokkyo_020.pdf> accessed 8 March 2018.
69In the debate in Intellectual Property Strategy Headquarters, one advisory who are from chemical
industry sector and corporate executive association was in the favor of the introduction of ADR.
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lawsuit to the court. This way the resolution processes will become double-tracked.
Thirdly, JPO has no experience to judge a reasonable royalty. Industry associations
requested for an intensive capacity building to this effect. Finally, such a public
ADR could probably distort the private ADR activities. Another opinion fears a
negative perception of Japanese SEP regulation in the global industry. Keidanren
warned that the SEP adjudication could be regarded as a compulsory license, which
is unpopular among the industry. Keidanren also has opposed it in India.
Faced with these objections, JPO sought a complemental policy option. In
September 2017, they started the collection of public opinions regarding the
guidelines on SEP license negotiations. This proposal aimed at collecting practical
knowledge in these negotiations and clear up opinions on fair and reasonable
royalty. Such knowledge is useful not only for the adjudication body but also for
firms outside the telecommunication industry. In the call for public opinion, they
did not show a specific draft of the guidelines but simply made an open question of
items to be included therein. Generally, the guidelines will not be legally binding,
but the public opinion collection legitimizes its power in litigations.71
Finally, JPO gave up the idea of introducing the SEP adjudication. Nikkan
Kogyo Shinbun,72 a Japanese newspaper, reported in November 2017 that they
recognized the unfairness of the adjudication in concern, which only SEP imple-
menters can claim. The newspaper also reported the difficulty in deciding reason-
able royalty caused due to the variety of appropriate royalty rate accepted in the
industry. Their recognition is in line with the report73 published by the same
subcommittee in February 2017 as a response to Intellectual Property Strategic
Program 2016, which requested for consideration of construction of general patent
royalty database to stimulate time-saving license negotiations and to increase
compensations in patent infringement cases. In the report, they concluded that a
royalty database is meaningless considering the wide variety of patent licensing
practices.
Alternatively, JPO suggested the introduction of a SEP licensing negotiation
guideline as proposed in September and an advisory opinion system on the tech-
nological essentiality of SEPs.74 They explained that the guideline does not aim to
set new regulations but to collect court decisions from around the world and show
71NTT Data Institute of Management Consulting, Inc., ‘Kuni no gyousei kikan ga kouhyou shita
guideline tou no zittai haaku no tameno chosa [A survey report on guidelines published by the
government]’ <http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000424429.pdf> accessed 31 December
2017 (In Japanese).
72‘Tokkyocho ga ADR seido miokuri: License ryo no settei konnann (JPO gave up the intro-
duction of ADR because of the difficulty in setting reasonable royalty)’ Nikkan Kogyo Shinbun
(November 27 2017) (In Japanese).
73Patent System Subcommittee of Industrial Structure Council, ‘To strengthen IP dispute reso-
lution systems’ <https://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou/toushin/shingikai/pdf/newtokkyo_shiryou019/01.
pdf> accessed 8 February 2018.
74Japan Patent Office, ‘Hyozyun hissu tokkyo wo meguru kadai to seidoteki taiou ni tsuite [Policy
actions on SEP related issues]’ <https://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou/toushin/shingikai/pdf/newtokkyo_
shiryou23/01.pdf> accessed 8 February 2018 (In Japanese).
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examples of faithful licensors and faithful willing licensees. In March 2018, JPO
published a draft of ‘Guide to Licensing Negotiations involving Standard Essential
Patents’ and invited public comments on the same.75 The guide covers multiple
issues from the faithfulness of parties in a negotiation, efficient negotiation process,
to reasonable royalties. JPO mainly enumerates considerations mentioned by the
international case laws and have not had any clear legal interpretations. This
measured content is a reflection of JPO’s attitude to be an objective information
provider to support SMEs or large firms outside the telecommunication industry.
The guideline will be published in spring 2018.
In addition to that, concerning an advisory opinion, JPO has announced the
introduction of a new policy whereby it would extend the scope of its scrutiny to the
essentiality of a SEP. Although this determination would not have any legal nature,
it would be beneficial in creating a platform for parties to set their negotiation terms
without approaching the court for these issues. To prevent malicious abuse of this
advisory opinion system, the draft of its procedure manual describes that petitioners
have to be involved in litigations in which essentiality of specific declared SEPs are
the issues.76 A newspaper reported that the advisory opinion process would be
designed to provide a conclusion within three months after the filing of the
petition.77
4 Conclusion
As the Japanese ‘Fourth Industrial Revolution’ argument mentions,
implementer-oriented countries are highly motivated to regulate SEPs to protect fair
competition in the wide range of ‘connected’ manufacturing sectors. Especially,
automobile industry or manufacturing machineries, manufacturers will need to
receive SEP licenses in wireless telecommunications without any sufficient expe-
rience to negotiate with giant SEP holders. Under this condition, Indian and
Japanese governments have a strong interest in the cost reduction of SEP licensing
transaction by introducing ADR measures for royalty negotiations. However, as
Indian debates raised by DIPP and TRAI discussion paper indicate, and as Japan’s
75Japan Patent Office, ‘Draft of Guide to Licensing Negotiations involving Standard Essential
Patents’ (2018) <https://www.jpo.go.jp/iken/pdf/180308_hyoujun/sep_guide_draft_en.pdf>
accessed 21 March 2018.
76Japan Patent Office, ‘Hyouzyun hissusei ni kakaru handan no tameno hantei no riyou no tebiki
(an) [Draft manual of the advisory opinion (Hantei) system concerning essentiality of standard
essential patents]’ <https://www.jpo.go.jp/iken/pdf/180216_hantei_tebiki/01.pdf> accessed 21
March 2018 (In Japanese).
77‘Zyuyou tokkyo 3 kagetsu de hantei: Tokkyo chou shinseido saiban nashi de [And advisory
opinion for influential patents within 3 months: JPO’s new policy]’ Nikkei Shinbun (21 February
2018) (In Japanese).
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failure in the introduction of new adjudication induces, there are a bunch of chal-
lenges and questions to regulate SEP negotiations.
The largest challenge is information asymmetry. Reasonable royalties vary upon
conditions of SEP holders and implementers. Some of them sell components while
some deal with final products. Some implementers have SEPs to be licensed and
some have non-SEPs, which are attractive for SEP holders. These differences link a
variety of licensing conditions. As One Blue case shows, a fixed royalty is not
always the only FRAND licensing condition. However, there are limited disclo-
sures of licensing terms and conditions. It is impractical for governments to know
reasonable licensing terms and conditions. In contrast, courts and antitrust
authorities can access such information in SEP litigations as plaintiffs and defen-
dants voluntarily disclose available licenses.
Another challenge is the expectation of being future dominant in standards. Even
in implementer-oriented countries, they have a huge potential to be SEP giants.
Especially, technology standards often offer emerging economies like India with a
big opportunity to manufacture standardized products.78 At the same time, this
couples with the improvement of technological capability by learning-by-doing.79
To illustrate, China had been a follower of wireless communication technologies.
They only manufacture mobile handsets and smartphones. But now, in 4G standard,
Huawei or ZTE, Chinese telecommunication equipment manufacturers, are one of
the leading SEP holders.80 Therefore, governments are hard to stand on a specific
position.
Moreover, private mechanisms can resolve the vast majority of these licensing
issues. Firstly, other than antitrust issues, many SEP holders have incentives not to
request excessive patent royalties in order to stimulate the diffusion of standards as
the global diffusion brings a large volume of sales of their products or revenues
from patent royalties. Even in concerns of aggregated royalties, their actual
occurrences is doubtful.81 They are well aware that an opportunistic behaviour is
not beneficial as, at the worst, such a behaviour promotes the introduction of
78Ogawa, Koichi, Junjiro Shintaku, and Tetsuo Yoshimoto ‘Architecture-based Advantage of
Firms and Nations’ (2015) 4(3) Annals of Business Administrative Science 21 <http://merc.e.u-
tokyo.ac.jp/mmrc/dp/pdf/MMRC48_2005.pdf> accessed 8 February 2018.
79Linsu Kim, ‘Stages of development of industrial technology in a developing country: A model’
(1980) 9(3) Research Policy 254.
80Austin, ‘New iRunway Report Shows 40+% 4G-LTE Patents in US Filed By Asian Entities’
(iRunway, 27 March 2017) <http://www.i-runway.com/technology-ip-news/press-releases/
iRunway-4G-LTE-2016-update-report.html> accessed 8 March 2018.
81Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar and Jorge Padilla, ‘The complements problem within
standard setting: assessing the evidence on royalty stacking’ (2008) 14(2) Boston University
Journal of Science and Technology Law <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
949599> accessed 29 November 2017; Kirti Gupta and Mark Snyder, ‘Smart phone litigation and
standard essential patents’ (Hoover IP Working Paper Series No. 14006) <https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2492331> accessed 29 November 2017.
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alternative standards.82 SEP holders have invested in research and development,
thus, they are locked-into focal standards. Exceptionally, specific non-practicing
entities, which have small number of SEPs, are free from such a constraint as their
investments are small. However, if their patent portfolio sizes remain tiny, major
locked-in SEP holders might file invalidity trials against them.
Secondly, transaction costs have been minimized by patent pools or component
suppliers. Although they are not mandatory for SEP holders, the majority of suc-
cessful standards associates patent pools (e.g., MPEG-2, DVD, and W-CDMA).
Patent pools not only reduce transaction costs between licensees and specific
licensors who joined the pool, but also their royalty rates can be used as a reference
of reasonable royalties.83 Most importantly, patent pool management firms have a
strong commitment to diffuse the standard and not to withdraw SEP holders from
the pool. Likewise, influential component suppliers can encapsulate a part of SEPs
into a single license. Once, a component supplier obtains a license of relevant
SEPs, the doctrine of patent exhaustion lets its customers be free from the burden of
licensing negotiations of these SEPs.84 In 3G wireless telecommunications,
Qualcomm took the initiative in the market by realizing this capsule license.85
In conclusion, there is limited efficiency of ex-ante regulations on SEPs. Instead,
ex-post regulations, such as ad hoc court decisions and antitrust orders, seem to be
an effective and efficient measure to resolve SEP issues. In this regard, the authors
emphasized on need for the capacity building of court judges and national com-
petition agencies. As the DIPP report mentions, IP and antitrust relations are often
left uninvestigated. Except in the US and Europe, very few case laws are accu-
mulated. Governments can help these two agencies by conducting international
surveys on SEP disputes and reasonable licensing conditions. In other words,
governments should remain as a think-tank for courts and competition agencies.
Exceptionally, governments can play a key role to reduce a negative impact of
the so-called patent trolls. Latest Japanese policy consideration of an expert advi-
sory system of essentiality of declared SEPs is an effective measure for regulating
these trolls. As discussed above, such trolls have little incentives to consider rea-
sonable royalties. Invalidity trials are a measure for implementers to defend
themselves, however, not all patents are invalidated. SSOs do not judge essen-
tialities; even the system provides no-legally binding opinions, which could be
useful for implementers.
This chapter discussed governmental regulations over SEPs in
implementer-oriented country perspectives by comparing two representative
countries; India and Japan. Even though these countries are followers in major
82For example, Nokia and Chinese firms developed alternative standards to CDMA2000, a
Qualcomm dominant standard (see, Gawer, Annabelle and Michael A. Cusumano, ‘How com-
panies become platform leaders’ MIT Sloan Management Review (1 January 2008)).
83Microsoft Corp v Motorola, Inc (2013) C10-1823JLR.
84Quanta Computer, Inc v LG Electronics Inc (2008) 553 US 617.
85Amelia Smith Rinehart, ‘Contracting Patents: A Modern Patent Exhausting Doctrine’ (2009) 23
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 483.
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global standards, like wireless communications, they do not take specific actions or
failed to introduce implementer-side regulations. Rather, they seem to face a
trade-off between the protection of their domestic manufacturers and the
enhancement of prospects. The authors’ arguments have two implications for policy
makers. Firstly, governments should keep on providing information on SEPs. This
knowledge sharing not only improves the capability of courts and antitrust
authorities but also fulfils the information gap between global leading SEP holders
and other firms. Secondly, governments should prepare some measures against
small patent trolls.
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Predatory pricing, or pricing below costs in order to drive out one or more rival
firms, has a long and convoluted history in both economic theory and competition
jurisprudence. This already contentious issue has become even more complicated in
the context of the new business models, largely based on information and com-
munications technologies (ICT), that come under the rubric of ‘two-sided plat-
forms’. The rise of gigantic ICT platform-based firms like Amazon, Apple,
Facebook, Google and Microsoft has disrupted several industries and ignited
impassioned debates involving policymakers, regulators, politicians, legal scholars
and economists in many countries. Even pro-business conservative politicians, as
well as the Economist and the Wall Street Journal have expressed concern about
declining competition and the power of these ‘tech titans’.1
In this chapter, the author first provides a non-technical introduction to the
economics of predatory pricing, showing why scholars and competition agencies in
the United States (US) and European Union (EU) became increasingly sceptical of
the feasibility of such a strategy. He shows how India’s old Monopolies and
Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act of 1969 remained oblivious of these
developments, and how despite several improvements, the poor drafting of the
relevant sections of the Competition Act 2002 creates some unnecessary compli-
cations. The chapter then provides a non-technical introduction to the economics of
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1For a compilation of relevant quotations, see Section 2 of Carl Shapiro, ‘Antitrust in a Time of
Populism’ (2018) International Journal of Industrial Organisation, to which the author can add the
20 January 2018 issue of the Economist, whose cover page is titled ‘The new titans and how to
tame them’, with an editorial and a long critical article inside.
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platforms, with several examples that are familiar in the Indian context.
Implications are derived for the antitrust treatment of predatory pricing. Finally, the
author discusses how the Competition Commission of India (CCI) has dealt with
some of these issues, in recent cases which have involved allegations of predatory
pricing against the app-based taxi aggregators Ola and Uber, whose rivalry
exemplifies platform competition.
2 Traditional Theories of Predatory Pricing
and the Chicago Critique2
A predatory pricing strategy appears simple enough. A firm (the ‘predator’) tem-
porarily charges a price below its costs. The idea is that its rivals (the ‘prey’) will
either lose their customers, or be forced to match the price reduction, thereby
incurring losses that will drive them out of business. The predator can then charge
monopoly prices and make up the losses it suffered while it was engaged in pre-
dation. Traditional economic analysis, as well as the legal framework in most
countries, assumes that only an incumbent firm which already has a large share of
the market will be able to benefit from predatory pricing after inducing the exit of
its rival(s), who are usually treated as new entrants with small market shares. Until
the 1970s, allegations of this kind often persuaded antitrust/competition agencies to
act against predation. Thereafter, the growing influence of the so-called Chicago
critique made them much more sceptical. Scholars associated with the Law School
of Chicago University argued that predatory pricing was unlikely to be a profitable
business strategy, for several reasons. First, precisely because it has a large market
share, the losses incurred by a dominant firm that sets its prices below its costs will
necessarily be larger than those of its intended victims. It might be argued that a
predator with superior financial resources (colloquially referred to as ‘deep pockets’
or a ‘long purse’) can sustain a period of losses to drive out its rivals. But why can’t
the prey also raise capital? Chicago adherents demanded a fuller explanation for
firms’ unequal access to financial resources. In their worldview, there can be few
monopoly positions durable enough to allow predators to recoup the profits they
must sacrifice during the predatory campaign. If the market is large enough to
accommodate more than one firm, an equally efficient prey can re-enter after the
predator reverts to above-cost pricing, or other firms could enter, possibly after
2This section and the next restate and update the discussion in Aditya Bhattacharjea, ‘Predation,
Protection, and the ‘Public Interest’ (2000) 35(49) Economic and Political Weekly <http://www.
epw.in/system/files/pdf/2000_35/49/Predation_Protection_and_the_Public_Interest.pdf>. The
author believes that this was the first comprehensive treatment of the law and economics
of predatory pricing in the Indian context. Readers interested in the economic literature can refer
to the references of that paper.
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acquiring the assets of the erstwhile prey. Capital markets should also recognize
this, and be prepared to finance firms that might be targeted for predation but are
otherwise viable. The predator would then have nothing to show for its sacrificed
profits. Finally, it makes more sense for a predator to buy out a rival firm than to
engage in a mutually destructive price war.
Each of these Chicago School arguments is designed to show that predation is
irrational (that is, it does not maximize profits, taking into account both the original
sacrifice and the subsequent uncertain recoupment), and to economists this means
that it will not be attempted. To the extent that (re-)entry into the industry remains
feasible even if predation is successful, elimination of competitors is not the same
as elimination of competition, and losses will be hard to recoup. This reasoning
influenced the US Supreme Court in the landmark Matsushita case of 1986, with
the majority judgement citing several Chicago School writings, and famously
declaring that ‘there is a consensus among commentators that predatory pricing
schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful’.3 Seven years later, in
Brooke Group, the court opined that ‘unsuccessful predation is in general a boon to
consumers’,4 and laid down a stringent two-pronged test for identifying predatory
pricing. The first condition to be satisfied was that the alleged predator’s prices
were below ‘an appropriate measure of costs’. The court did not specify what
measure would be appropriate, but both before and after this judgement, most lower
courts employed the Areeda-Turner test, which requires the plaintiff to show that
the defendant had charged a price below its average variable cost (AVC). This is
relatively uncontroversial, because a price below AVC means that the firm is losing
money on every unit it sells, although as seen below, it is difficult to apply in
platform markets. The second condition laid down by the court was a ‘dangerous
probability, of recouping [the alleged predator’s] investment in below-cost prices’.5
This requires detailed analysis of the market and the industry, to provide a con-
vincing demonstration that there are barriers to entry that will allow the alleged
predator to recover its sacrifice of profits. This is hard to prove, and there have been
no successful prosecutions of predatory pricing in the US since then.
The EU has not set such a high bar for predatory pricing cases. In 1991, the often
cited AKZO decision of European Court of Justice (CJEU) held that while a price
below AVC must always be regarded as abusive, even pricing above AVC may be
abusive if the defendant had ‘a plan to eliminate a competitor’.6 The latter allowed
for documentary and circumstantial evidence of predatory intent, which would not
be decisive in the US. In its 1997 Tetra Pak decision, the CJEU again held that a:
3Matsushita Electric Industrial v Zenith Radio (1986) 475 US 574.
4Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp (1993) 509 US 209.
5ibid.
6Case C-62/86 AK AKZO Chemie v Commission of the European Communities (1991) ECLI:EU:
C:1991:286, paras 71–72.
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price set below average variable cost must always be considered abusive. Predatory pricing
may be penalised whenever there is risk that competitors will otherwise be eliminated
without requiring additional proof that the undertaking in question has a realistic chance of
recouping its losses.7
This position was firmly restated in 2009 in the Wanadoo case, in which the
CJEU declared that ‘demonstrating that it is possible to recoup losses is not a
necessary precondition for a finding of predatory pricing’.8 Thus, the EU employs a
price-cost test that allows for prices above AVC to be regarded as abusive if
predatory intent and the risk of elimination of competitors can be established, while
prices below AVC are presumed to be predatory without requiring that recoupment
be demonstrably probable.9
3 The Game Theoretic Counter-Critique
In the 1980s, the Chicago consensus was challenged by several models of ‘rational
predation’, which employed the techniques of game theory with asymmetric
information (one party knows something that another does not). In one version of
this story, if the prey does not know what kind of firm it is confronting, then the
predator can build up a reputation for competing aggressively, by setting ‘irrational’
loss-making prices in some markets or some periods. This can pay off if it deters
later entrants, or rivals in other markets. Alternatively, if the dominant incumbent’s
cost is not known to its rivals, it might choose a low price to signal low costs, even
if it actually has high costs. It can be shown that this possibility forces an incumbent
who actually has low costs to set an even lower price. In another model with
asymmetric information, the incumbent knows the characteristics of the market but
the entrant does not. In this setting, the incumbent can reduce its price in such a way
that the entrant cannot tell whether it has miscalculated demand or because the
incumbent is engaging in predatory pricing. If the low price induces the entrant to
infer a large enough probability on the former, it may quit, even if it may have
withstood the latter. In another variant, directed against the Chicago contention that
a predator should prefer merger to predation, predatory pricing may actually be a
way of softening up the target as a prelude to a merger or takeover bid, so that it
sells out at a lower price.
7Case C-333/94 P Tetra Pak International SA v Commission of the European Communities ECLI:
EU:C:1996:436.
8Case C-202/07 P France Télécom SA v Commission of the European Communities (2009) ECLI:
EU:C:2009:214, para 113.
9However, the ECJ’s Post Danmark opinion of 2012 (Case C-209/10 Post Danmark A/S v
Konkurrencerådet (2012) ECLI:EU:C:2012:172) suggests some rethinking that will allow the
effects (both positive effects on efficiency, and negative effects on competition and consumers) of
allegedly predatory prices to be considered as an alternative to intent, when predation cannot be
presumed.
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Yet another version takes on Chicago by shifting the informational asymmetry to
the capital market. If banks cannot observe firms’ profits, they guard against
bankruptcy by demanding higher interest rates from (or refusing to lend to) firms
with lower equity. Predation then operates by reducing the value of the prey’s
equity, thereby tightening its external financial constraint. Finally, another model
demonstrated that an incumbent may set a low price if this enables it to sell a larger
volume of output which may involve short-term losses, but accelerates the process
of cost reduction through ‘learning by doing’. This assumes that there is a ‘learning
curve’ relating costs to cumulative output over time. The reduced costs also
diminishes the probability of (re-)entry by other firms, which was the Achilles’ heel
of static models of predatory pricing.
Although these game-theoretic models rehabilitated the possibility of rational
predation, the implications for antitrust analysis are extremely complicated and hard
to apply in specific cases. For one thing, the predatory price in all these models is
not necessarily less than the incumbent’s costs. Moreover, the likelihood of suc-
cessful predation depends on the unobservable beliefs of the players and the
counterfactual of ‘non-predatory’ pricing with accommodation of entry. The rep-
utation models show that the characteristics of the market in which predatory
pricing is alleged may not be relevant, since the predator may be willing to incur an
irrecoverable loss in that market in order to acquire a fearsome reputation which
will scare off rivals in other (geographic or product) markets. Unchallenged dom-
inance in the latter markets in turn provides the deep pockets to finance the
predatory campaign.
Even if an antitrust agency could somehow make a case that predation was
intended, likely to succeed, and would permanently impair competition, it is not
obvious that it should be penalized. The lower predatory price involves a trade-off:
relative to the counterfactual, it makes consumers better off in the short run but
worse off due to reduced competition in the long run. Matters become even more
complicated if the predator permanently reduces its costs. Expanding sales so as to
exploit a learning curve is a legitimate objective even without predatory intent, and
even if it deters entry, is it any more objectionable than investing in new technology
to reduce one’s costs? Given all these complexities, and the fear that ‘false posi-
tives’ in predatory pricing cases would have a chilling effect on price competition,
antitrust authorities have remained extremely reluctant to pursue such cases.
4 The Indian Legal Framework
Indian competition law remained oblivious of all these developments as long as the
MRTP Act was in force from 1970 to 2009. The Act contained no explicit clauses
on predatory pricing, but the MRTP Commission pronounced some manifestly
erroneous orders, in which it held that low-priced imports from some foreign
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suppliers were predatory, even though they collectively supplied only a tiny share
of the domestic market and there was no evidence that prices were below any
measure of costs.10 Some rethinking was apparent in the 1999 report of the
Raghavan Committee, which laid the foundations for India’s Competition Act. In
one of its many statements on the subject, it declared that ‘predatory pricing is a
discredited theory’, which seemed to recognize the Chicago critique and US case
law. But some members felt that it “is a pernicious practice warranting it being
identified under the ‘per se illegal category’’’. Ultimately, the Committee only
recommended that ‘it is better to treat predatory pricing as an abuse, only if it is
unambiguously established and indulged in by a dominant undertaking’.11 It pre-
scribed a two-stage test resembling the Joskow-Klevorik test used in some
American and British cases: first assess the market structure to determine whether a
monopoly position attained by successful predation can be sustained, and then
compare prices with costs.
These recommendations were incorporated and fleshed out in the Competition
Act 2002, which explicitly included predatory pricing as a form of ‘unfair or
discriminatory’ pricing, a prohibited abuse under Section 4, which pertains to the
‘Abuse of a Dominant Position’ (AoD). A dominant position is defined as ‘a
position of strength, enjoyed by an enterprise, in the relevant market, in India,
which enables it to (i) operate independently of competitive forces prevailing in the
relevant market; or (ii) affect its competitors in the relevant market in its favour.’
Section 19(4) of the Act lays down 13 ‘factors’, any or all of which the
Commission ‘shall have due regard to’ in inquiring into whether an enterprise is
dominant. These include market share, size and resources of the enterprise, size of
competitors, and dependence of consumers on the enterprise. Criteria for defining
the relevant product and geographical markets are also specified.
A predatory price is defined in Section 4 as ‘a price, which is below the cost, as
may be determined by regulations, of production of the goods or provision of
services, with a view to reduce competition or eliminate the competitors’. The
corresponding concept of cost, as specified in a Regulation adopted by the CCI
shortly after the relevant sections of the Act came into force in 2009,12 is ‘average
variable cost, as a proxy for marginal cost’. This is the Areeda-Turner test, but there
is also a proviso ‘that in specific cases, for reasons to be recorded in writing, the
CCI may, depending on the nature of the industry, market and technology used,
10For a critical review of the MRTP Commission’s orders, see Bhattacharjea (n 2).
11See ibid for a catalogue of the contradictory statements in the Report.
12The Competition Commission of India (Determination of Cost of Production) Regulations 2009
<http://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/regulation_pdf/cost_pro.pdf>. For an account of why the
enforcement of the Act was delayed from 2002 to 2009, see Aditya Bhattacharjea, ‘Of Omissions




consider any other relevant cost concept such as avoidable cost, long run average
incremental cost, market value’. Each of these cost concepts is defined in the
Regulation; the author returns below to the strange case of market value as a
measure of cost.
This approach to predatory pricing was a definite improvement over that of the
MRTP Act. By explicitly requiring evidence of dominance and below-cost pricing,
the Competition Act comes close to the EU model and is insulated against the kind
of wayward interpretations that the MRTP Commission felt free to devise.
However, as the author has documented in an earlier article,13 the muddled wording
of Section 4 of the Act (maladapted from Article 82—now 102—TFEU) is highly
problematic, and its treatment of predatory pricing even more so. Unlike the
adjacent sections on anticompetitive agreements and mergers, Section 4 of the Act
does not require a test for anticompetitive effects, making it possible for the CCI to
find any of the prohibited behaviours specified in the section (including predatory
pricing) to be abusive per se.14 Fortunately, as the author has documented in an
earlier paper,15 the CCI has set a high threshold for establishing dominance, and has
treated it as a condition precedent to deciding on abuse, so this provision has
remained untested.
Second, Section 4 carves out from the list of abusive practices any price (ex-
plicitly including predatory price) ‘which may be adopted to meet the competition’.
Despite the manifest origins of Section 4 in EU law, meeting the competition is not
a defence that is permitted in the EU, as confirmed by the CJEU while upholding
the judgement of the court of the First Instance in Wanadoo.16 Finally, the inclusion
in the Regulation of ‘market value’ as a possible alternative measure of cost is
incomprehensible. Section 2(c)(vi) of the Regulation offers an absurd definition:
‘market value means the consideration which the customer pays or agrees to pay for
a product which is sold or provided or can be sold or provided’—in short, the price.
So by this measure, predatory pricing is pricing below the price! Third, Section 27
allows the CCI to order the breakup of a dominant firm even before it has abused its
dominance—a dangerous weapon, which has fortunately not been deployed.
Before turning to platform competition, the author would like to summarize very
briefly the sole CCI case that pertained to predatory pricing not involving platforms.
In 2012, India’s state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) had floated
a tender for providing a range of technical services for its oil and gas exploration
13Aditya Bhattacharjea, ‘India’s New Competition Law: A Comparative Assessment’ (2008) 4 (3)
Journal of Competition Law and Economics 629–632; Reprinted in Eleanor Fox and Abel Mateus
(eds), Economic Development: The Critical Role of Competition Law and Politics (Edward Elgar
2011).
14This was first pointed out by Subhadip Ghosh and Thomas Ross, ‘India’s New Competition
Law: A Canadian Perspective’ (2008) Canadian Competition Record 23.
15Bhattacharjea (n 13).
16France Telecom (n 8), paras 50–61.
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activities for three years. (These presumably included services for its offshore
drilling rigs—platforms of a very different kind). A losing bidder, HLS Asia,
complained that Schlumberger had won the contract, covering almost all of
ONGC’s requirements, by quoting ‘ridiculously’ and ‘unreasonably’ low rates.
However, HLS did not provide any data to establish that Schlumberger’s bids were
below its costs. Absent this evidence, the CCI held that no prima facie case could be
made out, and closed the matter, without going into the questions of market defi-
nition and whether Schlumberger was dominant.17 This case, in conjunction with
the other unsuccessful AoD cases discussed in the author’s earlier article, suggests
that the two prongs of the dominance plus price-cost test can be applied in either
order, and that failing either prong would result in dismissal at the threshold.
5 Platform Competition
The economics of platform competition is based on the idea of externalities: the
effects of self-interested actions taken by one party on other parties. Two-sided
platforms generate a kind of reciprocal positive externality between two distinct
groups: the benefits to a participant on one side of the platform depend on the size
and composition of the group on the other side.18 In India, traditional village haats
and cattle fairs have of course played this role for centuries, attracting buyers to
locations where there are many sellers and vice versa. The distinguishing features of
a networked platform are first, that it intermediates between heterogeneous groups
whose members would benefit from being matched to particular members of the
group on the other side; second, that the platform is operated commercially by a
single economic entity, which can charge users on both sides an access or mem-
bership fee, and/or a fee per transaction. Shopping malls, stock exchanges, and
multi-brand department stores fit this description. More recently, ICT has enabled
e-commerce platforms of vastly greater scope. The most obvious examples are
online retailers like Amazon, Flipkart, and Snapdeal, which give buyers access to a
wider range of sellers, and sellers access to a larger number of buyers. Travel
websites and on-line ticket-booking services for films and plays play the same role.
(Consumers are usually not charged for access to most of these platforms, but it will
be shown below that this is a profit-maximizing strategy that follows logically from
the economics of platforms.)
Taxi service aggregators like Ola and Uber serve as platforms between indi-
vidual taxi owners and customers by matching their locations. The more the taxis
on one platform, the more quickly will a potential rider get a nearby vehicle willing
17HLS Asia Limited v Schlumberger Asia Services Ltd. (2012) Competition Commission of India,
Case 80/2012, order dated 6 February 2013.
18Technically, this is what economists call an ‘indirect network externality’, but a full explanation
would involve discussing the economics of networks and direct network externalities, which
would take it too far afield.
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to go where she wants; the more the customers who access a particular service, the
more taxi owners will want to sign up for that service. Credit card associations like
Mastercard and Visa facilitate payments from consumers to sellers via their banks,
but platform logic operates here as well: consumers are better off if more merchants
accept the card that they carry, and merchants are better off if more consumers carry
the card that they accept. The same goes for payment wallets like Paytm and
Mobikwik.
This matchmaking function is also performed by advertising media. For
example, newspapers are a medium for matching advertisers and readers who are
consumers, television channels mediate between advertisers and viewers, radio
channels between advertisers and listeners, and Google and Facebook between
advertisers and users. All these serve as platforms, because advertisers on one side
get access to a larger number of potential customers, and at least some consumers
on the other side appreciate access to a wider range of advertisements. The platform
function is different from the other services being provided (news, entertainment,
search, or social networking), but generates all or most of the platform’s revenue.
Yet another kind of platform is the operating system (OS) that runs a personal
computer, laptop, smartphone, tablet or videogame console. The more the users of a
particular OS, the bigger the market for applications (apps) that can run on it, and
the more the apps, the more users who will choose a device that uses that OS.
Examples that readily come to mind are Apple’s iOS, Google’s Android, and
Microsoft’s Windows, as well as Nintendo, PlayStation and Xbox. A very different
example would be platforms that facilitate matching between men and women.
Standard examples in Western countries are nightclubs and dating websites; more
familiar Indian examples would be matrimonial agencies and websites. A site (real
or virtual) that attracts more men will be more attractive to more women, and vice
versa.
In each of these examples, participants on one side of the platform value not just
the size but also the composition of the group on the other side. Consumers benefit
from platforms that sell or advertise products and services more suited to their tastes
and purchasing power; sellers benefit from exposure to potential customers who are
more likely to buy their products. For taxi apps, the location of the vehicle and rider
is paramount; for prospective dates, brides and grooms, other eligibility conditions
obviously apply.
What does any of this have to do with predatory pricing? The answer should be
evident to anyone who has used Facebook, FM radio, Google, no-fee credit or debit
cards, travel websites, ride-hailing apps, or freely downloaded software: these are
available for free, and therefore necessarily below cost—even if the cost of sup-
plying an extra post, song, listing, electronic payment, or download is negligible.
For most of the other examples given in the preceding paragraphs, the price to users
on one side of the platform is only a fraction of the cost of production and supply.
For example, the price of newspapers and magazines is often less than the cost of
paper and printing. If the platform is to break even, such under-pricing must be
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recouped by ‘overcharging’ users on the other side. The externality described above
results in a positive feedback effect between the number of users on the two sides.
Success breeds success, with every increase in membership and usage on one side
triggering an increase on the other side, further enhancing the attractiveness of the
platform to users on the first side, and so on. Growth in the network’s size also
allows it to spread its fixed costs over a larger volume of transactions, resulting in
orthodox economies of scale on the cost side. The feedback effect can also work in
reverse, with any loss of customers on one side of a platform causing defections on
the other side, recoiling on the first side, and so on in a downward spiral. This can
result in the market ‘tipping’ towards domination by one or two platform firms, as
all the named examples in the preceding paragraphs show.
Once entrenched with a large number of users on both sides, a platform is hard to
dislodge. A new entrant must necessarily begin with substantial investment and
fewer users, and will therefore not attract more, unless it is willing to incur ruinous
losses. The user-specific data (on shopping, commuting, or social networking
patterns) amassed by an incumbent platform is also not available to potential rivals,
making it a powerful barrier to entry, or ‘incumbency advantage’. Platforms can use
this data to provide users with suggested matches that suit their tastes, but also to
charge them personalized prices based on their observed willingness to pay, which
can help with recoupment. The combination of below-cost pricing, recoupment,
elimination of competition, and domination by one or two firms, makes this sce-
nario appear suspiciously like predatory pricing.
This is where the economics of two-sided platforms tells us that there are other
considerations at work. What is happening here is a standard response to an
externality problem. Economic actors do not appropriate the benefits of any positive
externalities that their actions generate, and need to be induced to perform more of
those actions: in this case, joining and actively using a platform so as to induce
participation on the other side. In order to be viable at all, the platform must have a
critical mass of users on both sides. Therefore, it charges less from those on one
side than it would have in a traditional ‘one-sided’ market, sometimes to the point
of providing the service for free or even subsidizing it, as in the case of credit cards
that offer ‘cash-back’ deals or reward points proportionate to the value of
transactions.
The profit-maximizing price on each side of the platform therefore depends not
only on the marginal costs and price-sensitivity (elasticity) of demand on that side,
but also the costs and elasticity on the other side, as well as the strength of the
demand externalities between the two sides. The resulting price structure may well
involve below-cost pricing on one side of the platform and above-cost pricing on
the other, so the prices on the two sides should not be seen in isolation from each
other. Such asymmetric pricing may be a feature of a platform regardless of the
presence or absence of rivals. Yet, the feedback effects discussed above set up a
tendency towards a ‘winner takes all’ outcome, even if this was not the intention of
the firm’s pricing behaviour. A price below cost cannot therefore be regarded as
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predatory. On the other hand, a firm with predatory intent may indeed exploit a
network externality by charging a low price on one side. But this price may have an
exclusionary effect even if it is not below cost. Standard price-cost tests, therefore,
are misleading and may result in both false positives and false negatives.
A relatively recent strand of antitrust thinking looks at the personalized data that the
platforms acquire from their users as the hidden ‘price’ of their services; it is
difficult to see how such data can be valued for a price-cost comparison.
Apart from the complications that platform economics creates for price-cost
tests, it also needs to be considered that some forces work against complete
monopolization by a single platform, countervailing the inherent ‘winner takes all’
tendency described above. First, there may be diseconomies of scale due to con-
gestion. This is evident in the case of brick and mortar platforms that are limited by
capacity, such as nightclubs, malls, and stock exchanges. But congestion may also
occur in virtual platforms with virtually limitless capacity, as participants find it
increasingly difficult to find a match when the crowd on the other side becomes too
large. Therefore, multiple platforms can cater to different groups so as to allow for
targeted matching. Such market segmentation can be vertical, with different plat-
forms serving consumers with different incomes (e.g. magazines, stores and web-
sites that feature luxury products and services as against those which cater to a mass
market). Or it can be horizontal, with platforms specializing in different locations,
tastes or needs (e.g. malls or clubs in different parts of a city; TV channels spe-
cializing in different kinds of programming; newspapers catering to readers with
different preferences; websites specializing in different kinds of products or ser-
vices; Facebook for social networking v LinkedIn for professional networking).
Second, the scope for one firm to take over the market is limited if users find it
convenient to patronize more than one platform, or if they can easily switch to a
rival platform, as with credit cards, nightclubs, newspapers or television channels.
(This is technically known as ‘multi-homing’). For both reasons, different platforms
can profitably co-exist.
On the other hand, depending on the nature of the industry and the platform,
these countervailing forces may be too weak to offset the ‘winner takes all’
dynamics. Multi-homing could involve additional costs for users (such as paying
multiple membership fees, visiting different locations, or learning different software
commands). A single online platform can itself mitigate the congestion problem by
building in search filters or an algorithm that helps different types of users to find
matches in different categories, locations or price ranges, with lower search costs.
This will reinforce the tendency towards a winner takes all outcome. But even if
one platform ultimately dominates a particular market, it is not clear that users are
worse off than with many competing platforms. If the dominant platform is well
designed, users get access to a wider range of potential matches without the costs of
multi-homing. Further, as compared to multiple competing platforms, a platform
monopolist may well impose higher charges on the seller-facing side, enabling it to
charge lower prices on the consumer-facing side. For many antitrust scholars,
especially in the US, consumer welfare (in the form of lower prices) is the standard
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by which to judge market outcomes. By this standard, market concentration in a
single platform is not necessarily harmful.19
In recent years, several American antitrust scholars have begun to question
whether the consumer welfare standard, and many other long-established antitrust
principles, are relevant or desirable in dealing with giant ICT-based firms. Several
such scholars are cited in a blockbuster paper by Lina Khan.20 She argues per-
suasively that Amazon’s incredibly low prices, leading to losses sustained for years
at a stretch, betray a business strategy that privileges growth and market dominance
over profit, at least over a very long horizon. She calls for abandoning the
recoupment standard, and argues that the harmful effects of Amazon’s behavior are
felt in related markets that it has penetrated, quality degradation, reduction of
choice, and price discrimination. Moving beyond the domain of consumer welfare,
she draws on the legislative history of the American antitrust statutes to argue
eloquently for a return to concerns with market structure and the competitive
process rather than its outcome in terms of prices, and sensitivity to issues of
dispersal of economic and political power. She recommends that predatory pricing
by a dominant firm should be treated as presumptively illegal, subject to a few
‘business justifications’ including ‘meeting the competition’. Interestingly, this is
the approach of Section 4 of India’s Competition Act, although the CCI has
repeatedly rejected a definition of dominance based only on market share, which is
what Khan advocates. Her paper is part of a growing literature that questions
established antitrust principles, harking back to the early years of US antitrust and
calling for bringing inequality and the concentration of economic and political
power back into focus. This literature has little to say about predatory pricing, so a
few remarks are consigned to a footnote.21
19Strictly speaking, economic theory judges outcomes in terms of total or ‘social’ welfare, defined
as the sum of producer and consumer surplus, with the latter taking into account variety and
quality in addition to price. But this is nearly impossible to calculate in actual cases, so the
consumer welfare standard is used in practice. This standard has very recently come under fire
from a vocal section of the American media and legal scholars. This debate is briefly discussed
below.
20Lina M. Khan, ‘Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox’ (2017) 126(3) Yale Law Journal 710.
21See also William A. Galston and Clara Hendrickson, ‘A policy at peace with itself: Antitrust
remedies for our concentrated, uncompetitive economy’ (Brookings Institution Report, 5
January 2018) <https://www.brookings.edu/research/a-policy-at-peace-with-itself-antitrust-
remedies-for-our-concentrated-uncompetitive-economy/> accessed 22 January 2018. The title of
their paper, as well as Khan’s (n 20), allude to Robert Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at
War with Itself (New York: Basic Books 1979), widely regarded as the foundational text of the
Chicago critique. Mainstream antitrust economists are unmoved by this reopening of an apparently
settled debate. Shapiro (n 1) makes a qualified case for more active antitrust enforcement while
retaining consumer welfare as the guiding principle, and avoiding the trap of condemning firms for
being successful or growing too big. While he agrees that concentration of political power,
inequality and unemployment are very important issues, he believes that antitrust is not the right
policy with which to tackle them. In earlier work, the author has shown how antitrust in most
developed countries was motivated by a variety of objectives that would nowadays be regarded as
non-economic, and the economic efficiency-based approach (based on maximizing social or
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6 The Radio Taxi Wars
The author now turns to a case study of how Indian competition law has begun to
get to grips with allegations of predatory pricing by platforms in a particular sector
of the economy in which ICT has come to play a crucial new role. As the discussion
above makes clear, ICT tools have vastly increased the power of platforms, by
allowing them to reach huge numbers of users on both sides, collect the information
relevant to each one’s idiosyncratic demand and supply, and facilitate matching,
logistics and payments. This has given rise to a new business model—taxi aggre-
gation or ride-sharing—which has disrupted a venerable old industry. Unlike most
ICT-enabled platforms, smartphones with GPS are a key additional element of this
model, because real-time tracking of each other’s location by taxi drivers and
potential riders is crucial. The rapid penetration of smartphone usage in India, at
least among the urban population, has sown the seeds of disruption.22
Traditionally, as in other countries, taxis in India were owned by individuals and
could be hailed from a stand or off the road. From around 2007, a number of radio
taxi companies began operating in the major Indian cities, with call centres which
despatched their own taxis to riders on the basis of bookings via telephone or
internet. From 2011, this business model was severely disrupted by the entry of taxi
aggregators like Ola and Uber, who did not own any vehicles but only provided a
platform to connect owner-drivers with potential passengers based on GPS-enabled
smartphones that identified their locations. The aggregators’ algorithms set the fares for
each trip, and unlike tariffs for traditional taxis, these could be calibrated in real time to
reflect the supply/demand balance for rides. In 2015, Meru, one of the more successful
radio taxi operators whose business had been badly affected, filed separate cases with
the CCI, alleging that Uber in Delhi and Kolkata, and ANI Technologies (owners of the
Ola brand) in Bengaluru, were engaged in predatory pricing. Another radio taxi
operator, Mega Cabs, filed a similar case against ANI in regard to the Delhi market, as
consumer surplus) is of relatively recent vintage. Author suggested that competition policy in
developing countries could address distributional issues by competition agencies initiating more
vigorous suo moto inquiries into markets for goods and services consumed by the poor, instead of
allowing their dockets to be swamped by clashes between corporate giants. See generally, Aditya
Bhattacharjea, ‘Who Needs Antitrust?: Or, Is Developing-Country Antitrust Different? A
Historical-Comparative Analysis’ in Daniel Sokol, Thomas K. Cheng and Ioannis Lianos (eds),
Competition Law and Development (Stanford University Press 2013).
22India’s smartphone revolution is impacting many other industries. See generally, Hemant K.
Bhargava, David S. Evans and Deepa Mani, ‘The Move to Smart Mobile and Its Implications for
Antitrust Analysis of Online Markets’ (2016) 16 UC Davis Business Law Journal 157. The authors
forcefully argue that antitrust principles developed for static markets are inapplicable to such
rapidly evolving markets.
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did three individual auto-rickshaw drivers. (Ola also provided aggregation services for
auto-rickshaws.)23 The author summarize below the essential features of these cases.
In all five cases, the informants claimed that the ‘Opposite Parties’ (Ola or Uber)
were dominant because each had within a few years captured over 50% of the
relevant market. Allegedly, this was because they were backed by vast amounts of
venture capital and private equity funding that enabled them to run their services at
a loss, offering very low fares to passengers and multiple incentives to drivers.24
There were disputes over the exact definition of the relevant markets and the
reliability of the market share data submitted by the informants, but the outcome of
the cases did not depend on these issues. In every case, the CCI found that there
was adequate evidence of vigorous competition between Ola and Uber, with several
other radio taxi services also present in each market. Evidence of fluctuating market
shares showed that ‘the competitive landscape in the relevant market is quite vibrant
and dynamic’.25 Thus no case of dominance was made out, and the CCI did not
have to make a determination on the question of predatory pricing, although on that
point Uber had been up front about network effects, claiming that its price reduction
was ‘not to indulge in unhealthy competition but to bring more and more cabs and
customers to its network and to increase the value of the network’.26 In the slightly
different case initiated by the Delhi auto-rickshaw drivers, their counsel argued that
the relevant product market included all ‘paratransit services’ including traditional
taxis and auto-rickshaws. But the CCI held that ‘owing to the difference in comfort,
time taken… buying power of the consumer (rider) etc.’,27 auto-rickshaws operated
in a different product market as compared to radio taxis, and less than 20% of
Delhi’s auto-rickshaws operated on the Ola network. Therefore, here again Ola was
not dominant. (Uber was not present in the auto-rickshaw segment.)
23Meru Travel Solutions Pvt Ltd (MTSPL) v Uber India Systems Pvt Ltd (2015) Competition
Commission of India, Case No. 81 of 2015, order dated 22 December 2015 (Kolkata); Mega Cabs
Pvt Ltd v ANI Technologies Pvt Ltd (2015) Competition Commission of India, Case No. 82 of
2015, order dated 9 February 2016; Meru Travel Solutions Pvt Ltd v Uber India Systems Pvt Ltd
and Others (2015) Competition Commission of India, Case No. 96 of 2015, order dated 10
February 2016; Mr Vilakshan Kumar Yadav and Ors. v ANI Technologies Pvt Ltd (2016)
Competition Commission of India, Case No. 21 of 2016, order dated 31 August 2016 (all three
Delhi); Fast Track Call Pvt Ltd and Meru Travel Solutions Pvt Ltd v ANI Technologies Pvt Ltd
Competition Commission of India, Case No. 21 of 2016, Cases No 6 and 74 of 2015, order dated
19 July 2017 (both Bengaluru; another radio taxi company, Fast Track, had separately submitted
information against ANI/Ola. Finding similar allegations in both cases, the Commission clubbed
them for investigation and disposal).
24Although the bulk of Khan’s paper is taken up by her documentation of Amazon’s behavior,
Uber is also mentioned (Khan (n 20) 786–787), as following a similar predatory strategy, with
sustained heavy losses financed by investors.
25Meru Travel Solutions Private Limited (Case No. 96) (n 23), para 24.
26ibid 15, emphasis added.
27Mr Vilakshan Kumar Yadav and Ors. (n 23), para 14.
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In one of the Delhi cases, Meru appealed to the Competition Appellate Tribunal
(COMPAT), which disagreed with the CCI’s narrow definition of the relevant
geographical market. It pointed out inconsistencies in the CCI’s reliance on the
market share data given in different survey reports. It also held that under
Section 19(4), dominance should not be established based on market share alone,
but the high market shares ascribed to Uber in the survey report submitted by Meru
could not be ignored. Regarding pricing, it remained agnostic:
Aggregator-based radio taxi service is a relatively new paradigm of public transport in
Indian cities…. Reportedly, it has done wonders to consumer satisfaction in whichever city
it has started. Therefore, it cannot be said definitively that there is an abuse inherent in the
business practices adopted by operator such as respondents [Uber,] but the size of discounts
and incentives show that there are either phenomenal efficiency improvements, which are
replacing existing business models with the new business models or there could be an
anticompetitive stance to it.28
COMPAT reopened the case, ordering an investigation by the Director
General (DG) of the CCI. But Uber immediately appealed to the Supreme Court, on
the grounds that COMPAT could only order an investigation if it found a prima
facie case against Uber, and that no such case could be made out because Uber was
not dominant in the relevant market. In January 2017, the Supreme Court restrained
the CCI from carrying out the investigation until further orders. Further hearings
took place in March 2017, but no further developments in this case have been
reported up till the time (January 2018) that this chapter was completed.
In four of the five cases reviewed here, the CCI found no dominance and hence
no prima facie case and closed the matter without ordering an inquiry by its DG.
The author would like to summarize at somewhat greater length the fifth case, in
which Meru and Ola faced off with regard to the Bengaluru market. Even though its
final decision was ultimately the same as in the other four cases, in this instance the
CCI did find a prima facie case of abuse, ordered a DG investigation, considered
more arguments going beyond market shares, and also discussed the economics of
platform competition and the issue of unequal access to financial markets.29
Presumably, if the Supreme Court allows the investigation in Meru v Uber to
proceed, that case will follow a similar trajectory to Meru v Ola.
In Meru v Ola, the CCI accepted the contention of the informants that the
relevant market was the market for radio taxi services in Bengaluru. It rejected
Ola’s argument that it was not a taxi service provider, but only a technology
software service provider or aggregator, enabling taxi drivers to connect with
potential passengers and facilitating payments. Notwithstanding that Ola, unlike the
rival radio taxi services, did not own the taxis that operated on its platform, it did fix
their prices and offer their services, which consumers treated as functionally
28Meru Travel Solutions Pvt Ltd v Competition Commission of India, Uber India Systems Pvt Ltd
& Ors (2016) Appeal No. 21/2016, order dated 7 December 2016, para 18.
29Fast Track Call Pvt Ltd and Meru Travel Solutions Pvt Ltd (n 23).
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substitutable with those of the rival operators. Regulatory authorities also treated
aggregators as radio taxi service providers. The CCI concluded that having a dif-
ferent business model did not imply that Ola operated in a different market.
The bulk of the CCI’s analysis dealt with the question of whether Ola was
dominant in the market thus defined. The fleet sizes registered by the different
platforms were not appropriate for market share calculations, since taxi owners
could register with different platforms; instead the number of trips was taken as the
relevant indicator. Four years after it commenced its Bengaluru operations in 2011,
Ola’s share of the number of taxi trips exceeded 60%, which according to the
informants created a presumption of dominance. Conversely, Meru’s share fell from
60 to 6–7%, and the other traditional companies were driven down to even less. But
the CCI refused to accept this as evidence of Ola’s dominance. It pointed out that
market share was only one of the indicators provided in the Act for assessing
dominance, and in new high-tech industries high market shares could be ephemeral.
The CCI highlighted the fact that Uber, which entered in 2013, had acquired a share
of nearly a third by 2015, providing effective competition to Ola, whose share
actually dipped. The erosion of the older operators’ shares was ‘more attributable to
the expansion of the consumer base in the market than them being deprived of the
demand which they were serving before’.30 All but one of the older operators had in
fact witnessed an absolute increase in the number of trips.
The CCI then gave a nice summary of the economics of network effects in
two-sided platforms31, but it did not agree with the informants that these constituted
barriers to entry. It pointed out that the network effects had not been strong enough
to deter the entry and rapid expansion of Uber. It also pointed out that both drivers
and riders could multi-home, switching easily between Ola and Uber. This ‘con-
strains the power of the platforms to act independently of the market forces’.32
Entry conditions for platforms were also more favourable than for traditional taxi
services, because platforms did not need to invest in large fleets of vehicles.
The CCI also disagreed with the informants that Ola’s access to huge finances from
foreign venture funds constituted an entry barrier. It pointed out that many start-ups
in various high-tech sectors with network effects had attracted financing. New
business models and technologies were rapidly displacing older ones.
The CCI refused to be swayed by the informants citing of its order in MCX v
NSE, in which it had suggested that predatory pricing itself could evidence of
dominance. It referred approvingly to the holistic approach of the Act, which did
not allow for a firm’s conduct to be accepted as evidence of dominance in the
absence of other factors. The informants had also argued that the absence of further
entry after Uber indicated lack of competition, but the CCI did not agree. It





process, not a count of the number of firms. A table of average monthly margins
over the period of investigations showed that it was Uber that had initiated the
strategy of pricing below costs, with Ola following nine months later. Finally, the
CCI made short work of the informant’s argument that Ola and Uber could be held
to be jointly dominant. Apart from citing the language of the Act itself, the CCI
pointed out that in 2012, an amending Bill had been tabled in the Lok Sabha (Lower
House of Parliament) in order to introduce the concept of joint dominance, thereby
showing that Parliament was aware that it was absent in the Act. The Bill lapsed
when the Lok Sabha was dissolved in 2014 before it could be passed.
The CCI’s conclusions on dominance deserve to be reproduced in full:
In conclusion, based on collective consideration of the facts that the competitive process in
the relevant market is unfolding, market is growing rapidly, effective entry has taken place
thereby leading to gradual decline in [Ola’s] market share, entry barriers are not insur-
mountable, there exist countervailing market forces that constrain the behaviour of OP and
the nature of competition in dynamic, innovation-driven markets, the Commission is of the
considered view that [Ola’s] dominance in the relevant market remains unsubstantiated.33
Since in the CCI’s jurisprudence, establishing dominance has been (in most
cases) a hurdle that has to be crossed before addressing the allegation of predatory
pricing, this conclusion was sufficient to dispose of the case against Ola. But the
CCI nonetheless devoted the last few paragraphs of its order to a brief discussion of
pricing strategy. It was clearly impressed by the 1900% increase in radio taxi trips
during the 40-month period of investigation, attributing it not only to the reduction
in transaction costs made possible by the platform technology, but also the
‘abysmally low prices’ of Ola and Uber which had ‘revolutionised the taxi mar-
ket’.34 Significantly, it acknowledged that
[T]he Commission does not fully disagree with the Informants that the low prices of [Ola]
are not because of cost efficiency, but because of the funding it has received from the
private equity funds. But as discussed above, there is no evidence that the access to such
funding was inequitable and that the market for financing was not competitive and had
aberrations. Moreover, it was their penetrative pricing strategy that facilitated them to
garner high market shares in short span of time as well as develop the networks to a size
that could provide sufficient positive externalities to the participants of the network.35
The CCI concluded that ‘it is difficult to determine with certainty the long-term
impact of this pricing strategy as the market is yet to mature’, and expressed its
reluctance ‘to interfere in a market which is yet to fully evolve’. In any case, there
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This order of the CCI in Meru v Ola may be appealed, as was the order in Meru v
Uber, which resulted in COMPAT’S directive to investigate the issue of dominance.
However, the taxi wars entered a new phase in October 2017 when Meru initiated a
fresh round of litigation before the CCI by alleging that acquisition of large equity
stakes in both Ola and Uber by SoftBank would affect their pricing decisions jointly.
This raises multiple possibilities. The common shareholder could be seen to facilitate
a horizontal agreement or understanding on price-fixing, which would be presump-
tively illegal under Section 3(3) of the Act. Or, if it could be established that
SoftBank’s shareholding is sufficient for it to exercise control over both the firms,
then they could be a ‘group’ as defined in the Act. This would allow Meru to cross
the hurdle of establishing their joint dominance in the relevant markets, clearing the
path to an inquiry into an exclusionary pricing strategy under Section 4. Even if no
such common understanding or control can be established, if either Ola or Uber is
individually found to be dominant in one of the metros after a fresh investigation, the
question of SoftBank’s liability for the conduct of its portfolio firms might arise.37
Meanwhile, the two giants, Ola and Uber, continue to slug it out, incurring
heavy losses, being kept afloat only by periodic infusions of venture capital.
Presumably, armed with the huge amount of data they have gathered on individ-
uals’ commuting patterns, the promoters of each one (and their investors) have
worked out the pricing structure that they would implement if the other one gives
up and exits, and on that basis have calculated that they will be able to recoup their
losses. While the CCI is not required to establish recoupment, it will have to look
into price-cost margins. How will it distinguish between ‘phenomenal efficiency
improvements’ and anticompetitive behaviour, both of which the COMPAT
allowed for a while ordering the investigation? While prices can be inferred from
reported revenues, the AVC for such operators would have to be constructed from
data on commissions and incentives given to drivers. What the equilibrium
monopoly pricing structure might be, and whether consumers would be worse off if
only one aggregator is left standing, is probably beyond any antitrust agency’s
ability to predict. How far the CCI can venture in such cases is also open to
question, given that Section 4 of the Competition Act does not require an assess-
ment of effects on competition. But these issues will arise only if the Supreme Court
allows the investigation into Uber’s dominance to proceed, and the CCI either finds
Uber to be dominant or is persuaded by the new arguments based on common
shareholding. Meanwhile, the COMPAT has been wound up, and all appeals will
now go the overburdened National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, which has
no experience in competition matters, and then to the Supreme Court. Resolution of
these issues seems a long way off, by which time technologies, business models,
and commuting habits of the public may have changed significantly.
37For a discussion of the antitrust analysis of the role of common shareholding in anticompetitive
practices of portfolio firms (written before SoftBank invested in Uber), see Smriti Parsheera, Ajay
Shah and Avirup Bose, ‘Competition Issues in India’s Online Economy’ (2017) National Institute




The economic analysis of predatory pricing has gone through several phases. If the
Chicago critique cast doubt on the very rationality of such a strategy, then the
game-theoretic counter-critique rehabilitated it theoretically but gave few practical
insights into how to identify it in real-world cases. The newer literature on platform
competition has further muddied these waters, showing that there is no simple way
to prove predatory pricing, much less to condemn it. Indian competition jurispru-
dence, having gone completely off the rails in the MRTP era, is now cautiously
trying to deal with some of these issues in the ongoing legal battles between old and
new model radio taxi operators.
It is difficult at this stage to provide any general principles on how to proceed in
such cases.38 What emerges from the successive doctrinal phases in antitrust
thinking that the author surveyed above is that assessment of predatory pricing in
platform competition is very complicated and should be conducted case by case,
taking into account both positive and negative effects which may differ from
industry to industry. This requires what is called the ‘rule of reason’ in antitrust
jurisprudence. Such an approach requires careful fact-finding and analysis. But
given the rapidly unfolding dynamics of platforms, the complexity of arguments on
both sides, and the ability of such firms to withhold data and hire top lawyers to
delay proceedings, the damage may be done and the platform fully entrenched
before the case is decided. On the other hand, early intervention by a competition
agency could prematurely kill off a promising new business model which might
eventually prove beneficial for society. Unleashing the agency’s weapon of the last
resort, the power to break up a dominant firm, would be self-defeating: as the
Economist put it recently, ‘a full-scale break-up would cripple the platforms’
economies of scale, worsening the service they offer consumers. And even then,
one of the Googlettes or Facebabies would eventually sweep all before it as the
inexorable logic of network effects reasserted itself.’39
Postscript
As the final proofs of this chapter were being reviewed, the CCI pronounced a
combined order disposing of four very similar ‘informations’ filed by Meru against
Ola and Uber regarding their conduct in Hyderabad, Chennai, Mumbai and Kolkata
(Cases 25-28 of 2017, order dated 20 June 2018). Meru repeated many of the
arguments it had advanced in the cases discussed above in Part 6, and the
38Parsheera, Shah and Bose (n 37) gave some interesting suggestions on how the CCI should deal
with competition issues in network markets, but the author does not think they can be accom-
modated within the scheme of the Competition Act.
39‘Taming the Titans’ The Economist (20–26 January 2018) 11.
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Commission rejected them on the same grounds as before. But, as mentioned on
page 228 above, Meru also advanced the new argument that Ola and Uber are now
dominant as a group because common investors like SoftBank own shares in both
companies. The CCI’s order acknowledged that both academics and competition
authorities have recently assessed various ‘theories of harm’ that could arise out of
common ownership, but the theoretical and empirical literature does not give any
grounds for concluding that such ownership would always have an anticompetitive
effect. Even if Ola and Uber could be held to be dominant as a group on the basis of
common ownership, the Commission pointed out that there was inadequate evi-
dence of abuse of dominance. Therefore, it held that the facts do not at present
establish a prima facie case of violation of the Competition Act, and closed the
case. However, it warned that it would keep a close eye on the firms, and take
action if common ownership results in anticompetitive effects in future. Network
effects and platform competition did not figure significantly in this order.
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Competition Law and Standard
Essential Patent (SEP) in India:
A Few Critical Issues to Ponder
Geeta Gouri
1 Introduction
Several cases pertaining to standard essential patents (SEPs) and fair, reasonable, and
non-discriminatory (FRAND) commitments have been filed before the Competition
Commission of India (CCI). These cases pertain to well established technology com-
panies that granted SEPs for their innovations in the telecommunications sector. As is
to be expected, the allegations are mainly from smart phones manufacturers or
assemblers. The parties have alleged in their representation to the Commission that SEP
owners in the telecommunication sector have violated FRAND commitments of ‘fair,
reasonable and transparent’ in the terms offered to licensees. Royalties in their opinion
are high and discriminatory indicative of abuse by dominance in the technology of
GSM, 2G, 3G and other expanding segments of the sector. Injunctions have also been
sought from the High Court of Delhi as regards to royalty base and methodology
including royalty stacking of SEPs suggesting hold-up by patent owners.
In India, these are the first cases pertaining to SEPs. Most competition juris-
dictions which now include China and South Korea do not consider violations
pertaining to SEP are in the domain of antitrust authorities. Accepting the argument
that Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) can create dominance they have opined that
extending the liability referenced to standard antitrust arguments is inappropriate
and self-defeating impacting technological development and consumer benefits.
Concerns have however, been voiced on whether by including several Intellectual
Properties (IPs) into a single portfolio there is possibility of monopolization and of
unilateral action more so with the emergence of Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs) or
of trolls. The literature on FRAND and SEPs however, all point to settlement of
issues in court of law rather than as an antitrust issue. It raises the fundamental
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question as to why CCI directed investigation by the Director General (DG) in what
is widely accepted as the domain of the courts and not an antitrust issue.
The decision of the Delhi High Court permitting the Commission to resume its
investigation on the allegation of dominance and its abuse adds further substance to
the question raised. In this chapter an attempt is made to examine the concerns of
the Commission for initiating investigation and whether the unease of the
Commission can be justified. It is significant that all cases pertaining to SEPs have
been considered in the framework of Section 4 (Abuse of Dominance) in terms of
their anticompetitive effects and not with reference to Section 3(4) which deals with
agreements and Section 3(5) which deals with agreements protected under IPRs.
This penchant for Section 4 raises several questions as the entry point for antitrust
investigation. Does the textured rigidity and static arguments of the Section make it
easier for the Commission in its assessment of anticompetitive effects? Or per-
suaded perhaps ironically, by the perception of informants of Commissions pro-
clivity for the Section. The presumption is that SEP owners are dominant and
therefore immune to competitive constraints. The author is of the opinion that the
presumption and choice of the appropriate section while interlinked, suggests a ‘per
se’ approach to competition law and SEP in India.
The author ventures further to fathom that the decision of the Delhi High Court
suggests that it was an attempt on the part of judiciary to endorse a reasoned
economic analysis of IP, SEP and FRAND in dynamic markets of innovation by an
expert body. The Commission is yet to develop a reasoned approach and
jurisprudence towards IPR. In absence of guidelines dealing with IP and with a
track record of conservative judgements, it is imperative that instead of extending
liability under uncertain circumstances an objective discussion may be initiated
based on logic and reasoning.
This chapter examines the two basic but interlinked questions: Are SEPs prima
facie dominant and whether dominance leads to a per se inference of abuse? The
chapter is divided into two parts to address the two questions separately.
2 Dominance and Standard Essential Patents
The number of cases filed before the Commission on patents in the telecommu-
nications sector and SEPs are about half dozen pertaining to abuse of dominance.1
Allegations in all the cases pertained to abuses of dominance under Section 4 of the
1M/s ESYS Information Technologies Private Limited v Intel Corporation (2011) Competition
Commission of India, Case 48/2011; Micromax Informatics Limited v Telefonaktiebolaget LM
Ericsson (Publ) (2013) Competition Commission of India, Case 50/2013; Intex Technologies
(India) Limited v Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (Publ) (2013) Competition Commission of
India, Case 76/2013; M/s Three D Integrated Solutions Ltd. v M/s VeriFone India Sales Pvt. Ltd.
(2013) Competition Commission of India, Case 13/2013; M/s Atos Worldline India Pvt. Ltd. v M/s
Verifone India Sales Pvt. Ltd. (2012) Competition Commission of India, Case 56/2012; M/s
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Act on the premise that SEP owners are dominant in the relevant market. The prima
facie Order in the case Micromax Informatics Limited v Telefonaktiebolaget LM
Ericsson (Publ) identifies dominance as central to the allegation to be addressed: ‘From
the perusal of the information and the documents filed by the Informant prima facie it is
apparent that Ericsson is dominant in the relevant market of GSM and CDMA….’
Further, an explanatory phrase in the next paragraph: ‘The allegations made in
the information and not refuted by OP concerning royalty rates sums up the initial
responses of the Commission.’
Prima facie Orders are important although not in the same league as the Order
after the investigation. A pre-investigation Order has less weightage. It indicates
the mind of the Commission based on information available in public domain and
what is filed by the parties. The investigations generally follow the line of thinking
of the prima facie Order. It strengthens the initial presumption rather than pose
counterfactuals or alternate lines of reasoning. There have been dissenting prima
facie Orders too, but Members largely prefer to evaluate their decision on receiving
the investigation Report of the DG. The Commission also has a policy: (i) to call for
more information from the informant and the deponent and (ii) to provide for initial
hearing of the arguments. The information filed can therefore be refuted at the early
stages to which due weight is given by the Commission. In the SEP cases, decisions
made based on similar information tend to carry weight in subsequent prima facie
Order.2
It needs however, to be emphasized that a prima facie Order does not necessarily
suggest thinking of the Commission but merely voices concerns on the possibility
of dominance and the scope for abuse. For instance, in Micromax Informatics
Limited v Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (Publ) (Ericsson) the market so defined
(GSM and CDMA) suggested dominance of the enterprise indicative of indulgence
in anticompetitive activities that call for further investigation. At the outset let us
examine as to whether SEPs are necessarily dominant in the relevant market as
alleged in an assertion that devolves on a ‘per se’ understanding based on a static
traditional approach of economics of competition law that patents provide a
monopoly right. This approach raises several uncomfortable questions in the
telecommunications sector, the sector itself is no longer confined to the lines and
wires networks and related equipment has expanded to include internet services,
digital transmission of voice and data, cloud computing, internet of things and
requisite technology accessed by consumers.
Firstly, a monopoly right and the scope afforded for earning monopoly profit
while an incentive for existing patent owners is also the incentive for aspiring
innovators. It is also debatable whether monopoly profits are sufficiently conducive
Best IT World (India) Private Limited (iBall) v M/s Telefonaktiebolaget L M Ericsson (Publ)
(2015) Competition Commission of India, Case 04/2015.
2ibid.
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for further innovation and degenerate to the general advantage of patent as an entry
barrier. The counter to this argument is that patents are awarded only to new
innovations that are original and patentees have to prove that it is not mere imitation
or improvisation at the most. The scope for innovation and the time cycle of
innovation differs among industries. Studies and evidence have shown that in the
telecommunications sector the speed of innovation has been remarkably fast.
Secondly, the telecommunications sector and its convergence with the internet
and artificial intelligence has seen two developments: (i) a wide range of alterna-
tives to the GSM/CDMA technologies and (ii) combining of different innovations
enabling different functions in a mobile and of course, the emergence of apps.
Technological developments redefine markets spaces and dominance which
have not been taken into account in the prima facie Orders. Orders uniformly
state that as SEP owners in the telecommunications sector, the firm is but dominant.
The same arguments have been applied in other cases also, for instance, Intel in the
microprocessor segment.
The Order notes that in the market for GSM and CDMA technology in India,
Ericsson3 is dominant. Globally the market share of Ericsson was estimated at 35%.
In India as the Order points out the company holds 30,000 patents of which 400
patents have been granted in India.4 The Order opines that since the firm holds an
SEP, it is an indication that there is no alternate technology in the market. This
is indicative of market power and dominance. The same argument continues in later
Orders.5 In the case of Intel and microprocessors (chips) the Commission found the
firm in a dominant position in three of the four defined markets.6
Market data shows that towards the end of 1990s, 85% of the GSM market
consisted of five players—Ericsson, Nokia, Siemens, Motorola and Alcatel.7
Major SEP owners with licensing programs includes Lucent, Ericsson, Nokia,
Interdigital and Qualcomm.
The data on market share clearly points to two facts. Firstly, the telecommuni-
cations sector is highly innovative with ever expanding horizons of the internet
from 2G to LTE to Cloud computing. As a lucrative market, entry of new firms with
competing and often disruptive technology is the hall mark of technology based
markets. Dominance at best is a temporary phenomena subject to the threatening
presence of competitive constraints. As is argued later the presence of competitive




6M/s ESYS (n 1).
7Claudia Tapia, Director IPR Policy, ‘DT: A New Technological and Economic Paradigm’
(Speech at the Going digital: the future of industry and jobs Workshop, Paris, 24 April 2017)
<http://www.isigrowth.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Tapia.pdf>.
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importance of looking at competitive constraints rather than dominance points to
moving towards effects based analysis using rigorous economic analysis by the
Commission. The argument that SEPs are dominant is powerful but not necessarily
borne out by evidence.
Secondly, the need to appreciate the significance of SEP in promoting compe-
tition. Standardisation is a mechanism created by standard setting organisations
(SSOs) and as the name indicates it enables the creation of a portfolio of patents that
maintains standards and ensures compatibility. Several patents grouped together
provide for the numerous activities that are looked for in smartphones with each
generation providing for more functions. Standardization is the process where all
patents are grouped together. Negotiations are simplified for a firm seeking a
license. Multiple licenses are no longer required. A single license combines all
patents in a set.
Thirdly, the argument that SEPs create entry barriers is not sustainable. The data
shows that in the telecommunications sector, requirements of interoperability and of
incorporating new features in the smartphone, the mechanism of standardization is
appropriate. Standardization is a process whereby a group of patentees that combine
as a package seek approval from SSOs. There are several SSOs who issue SEPs
incorporating different technologies. A safe selection process of a SEP is to choose
from a credible SSO such as the European Telecommunications Standard Institute
(ETSI). As so much doubt has been raised on SEPs and standard setting process
perhaps the Commission could consider hosting an open forum for discussion on
SSOs and the process of selection before taking the final decision.8
Fourthly, the hallmark of a SEP approved portfolio of patents is that FRAND
condition is voluntary and ensures that for a licensee the technology is available to
all firms who agree to pay. SEP and FRAND have resulted in the proliferation of
smartphones both in terms of companies manufacturing them and in the new fea-
tures that are advertised as each new model is introduced in the market. The
booming market for smartphones which even a partial list shows more than two
dozen manufacturers9 is testimony to the fact that SEPs have facilitated the growth
of smart phones and telecommunication systems.
8DoT has attempted such an open forum discussion.
9ibid; Apple, Samsung, Huawei, BlackBerry, Google, Xiaomi, Blu, Foxconn (FIH Global), LG,
Pantech, Acer, ZTE, Bq, GeeksPhone, Gradiente, Positivo, DataWind, Amoi, BBK, Coolpad,
Cubot, Gfive, Gionee, Haier, Hisense, Konka, Letv, Meizu, Qihoo 360, Wasam, Technology
Happy Life, Ningbo Bird, Smartisan, Zopo Mobile, Lenovo, Jablotron, Verzo, Jolla, Archos,
Wiko, Videocon, Groupe Bull, MobiWire, AEG, Grundig Mobile, Telefunken, Tiptel, Celkon,
IBall, Intex Technologies, Karbonn Mobiles, Lava International, LYF, Micromax Informatics,
Onida Electronics, Ringing Bells, Spice Digital, Xolo, YU Televentures, Nexian, Evercoss, MITO,
Polytron, Advan, Brondi, NGM, Olivetti, Onda Mobile Communication, TelitKyocera
Communications, NEC, Panasonic, Sansui, Sharp Corporation, Sony Mobile Communications,
DoCoMo, Just5, M Dot, Ninetology, Kyoto Electronics, Lanix, Zonda, Fairphone, John’s Phone,
Philips, Koryolink, QMobile, Voice Mobile, Advance Telecom, TCT, Dell, Microsoft, etc.
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Lastly, and of importance in an analysis of market power exerted by a dominant
player is the choice available for selection of technology. Selecting a specific
FRAND license being voluntary, there is no compulsion on phone manufacturers to
select a particular SEP. It does however raise the question as to why the cases filed
before the Commission have been on SEP and that of Ericsson. The counter
arguments on this linear approach is the uncomfortable fact that all cases before the
Commission are bunched in terms of time i.e. within a year suggesting a pattern of
comradeship.
Discussions on SEPs and the process followed by SSOs are an important
dimension of selecting a particular patent.10 Credibility of an SSO is important as
there are both public and private institutions including the emergent PAEs. In the
present case ETSI is a well established SSO. The concern of the Commission is not
on ETSI but on Clause 6 of ETSI which it is argued has been abused by Ericsson.
Clause 6 as quoted by the Commission: ‘an IPR owner is required to give irre-
vocable written undertaking, that it is permitted to grant irrevocable license on
FRAND terms, to be applied fairly and uniformly to similarly placed players.’11
In adopting a legalistic approach the Commission placed emphasis on the last
phrase of ‘fairly and uniformly’ as the phrase encapsulates abuse of dominant
position stated as under Section 4(2). To quote: ‘… directly or indirectly, imposes
unfair or discriminatory conditions in purchase or sale… …or in the price of
purchase or sale of a good or service.’ Taking recourse to Clause 6 the Order
suggests that owners of SEP are not in conformity with ‘fair, reasonable, and
non-discriminatory’ in making royalty claims. Interpretation of the phrase is open to
multiple interpretations.12 Reference to Clause 6 and the allegations in the Orders
necessitates an examination of ‘fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory’ royalty
payments.
Recent provocation by the Indian Cellular Association to mobile manufacturers
to calibrate their allegations against SEP owners on royalty payments and the
non-disclosure agreement cite violation of ‘fair and reasonable’ condition of
FRAND. Claims of royalty claimed as excessive and inappropriate in terms of
methodology suggests attempts to persuade the Government to declare SEPs as
‘non-essential’ placing it outside the framework of essential and standard, in a
misplaced understanding of ‘essential’ in SEP. It is also a move that will hit the
growth of smartphone manufacturers and the emergence of strong IPR standards
within the country.13
10Ankita Tyagi and Sheetal Chopra, ‘Standard Essential Patents (SEP’s)—Issues & Challenges in
Developing Economies’ (2017) 22(3) Journal of Intellectual Property Rights 121.
11ibid; Micromax (n 1).
12ibid; The most narrow limited interpretation is if a legalese approach is followed as in the MCX
Stock Exchange Ltd v National Stock Exchange of India Ltd (2009) Competition Commission of
India, Case 13/2009. Or more expansive and sound in terms of economic theory is possible with an
effects-based approach as in the recent decision on Ola and Uber cabs.
13‘Handset firms trying to avoid paying royalty worrying’ The Financial Express (12 March
2016).
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Does dominance lead to abuse seen in terms of royalty conditions? What is ‘fair
and reasonable’ always provokes different responses. Interestingly arguments often
made before the Commission not only in cases of SEP but across all cases of abuses
relating to pricing clearly demonstrated an effort to define fair and reasonable from
the perception of the informant and of uniformity irrespective of differences in the
nature and characteristic of the product or on whether each price is a negotiated
transacted amount. In this part the author will only emphasize upon few fallacies
and misconceptions on pricing and royalty payments that have bothered her and
calls for deeper analysis.14
The commonplace interpretation of ‘fair and reasonable’ argued as uniform
royalty for all licensees tends to ignore the critical point that a license is a negotiated
document between two parties defined by what is offered and what is sought.
A price so negotiated is fair and reasonable disputed on grounds that a SEP owner is
dominant and the agreement is not fair as it is between two unequal parties. There
are several loopholes in the argument of unequal bargaining strength with shades of
populism. Firstly, firms manufacturing handsets are not exactly small. As per the
information filed by one of the informants Micromax, by its own admission is the
12th largest handset manufacturer in the world.15 Between a large domestic man-
ufacturer and a large international SEP owner the situation is more akin to com-
peting dominance than of unequal status at least in the Indian mobile and handset
market. The issue devolves on who needs whom. Is it the patent owner or is it the
patentee? Data on SEP technology for telecommunications showed several players
vying for the market. The prevalence of competitive constraints balances the
relationship in a negotiated settlement. Patent owners seek markets and generate
funds by selling their patents. These funds cover investment in R&D vital to
product development and innovation. To argue that a common (uniform) royalty
rate be applicable to all seeking license is not a valid argument. Secondly, a
competitive price is the rate at which a consumer satisfaction or marginal utility is
met. It defines the value of a product (patent in this case) to the person seeking a
license. Process of negotiation and the price settled reflects the value of the license
in terms of the price fixed. There are different features that a phone incorporates and
the choice of a specific patent is defined by the features that a phone manufacturer
wishes to incorporate. Prevalence of competitive markets at the SEP technology and
in the market for smartphones and other communication devices make for com-
plexity of negotiations and royalty payments. To prove that royalty rates are rea-
sonable and fair requires comparisons to be product specific, feature specific and
14The author has not gone into the arguments on the welfare aspects of price discrimination as set
out in the Second theorem. As regards patents the word ‘differential’ is preferred to discrimination
to avoid any pejorative connotation.
15ibid.
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time specific, provoking the question, how is the market to be defined—technology,
implementer and consumer? And then to examine the strength of each market(s) in
providing the requisite competitive constraint.
A negotiated settlement normally involves the rights of two parties but in the
case of smartphones and telecommunication equipment the rights of consumer have
to be considered by antitrust authorities. The rights of a patent owner to his IP and
the incentive to keep innovating as against the right of the patentee or implementer
whose right stated in the prima facie Order is assured under Clause 6 of the ETSI.16
The Order points out that the patent owner has to grant irrevocable license to the
following extent: ‘Manufacture, including the right to make or have made cus-
tomized component and sub-systems to the licensee’s own design for use in
manufacture, sell, lease, or otherwise dispose equipment so manufactured; repair,
use or operate equipment’s; and use methods’.
Issuing of SEP licenses on FRAND terms enables the gains to be used by the
implementer to benefit the consumer. Competition authorities concern should be
with the consumers and not the implementers. Benefits of technology flows through
the chain. How does one view the dynamic benefits of technology? How does one
give a patent holder the right to his innovation? As stated in the Preamble of the
Act, competition is to protect consumers. The argument put forth by Micromax and
Intex in their filings with the Commission that consumers lose out on account of
high royalty payments which result in higher costs is simplistic and tends to be an
‘accounts based approach’ towards pricing rather than an ‘economics based
approach’ to pricing. The former is a methodology commonly used in cost based
pricing schemes where all inputs plus a reasonable rate is added to arrive at a
reasonable price. The arguments against royalty as a percentage of final selling price
and for royalty pricing on the smallest saleable patent practicing component
(SSPPC) proceeds on this logic and designated as ‘discriminatory’.17 The argument
that royalty rates affect the final price resulting in consumer harm is based on
simplistic concept of pancaking of costs to arrive at the final costs. In a competitive
market, prices of handsets and of smartphones are based on several factors—such as
elasticity of demand; number of firms and availability of substitutes; business
strategies that different firms adopt to increase sales etc. notwithstanding that
royalty payments where SEP is concerned would impact in the same manner for all
telecommunication equipment manufacturers.18
It still leaves the question as to why the Order considered that charging of
relevant fee on the total sale price was exorbitant and instead suggested royalty to
be paid on the patented product or what is known as the SSPPC as the royalty base
to determine a FRAND royalty. While arguments have been put forward for SSPPC
it goes against the logic of standardization process. In fact, payment of royalty for
16ibid.
17The example cited in the Orders is that the royalty would be `1.25 in a phone costing `100. On a
phone costing `1000 the royalty would be `12.5.
18Prices of smartphones and handsets have been falling as also that of mobile subscription.
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each patent may result in a larger amount of royalty paid out and misses out on the
importance of the basic intention of FRAND which is to determine a value of the
entire portfolio.19
Primarily and most importantly, there are several inputs and complementary
products that are part of a mobile. In a standard they are all part of a package where
the royalty payment is for the package. All of them have been harmonized to
complement each other leading to what is commonly known as network effects. The
standards setting process of SSO coordinate the process of a SEP. The value of a
single license is enhanced by all the complementary features. They can only
function if interoperable. Networks create value and fixing royalty as a percent of
the final price is to price the patent at the value consumers’ perceive when they buy
the product at a given price.20
The recent Delhi HC judgement has brought to the forefront network economies
and payment of royalty on the basis of total value associated with interoperability
and complementarity of telecommunications systems rather than on the value of a
single license. The court also noted that this was the method of fixing the base for
royalty world over including US and China. The court also confirmed uniformity of
approach after examining several licenses.21 The importance of these developments
to the benefit of consumers (primarily achieved through network effects of com-
patibility) was highlighted. The essence of FRAND royalty is of network
economies.22
The Commission in examining cases of ‘abuse of dominance’ prefers the
‘form-based approach’ rather than ‘effects-based approach’.23 An ‘effects based
approach’ would necessarily have to take into consideration the dynamics of market
pricing as also the relevance of network economies. The concept of network
economies did not find much favor during the prima facie Orders. In MCX-SX v
NSE, network economies and the gains to consumers were overshadowed by
19‘An appropriate way to determine a FRAND royalty is to determine a benchmark rate which is
governed by the value of the patentee’s portfolio’; Unwired Planet v Huawei [2017] EWHC 711.
20As a point of reference, cases on FRAND dispute in the US courts use the term ‘price differ-
entiation’ and not ‘discrimination’ thereby removing the pejorative connotation of the term.
21J. Gregory Sidak, ‘FRAND in India: The Delhi High Court’s Emerging Jurisprudence on
Royalties for Standard Essential Patents’ (2015) 10(8) Journal of Intellectual Property Law &
Practice 609.
22J. Gregory Sidak, ‘The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties’ (2013) 9(4) Journal of
Competition Law & Economics 931; J. Gregory Sidak, ‘The Proper Royalty Base for Patent
Damages’ (2014) 10(4) Journal of Competition Law & Economics 989; J. Gregory Sidak, ‘The
Meaning of FRAND, Part II: Injunctions’ (2015) 11(1) Journal of Competition Law & Economics
201.
23Shift to an effects based approach is discernible in some of the recent orders of the Commission
such as XYZ v REC Power Distribution Company Ltd. (2014) Competition Commission of India,
Case 33/2014; Bharti Airtel Limited v Reliance Industries Limited (2017) Competition
Commission of India, Case 03/2017; Fast Track Call Cab Pvt. Ltd v ANI Technologies Pvt. Ltd.
(2015) Competition Commission of India, Case 6 & 74/201; as compared to the attempts to use
effects based analysis as in the Minority Order of MCX (n 12).
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concerns of predatory pricing and leveraging of a ‘dominant’ stock exchange. The
prism of static analysis saw the Majority Order emphasizing in this case the
importance of protecting competitors rather than competition.24
3 Abuse of Dominance
Proceeding on the basis that SEP owners are dominant, the Order directed the DG
to proceed with investigations within the framework of Section 4 ‘Abuse of
Dominance’. The tempting dimension of the Section is the scope afforded for a ‘per
se’ acceptance of abuse once dominance is established. In a form based approach
the guiding factor in Section 4 of the Act is the word ‘shall’ in the phrase ‘No
enterprise of group shall assume its dominant position’ enabling conditions for a
‘per se’ decision.25 Section 19(4) which lists out conditions of dominance provides
little legal comfort for an alternate understanding of dominance except for general
clause (m) ‘any other factor which the Commission may consider relevant for the
enquiry’.26 The approach is inadequate in cases involving IPRs and patents for
SEPs in the telecommunications sector primarily on account of limited dominance,
at the most is a temporary phenomenon as noted in the previous part. Given the
rapidity of technological change it was also pointed out that there are several SEPs
and SSOs. Any dominance is subject to competitive constraints. An ‘effects based’
approach is required but the temptation of resorting to a ‘form based’ approach is
often too strong.
An ‘effects-based’ approach persuades investigation to define the market
appropriately and in doing so be able to identify competitive constraints. An
innovative Small but Significant Non-transitory Increase in Prices (SNNIP) test that
looks at alternate technologies and alternate features that can be included in a smart
phone can be considered. In defining the market with or without the SNNIP test
several outcomes can be envisaged. Identify the number of SEPs and SSOs
prevalent and popular in the market. Ranking of SEPs in terms of popularity could
be a proxy to assessment of price ranges. Understanding the complex market
indications of which were given in the first part could help to comprehend why
there is no compulsion to use that patent even though it has been classified as
‘essential’? In fact, a more clear understanding of the concept ‘essential’ in SEP
comes to the forefront as argued in the Order as a criteria of dominance.
24ibid.
25The counter to the per se approach is that ‘shall’ is also used in the context of listing abuses is an
argument that to the author is not sustainable.
26According to the author, there is no record of this clause.
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An inappropriate assessment of dominance can have long term damaging effects
especially in the emergent technology and communications sectors. Scholars have
hinted at the conservative approach of the Commission and some have termed it as
‘Reductionist Approach of CCI’ based on analysis of earlier decisions.27 There is
also a tendency to obfuscate the definition of consumer and in identifying a com-
petitor as the consumer.
The proclivity of the Commission is more towards a conservative approach
except that where IPR and SEP cases are concerned (as they pertain to agreements
between an SEP owner and the buyer of the license). Section 3(4) would be the
appropriate section for the scope afforded for assessing anticompetitive effects.
Section 3(4) does not require establishing dominance. By traversing from Section 4
to Section 3(4) dominance is already established and abuses of Section 3(4) which
are considered to cause AAEC are equated with abuses of dominance under
Section 4 without the need for an investigation into possible efficiency outcomes
listed under Section 19(3). This Section which lays down factors that need to be
considered in assessing anticompetitive effects of vertical agreements includes both
positive and negative outcomes that need examination before arriving at a decision.
Section 19(4) only lays down factors that measure dominance. Contracts and
agreements constitute the area of Section 3(4). Obfuscation of sections is distor-
tionary with unintended outcomes affecting the sector, the economy and consumers.
4 Conclusion
This chapter addresses a few issues and highlights some of the critical miscon-
ceptions pertaining to SEPs and FRAND. The author’s analysis points towards an
effects based approach to technology, to patents and to SEPs. The ever growing
evidence briefly summarized above reflects a dynamic market sustained on inno-
vative and disruptive technological developments. Creating uncertainty by
extending antitrust action of dominance where SEPs are involved could negatively
impact the growth of the telecommunications sector and of technological devel-
opment itself.
The author has shown how dominance itself is ephemeral. The prevalence of
competitive constraints and the continuous changing scenarios that SEPs represent
would require a rational approach to capture network economies. Pricing of patents
and royalty payments accordingly need to be valued, based on the value created by
networks. It also means that definition of ‘fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory’
have to be located in the economic principles of pricing and not applied in a
27Yogesh Pai and Nitesh Daryanani, ‘Patents and Competition Law in India: CCI’s Reductionist
Approach in Evaluating Competitive Harm’ (2017) 5(2) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 299.
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commonplace meaning. The aspect of SEP, technological development and inno-
vation is a complex relationship. Several competition authorities are engaged in
understanding the dimensions of competition law and IPRs without extending the
liability.
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Interface Between Antitrust Law
and Intellectual Property in the Payment
Systems Market in India
Yogesh Dubey and Konark Bhandari
1 Introduction
In one fell swoop, on 8 November 2016, the Indian government outlawed certain
notes of high denomination with the result being that approximately 86% of the
currency that was in circulation, lost its status as legal tender.1 The vernacular press
referred to it as ‘notebandi’, meaning ‘banning of notes’. However, irrespective of
the semantics, one thing was for sure that this was a far reaching event that had
irreversibly changed the course of the Indian payments industry. For instance, prior
to demonetization, the usage of cashless payment as an option was popular and had
increased 22% from October 2015 to October 2016. But post-demonetization, the
usage of cashless payment instruments had returned to levels that existed prior to
demonetization. Except for one cashless payment instrument—Unified Payment
Interface (UPI).2
In April 2015, UPI, was launched by the National Payments Corporation of
India (NPCI), the umbrella organization for every retail payment system in India.3 It
Y. Dubey (&)  K. Bhandari
Competition Commission of India (CCI), New Delhi, India
e-mail: yogeshkr.dubey@gmail.com
1‘Currency in Circulation at 90% of level before note ban’ (LiveMint, 20 October 2017) <http://www.
livemint.com/Politics/Zp9V2MR6szRwCwEuPjJIKK/Currency-in-circulation-at-90-of-level-before-note-
ban.html>.
2Dinesh Unnikrishnan, ‘Shift to cashless economy: demonetisation has indeed boosted digital payments
but let’s not over-hype it’ (Firstpost, 17 July 2017) <http://www.firstpost.com/business/shift-to-
cashless-economy-demonetisation-has-indeed-boosted-digital-payments-lets-not-over-hype-it-3822579.
html>.
3National Payments Corporation of India, ‘NPCI presents Unified Payments Interface
(UPI) System’ (11 April 2016) <https://www.npci.org.in/sites/default/files/UPI_Launch_Press_
Release_April_11_2016.pdf>.
© The Author(s) 2018
A. Bharadwaj et al. (eds.),Multi-dimensional Approaches Towards New Technology,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1232-8_13
243
was an immediate payment system using a mobile application that would allow
instantaneous money transfer between various bank accounts.
As stated by NPCI, ‘UPI is a unique payment solution as the recipient is now
empowered to initiate the payment request from a mobile. It facilitates ‘virtual
address’ as a payment identifier for sending and collecting money and works on
single click two factor authentication.’4
Although introduced earlier in April 2016, it was only in August 2016 that the
mobile applications of various participating banks became operational,5 thereby
officially ushering in a new era for digital payments in India. However, it was only
with the advent of demonetization that the UPI started to gain traction and wit-
nessed swift adoption by users. The data collated post demonetization validates this
statement.6 While the user friendly interface definitely helped with the rapid
adoption rate, the UPI was largely successful because it was a unique payment
system, heralded by many as unlike any other before it, anywhere in the world.7
Demonetization only increased the awareness of such unique and alternative pay-
ment systems.
2 Interoperability and the Functioning of UPI
2.1 Working of UPI
Aside the technical verbiage employed by the NPCI when introducing UPI, one
must investigate the working of UPI. While using the UPI app, a customer can
initiate a transaction by sending funds to the intended beneficiary by way of linking
his bank account to his mobile number and by selecting the mobile number of the
beneficiary (and provided that such beneficiary has also downloaded a UPI app). As
a second step, the amount to be transferred has to be entered, followed by entering a
four digit Personal Identification Number (PIN) authenticating the transaction. The
attractive feature of UPI was arguably that a user could avail the UPI app of any
bank, even a bank where the user did not have a bank account, to credit money from
his bank account (at a different bank) to an altogether different bank account. All
these happened in real time. i.e. the unique selling point was that it did not matter if
the bank whose app the user was using hosted his actual account.
4ibid.
5National Payments Corporation of India, ‘NPCI’S Unified Payments Interface (UPI) set to go live’
(25 August 2016) <https://www.npci.org.in/sites/default/files/NPCIsUnifiedPaymentsInterface%
28UPI%29settogoliveAugust252016.pdf>.
6Unnikrishnan (n 2).
7Arundhati Ramanathan, ‘The unlikely story Of BHIM, the upsetter of plans’ The Ken (25 January
2017) <https://the-ken.com/unlikely-story-of-bhim/>.
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2.2 Interoperability
The feature of interoperability has so far remained available only to banks. In other
words, other payment instruments, such as mobile wallets have thus far, not been
able to avail this facility. Interoperability would permit the user of a particular type
of mobile wallet to transfer or receive money from the user of a different brand of
mobile wallet. Recently, a Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) Master Direction has
mandated that mobile wallets must be made interoperable with one another and
subsequently, at a later stage, also made interoperable with banks.8 At the outset, it
means that once interoperability is operational between mobile wallets inter se,
mobile wallet users of one particular company would be able to transfer funds to
and from the mobile wallets of other companies. Afterwards, the second stage of
interoperability will entail that mobile wallet users will also be able to transfer
money to and from different bank accounts.
2.3 Difference Between Mobile Wallets and UPI Apps
When compared to mobile wallets, UPI apps are widely seen as more convenient and
easy to use. This is due to the fact that compared to mobile wallets; they have a
substantially higher transaction limit of ` 1 lakh per day compared to the ` 20,000 per
month that can be transacted through mobile wallets (without Know Your Customer
(KYC) and ` one lakh per month with KYC); are interoperable with one another; do
not require frequent topping up (as they are linked to a bank account); are viewed as
more secure; and do not require any tie-up with any merchants unlike mobile wallets.
Despite this, mobile wallets remain popular among all strata of users (customers
and merchants), even though the adoption rate of such mobile wallets appears to be
tapering.9 The most popular UPI app remains PhonePe, owned by Indian
e-commerce major Flipkart and partnered with Yes Bank (since it is the bank that
has the right of securing a license from RBI and while software developers can
8Suneeth Katarki, Ashi Bhat and Anoop Ashok,‘Master Direction on Issuance and Operation of
Prepaid Payment Instruments’ (Mondaq, 20 November 2017) <http://www.mondaq.com/india/x/
647880/Financial+Services/Master+Directions+On+The+Issuance+And+Operation+Of+Prepaid
+Payment+Instruments+In+India>.
9ibid; Mobile wallets have been arguably more adept at stealing a March over UPI apps due to
their simple interface, ease of use, cashbacks, and being less prone to bugs. However, data released
by the RBI for digital transactions showed that for UPI, the transaction volume saw a month on
month increase of approximately 85% to 30.8 million transactions in September 2017. Further, the
value of transactions rose from ` 4,127 Crores to ` 5,293 Crores in September from the previous
month, an increase of 28%. This in contrast to PPIs such as mobile wallets which saw a high
transaction volume of 87.5 million, yet a comparatively lesser value being transacted at ` 2,759
Crores. Komal Gupta, ‘Digital Transactions Rose 13.5% to ` 124.69 tn in September: RBI’
(LiveMint, 2017).
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develop the app and implement it, the infrastructure has to be provided by the bank)
with 45 million users10: They are trailed by the government promoted BHIM app,
which as per the latest press release by NPCI had 16 million users.11 This is
considerably lesser than the user base of 200 million enjoyed by India’s largest
mobile wallet company, Paytm.12
Therefore, it is apparent that after the introduction of UPI, the UPI apps of banks
have stolen a March over the likes of mobile wallets (in terms of value of trans-
actions) owing to the factors enumerated earlier. There are certain factors that
explain this impressive growth. As mentioned earlier, the biggest attraction for
users when downloading a UPI app was that it was platform neutral and allowed for
interoperability, i.e. it did not matter whether the user had an account at the bank
whose UPI app he was downloading. The same however, has remained elusive for
mobile wallets, until recently, when the RBI issued a Master Direction requiring
compulsory interoperability. However, as we shall see later in the course of this
chapter, even the RBI mandating interoperability among mobile wallets inter se and
between mobile wallets and banks is unlikely to drive further growth for mobile
wallets owing to the simultaneous tweaking of certain regulatory norms for the
mobile wallets regime.
In the following paragraphs, it is analyzed that why mobile wallets were ‘left
out’ when the feature of interoperability was being extended to banks? The reasons
could possibly range from any, to all the following:
(a) Fear of mobile wallets capturing a substantial part of the banks’ business: Initially,
when mobile wallet companies started operations, they focused only on ancillary
and niche business segments such as insurance or loan products. Once mobile
wallets started to make incursions into what was regarded as the domain of banks
(such as the payments business),13 the banks responded with hostility.14 State
Bank of India (SBI), India’s largest bank, blocked its customers from being able to
transfer any money to the mobile wallet run by Paytm.15 While no senior bank
10Arundati Ramanathan, ‘RBI Has Kicked off a Shark Fight for Wallet Users’ The Ken (16
October 2017) <https://the-ken.com/story/rbi-kicked-off-shark-fight-wallet-users/>.
11National Payments Corporation of India, ‘NPCI’s BHIM App crosses 16 million downloads
mark’ (24 July 2017) <https://www.npci.org.in/sites/default/files/NPCI-BHIM-App-crosses-16-
million-downloads-mark.pdf>.
12Mugdha Variyar, ‘Paytm wallet reaches 200 million users’ The Economic Times (28 February
2017) <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-biz/startups/paytm-wallet-reaches-200-
million-users/articleshow/57371236.cms>.
13Arundati Ramanathan, ‘Barbarians at the Gate’ The Ken (1 March 2017) <https://the-ken.com/
barbarians-at-the-gate/>.
14Goutam Das ‘Shrinking Wallets’ Business Today (New Delhi, 4 June 2017). It is however,
debatable whether the banks were all that interested in their payments business since it’s a low
margin business as per most industry experts and the source of revenue thus far for banks was
mostly card companies that would provide the banks a pre-determined Merchant Discount Rate
every time a merchant used a bank’s credit or debit card for accepting payment.
15ibid.
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official may go on the record and admit that mobile wallets were cannibalizing
their payments business, it is not wholly inconceivable that by also making mobile
wallets fully interoperable, the banks might have had to face the attendant risk of
such mobile wallet companies further nibbling away at their payments business–a
business which received a fillip with the advent of the UPI. Indeed, ICICI Bank
did block its customers from availing the PhonePe UPI app operated by Flipkart
by alleging a transgression of interoperability rules. Another potential reason
could be that by extending interoperability to mobile wallets, the banks may suffer
on account of lesser realization of service fees that they currently charge the
mobile wallet company every time a user debits money from his bank account and
into his mobile wallet. With interoperability, the mobile wallet user may also
top-up his mobile wallet balance by transferring the amount from another mobile
wallet and forego using a bank account linked to his mobile wallet.
(b) The regulatory architecture of NPCI: The NPCI is the body that has been
responsible for introduction and implementation of UPI. It is interesting to note
that the role of NPCI is nebulously defined. It is currently involved with an
assortment of activities ranging from: operating a payment systems such as
IMPS and UPI; being a quasi-regulator; and being an app owner in the form of
BHIM. With such a variety of roles, there appears to be a conflict of interest
here. At its core, the NPCI is comprised of 56 member banks, most of which
have come out with their own UPI app, while at the same time, it is entrusted
with defining the contours of how the UPI payment system will operate for
others. This, as seen above, has been to the detriment of mobile wallet com-
panies. This has been recognized by the Ratan Watal Committee Report on
Digital Payments constituted by the Ministry of Finance, Department of
Economic Affairs.16 It has been suggested that ‘only bank led PSPs (payment
service providers) have direct access to payment systems’.17
(c) RBI’s reluctance to relax regulations on mobile wallets: In addition to NPCI
(which implements the UPI), the RBI has regulatory oversight of how prepaid
payment instruments are governed.18 So far, the RBI too, was hesitant to allow
mobile wallets to be fully interoperable because only banks were allowed to
accept deposits. Since deposits are public money, the banks were tightly reg-
ulated. Mobile wallets did not enjoy regulatory scrutiny to the same extent and
therefore there was a risk with interoperability. It was feared that if something
goes wrong, the mobile wallet companies will not be able to recoup the losses.
16Press Information Bureau, ‘Committee on Digital Payments Headed by Shri. Ratan P Watal,
Principal Advisor, NITI Aayog and former Finance Secretary submits its final report to the Union
Finance Minister Shri Arun Jaitley today’ (9 December 2016).
17Committee on Digital Payments, ‘Medium term recommendations to strengthen digital payments
ecosystem’ (2016).
18Katarki (n 8); All entities that have been issuing PPIs have been operating within the regulatory
framework of RBl’s ‘Policy Guidelines for Issuance and Operation of Pre-paid Payment
Instruments in India’, issued on 27 April 2009, and most recently amended vide a master circular
dated 1 July 2016.
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According to industry insiders, the RBI was taking a risk at the outset by letting
mobile wallet companies to take deposits.19 With the issuance of the latest
Master Directions on 11 October 2017, however, the RBI has apparently
overcome any doubts about the risk involved.
(d) Exploiting the data available: Cash still remains king and is the predominant
payment mode for transacting business.20 Further, there remains little clarity on
how and where the cash is spent. However, whenever a user avails his
bank-issued credit/debit card or net-banking, such spending pattern can be
configured by the bank. With the arrival of mobile wallet companies, this
became a challenge for the banks since now the users began debiting money to
their mobile wallets and started spending through these wallets. The banks lost
track of the spending trail and the mobile wallets became the sole repositories
of such data. With their constant revision of algorithms and updating of soft-
ware, mobile wallet companies are also better placed to project the trajectory of
how the wallet users will use their money in future. By preventing interoper-
ability, the NPCI sought to prevent losing further data and make all UPI app
developers (who must partner with a bank as per RBI instructions) share data
which the UPI app developer possesses.21
However, the RBI has mandated that the feature of interoperability be introduced
for mobile wallets as well, albeit in a phased manner. Despite this direction by the
RBI, the promise of interoperability may not fructify in the manner as is envisioned
by mobile wallet companies. This will be explained in the following part.
3 Reserve Bank of India—Reservations on Mobile Wallets
3.1 RBI Master Direction dated 11 October 2017
While the Master Direction is wide ranging and covers lot of matters, the following
issues are significant from the perspective of this chapter:
(i) Interoperability to be permitted: The Master Direction requires that inter-
operability be introduced, albeit in a phased manner. First, with KYC-
19Ramanathan (n 10).
20Vindu Raj and Suhasini Raj, ‘India Clings to Cash, Even as Tech Firms Push Digital Money’
The New York Times (7 January 2018) <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/07/technology/india-
digital-money.html>.
21Although it should be noted that with the issuance of the most recent RBI circular dated 11
October 2017, PPI issuers such as mobile wallets would have to share any data with the RBI and
‘any other agency/agencies as may be advised by RBI’. This has apparently been done to counter
money laundering.
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compliant mobile wallets will be interoperable amongst themselves and
subsequently, interoperability will be enabled between wallets and banks
through UPI.
(ii) KYC norms to be strengthened: As a result of the new KYC norms, every
mobile wallet user’s supporting documents will be verified by an agency
commissioned by the mobile wallet company. This has been viewed by many
as sounding the death knell for mobile wallets, which already operate on
wafer thin margins.22 The fear is that the customer acquisition cost will be
too exorbitant.23 Essentially, it appears that whatever advantage the mobile
wallets would have secured with interoperability has been squandered with
the implementation of the stringent KYC rule. This would, in effect, amount
to a re-acquisition of existing customers, many of whom might not want to
go through the requirement of KYC.
(iii) Successive transactions are required to be authenticated with customer
consent: Under the Master Direction, ‘issuers shall introduce a system where
every successive payment transactions in wallet is authenticated by explicit
customer consent.’24 This would apparently bring the mobile wallet at par
with UPI apps which also requires a PIN for authentication of the transaction.
(iv) Capital requirements of Pre-Paid Instruments (PPI) issuers such as mobile
wallets raised substantially: Under the revised Master Direction, non-bank
entities must have a positive net worth of ` five Crores. Under the earlier RBI
policy guidelines on PPIs, the minimum positive net worth was stipulated at
` one Crore. No reason has been attributed for this 400% increase in the
minimum positive net worth requirement. Although it may be possible that
by ensuring a higher net worth requirement, only serious players with a
long-term vision for the sector will participate.
As mentioned above, certain changes in the RBI Master Direction render
interoperability ineffective, since the mobile wallets may view the costs of con-
ducting a KYC exercise as needlessly burdensome. Accordingly, the Master
Direction may be viewed by mobile wallet companies as unfair and inequitable.25
22Goutam Das, ‘The Money Revolution’ Pressreader (4 June 2017). While merchants must pay a
commission of approximately 1.8% to the mobile wallet company when there is a transaction, the
mobile wallet company has to pay 1.5% service fee to the bank when money is debited from a
bank account to a mobile wallet. Since users are not charged for anything, the business model of
mobile wallet companies operates on a very low margin.
23Das (n 14).
24Master Direction, Clause 15.3 (c).
25However, even if the RBI has the power to prescribe guidelines on any issue falling within the
purview of its mandate under the PSS Act, it should still ensure that the guidelines/circulars framed
thereunder are not arbitrary and unreasonable. For instance, a perusal of the Master Direction
makes it clear that the RBI has sought to regulate PPIs such as mobile wallets at par with banks—
whether it is KYC norms/onerous capital requirements/authentication protocol. In doing so, the
RBI is prescribing similar norms for both banks and mobile wallets despite the various differences
that exist between the two and which have been alluded to above. Since the banks and PPIs do not
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4 European Commission and the Competition
Commission of India—Drawing Parallels
European Commission (EC) and European Parliament guidelines/briefing on
interoperability. A 2012 Green Paper of the EC has recognized the need for
interoperability among, inter alia, application developers and banks.26 A European
Parliament Briefing on the consumer protection aspects of mobile payments reit-
erated the same in the following manner:
As technology advances rapidly and options for mobile payment increase, lack of inter-
operability (including cross-border) between service providers is an issue. Better interop-
erability would provide consumers with more flexible payment options (better switching
between different services and providers), leading to an increase in the number, speed and
volume of mobile transactions. Better financial inclusion could be another benefit of more
accessible and flexible services for consumers (also for the most vulnerable ones).
Payments normally flow through the banking system, but mobile payments currently offer
low regulatory entry barriers for new players, which could influence the payments markets,
traditionally dominated by banks.
However, one needs to ask whether Competition Commission of India
(CCI) should replicate the approach of EC. In this regard, it should be noted that a
comparative assessment of the legislative scheme of Section 4 of the Competition
Act 2002 and Article 102 of the Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU) displays many similarities:
(a) Definition of ‘dominant position’—Explanation (a) to Section 4 of the Act
defines ‘dominant position’ as follows:
‘Dominant position’ means a position of strength, enjoyed by an enterprise, in
the relevant market, in India, which enables it to –
(i) operate independently of the competitive forces prevailing in the relevant
market; or
(ii) affect its competitors or the relevant market in its favor.
form a homogenous class, their similar treatment despite being dissimilar in their characteristics,
amounts to unreasonable classification and may be treated as being ultra vires of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. Indeed, a former RBI deputy governor had remarked that ‘if you don’t insist
on the same type of terms for banks and wallets, then there is clear arbitrage, and it is tantamount
to picking a winner’, further adding that ‘if RBI doesn’t lay terms of security and KYC, then
wallets will be at a clear advantage.’ This statement is reflective of bias that exists in favour of
banks and may have led to the bracketing of banks and mobile wallets in a similar category—a
categorization that may be unreasonable.
26‘The mobile payment market in Europe is still in its infancy. One of the main barriers to
widespread take-up of m-payments seems to be a stalemate between Mobile Network Operators
(MNOs), traditional PSPs (banks) and other players, such as manufacturers or application
developers’, Commission, Towards an Integrated European Market for Card, Internet and Mobile
Payments COM (2011) 0941 final.
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This definition of ‘dominant position’ is derived from the European Court of
Justice (ECJ)27 decisions that have expounded on the concept of ‘dominant posi-
tion’. This is also mentioned (but not defined) in Article 102 of the TFEU.28
Elaborating upon the concept of ‘dominant position’, the ECJ judgements in the
United Brands case29 and the Hoffman-LaRoche case30 say that dominant position
is:
position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent
effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by giving it the power to
behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers and ulti-
mately of the consumers.31
(b) Special responsibility on dominant enterprises—Section 4 of the Act is dif-
ferent from Section 3 in the sense that the proscribed conduct under Section 4
(2) is applicable only to dominant enterprises whereas the appreciable adverse
effect on competition prohibited under Section 3 can be caused by any enter-
prise or enterprises.
This dichotomy between the two sections only serves to highlight the ‘special
responsibility’ imposed upon a dominant enterprise to not to distort competition.
Although, this special responsibility has not explicitly been mentioned in the Act, it
can be inferred from the language of the Act as shown in the preceding paragraph.
Indeed, the CCI recognized this ‘special responsibility’ while deciding the land-
mark DLF case32 in paragraph 12.20 of its Order.33 DLF argued34 that the
27Presently called as Court of Justice of the European Union or CJEU.
28TFEU, art 102:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market or in
a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far as it
may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading
conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby
placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supple-
mentary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection
with the subject of such contracts.
29Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission of The European Communities (1978) ECLI:EU:
C:1978:22.
30Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission (1979) ECLI:EU:C:1979:36.
31United Brands (n 29), para 65; ibid, para 38; OECD, ‘Country Studies: European
Commission-Peer Review Of Competition Law And Policy’ (2005).
32Belaire v DLF (2011) Competition Commission of India, Case No 19 of 2010.
33ibid.
34ibid, para 8.5.
13 Interface Between Antitrust Law and Intellectual Property … 251
conditions in the apartment buyer’s agreement could not have been imposed due to
abuse of dominant position since these were standard clauses in the majority of
apartment buyer’s agreement executed by any real estate developer and therefore,
have been incorporated to meet the competition—something that is a defense as per
the Explanation under Section 4(2)(a) of the Act. The CCI rejected this argument
by saying that the responsibility of the dominant player is more onerous and similar
practices by other developers would not fall within the ambit of Section 4.
In recognizing the concept of special responsibility, the CCI has taken a leaf out
of the book of the ECJ in the Michelin case.35 The ECJ held that:
a finding that an undertaking has a dominant position is not in itself a recrimination but
simply means that, irrespective of the reasons for which it has such a dominant position, the
undertaking concerned has a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair
genuine undistorted competition on the common market.36
The CCI’s decision was confirmed by the Competition Appellate Tribunal
(COMPAT) in its order as well where it reasoned that DLF, being ‘a dominant
player in the market, has a special duty to be within the four corners of the law’.37
The CCI had also reiterated its position on the special responsibility of the
dominant enterprise in the Car Manufacturers Spare Parts case.38 It opined that the
pro-competitive factors listed under Section 19(d)–Section 19(f) must be given less
weightage than the anticompetitive factors under Section 19(a)–Section 19(c) when
evaluating a vertical agreement by a dominant enterprise that forecloses the market.
In doing so, it explicitly cited the Michelin case for the first time.39
Collective/Joint Dominance - Article 102 of the TFEU is not restricted to single firm
conduct.40 The ECJ too recognizes the theory of collective/joint dominance under which
several firms can share and abuse a dominant position.41
India too is seeking to introduce this concept by amending its competition legislation. The
Competition (Amendment) Bill 2012 discusses the possibility of inserting language that
would enshrine the concept of collective/joint dominance. It will do so by inserting ‘jointly,
or singly’ after the word ‘group’ under Section 4(2). If it decides to do so, it will be
following the lead of the EC.42
35Case 322/81 NV Nederlandsche v Commission of the European Communities (1983) ECLI:EU:
C:1983:313.
36ibid, para 57.
37DLF v CCI (2014) COMPAT, W.P. (C) 6361/2014 and 6362/2014.
38Shamsher Kataria v Honda, Volkswagen, Fiat and Others (2011) Competition Commission of
India, Case No. 03/2011.
39ibid, para 20.6.35.
40Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position.
41Case C-393/92 Municipality of Almelo and Others v EnergiebedrijfIJsselmij NV (1994) ECLI:
EU:C:1994:171; Joined Cases T—68/89, T—77/89 and T—78/89 Italian Flat Glass Case (1992)
Judgement of the court (First Chamber) ECLI:EU:T:1992:38.
42‘Collective dominance is a complex concept and is not widely used. In the European Union, it
did not find place in the original legislation (The Treaty for the European Union or TFEU) but
grew during the 1990 s through certain decisions of the courts. It has taken the courts several cases
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The Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) has however, voiced its concern over
inserting under Section 4 since, Section 4 does not require the showing of an
‘agreement’ and therefore, the CCI would have unbridled discretion in determining
what constitutes collective dominance. Not requiring the showing of an agreement
might again put India in the same category as the EC since the judgement of the
court (of the Fifth Chamber) had dispensed with the need to show an agreement in
case of collective dominance.43 The court had held as follows:
The existence of a collective dominant position may therefore flow from the nature and
terms of an agreement, from the way in which it is implemented and, consequently, from
the links or factors which give rise to a connection between undertakings which result from
it. Nevertheless, the existence of an agreement or of other links in law is not indispensable
to a finding of a collective dominant position; such a finding may be based on other
connecting factors and would depend on an economic assessment and, in particular, on an
assessment of the structure of the market in question.44
Not required to show anticompetitive effect—Section 4 of the Act does not
require a showing of an actual appreciable adverse effect on competition. Therefore,
no competitive impact is required to be shown in case of abuse of dominance by an
enterprise. This is similar to the position in the EC as well. To reach a finding of
infringement, it is not necessary to show that the alleged abusive conduct produced
an actual anticompetitive effect. It is enough to show that the conduct is likely to
have or capable of having that effect.45
Predatory Pricing—The concept of predatory pricing has been mentioned in
Section 4 of the Act. It is interesting to note that the language used in the act
signifies that ‘intent’ has to be shown when alleging predatory pricing conduct by
an enterprise. This is because the language used says it must be conducted ‘with a
view to reduce competition or eliminate the competitors’.46 In such a case, it would
not be dissimilar to the position espoused in some EC cases. In France Telecom SA
v Commission of the European Communities,47 the court reiterated its earlier stand
in AKZO v Commission48 and Tetra Pak v Commission49 when it said that prices
to progressively develop and clarify the concept, yet it is not frequently resorted to even in the
EU’, Vinod Dhall, ‘Written submission to the Standing Committee on Finance’, 15th Lok Sabha,
Ministry of Corporate Affairs, The Competition (Amendment) Bill 2012, 83rd Report, para 35.
43Joined Cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P Compagnie v Dafra-Lines (2000) Judgement of the
court (Fifth Chamber) ECLI:EU:C:2000:132.
44ibid, para 45.
45United Brands (n 29).
46Explanation (c) to s 4.
47Case C-202/07 P France Télécom SA v Commission of the European Communities (2009)
Judgement of the court (First Chamber) ECLI:EU:C:2009:214.
48Case C-62/86 AK AKZO Chemie v Commission of the European Communities (1991) Judgement
of the court (Fifth Chamber) ECLI:EU:C:1991:286.
49Case C-333/94 P Tetra Pak International SA v Commission of the European
Communities (1996) Judgement of the court (Fifth Chamber) ECLI: EU:C:1996:436.
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below average variable cost (AVC) are always considered abusive, but prices above
AVC and below average total cost would require the showing of an intent to
eliminate.50
Excessive Pricing—While the US has not come up with a definite standard for
assessing excessive pricing cases,51 the TFEU does provide against the imposition
of excessive prices. While ‘excessive price’ may not find a mention in Article 102
of the TFEU, it is generally understood to be covered by the prohibition under
Article 102 (a) on charging ‘unfair prices’.52 This observation has been upheld by
various judgements of the European Courts and EC as well.53
India too has tendered the notion that ‘excessive price’ is a subset of ‘unfair
price’ in its written submissions to OECD Policy Roundtables on Excessive
Pricing.54 Evidently, this is similar to the position taken in Europe. Again, like the
EC law, the Indian Competition Act does not define ‘unfair price’. Therefore, it is
left to the CCI to interpret what constitutes unfair price. Perusing through the few
cases that the CCI has adjudged on excessive pricing issues, it is heartening to note
that the CCI has not decided to become a price regulator and intervene indis-
criminately. The DIAL/MIAL case55 dealt with the allegation that DIAL/MIAL were
charging excessive vehicle parking rates and the informant prayed that the rates be
brought down by the CCI to the rates at the Kolkata/Chennai airports or the rates
charged before privatization. The CCI refused to intervene, by holding that (a) there
was competition at the time of bidding by consortia, (b) aeronautical services and
non-aeronautical services cannot be looked into separately and (c) space should be
ceded to the market forces of demand and supply in case of parking space, which is
scarce at airports to begin with. Similarly, in the case of Manjit Singh Sachdeva v
DGCA,56 the CCI (in response to a request by the informant to direct the Director
General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) to fix a maximum retail price for airline tickets)
said that the free market forces of demand and supply should govern the price.
50ibid, para 33.
51The FTC notes in its report that when the question was presented in court, judges have resorted
to a case by case analysis and those decisions ‘have not been particularly consistent’. It further
states that given ‘the uncertainty about what constitutes an unconscionable, excessive or exorbitant
price, and the paucity of decisions on the issue, statutes based on any of these terms are likely to be
difficult to enforce.’
Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, ‘Working Party
No. 2 on Competition and Regulation Excessive Prices- Background Paper’ DAF/COMP/WP2
(2011)7/REV1 (9 January 2012) <http://www.oecd.org/regreform/sectors/49482277.pdf>.
52ibid.
53United Brands (n 29).
54Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs (n 51).
55Citizen Grievances v Mumbai International Airport (2013) Competition Commission of India,
Case No 51 of 2013.
56Mr Manjit Singh Sachdeva v Directorate General of Civil Aviation (2012) Competition
Commission of India, Case No 68/2012.
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This is similar to the outlook of the EC where cautious enforcement of antitrust
laws is practiced, since it is seen as ‘preferable to give market forces the time to
play out and entry and expansion to take place, thereby bringing prices back to
more normal levels’.57 Therefore, from the above, it appears that the legislative
scheme of the Act is significantly influenced by the jurisprudence of the EC on
antitrust law. All this is significant as we proceed to examine whether the antitrust
law doctrine of Essential Facilities originating in the EC can find resonance in the
payments market in India.
5 The Essential Facilities Doctrine
Before commencing with a discussion on the Essential Facilities Doctrine (EFD), it
is important to consider a few hypothetical situations. Considering how significant
interoperability is to the future of mobile wallets—what if the RBI Master Direction
was to be implemented in its current form? As mentioned earlier, the addition of
regulations pertaining to KYC norms, capital requirements and authentication
would probably be a disincentive for mobile wallets and certainly takes away
whatever benefit the mobile wallets would have derived from interoperability.
However, what if, theoretically speaking, these other regulations were struck down
by a court or withdrawn by the RBI? Would interoperability still be extended to
mobile wallets? If it was extended, what if the banks still refused to provide the
Application Programming Interface (API) required for interoperability? In such a
scenario, and most significantly, could the EFD be invoked by mobile wallets to
secure access to such API?
Assuming that banks refuse the API, how would the EFD be invoked by the
mobile wallets? Before answering these questions, it is necessary to understand the
origins of the EFD and the decisional practice concerning the doctrine followed by
the EC.
Practice of the EC in EFD cases are:
(a) Commercial Solvents case58: Commercial Solvents Corporation (CSC) was the
parent company of Istituto, a company incorporated under Italian law. Istituto
was the reseller of aminobutanol, which was an intermediary product for the
manufacture of ethambutol and ethambutol-based specialties, used as an
anti-tuberculosis drug. Zoja Istituto’s customer also used the aminobutanol for
the manufacture of ethambutol-based specialties. In 1970, CSC stopped sup-
plying aminobutanol to the European Union. At the end of 1970, when Zoja
57Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, ‘Policy Roundtables:
Excessive Prices’ DAF/COMP(2011)18 (7 February 2012) <http://www.oecd.org/competition/
abuse/49604207.pdf>.
58C 6-7/73 Commercial Solvents v Commission (1974) Court of Justice of European Union ECLI:
EU:C:1974:18.
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placed a new order for aminobutanol, CSC responded that there is no avail-
ability of the same. It also happened to be the case that CSC was the only
possible source of aminobutanol in the world market. Zoja moved the EC for
institution of proceedings against CSC. The EC decided to require CSC to
supply, inter alia, 30,000 kg of aminobutanol to Zoja. CSC challenged this
aforementioned EC order before the ECJ. The EC’s stance was that ‘discon-
tinuance of the supply of aminobutanol had the effect that Zoja was forced to
discontinue its manufacturing process and to become a mere packer and dis-
tributor of ethambutol.’59 The ECJ observed that the fact Zoja had survived so
far does not alter the fact that Zoja had disappeared from the market as a
manufacturer of ethambutol.
One of the justifications advanced by CSC in cutting back the sale of
aminobutanol and other raw materials required to make ethambutol was that it had
been CSC’s longstanding policy to come into closer connection with the end user
and therefore decided to have more raw materials available for itself to make sales
of the final derivative product.60
However, the ECJ found the same conduct to be abusive.61 It remarked as
follows:
It follows that an undertaking which has a dominant position in the market in raw materials
and which, with the object of reserving such raw material for manufacturing its own
derivatives, refuses to supply a customer, which is itself a manufacturer of these derivatives,
and therefore risks eliminating all competition on the part of this customer, is abusing its
dominant position.62
(b) Magill case63: RTE and ITP, two broadcasters, had a stringent policy regarding
dissemination of programme listings wherein only daily listings were to be
provided to daily and periodical newspapers. When Magill attempted to publish
59ibid.
60Commercial Solvents (n 58).
61It should be noted however, by forcing CSC to supply aminobutanol to Zoja in complete
disregard of its longstanding policy to establish a direct connection with the end user would raise
the following issue:
Duty to shareholders v Duty to competitors: The directors of a company which controls or
maintains hold over a key raw material, may find themselves in a quandary when deciding whether
to supply such raw materials to others. One argument could be that the EFD would mandate they
should supply it. However, Section 166 of the Companies Act 2013 which prescribes the duties of
directors mentions, inter alia, that a director of a company shall act in good faith in order to
promote the objects of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in the best
interests of the company, its employees, the shareholders, the community and for the protection of
environment. Which duty would prevail? The duty to supply to others in the market? Or the duty
to look out for the best interests of shareholders and act in the best interests of the company?
62Commercial Solvents (n 58).
63C-241/91 and C-242/91 Radio TelefisEireann v Commission (1995) Court of Justice of European
Union ECLI:EU:C:1995:98.
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a weekly TV guide, it was prevented from doing so by both RTE and
ITP. Magill approached the Commission to seek a ruling that both RTE and ITP
were abusing their dominant position by refusing to grant licenses for publi-
cation of their weekly TV listings. The EC found a breach and ordered the
defendants to supply to third parties on request, on a non-discriminatory basis
with their individual advance weekly programme listings for the purpose of
publication. The Court of First Instance (CFI) affirmed the decision of the EC.
The CFI held that the third parties like Magill were in a position of ‘economic
dependence’ on parties like RTE and ITP. The CFI also held that while
copyright entitled the copyright holder to reserve the exclusive right to repro-
duce the protected work, it was apparent that the right was being exercised in
such ways so as to pursue an aim manifestly contrary to objectives of Article 86
of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty).64
CFI noted that by reserving the exclusive right to reproduce their weekly
listings, RTE and ITP were ‘preventing the emergence on the market of a new
product, namely a general television magazine likely to compete with their own
magazines’.65 This, as per the CFI, ‘went beyond what was necessary to fulfill
the essential function of the copyright’.66
Before the ECJ, ITP submitted that:
copyright owners ordinarily and naturally exercise their copyright in order to restrict
competition with their own product by other products made using their copyright material,
even on a derived market. That, it continues, is the essence of copyright. RTE further added
that the owner of an intellectual property right is under no obligation to offer justification
for his refusal to grant a license.67
The ECJ found the conduct abusive, owing to the following reasons:
(i) Preventing appearance of new product: Both RTE and ITP’s refusal to
provide basic information prevented the appearance of a new product for
which there was potential consumer demand.
64EEC Treaty, art 86:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or
in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market insofar as it
may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading
conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby
placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supple-
mentary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection
with the subject of such contracts.
65Radio TelefisEireann (n 63), para 29.
66ibid, para 30.
67ibid, para 39.
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(ii) No justification: There was no justification for such refusal either in the
activity of television broadcasting or in that of publishing television
magazines.
(iii) Excluded all competition: The parties, by their conduct reserved to them-
selves the secondary market of weekly television guides by excluding all
competition on that market.
(iv) Indispensability: The parties denied basic information which is the raw
material indispensable for the compilation of such a guide.
It should be noted that the ECJ did not, at any stage, anywhere in its judgement
expound the EFD or list its constituent elements.
(c) Bronner case68: In this case, a regional court in Vienna, referred to the ECJ for
a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty. The
facts involved Oscar Bronner, a company editing, publishing, manufacturing
and distributing the daily newspaper Der Standard. Mediaprint published more
prominent newspapers and has established a nationwide home-delivery scheme
for the distribution of its newspapers. Oscar Bronner sought an order mandating
Mediaprint to include its Der Standard newspaper in its home delivery scheme
because its own mode of distribution (which involved postal delivery) did not
take place until late morning whereas Mediaprint’s home delivery scheme
delivered in the early hours of the morning. Oscar Bronner referred to the EFD,
as established in the Magill case and made it clear that by owning the only
‘economically viable’ home-delivery scheme in Austria, Mediaprint is obliged
to allow access to the scheme by competing products.69
Mediaprint objected first by submitting that ‘undertakings in a dominant
position are also entitled to the freedom to arrange their own affairs, in that they
are normally entitled to decide freely to whom they wish to offer their services
and, in particular, to whom they wish to allow access to their own facilities.’70
Mediaprint also submitted that ‘all competition’ was not eliminated as Bronner
had other distribution systems which could enable it to sell its papers in
Austria.71
The ECJ proceeded by observing that it would be necessary:
for the Magill judgement to be effectively relied upon in order to plead the existence of an
abuse…,not only that the refusal of service comprised in home-delivery be likely to
eliminate all competition in the daily newspaper market on the part of the person requesting
the service and that such refusal be incapable of being objectively justified, but also that the
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service in itself is indispensable to carrying on that person’s business, inasmuch as there is
not actual or potential substitute in existence for that home-delivery scheme.72
The ECJ went on to observe that there were other methods of distributing
newspapers even though they may be less advantageous and that it is not enough to
argue that such other systems are not economically viable by reason of small
circulation. Accordingly, the ECJ found the conduct of Mediaprint to not constitute
an abuse of its dominant position.73
(d) IMS Health case74: Both IMS and NDC were entities that were engaged in
tracking the sales of pharmaceutical and healthcare products. IMS provided
data on regional sales of pharmaceutical products in Germany to pharmaceu-
tical laboratories by using a brick structure.75 The IMS brick structure com-
prised of 1,860 bricks or a derived structure consisting of 2,847 bricks. NDC
acquired a company PII that had also decided to use brick structures of 1,860 or
3,000 bricks, ‘very similar to those used by IMS’.76 An interlocutory order was
granted prohibiting PII from using the aforesaid brick structure. NDC com-
plained to the EC and eventually, the EC adopted an interim measure ordering
IMS to grant a license to all undertakings present on the market for provision of
German regional sales data. The EC held that the IMS brick structure had
become the industry standard and refusal of access without any objective jus-
tification would eliminate all competition. Eventually the EC order was with-
drawn since there was no urgency anymore in imposing interim measures.
Therefore, the court before whom the main proceedings (from where the issue
originated) were ongoing had requested the ECJ’s preliminary ruling regarding
interpretation of a key question, namely, whether the refusal to grant a license
to use a brick structure constitutes an abuse of dominant position.
IMS argued, inter alia, that the refusal to grant a license must prevent the
emergence of a new product (along with other factors which need to be proved).
Since NDC intends to use the same brick structure as IMS, it cannot be said to
introduce a new product on the market and was instead, supplying the same product
in the same market.77 NDC however claimed that it is not essential for there to be
two distinct markets.78 However, the ECJ observed that as per the Bronner
judgement, it was held that it was relevant to distinguish an upstream market
72ibid, para 41.
73ibid, para 45.
74Case C-418/01 IMS Health v NDC Health (2004) Court of Justice of the European Union ECLI:
EU:C:2004:257.
75A brick structure is a data collection system which segregates geographical regions into ‘bricks’
comprising of few pharmacies each. The structure is used to track and subsequently, used by
pharmaceutical companies to analyse their sales strategies.
76IMS Health (n 74).
77ibid, para 32.
78ibid, para 33.
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constituted by the product in question and a downstream market, on which the
product in question would be used to create a derivate product. Therefore, the ECJ
held that the refusal to grant a license may be abusive only where the entity
requesting the license does not reduce itself to merely duplicating the product in
question, ‘but intends to produce new goods, not offered by the owner of the right
and for which there is potential consumer demand’.79
(e) Microsoft case80: The EC found Microsoft guilty of abusing its dominant
position with respect to two types of conduct. The first abusive conduct related
to Microsoft’s refusal to supply its competitors with ‘interoperability infor-
mation’ which could be used for the purpose of developing and distributing
products competing with Microsoft’s own products on the work group server
operating systems market. The second abusive conduct pertained to Microsoft
making its operating system available contingent on the simultaneous acqui-
sition of the Windows Media Player software.
For this chapter, authors have focussed only on the first abuse, namely,
Microsoft’s refusal to supply interoperability information to its rivals for devel-
oping new products. This is being done since the second abuse concerns a practice
commonly known as ‘bundling’ (where products are not available on a standalone
basis and are instead sold only in a bundle with each other). The present imbroglio
with mobile wallets and interoperability does not involve the issue of bundling.
Microsoft started by invoking an assortment of intellectual property
rights (IPRs) for protecting its interoperability information protocol such as those
granted under patent law, copyright law and trade secrets law. The CFI remarked
that the central issue in this case would be whether the conditions under which a
dominant entity may be required to grant a license to its intellectual property (IP)
are satisfied in the instant case. Below is a brief summary of the court’s findings on
the four ingredients of the EFD:
(i) Indispensability: Microsoft submitted that a particular technology could not be
indispensable if it was ‘economically viable’ for the competitors to develop and
market their products without access to that technology. Further, Microsoft
claimed that the EC failed to show a causal link between the non-availability
interoperability protocol and the claimed inability of the competitors to com-
pete.81 The EC replied by stating that the Microsoft’s view on indispensability
would tantamount to an ‘inefficient interoperability solution’ that would allow
competitors to achieve only de minimis market penetration whereas what is
needed was an ‘economically viable source’.82
79ibid, para 49.
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The CFI rejected Microsoft’s submissions and was able to establish a causal
link between the denial of the interoperability protocol and the receding market
share of its competitors. However, the CFI also held that indispensability also
required that the degree of interoperability should be such that ‘non-Microsoft
work group server operating systems must be capable of interoperating with the
Windows domain architecture on an equal footing with Windows work group
server operating systems if they were to be marketed viably on the market.’83
(ii) Elimination of competition: Microsoft submitted that the EC referred to a
‘mere risk of elimination of competition in the market’, when the refusal in
question should instead be likely to eliminate all competition. Therefore, the
standard adopted, as per Microsoft, should be ‘something close to certainty.’84
The CFI however, held as follows:
Nor is it necessary to demonstrate that all competition on the market would be
eliminated. What matters, for the purpose of establishing an infringement of
Article 82 EC, is that the refusal at issue is liable to, or is likely to, eliminate
all effective competition on the market. It must be made clear that the fact that
the competitors of the dominant undertaking retain a marginal presence in
certain niches on the market cannot suffice to substantiate the existence of such
competition.85 (emphasis added)
Therefore, what was required to be demonstrated was not the elimination of ‘all
competition’ but only ‘all effective competition’.
(iii) New product: Microsoft submitted that the EC order failed to point out any
new product that would be developed as a result of providing the interop-
erability protocol. All that would be accomplished is the creation by the
competitors of an enhanced version of Microsoft’s own product. And that, it
was claimed by Microsoft, amounts to merely an addition of a feature that
cannot be viewed as the creation of a ‘new product’.86
The CFI held that the appearance of a new product cannot be the only
parameter to judge whether the refusal in question is abusive. Such abusive
conduct may also be established by limiting technical development as well.87
The CFI contemplated that the competitors would have no reason to imitate
Microsoft’s product since in order to ‘maintain a profitable presence in the
market’, the competitors would have choice other than ‘to differentiate their
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(iv) Objective Justification: Microsoft again invoked its IPRs as a justification for
refusing to supply the protocol in question. In addition, Microsoft claimed
that providing a license to the competitors would also have a negative impact
on the incentives to innovate. The EC however, countered by saying that the
‘positive impact on the level of innovation in the whole industry outweighed
the negative impact of the dominant undertaking’s incentives to innovate.’
The CFI concurred with the EC and held that it was normal practice in the
industry for operators to disclose to third parties information that enables
interoperability and such disclosure cannot have any negative impact on the
incentives to innovate.89 Accordingly, the CFI ruled that Microsoft had not
shown any objective justification while refusing to disclose its interoper-
ability protocol.
5.1 Essential Facilities Doctrine in India
CCI’s prior jurisprudence on the issue of EFD is scant.90 The NSE case had
involved the issue of an essential facility.91 Eventually the CCI did not rule on
whether the Application Program Interface Code (APIC) was an essential facility.92
Further, when the matter went on appeal to the erstwhile COMPAT, the COMPAT
did not rule on the issue as the parties had reached a settlement on the APIC issue.93
89ibid, para 702.
90MCX Stock Exchange v National Stock Exchange (2009) Competition Commission of India,
Case No 13/2009; one of the issues that was raised by MCX-SE was the denial of a market watch
facility that was offered by NSE.
91The CCI noted that ‘NSE had acquired a 26% stake in Omnesys which was a technology vendor
providing software for financial and securities market. The stake was taken through DotEx a 100%
subsidiary of NSE. DotEx/Omnesys created a new product known as ‘NOW’ which was intended
to substitute software called ‘ODIN” developed by FTIL (the promoters of MCX-SE). NSE
simultaneously refused to share its Currency Derivatives segment Application Programme
Interface Code (APIC) with FTIL thus disabling the users of ODIN from connecting to the market
watch of NSE’s CD segment trade. APIC, it was argued by MCX-SE, was an essential facility to
connect front end application of NOW with any other application such as ODIN, which constitutes
the electronic trading platform of the stock exchanges’, ibid.
92But the CCI did rule that ‘normally, APIC should have been denied for all segments but this was
not the case’, and the denial of this facility to MCX-SE smacked of anticompetitive intent. This, it
would appear, seems to suggest that the Commission felt that the feasibility of providing the
facility was not in doubt, ibid.
93The COMPAT held that ‘as regards exclusionary denial of integrated market watch facility, we
need not express anything here …. in view of settlement of the concerned parties’, The National
Stock Exchange of India v Competition Commission of India (2014) COMPAT, Appeal No 15 of
2011 with IA NoS 25/2011, 26/2011, 27/2011, 10/2012,27/2012.
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However, when reference is made to other governmental reports, it becomes
clear that EFD has been considered in the Indian context as well. For instance, a
review of the Report of the Working Group on Competition Policy constituted by
the erstwhile Planning Commission, exhibits traces of the EFD. The aforesaid
report, in fact, considered the EFD as one of the guiding principles of a national
competition policy.94 Similarly, the Draft Competition Policy 2011 prepared by the
Committee on National Competition Policy (that was constituted by the Ministry of
Corporate Affairs) also saw to it that a national competition policy, when drafted,
should also include ‘third party access to essential facilities’ as one of the
principles.95
Therefore, the concept of ‘essential facilities’ does find mention in various
governmental reports and is not altogether an alien concept to India’s competition
law experts. However, it still lacks a legislative framework and any kind of deci-
sional practice that would lay out the contours of how such doctrine is to be applied.
However, a recent CCI prima facie Order under Section 26(1) of the
Competition Act 2002, appears to have veered close to recognizing the EFD. In
HPCL-Mittal Pipelines Limited (HMPL) v Gujarat Energy Transmission
Corporation Limited (GETCO) and Ors.96, the CCI found the conduct of GETCO
and other Opposite Parties (OPs) as anticompetitive at prima facie level. The
Informant, HMPL, had alleged that the denial of open access to electricity by the
OPs to itself was not in consonance with the principle of open access that was
envisioned under the Electricity Act 2003 (which sought to create an environment
where the power generating companies could sell power to the highest bidder and
consumers could buy power from the most economical source instead of purchasing
power from the distribution licensee). Therefore, it was alleged that by denying
HMPL the right to link to a distribution company of its choice, the OPs had, inter
alia, denied market access to other distribution companies that may have been able
to supply to HMPL, were it not for the refusal of the OPs to provide it with a no
objection certificate (NOC) and permission to source power from other distribution
companies. While the CCI refrained from using the term ‘EFD’ in its prima facie
order, the essential conditions for the invocation of the doctrine appear to be there.
Firstly, the NOC was indispensable as HMPL could not have itself constructed a
power generation facility to source power from. Secondly, there would be a killing
of ‘effective competition’ by the OPs since by refusing to provide the requisite
permission, it would damage the commercial prospects of HMPL, which actually
94‘Control over essential facilities by dominant enterprises undermines competition by denying
access to new entrants. Third party access to essential facilities on reasonable fair terms will ensure
effective competition and, therefore, should be provided in law. However, what constitutes an
essential facility may differ on a case to case basis’, Planning Commission, Government of India,
‘Report Of The Working Group on Competition Policy’ (February 2007), para 5.2.1 <http://
planningcommission.nic.in/aboutus/committee/wrkgrp11/wg11_cpolicy.pdf>.
95'Draft National Competition Policy' (2011), para 7.1 <http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/pdf/
Draft_National_Competition_Policy.pdf>.
96HPCL v Gujarat Energy (2017) Competition Commission of India, Case No 39 of 2017.
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competed with OP two in the instant case (which was a wholly owned subsidiary of
GETCO). Thirdly, the denial of permission by GETCO and other OPs would
restrain the technical development of the product as well. Indeed, the CCI found
that the OPs had violated Section 4(2)(b)(i) and limited technical development.
Lastly, the Commission also found that there was no objective justification offered
by the OPs in refusing an NOC or permission to HMPL since their grounds of
network constraints were found to be illegitimate.
Notwithstanding the above case, the authors will briefly examine below how the
mobile wallet companies may embark on securing the API of the interoperability
protocol of UPI, should it be denied by the banks.
To highlight the same, each ingredient of the EFD will be discussed. Such
discussion will be informed by jurisprudence of the EC/ECJ/CFI that had been
underscored earlier. Further, the discussion will also take into account the potential
pitfalls as well as opportunities arising from such jurisprudence from the per-
spective of mobile wallet companies, when invoking the EFD.
(i) Indispensability: While the Commercial Solvents case had laid down the criteria
that would have to be cumulatively satisfied to successfully invoke the EFD, it
remained silent on how each ingredient was to be applied. The Magill case, on
the other hand, is the first case that had attempted to explain, inter alia, how
indispensability would be assessed. During its judgement, the ECJ was of the
opinion that Magill, as a publisher of a weekly TV guide was in a position of
‘economic dependence’ on news channels such as RTE and ITP. However, it is
debatable whether Magill could really be said to be dependent on those
channels when they comprise only a tiny proportion of the total number of
channels for which the guide would be published. Taking this argument further,
can an applicant entity said to be economically dependent on a dominant entity
when the item that is sought to be procured from the dominant entity would
constitute only a fraction of the applicant entity’s revenues?
The Bronner case further narrowed the scope of how indispensability was to be
construed. It effectively held that a facility is not indispensable if there are other
methods to develop the facility available at the disposal of the applicant entity, even
though if these methods are less advantageous and not economically viable.
The Microsoft case however, reversed the reasoning of the Bronner case. In the
Microsoft case, the CFI has diluted the indispensability requirement defined in the
earlier cases by insinuating that even though the applicant entity requesting the
‘essential facility’ may be able to create an interoperability protocol on its own,
however, if the protocol so created was not marketable or commercially viable, then
the enterprise could always fall back on the EFD to secure it from the entity holding
the predominant interoperability protocol.
From the above, it appears that if the mobile wallet companies were to go by any
measure of the indispensability requirement as defined over the years by the ECJ/
CFI, it would have a strong argument to secure access to the API of the banks.
Firstly, mobile wallets companies appear to be in a position of economic
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dependence on the banks as the refusal by banks to provide the API could scuttle
their chances to be truly interoperable with other mobile wallets and the banks. This
would have a concomitant impact on their commercial viability, a key element
when appraising indispensability, since the interoperability feature would not be
there.
(ii) Eliminate competition: The promising growth of mobile wallets (albeit it may
have plateaued in terms of the value of transactions compared to UPI apps),
even in the absence of interoperability, may prove at the very outset that a lack
of interoperability would not kill all competition. However, given that the
Microsoft case has effectively shifted the goalposts on what ‘competition’
means, it can still be asserted that mobile wallet companies would be able to
satisfy this criterion as well. The Microsoft case saw the CFI ruling that the
refusal to provide the essential facility does not have to result in hindering the
emergence of all competition, but only all effective competition. In other
words, even if the refusal does not prevent the applicant entity from being able
to compete in some manner with the dominant entity, that alone would not
disqualify the applicant entity from invoking the EFD.
Accordingly, one may argue that it is not a prerequisite for mobile wallet
companies to show an irreversible decline of their business prospects if they were
not to be provided with the interoperability protocol. Instead, the fact that a denial
will blunt their ability to compete effectively with UPI apps will be sufficient reason
to provide them with the claimed protocol.
(iii) New Product: While the IMS Health case had categorically said that the
creator of the new product must offer a product that is not offered by the
owner of the right, the Microsoft case again, diluted what could be consid-
ered as a new product. In fact, the Microsoft case held that it is not even
necessary for there to be a new product. It is sufficient if the refusal results in
the limitation of technical development. The mobile wallet companies would
face a hard time furnishing any meaningful evidence regarding the creation
of a new product as most banks would also have a mobile wallet. However,
the fact that a refusal would prevent the addition of new features into an
existing mobile wallet would definitely fall within the purview of restricting
technical development.
(iv) Objective justification: While a refusal to provide an essential facility may be
justified by some entities on grounds of scarcity of raw material, the same
would not be a justifiable reason in the present case of mobile wallets. Since
the supply of API is non-rivalrous in nature, (i.e., one mobile wallet’s use of
the bank’s API does not come at the expense of any other mobile wallet or
bank), it is feasible to supply it as it is readily available. The API is merely a
tool for building a software, and stipulates how various software components
interact with one another. The same is therefore a proprietary product that
can be lent to more than one mobile wallet company at any given time.
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5.2 Evaluation Under Section 4 of the Act
Since the EFD is applicable only to dominant enterprises, it would have to be
examined whether the conduct of banks would be that of a dominant entity under
Section 4 of the Act.
(i) Whether CCI has jurisdiction: This pertains to an issue of probable regula-
tory conflict of the CCI with the Copyright Board under the Copyright Act
which has been discussed later in this chapter.
(ii) Enterprise concerned: It appears that the relevant entity for the purposes of
evaluating dominance would be a bank, since it the bank that possesses the
API. However, for the sake of a comprehensive academic analysis, authors
have elaborated on the other side of the argument as well. Some may submit
that it is the NPCI which is the relevant enterprise since it was the NPCI that
had introduced the concept of UPI and also has a UPI app of its own—
BHIM. Unlike other UPI apps that are connected or linked to a particular
bank, BHIM was mandated to be integrated with the software applications of
all banks that comprised the NPCI, thus giving it a unique status among other
UPI apps.97 However, it would appear that since the NPCI itself does not
have any API to offer, there cannot be an issue of refusal or denial of
providing API in the first place. Therefore, the definition of ‘enterprise’ is
more likely to include only a bank. Since it is the bank which actually
provides the API of the interoperability and therefore is in a position to refuse
or deny access to such API, the appropriate enterprise for the purpose of the
evaluation would appear to be the banks.
(iii) Whether API is a good or service: Since the present case involves the issue of
licensing the right to use the interoperability protocol, the question is whether
the same can be regarded as a ‘good’ or ‘service’. It should however, be
noted that Section 2(u) of the Act does define ‘service’ to include a ‘service
of any description which is made available to potential users and includes the
provision of services in connection with business of any industrial or com-
mercial matters such as banking…’. Since the API in question has no utility
unless it is provided to enable interoperability (and in most cases, the banks
provide the API to third party UPI app developers to enable interoperability),
it would fall within the purview of a ‘service which is made available to
potential users…in connection….with banking’.
(iv) Relevant market: As per Section 2(t) of the Act, the ‘relevant product mar-
ket’ means all those products or services which are regarded as inter-
changeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of characteristics of
the products or services, their prices and intended use. At first glance, one
may be tempted to delineate the relevant market as the ‘provision of banking
services’ considering that the issue in question involves banks. However,
97Ramanathan (n 7).
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since the contentious point here is the potential denial of the API by banks to
mobile wallet companies, the relevant product market should instead be the
‘provision of API of the interoperability protocol by all banks to mobile
wallets’. It should be pointed out here for the sake of a complete and
informed analysis that the relevant product market cannot be limited to the
provision of API of interoperability protocol by each bank. This is due to the
fact that just as there is no limitation here on the owner of a primary product
(a bank account) to switch to the secondary product (a UPI app) of another
bank, similarly, each mobile wallet company has to secure just one API from
a bank to secure interoperability. For instance, ICICI Bank can easily provide
an API to a mobile wallet company that would make its mobile wallet
interoperable with all other mobile wallets. Even though each API is unique
in itself, the fact is that for a mobile wallet company, the choice of bank that
actually provides the API would not matter. Therefore, the relevant market
could be the ‘provision of API of the interoperability protocol by all banks to
mobile wallets’. Alternatively, however, if a mobile wallet company chooses
to tie up with a bank for offering certain banking services, like many UPI app
developers have done, then the choice of the bank as the API provider would
matter owing to each bank’s unique suite of banking services98 and
accordingly it may not be possible to contend that the relevant product
market would comprise of provision of API of interoperability protocol of all
banks.
(v) Dominance: Each API is unique to the bank which provides it, but when
taken collectively, no single bank could be said to be dominant in the rele-
vant market. Since the concept of collective dominance has not been intro-
duced under the Act, it may not be possible to invoke the essential facilities
doctrine with no dominance being established. However, under the alterna-
tive definition of relevant product market provided above, it is possible that
each bank is considered as dominant in the provision of its unique API to a
mobile wallet company.
5.3 Possible Grounds for a Refusal by Banks
Firstly, since the API is an internal program that is not available for sale in the open
market, can antitrust authorities compel companies to divert what would otherwise
be captive production (to be used for internal consumption)? In vertically integrated
groups, it is common for the upstream arm to produce only internally for ‘captive
98It should be remembered that any UPI app is, after all, an app that is tied to a particular bank.
While the fact that each UPI app is platform agnostic is a great attraction, at the end of the day, a
lot of users would also want to transact on that particular app owing to the bank (that has tied up
with the app) offering some unique boutique of services.
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use’ by the downstream arm. The issue is whether such ‘captive production’ by the
upstream arm should be included in product market or whether such product market
should only include those products that are sold in the ‘merchant market’. For
instance, in Pfizer/Hospira (C-2015/03/255), when analyzing the possibility of
vertical foreclosure due to Pfizer selling formulations and Hospira selling APIs
(Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients), it was observed that Hospira was primarily
utilizing the APIs for internal use and not for sale in the merchant market and
therefore there was no possibility of foreclosure of input foreclosure as the API
could not be considered an input. Similarly, in Aditya Birla Chemicals/Grasim, the
combined market was calculated by excluding any production that was captively
consumed. However, these are combination cases and the Commission may adopt a
different approach when evaluating the same under the antitrust regime dealt with
by Section 4.
Secondly, since the interoperability protocol API is likely protected as a trade
secret or copyright, it may be difficult to secure access to it. The recent White Paper
of the Committee on Experts on a Data Protection Framework for India also rec-
ognized that it may be difficult to compel businesses to provide access to their
algorithms that are used to make automated decisions as this right to access is likely
to be heavily limited owing to trade secrets of these businesses.99
Thirdly, it would appear natural that the courts will not second guess the value
judgement or the business acumen of private enterprises.
Since this chapter is concerned with the interface between IP and antitrust law, it
will now focus on the second ground of IP protection.
6 Intellectual Property Defense
Section 3(5)(i) of the Competition Act 2002 provides that nothing in Section 3 shall
restrict the right of any person to restrain any infringement of, or to impose rea-
sonable conditions, as may be necessary for protecting their IPRs. The CCI has
dealt with the issue of IPRs in a few cases.
In the FICCI Multiplex case,100 the first cartel case decided by the CCI, one of
the arguments adopted by the arraigned parties before the CCI in order to justify not
providing access of their films to multiplex owners was that ‘no multiplex owner
can demand that the film be released in a theatre let alone dictate the commercial
terms on which such film must be released.’101 This, it was argued, was due to the
99‘White Paper of The Committee of Experts on a Data Protection Framework for India’ (2017) <http://
meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/white_paper_on_data_protection_in_india_171127_final_v2.pdf>.
100FICCI—Multiplex Association v United Producers (2009) Competition Commission of India,
Case No 01 OF 2009.
101ibid, para 23.11.
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copyright that subsisted in the films which gave them the right to decide on what
terms to provide the films. The CCI held that copyright is a statutory right and not
an absolute right and would be subject to the rigors of the Competition Act 2002. In
the Shamsher Kataria case102 on the other hand, the CCI emphasized that the party
in question may ‘impose reasonable conditions, as may be necessary for protection
any of his rights’. In the view of the CCI, the concept of protection of an IPR was
qualified by the word ‘necessary’. So the key question for consideration by the CCI
in such cases was viewed to be: whether the IPR holder can protect his IPR, even if
such restriction was not present. In the instant case, the CCI held that the restric-
tions that had been imposed by certain car manufacturers on the sale of their spare
parts to everyone except their own subsidiaries, was beyond the scope of what was
considered as necessary in order to protect the IPR that was vested therein.
However, it is pertinent to note that the IP defense is only available to agree-
ments that are coming under the purview of Section 3 of the Act. In other words,
there is no such defense available for abuse of dominance. However, since the EFD
does not squarely fall under any of the provisions of the abuses listed under
Section 4 of the Act, perhaps IP protection can be invoked. In such a case, it might
come down to an issue of conflict between different statutes, i.e. The Copyright Act
1957 and the Competition Act 2002.
In this regard, it is noted that the Copyright Act is a statute that deals with
consolidation of the law relating to copyright in India, but is not a comprehensive
piece of legislation in that it does not cover anticompetitive conduct that may result
(as a result of copyright subsisting in any class of work). Accordingly, the aims and
objectives of the two legislations are manifestly different. Also, unlike the Patents
Act, (which contains provisions to redress abusive conduct when a patentee refuses
to grant a license on reasonable terms), the Copyright Act only provides for a
compulsory license in case of works withheld from public.103 At this juncture, it is
relevant to point out that the Copyright Act would be viewed as a ‘special’ statute
vis-à-vis the Competition Act (owing to the fact that it is a self-contained code)
which would give it primacy in case of a conflict between the two. However, the
two statutes do not have to be construed in such a manner, especially, since both do
not have absolute non-obstante clauses. While the Competition Act does provide
that the provisions of the Act shall have overriding effect notwithstanding anything
contrary contained in other law, that provision is tempered by Section 62 which
provides as follows: ‘The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to, and not in
derogation of, the provisions of any other law for the time being in force.’
Therefore, the provisions of the Copyright Act and the Competition Act have to
be construed harmoniously and it cannot be said that either legislation supersedes
the other. In Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v Competition Commission of India
102ibid.
103Copyright Act 1957, s 31.
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and Another,104 the Delhi High Court was of the opinion that the two enactments,
viz. The Patents Act 1970 and the Competition Act 2002 can be construed har-
moniously as the Controller of Patents can be mandated to take into account ‘any
finding of anticompetitive practice, that is returned after a judicial or administrative
process including by the CCI under the Competition Act, while settling the terms of
a compulsory license issued to remedy such practice.’105
Accordingly, it appears that the Commission can indeed apply the EFD in a case
of refusal to provide interoperability protocol to mobile wallet companies.
7 Conclusion
After a discussion on UPI (and its much vaunted interoperability benefit), the
validity of the impugned RBI Master Direction, the parallels between the EC and
CCI, and a threadbare discussion on the EFD in the EC, a definitive conclusion can
be reached. EFD can be implemented when confronted with the protective cover
that is provided by IPRs. The contravention of the Competition Act under Section 4
can be established under many potential heads listed in Section 4. For instance
—‘restricting technical development’ under Section 4(2)(b)(ii) by preventing the
addition of a new feature in mobile wallets, ‘denial of market access’ under
Section 4(2)(c) by banks by preventing the mobile wallet companies from
accessing the interoperability protocol that is available to others and ‘leveraging’
under Section 4(2)(e) by banks trying to secure the downstream market of mobile
wallets for themselves to the exclusion of the existing players.
Disclosure: The authors wish to point out that the views expressed in this chapter are their own
and do not necessarily reflect the policy or position of the Competition Commission of India.
104Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v CCI (2016) Delhi High Court, WP(C) 464/2014 and CM
Nos 911/2014 & 915/2014.
105ibid.
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Chapter 14
Towards a Transaction Cost Approach
to the Essential Facilities Doctrine
Yugank Goyal, Padmanabha Ramanujam and Anmol Patel
1 Introduction
Most problems facing a policy maker involve tradeoffs. She chooses legal tools to
tilt the balance in favor of one action against the other. The essential facility
doctrine (EFD) is one such tool. However, before utilizing the tool, one has to
decide which side needs tipping. This chapter discusses how to make that decision,
with regard to EFD (and specifically with respect to intellectual property rights
(IPRs)). Borrowing from the ideas that have emerged in US and Europe, the chapter
proposes specific suggestions for India, which, without loss of generality, can be
applied to most other developing nations as well. The doctrine is used to address the
anticompetitive behavior of a firm with market power, which owns ‘an essential
facility’ and refusing to license it to competitors or new entrants. Using the doctrine,
government may mandate the firm to share the facility. The issues addressed here
are significant and with debates on this issue gaining momentum in developing
countries, there is a need for rigorous analysis.
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Study of EFD has had its own share of conflicts. It has attracted dissimilar
sentiments from various scholars. Areeda famously called it ‘an epithet in need of
limiting principles,’1 and many others have been critical of its scope.2 Yet host of
scholars defend its importance in relevant policy designs.3 Given that the doctrine
advocates granting access to competitors, it has generated significant debates in
academia, for both its desirability and applicability.4
From economic consideration, the issue is complex. It usually applies to firms,
which are vertically integrated, and perhaps natural monopolists in one market
1Phillip Areeda, ‘Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles’ (1990) 58(4)
Antitrust LJ 841.
2See, eg, David Reiffen and Andre N Klett, ‘Terminal Railroad Revisited: Foreclosure of an
Essential Facility or Simple Horizontal Monopoly’ (1990) 33(2) JL & Econ 419; Keith N Hylton,
‘Economic Rents and Essential Facilities’ (1991) 1991(3) BYU L Rev 1243; Abbott B Lipsky, Jr
and J Gregory Sidak, ‘Essential Facilities’ (1999) 51(5) Stan L Rev 1187; Herbert J Hovenkamp,
‘Unilateral Refusals to Deal, Vertical Integration, and the Essential Facility Doctrine’ (2008)
University of Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No 08–31 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1144675>; Steven Anderman, ‘The epithet that dares not speak its name: the
essential facilities concept in Article 82 EC and IPRs after the Microsoft case’ in Ariel Ezrachi
(ed), Article 82 EC: Reflections on Its Recent Evolution (Hart Publishing 2009) 87–98.
3See, eg, Robert Pitofsky and Donna Patterson and Jonathan Hooks, ‘The Essential Facilities
Doctrine under US Antitrust Law’ (2002) 70(2) Antitrust LJ 443; Spencer Weber Waller, ‘Areeda,
Epithets, and Essential Facilities’ (2008) 2008(2) Wis L Rev 359; Brett Frischmann and Spencer
Weber Waller, ‘Revitalizing Essential Facilities’ (2008) 75(1) Antitrust LJ 1; Marina Lao,
‘Networks, Access, and Essential Facilities: From Terminal Railroad to Microsoft’ (2009) 62(2)
SMU L Rev 557.
4Michael Boudin, ‘Antitrust Doctrine and the Sway of Metaphor’ (1986) 75(2) Geo L J 395;
Gregory J Werden, ‘The Law and Economics of the Essential Facility Doctrine’ (1987) 32(2) St
Louis U LJ 433; James R Ratner, ‘Should There be an Essential Facility Doctrine’ (1988) 21(2)
UC Davis L Rev 327; David J Gerber, ‘Rethinking the Monopolist’s Duty to Deal: A Legal and
Economic Critique of the Doctrine of Essential Facilities’ (1988) 74(6) Va L Rev 1069, with
Daniel E Troy, ‘Unclogging the Bottleneck: A New Essential Facility Doctrine’ (1983) 83(2)
Colum L Rev 441; Phillip Areeda, ‘Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles’
(1990) 58(4) Antitrust LJ 841; Keith N Hylton, ‘Economic Rents and Essential Facilities’ (1991)
1991(3) BYU L Rev 1243; David McGowan, ‘Regulating Competition in the Information Age:
Computer Software as an Essential Facility under the Sherman Act’ (1995) 18(4) Hastings Comm
& Ent LJ 771; Richard J Gilbert and Carl Shapiro, ‘An Economic Analysis of Unilateral Refusals
to License Intellectual Property’ (1996) 93 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
12,749; Allen Kezsbom and Allen V Goldman, ‘No Shortcut to Antitrust Analysis: The Twisted
Journey of the Essential Facilities Doctrine’ (1996) 1 Colum Bus L Rev 1; Abbott B Lipsky, Jr and
J Gregory Sidak, ‘Essential Facilities’ (1999) 51(5) Stan L Rev 1187; Robert Pitofsky and Donna
Patterson D and Jonathan Hooks, ‘The Essential Facilities Doctrine under US Antitrust Law’
(2002) 70(2) Antitrust LJ 443; Glen O Robinson, ‘On Refusing to Deal with Rivals’ (2002) 87(5)
Cornell L Rev 1177; Paul D Marquardt and Mak Leddy, ‘The Essential Facilities Doctrine and
Intellectual Property Rights: A Response to Pitofsky, Patterson, and Hooks’ (2003) 70(3)
Antitrust LJ 847; Lawrence A Sullivan and Warren S Grimes, The Law Of Antitrust: An Integrated
Handbook (2d edn, Thomson West 2006) 124–31; Marina Lao, ‘Networks, Access, and Essential
Facilities: From Terminal Railroad to Microsoft’ (2009) 62(2) SMU L Rev 557.
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attempting to refuse in providing a monopolised input to a rival in a related
competitive market. While at one level, their refusal is justified in preventing
efficiency losses, free-riding tendencies by rivals, double marginalization problem
and ensuring that there are incentives to invest/innovate5; at another level, such
denials have potential to thrust anticompetitive effects in the market.6 Chicago
school thinkers are primary sources for benign academic view of EFD. They pro-
pose a ‘single monopoly profit theorem,’ according to which, if the products are
used in fixed proportion, then a monopolist in one market cannot increase its profits
in an adjacent market through extension.7 In some ways, the approach proposes that
such extensions are driven by efficiency considerations and therefore hardly anti-
competitive.8 However, recent scholarship contends that Chicago School’s thinking
went too far, grounded on unrealistic assumptions, because neither products are
necessarily used in fixed proportions, nor the static efficiency merits such a
short-term view.9 The denial for sharing the services could be motivated by rising
rival’s costs and in short-term, there are no substitutes for essential facilities.10 Even
Areeda, in his famous critique, accepted the economic value of the doctrine in under
certain circumstances—for instance, he agreed with court’s decisions in MCI and
Otter Trail cases because of the natural monopoly of the issue.11
5See Michael H Riordan and Steven C Salop, ‘Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago
Approach’ (1995) 63(2) Antitrust LJ 513.
6See ibid 519 (‘Vertical mergers can lead to exclusionary effects by increasing rivals’ costs of
doing business. This may involve raising their input costs by foreclosing their access to important
inputs or foreclosing their access to a sufficient consumer base.’).
7See, eg, Robert H Bork, Book Review (1978) The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself;
Richard A Posner, ‘The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis’ (1979) 127(4) U Pa L Rev 925:
The tie-in analysis, for instance, was extended to vertical integration in general. To illus-
trate, it makes no sense for a monopoly producer to take over distribution in order to earn
monopoly profits at the distribution as well as the manufacturing level. The product and its
distribution are complements, and an increase in the price of distribution will reduce the
demand for the product. Assuming that the product and its distribution are sold in fixed
proportions, the conclusion is reached that vertical integration must be motivated by a
desire for efficiency rather than for monopoly.
8See Posner, ibid 927.
9See Einer Elhauge, ‘Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit
Theory’ (2009) 123(2) Harv L Rev 397.
10See Thomas G Krattenmaker and Steven C Salop, ‘Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’
Costs to Achieve Power over Price (1986) 96(2) Yale LJ 209, 234.
11Areeda (n 1) 845–848.MCI Communications v American Telephone & Telegraph Co 7th Circuit
708 F2d 1081, cert denied 464 US 891 (1983) and Otter Tail Power Co v United States (1973) 410
US 366.
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Perhaps the pivot over which EFD cases revolve is to decide when the shared
use becomes essential. Further, questions like whether in denial of the license, is
there a threat to competition, and how to draw the guiding principles which help
identify the exceptional circumstances that may justify the competition authority’s
intervention, without undermining the objective justifications by a dominant
undertaking in refusing to allow such access. The legislative design in Europe,
which refers to ‘refusal to deal’ cases are dealt as exclusionary abuse of dominance,
under Article 82, EC Treaty establishing the European Community (hereinafter,
Article 82 EC). Section 4 of the Competition Act 200212 and Section 2 of the
Sherman Act 1890 are the corresponding provisions under Indian law and US law
respectively. Needless to mention, Competition Act 2002 is nascent and is yet to
evolve in matters involving abuse of dominance.
The rest of the chapter is divided as follows: Part two illustrates the evolution of
the doctrine through last century, in the US and the EU. It examines the case law
driven jurisprudence and shows the trajectory of the attitude of the judiciary in both
regions. This part serves to give an account of the path dependency of the doctrine
and allay the surprises that may emerge from a time-restricted view of the doctrine.
Part three compares Article 82 EC and Section 2 of Sherman Act in order to
understand the (differing) EU and US approaches to encouraging competition. This
chapter will carve out the principles on which Indian approach should (or should
not) be based. Part four delves into how the doctrine has been invoked in India and
in Part five, criticizes its present scope and design. Part six proposes that India
needs a proactive application of the doctrine, which needs to be modeled on EU’s
line. To support the proposal, this part builds an analytical argument, examining
EFD in alternative theoretical set-ups. Authors analogise EFD as a legal institution
with liability rule, which intervenes in a property framework. Drawing from the
famous Calabresi and Melamed paper13 this chapter shows how EFD could be
located in this scholarship. This chapter utilizes the concept of transaction cost from
the perspective of bargaining power between transacting parties and investigate its
variation in different scenarios that produce (dis)incentives to refusing to license.
Authors conclude that India needs to adopt expansive view of the doctrine par-
ticularly by its competition authorities because Indian IPRs regime is weak, which
exhibits high transaction costs and therefore requires liability rule of EFD. Part
seven concludes, mainly recognizing the limitations of the proposed model.
12The Competition Act 2002, No 12 of 2003, as amended by The Competition (Amendment) Act
2007 (Competition Act 2002), s 4.
13Guido Calabresi and A Douglas Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral’ (1972) 85(6) Harv L Rev 1089.
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2 Historical Overview
It can fairly be said that ‘refusal to deal’ under competition law is a manifestation of
the ‘freedom of contract’ of contracting parties,14 which was the essence of freedom
from undue restraint on the right to contract.15 Clauses of contract not to compete
received considerable judicial attention in the 1880s in US just as they do today.16 It
may at first seem that freedom of contract would support enforcement of these
agreements because parties ought to be able to set the terms of their contracts.17
However, enforcement of these contracts can prevent formation of many other
contracts.18 It could, therefore, be argued that a court may actually increase the level
of contract activity by refusing to enforce such contracts, as is the case with some
‘restraint of trade’ contracts and this would be an increase in the freedom of contract
under some connotations of that term.19
2.1 Doctrine’s Origin in the US
As largely driven from American judgements, the doctrine is usually seen to have
originated in US Supreme Court’s 1912 Terminal Railroad20 decision, in which
denial of third party usage of railroad bridges to St. Louis, owned and maintained
by the defendant was challenged. The court opined that ‘the inherent conditions are
such as to prohibit any other reasonable means of entering the city, the combination
of every such facility under the exclusive ownership and control of less than all of
the companies under compulsion to use them violates’21 Section 1 and Section 2 of
the Sherman Act. Note that the defendant here was an Association that comprised
of fourteen railroads serving St. Louis, and therefore invoked a strong sense of
competition concerns. However, the Supreme Court did not agree to prosecutor’s
(government’s) contention to dissolve the Association and proposed alternate
institutional safeguards.22 The idea of invoking antitrust concerns was logical, but
14Albeit the contrary was also believed for some time as is evident from old scholarship. See, eg,
Joseph A Joyce, Treatise on Monopolies and Unlawful Combinations or Restraints: Embracing
Every Contract, Combination in the Form of Trust, Pool or Otherwise in Restraint of Trade or
Commerce (New York, Banks 1911).
15W W Thornton, Treatise on Combinations in Restraint of Trade (W H Anderson Company
1928).




20United States v Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis (1912) 224 US 383, 409.
21ibid 409.
22ibid 409–411.
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there was no explicit mention of the doctrine, and the courts had differing view-
points on how strictly they want to come out on monopolies.23 Comparable reliefs
were granted by the US Supreme Court in subsequent years, solidifying the exis-
tence of doctrine.
In Associated Press24 (AP) case, where AP had prohibited member newspapers
to provide any news to nonmember organizations, the court held AP’s practice as an
unreasonable restraint of trade violating Section 1 of Sherman Act, even though
there was no monopolization that AP exhibited.25 The court’s view was that AP’s
bylaws served ‘seriously to limit the opportunity of any new paper to enter’, and
that its services ‘give many newspapers a competitive advantage over their rivals.’26
In both these influential cases, there was an element of unfairness rather than fear of
market power. Yet, the essentiality of goods/services was pivotal in both the cases.
Many cases provide precedents to the similar reasoning: for instance, Eastern States
Lumber Dealers’ Association v United States27 and Klor’s, Inc. v Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc.28 Of particular interest is Silver v NYSE29 where the court held the
Exchange’s decision to terminate two brokers’ direct wire connection was violating
Section 1 of Sherman Act, holding that ‘valuable service germane to petitioner’s
business and important to their effective competition with others was withheld from
them by collective action.’30
The courts have been cautious however, by avoiding blanket mandates to declare
all group-boycotts illegal. For instance, in Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v
Pacific Stationery and Printing Co,31 the court expressly held that, ‘Unless the
cooperative possesses market power or exclusive access to an element essential to
effective competition, the conclusion that expulsion is virtually always likely to
have an anticompetitive effect is not warranted…. Absent such a showing with
respect to a cooperative buying arrangement, courts should apply a rule-of-reason
analysis.’32 Notice that not all cases had issues pertaining to competition but def-
initely with essential goods/services, unilateral refusals to deal with which was
imposing severe fairness considerations.
23See, for instance, United States v New England Fish Exch., 258 F 732 (D Mass 1919), which was
somewhat similar to Terminal Railroad case, but the court declared illegal the fish exchange made
by comprising of all local fish wholesalers.
24Associated Press v United States (1945) 326 US 1, 8, 21.
25ibid 11–12.
26ibid 13, 17.
27Eastern States Lumber Dealers’ Association v United States (1914) 234 US 600.
28Klor’s, Inc. v Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. (1959) 359 US 207.
29Silver v NYSE (1963) 373 US 341.
30ibid 349.
31Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v Pacific Stationery and Printing Co (1985) 472 US 284.
32ibid 296–297.
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However, a clearer jurisprudence evolved from interpreting Section 2 of the
Sherman Act,33 where one party’s alleged control of some ‘essential facility’ is
enough to invoke the doctrine. Consider United States v Griffith,34 which invali-
dated the monopoly power of theatres in one geographical market to use their
positions and occupy monopoly power in another market. The court stated that ‘the
use of monopoly power, however lawfully acquired, to foreclose competition, is
unlawful.’35 Note that in both cases, courts were trying to prevent monopoly power
to beget further monopoly power. This is indeed the case in owning essential rival
goods/services, sole access to which can greatly enhance monopoly power of firms
that own them. After Otter Trail36 and Aspen Highlands37 cases, the doctrine was
etched in legal memory to be invoked frequently in subsequent cases. In the former
case, Otter Trail, which was an integrated electric utility company attempted to
prevent entry of distribution players in the business by refusing to sell or transmit
wholesale power to them. Even though not specifically articulated in the EFD
context, the court held the conduct unlawful because the ‘[u]se of monopoly power
‘to destroy threatened competition’ is a violation of the ‘attempt to monopolise’
clause of Section 2 of the Sherman Act’38 and therefore paved way for broader
understanding of EFD. Similarly in Aspen Highlands case, the court declared the
refusal to access the three skiing mountains by the owners to the owner of a fourth
mountain who wanted to offer a joint lift ticket in cooperation with the three,
anticompetitive and therefore unlawful.39 Interestingly, that even in Aspen
Highlands, the court never explicitly mentioned EFD. On the contrary, it went to
suggest that it was ‘unnecessary to consider the possible relevance of the ‘essential
facilities’ doctrine…’40 This view is noteworthy for another reason—many firms
engage in unilateral actions everyday, both to accept and refuse and there is no
reason to believe that all such actions warrant similar judicial reactions.41 Yet, the
common binding factor is that of how refusing access to essential facility could
result in potential anticompetitive effects. Scholars have located the doctrinal
original in cases including this one and these precedents structure how judicial
viewpoints are shaped in time.
33US Sherman Act 1890, s 2.
34United States v Griffith (1948) 334 US 100.
35ibid 107. The reasoning is very similar to Berkey Photo, Inc v Eastman Kodak Co (1979) 2nd
Circuit 603 F2d 263, cert denied 444 US 1093 (1980).
36Otter Tail (n 11).




41See for instance, Phillip Areeda, ‘Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles’
(1990) 58(4) Antitrust LJ 841, 844. See also Philip E Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust
Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and their Applications (3rd edn, Wolters Kluwer Law &
Business 1995), which shows that there is no general conclusion from Supreme Court’s pro-
nouncements that firms should always make its facilities available.
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Therefore, which cases will strictly fall under EFD could be disputable.
Werden42 makes a logical categorization and other than Terminal Railroad and
Otter Trail, suggests that two other major cases be considered under the category of
strictly EFD: Gamco, Inc. v Providence Fruit and Produce Building, Inc.43 and
Hecht v Pro-Football, Inc.44 but the latter deserves special mention because it was
the first case to expressly use the term, ‘essential facility doctrine.’ In Hecht, a
covenant prohibiting leasing the stadium to any other professional football team
was challenged and the court opined, ‘essential facility doctrine would also support
an allegation that the Redskins’ refusal to waive the restrictive covenant constituted
illegal monopolization under section 2’.45 The definitional impact of this judgement
for EFD was also recognised by Sixth Circuit in 1979.46
Perhaps the most significant case that rests entirely on EFD and proposes a
systematic test to establish liability for the doctrine is the famous MCI case.47 The
case involved AT&T refusing access to its local Bell facilities to MCI, which the
latter challenged. The court of appeals sustained the jury opinion that AT&T’s
action constituted violation of Section 2 of Sherman Act. The court stated that:
the case law sets forth four elements necessary to establish liability under the essential
facilities doctrine: (1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor’s
inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use
of the facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility.48
This four-part test was subsequently adopted by the court in Aspen Highlands
case.49 The doctrine has subsequently been extensively applied in cases involving
42Gregory J Werden, ‘The Law and Economics of the Essential Facility Doctrine’ (1987) 32(2) St
Louis U LJ 433.
43Gamco, Inc. v Providence Fruit and Produce Building, Inc. 1st Circuit, 194 F2d 484, cert denied
344 US 817 (1952).
44Hecht v Pro-Football, Inc. (1977) DC Circuit 570 F2d 982, cert denied 436 US 956 (1978).
45ibid 993. The court also mentioned before reaching the conclusion that:
The essential facility doctrine, also called the ‘bottleneck principle,’ states that ‘where
facilities cannot practicably be duplicated by would-be competitors, those in possession of
them must allow them to be shared on fair terms. It is illegal restraint of trade to foreclose
the scarce facility.’ This principle derives from [Terminal Railroad] and was recently
reaffirmed in [Otter Tail]; the principle has regularly been invoked by the lower courts.
(See ibid 992, footnotes omitted).
46In dictum, the Sixth Circuit stated, ‘There also exists a… line of cases which has been styled as
promulgating the ‘bottleneck theory of antitrust law.’ Under this approach, a business or group of
businesses which controls a scarce facility has an obligation to give competitors reasonable access
to it.’ See Byars v Bluff City News Co (1979) 6th Circuit, 609 F2d 843, 856.
47MCI (n 11).
48ibid 1132–33. The case cited Hecht, Otter Trail, Terminal Railroad.
49Two other quick follow up cases which invoked the EFD—as categorised in Werden (n 42) 446–
447 are Fishman v Estate of Wirtz ((1986) 7th Circuit, 807 F2d 520) and a district case,
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non-tangible assets.50 After the four-part test, the lower courts have construed it
rather narrowly.51
However, recently, American jurisprudence in favor of EFD has suffered lim-
iting checks, especially in appreciating the role of regulatory bodies to address the
issue, and encouraging EFD only for those cases where regulation has not been able
to settle points of contentions. Of particular importance is the famous Trinko52 case.
It was a class action suit brought against Verizon (local telephone monopolist),
alleging antitrust violations since Verizon had not shared its network with rivals,
even when this was mandated in Telecommunications Act 1996.53 The court
declined that there was an antitrust liability54 while opining that the defendant had
no general duty to deal with rivals with whom it did not have a prior course of
dealing.55 The court announced that the doctrine only ‘crafted by some lower
courts’56 and that it had ‘never recognized such a doctrine…and find no need either
to recognize it or to repudiate it here’.57 Post-Trinko era has been characterized by
increasing scepticism of EFD, and only those cases have survived the EFD claims
who have been operating in unregulated market.58 In 2007, the Antitrust
Modernization Commission recommended that ‘[r]efusals to deal with horizontal
rivals in the same market should rarely, if ever, be unlawful under antitrust law,
even for a monopolist’.59 The Justice Department in 2008 suggested that EFD be
out rightly abolished.60
Consolidated Gas Co of Florida v City Gas of Florida, Inc ((1987) SD Fla, 1987–2 Trade Cas 1
67,741).
50BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp v Donnelly Information Publishing, Inc, (1991) 11th
Circuit, 933 F2d 952 (holding that the doctrine applies to both ‘physical structures’ and ‘services’,
such as ‘information wrongfully withheld,’ including the service of providing business classifi-
cations for telephone directories), vacated, (1992) 11th Circuit, 977 F2d 1435, and reversed en
bane on other grounds, (1993) 11th Circuit, 999 F2d 1436, cert denied 114 S Ct. 943 (1994).
51Lao (n 3) 565.
52Verizon Commc’ns Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko, LLP (2004) 540 US 398.
53ibid 402, 404. Also note that the Federal Telecommunications Commission had already fined






58See, eg, Nobody in Particular Presents, Inc v Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc (2004) 311 F Supp
2d 1048, 1113–14.
59Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report and Recommendations, 101–04 (2007), cited in
Spencer Weber Waller and William Tasch, ‘Harmonizing Essential Facilities’ (2010) 76(3)
Antitrust LJ 741, 744.
60US Department of Justice, Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act 127–29 (2008) cited in Spencer and Tasch, ibid 744.
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2.2 Doctrine’s Origin in Europe
EFD as it appeared in the US inspired many jurisdictions at multiple levels. Yet,
since the doctrine expressly relies on its ability to read issues through competition
law lens, there is a need to understand the legal framework that deals with com-
petition law in US and Europe. Section 2 of the Sherman Act in US not only
assumes the name of Section 82 of the European Commission (EC), but also differs
markedly in spirit.61 While Section 2 of the Sherman Act punishes willful acqui-
sition or maintenance of monopoly power by the use of exclusionary conduct,62
Article 82 EC prohibits abuse of dominant position by an undertaking in the
common market.63 In several ways, EC’s approach is more sympathetic to the cause
of EFD more than that of US.
It is important to note that the genesis of competition law in Europe reflected a
desire to break down trade barriers and promote economic integration, in the hope
that this would lead to a period of stability and peace in the post-war European
environment.64 That is why, the core objectives of Article 82 EC are to protect
competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare, ensuring an
efficient allocation of resources65 and to ensure fairness and protect small and
medium-sized firms.66 Basic notions of fairness67 and the idea that small and
medium sized firms need protection feature more prominently under Article 82 EC
than the equivalent provision in US, Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The origins of
‘fairness’ concerns under Article 82 EC reflect the impact of German ordoliberal
thinking,68 which attached importance to the notion that large firms should not
unfairly limit their rivals’ production and access to markets-on the initial drafting of
Article 82 EC.69
61See J Bruce McDonald ‘Section 2 and Article 82- Cowboys and Gentlemen’ (Second Annual
Conference, College of Europe, Global Competition Law Centre, Brussels, 16–17 June 2005)
<https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/section-2-and-article-82-cowboys-and-gentlemen> accessed
25 September 2017. See also Robert O’Donoghue and Atilano Jorge Padilla, The law and eco-
nomics of Article 82 EC (Hart 2006) 11–12.
62See United States v Grinnell Corp (1966) 384 US 563.
63See EC Treaty, art 82.
64McDonald (n 61).
65See ‘DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to
exclusionary abuses’ (Brussels 2005), para 4.
66McDonald (n 61) 7.
67Courts were like the spectators. Adam Smith aptly describes in Adam Smith, The Theory of
Moral Sentiments (first published 1959, Penguin 2010) 101, ‘In the race for wealth, and honours,
and preferments, he may run as hard as he can, and strain every nerve and every muscle, in order to
outstrip all his competitors. But if he should justle, or throw down any of them, the indulgence of
the spectators is entirely at an end’.
68John Kallaugher and Brian Sher, ‘Rebates revisited: Anticompetitive effects and exclusionary
abuse under Article 82’ (2004) European Competition Law Review 263.
69McDonald (n 61) 7.
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On the other hand, US antitrust law, which is much older, was borne of the
desire to dismantle a number of cartels and conglomerates, or ‘trusts’ as they were
known, that had come to dominate late 19th century economic life in the US, with
adverse effects for consumers. Over a period of time, influenced by the vagaries of
Great Depression,70 post-war reconstruction efforts,71 and academic writings, par-
ticularly of the Chicago School72 informed the fundamental purpose of US antitrust
law to protect the public from the failure of the market. As noted by the Supreme
Court, ‘the law directs itself not against conduct which is competitive, even
severely so, but against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition
itself.’73 American antitrust laws ‘are for the benefit of competition, not
competitors.’74
This is precisely why Section 2 of the Sherman Act adopts a more minimalist, or
less interventionist, approach to enforcement than Article 82 EC. Section 2 of
the Sherman Act encourages a monopolist even, to compete aggressively on
merits.75 Even if such aggressive competition harms less efficient firms, it is the sort
of competition that promotes the consumer interests that the Sherman Act aims to
foster.76 The underlying principle of US antitrust law is that striving for monopoly
is an important element of the free-market system because it induces risk taking that
produces innovation and economic growth.77 The successful competitor, having
been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.78 In contrast, in
Europe, dominant firms must be mindful of their rivals and not necessarily celebrate
their successes in isolation.79 Dominant undertakings have a ‘special responsibility’
not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the common
market.80
It is easy to imagine from preceding discourse that the intervening doctrine of
essential facility will find more conducive environment in Europe. This is indeed
the case. The doctrine was openly introduced by the EC in early 1990s and has
indirectly inspired the legislation concerning deregulation of traditional natural
70See Wayne D Collins, ‘Regulation, Deregulation and Antitrust Law’ (1985) 7(1) Antitrust
(Newsletter) 8.
71See James May, ‘Historical Analysis in Antitrust Law’ (1990) 35(4) N Y L Sch L Rev 857, refer
to the economic policy during the post-war period.
72See Alan Devlin, ‘Antitrust in an Era of Market Failure’ (2010) 33(2) Harv J L & Pub Pol'y 557.
73Spectrum Sports, Inc v McQuillan (1993) 506 US 447, 458.
74Ball Mem’l Hosp, Inc v Mutual Hosp Ins, Inc (1986) 7th Circuit, 784 F2d 1325, 1338.
75See Olympia Equip Leasing Co v Western Union Tel Co (1986) 7th Circuit, 797 F2d 370, 375.
76See Copperweld Corp v Independence Tube Corp (1984) 467 US 752, 767.
77See Verizon Communications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis v Trinko, LLP (2004) 540 US 398, 407.
78United States v Aluminum Co of Am (1945) 2nd Circuit, 148 F2d 416, 430.
79McDonald (n 61) 4.
80Case T-219/99 British Airways plc v Commission (2003) Court of First Instance 2003 ECR 242.
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monopolies.81 A nontrivial scholarly literature emerged alongside82 and only bol-
stered the existence of the doctrine in the EU. Like in the US, where judicial
pronouncements decided the scope and institutional heaviness of the doctrine, in the
EU, the Commission has developed an extensive case law referring to the doctrine
expressly, and sometimes subtly.
The first case in which the principle was applied in 1974: Commercial Solvents
Corp v Commission of the European Communities.83 The judgement proposed that
a dominant supplier of an input abused its dominant position when it refused to
supply the input to a customer, the supplier’s competitor in the downstream
derivative market. B&I/Sealink84 was one of the very first case in which the doc-
trine was explicitly applied. The case concerned Sealink as the owner of the port
changed the timings in a way that its vessels obstructed B&Is loading procedure.
A similar case was that of Sea Containers/Stena Sealink,85 where the complainant
was a new comer desiring entry into the market. The Commission granted interim
measures in favour of the complainants in both cases. Up to this point, only a faint
picture of ‘essential facilities’ could be drawn including any facility or infrastruc-
ture without access to which competitors could not provide services to their cus-
tomers. There had to be some test to determine which facilities would be truly
‘essential’ or ‘indispensable’ rather than merely desirable. At the same time, the
questions pertaining to actual access or sharing of facilities were also not yet
answered. It was pertinent to decide whether the parties themselves or some
authority, like the Commission, should dictate the terms of such an arrangement.
Other infrastructure related cases involve tunnels,86 airports and ports. For
instance, in London European/Sabena,87 a Belgian firm was asked by the
Commission to grant access to its computerized reservation systems to a British
firm. In FAG-Flughafen Frankfurt/Main AG,88 the company operating the airport
81Vassilis Hatzopoulos, ‘The EU Essential Facilities Doctrine’ (Research Papers in Law 2006) 3
<https://lsa.umich.edu/content/dam/ces-assets/ces-docs/Hatzopoulos_EU_Essential_Facilities.pdf>
accessed 11 May 2018. Even though the authors note that the doctrine has only received limited and
indirect support from Court of First Instance and European Court of Justice.
82See generally, Daniel Glasl, ‘Essential Facilities Doctrine in EC Antitrust Law: A Contribution
to the Current Debate’ (1994) ECLR 306; Mark Furse, ‘The essential Facilities Doctrine in
Community Law’ (1995) ECLR 469; Leo Flynn, ‘The Essential Facilities Doctrine in the
Community Courts’ (1999) Commercial Law Practitioner 245.
83Joined Cases 6/73 and 7/73, Commercial Solvents v Commission 1974 ECR 223.
84B&I/Sealink, Decision (interim measures) of 11 June 1992, EC Bull 6-1992, para 1.3.30. On this
decision see Nick Maltby, ‘Restrictions on Port Operators: Sealink/B&I Holyhead’ (1993) ECLR
223.
85Sea Containers/Stena Sealink, Decision (interim measures) of 21 December 1993, 94/19/EC, EE
L 15, 18-1-94, 8.
86See, eg, European Night Services Ltd (ENS) v Commission, Joined Cases T-374/94, T-375/94,
T-384/94 & T-388/94, 1998 ECR II-3141, [1998] 5 CMLR 718.
87British Midland/Aer Lingus, Decision (1992) 92/213/EEC, EE L 96/34.
88FAG-Flughafen Frankfurt/Main AG, Decision of 14 January 1998, 98/190/EC, EE L 72,
11-3-98, 30.
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was also engaged in ground-handling services without allowing other companies to
enter and compete. Notably, Commission’s general attitude in this regard has not
changed regardless of whether the defendant is a private party of public authority—
something clear from the case of Port of Rødby89 and that of ICG/CCI Morlaix
(Port of Roscoff),90 where the defendants were Danish government and Chamber of
Commerce of Morlaix in Brittany.
European approach to EFD is most visibly pronounced in IPR related cases, and
in particular by the famousMagill91 case, which was not only affirmed by European
Court of Justice (ECJ) but has generated a significant amount of scholarship.92 The
case investigated and confirmed that three broadcasters of television programs in
their refusal to grant licenses to Mr. Magill for publication of their weekly listing by
him were considered engaging into abusive and anticompetitive practices. IMS
Health93 case has also given rise to a heated debate.94 It involved access of IMS
Health’s (a market research company) patented database structure (brick structure)
to other firms on market research to produce a more competitive database. The court
said that ‘on the premise … that the use of the 1860 brick structure is indispensable
to allow a potential competitor to have access to the market’.95
Perhaps the most significant case in the segment of IPR is that of Microsoft.96
After a lengthy investigation, in 2004, the EC issued its decision against Microsoft.
The Commission identified two infringements of Article 82 EC: (a) refusal to supply
interface information to competitors to achieve client-to-client and server-to-server
interoperability and leveraging its dominant position in the PC-client operating
system market into the market for work-group server operating system under Article
82(b) EC, and (b) technological integration or ‘tying’ of Windows with Windows
Media Player under Article 82(d), EC. The Commission imposed a record fine of
€497 million, in addition to requiring Microsoft to provide the interoperability
information and to produce Windows without Windows Media Player. Microsoft
appealed and on 17 September 2007, the European Court of First Instance upheld the
Commission’s decision that Microsoft had abused its dominant position.
89Port of Rødby, Decision of 21 December 1993, 90/119/EC, EE L 55, 26-2-94, 52.
90ICG/CCI Morlaix (Port of Roscoff), Decision (interim measures) of 16 May 1995 (IV/35.388) 5
CMLR (1995), 177.
91Magill TV Guide/ITP, BBC & RTE, Decision of 21 December 1989, OJ L 78, 43.
92See Richard Whish, Competition Law (5th edn United Kingdom, Butterworth & Co Publishers
2003) 665 and its bibliography.
93NDC Health/IMS Health, Decision (interim measures) of 3 July 2001 OJ 2002 L 59, 18.
94Valentine Korah, ‘The Interface between Intellectual Property and Antitrust: The European
Experience’ (2001) 69(3) Antitrust LJ 801 (asking how there could be copyright in a list). See also
Frank Fine, ‘NDC/IMS: In Response to Professor Korah’ (2002) 70(1) Antitrust LJ 247; John
Temple Lang, ‘Comment on Professor Korah’s Paper Essential Facilities and Duty to
License-IMS’ (10th Annual Conference on International Intellectual Property Law and Policy,
Fordham University School of Law, 2001).
95NDC Health (n 93), para 22.
96Commission Decision of 24 March 2004, COMP/C-3.37.792, C(2004) 900 final.
14 A Transaction Cost Approach to EFD 285
The case of Bronner97 reflects the shift in courts’ priorities. It not only restricts
the scope of the doctrine by limiting its usage in situations where owner has more
than a dominant position but also imposes a forward looking test, thereby ascer-
taining whether refusal to deal will lead to monopolization in downstream market.98
In a way therefore, this case represents a bridging effort of Section 82 of EC Treaty
that talks of abuse of dominant position and Section 2 of Sherman Act in US which
centralises monopolization in its context.99 The case involved Austria’s leading
newspaper publishing company refusing to allow another newspaper its delivery
services. In addition to addressing the issue on grounds that emerged from existing
case laws, the court also held that it is important to observe the refusal is likely to
eliminate all competition, and the service being indispensable (there is no actual or
potential substitute for home-delivery scheme).100
Overall, in a way, with Trinko and Bronner cases, the uncertainty in excavating
reasonableness in potential EFD cases seems to have increased. It is in this light that
the chapter proposes alternative theoretical benchmarks against which one can view
the issues. But before that, it may be useful to highlight how EFD legislations and
case law have impressed upon regulatory thought in few other jurisdictions.
3 Application of the Doctrine in IPR Cases:
Comparing US and EU Approach
Because of the aggressive competition encouraged by US and the responsible
competition standard adopted by Europe, they have been regarded as cowboy
capitalists and gentlemen competitors respectively.101 Close inspection of the
legislative language itself surfaces their inherent subtle differences in approach. The
European Act is hinged on prohibiting ‘…abuse by … undertakings of a dominant
position…’,102 while American counterpart forbids actions of ‘[e]very person who
shall monopolise, or attempt to monopolise…’103 Hence, while one attacks dom-
inant position, the other, monopoly. Dominance can be presumed if a single
undertaking owns more than 50% of the market share, which reflects in European
97Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag
GmbH & Co KG 1998 ECR I-7791, [1999] 4 CMLR 112.
98See Sebastien J Evrard, ‘Essential Facilities in the European Union: Bronner and Beyond’ (2004)




102Article 82 of EC.
103Section 2 of Sherman Act, courts have interpreted that monopolization requires (1) the willful
acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power (2) by the use of exclusionary conduct.
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approach104 while in US, any share less than 70% will make it highly unlikely to be
appreciated as an antitrust case. Divergent treatment of tying by Microsoft exem-
plifies this amply. Even though the company had 90% market share and pure
monopoly in operating system market, the appeals courts in US required that
regardless of the market share, it should be evaluated under a rule of reason,
whether there was actual proof of anticompetitive effects in the downstream
browser markets.105 The EC decision on contrast, considered the tie between
operating system and downstream media player as outrightly unlawful without
delving into excavating proof of impact on consumers.106 The case laws will help
us generalize this observation.
The earlier American approach in deciding the framework of EFD in IPR related
cases, was derived in by precedents set by court of Appeals and three different
circuits and had presumed the legality of refusal to license cases in nearly absolute
terms. The first case in this regard was that of Data General,107 which was a
computer manufacturing company, and it declined to license copyrighted diagnostic
software to independent service organizations that competed with it in maintenance
and repair of its computers. Even though the First Circuit acknowledged that ‘cases
in which antitrust liability is unlikely to frustrate the objectives of the Copyright Act
are certainly rare’108 it suggested that this can happen only if there is enough
evidence that monopolist had acquired IP protection unlawfully. This was not the
case here and affirmed that ‘author’s right to exclude others from use of its
copyrighted work is presumptively valid business justification.’109
This judicial view was further reinforced by Ninth Circuit’s case of Kodak,110 in
which the legality of refusal to license was extended to even patents, largely based
on the fact that presumption of legality could be rebutted by evidence of anti-
competitive intent on the part of IP holder who is refusing to license.111 The Federal
Circuit has crystallised this narrow view in form of a rule, in a case involving
Xerox112 that involved Xerox refusing to sell and license its protected replacement
parts and software maintenance, driving the plaintiff out of the service market. The
court held that a patent holder is free to exclude competition altogether in more than
one antitrust market, absent exceptional circumstances.113
104See, eg, Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission (1978) ECJ 1978 ECR 207, para 65.
105United States v Microsoft Corp (2001) DC Circuit, 253 F3d 34, 84.
106Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft, para 5.3.2.1.4 (24 March 2000); ibid.
107Data General Corp v Grumman Systems Support Corp (1994) 1st Circuit, 36 F3d 1147.
108ibid 1187.
109ibid.
110Image Technical Services, Inc v Eastman Kodak Co (1997) 9th Circuit, 125 F.3d 1195.
111ibid 1218.
112In re Independent Services Organizations Antitrust Litigation (CSU v Xerox): (2000) Federal
Circuit, 203 F3d 1322.
113ibid 1327.
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The US therefore, appeared to grant immunity to firms refusing to license, in
view of stronger support for rights-based-framework as deciding factor between
justified and unjustified restraints of competition.114 Such views, which favor one
area of law (IPR) compared to another (competition) rest on assuming that rela-
tionship between IPR and competition law is conflicting—a myopic outlook for
appreciating their complementary set up to promote innovation.115 Although it
appears that courts have generally been inclined to recognise the loss of incentives
to innovate and invest rather than antitrust duty to license.116
This need to ensure companies’ IP incentives are not diluted was further
observed by the Supreme Court in Trinko case.117 The court argued that while
invoking Sherman Act’s Section 2 is plausible, but its applicability is limited by
(a) enabling the firm to be free in using their property thereby incentivizing them to
innovate, (b) court’s ill-equipped competence to determine terms of dealing, and
(c) possibility of collusion in compelled negotiation.118 This judgement shows
American legal system’s inclination to tilt in favor of IP rights and its acceptance of
certain degree of market power that could spur innovation.119 There are good
reasons to doubt these viewpoints and scholarly work has shown that innovation
may actually be higher in competitive markets.120 Regardless of the merits in
arguments, the insulation of IPR against application of antitrust law in American
judgements stifles EFD’s fertility.
The European approach (driven by the Commission and ECJ) is fairly different
from the American.121 This has been mentioned in the preceding part of the chapter,
but authors look at it more closely here. Even though considerations of long-term
incentives and contractual freedom is espoused regularly, the imposition of duty to
license that interferes with the IPR is common—giving it an IP-friendly color. Even
though EFD principle has been implemented in judgements of European courts
from 1988, a major thrust to evolving jurisprudence in this regard came in Magill
case.122 The three broadcasters of TV programs in Ireland used to provide their
114Beatriz Conde Gallego, ‘Unilateral refusal to license at indispensable intellectual property rights
—US and EU approaches’ in Josef Drexl (ed), Research handbook on intellectual property and
competition law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2010) 218.
115ibid 219.
116ibid.
117For a critical analysis of Trinko decision, see Josef Drexl, ‘IMS Health and Trinko-Antitrust
placebo for consumers instead of sound economics in refusal-to-deal cases’ (2004) 35 IIC—
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 788.
118ibid.
119ibid.
120The argument was made first, very powerfully, in Kenneth Arrow, ‘Economic Welfare and the
Allocation of Resources for Innovations’ in Richard R Nelson (ed), The Rate and Direction of
Inventive Activity (Princeton University Press 1962).
121For a quick overview of case law of the ECJ on refusal to license, see Richard Whish,
Competition Law (London: LexisNexis 2003) 758–762.
122Magill (n 91).
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copyrighted program schedules to daily newspapers free of charge, but there was no
comprehensive weekly listing guide. When Mr. Magill attempted to produce an
Irish guide of all channels, he was refused the copyright license. He complained to
the EC. The Commission considered it violating Article 86 of Rome Treaty,123 and
this view was endorsed by the ECJ, which stated, ‘prevented the appearance of a
new product, a comprehensive weekly guide to television programmes, which the
appellants did not offer and for which there was a potential consumer demand.’124
Further, it argued that the appellant had monopolized ‘the secondary market of
weekly television guides by excluding all competition in that market since they
denied access to the basic information which is the raw material indispensable for
the compilation of such a guide.’ It explained why this case fits into the ‘exceptional
circumstances’ where a refusal to license prevented the appearance of a new
product. The reading of the case clearly depicts European approach to be far more
considerate towards competition issues in comparison to its IPR counterparts.
Several uncertainties arising out of Magill case were put to an end in the next
landmark judgement, IMS Health case.125 It concerned a copyrighted
‘1860-brick-structure’ for processing regional sales data becoming de facto industry
standard in Germany. The copyright holder’s refusal of the license, even though
acknowledged as non-abusive in nature generally, was held to constitute as a
violation of Article 82 EC. It laid out three cumulative conditions to be satisfied for
refusal to license to constitute an abuse, namely (a) refusal must prevent emergence
of new product for which there is a potential consumer demand, (b) it must be
unjustified, and (c) it must exclude any competition on a secondary market.126 In
addition to offering legal certainty to gaps left unfilled from Magill case, the ECJ in
this judgement, broadly interpreting Magill, also ‘does away with leveraging of
market power between two distinct markets as an independent form of abuse in
cases involving IPRs.’127
The attitude of Commission only resonates that of the judiciary, in its willing-
ness to affirm a duty to license under Article 82 EC. Even though the Commission
did not consider IMS Health case as that involving leveraging, it did so in the
Microsoft case.128 Moreover, it applied a new balancing test, comparing the pos-
sible negative impact that duty to license may have on right holder’s incentives to
innovate, and the positive impact of this duty on the level of innovation of the
whole industry.129 This reasoning is also reflected in Commission’s Discussion
123art 86 prohibits all kinds of ‘Abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within
the common market.’
124Magill (n 91), para 54.
125NDC Health (n 93).
126ibid, para 48.
127Gallego (n 114) 223.
128See European Commission of 24 March 2004, Microsoft (n 106).
129See Francois Leveque, ‘Innovation, Leveraging and Essential Facilities: Interoperability
Licensing in the EU Microsoft Case’ (2005) 28 World Competition 28 71-75.
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Paper130 on exclusionary abuses, which mentions that for refusal to license to be
abusive, following conditions131 have to be met: (a) there is a refusal to license (it
also includes license with unreasonable terms,132 or dilatory tactics by dominant
firm133), (b) right holder has a dominant position in the relevant (mostly upstream)
market, (c) the IPR is indispensable, (d) there is likely market-distortionary fore-
closure effect on downstream market, (e) no negative effects on long-run incentives
to innovate, and (f) refusal to license prevents the emergence of a new product.
Indeed, EC’s decision in theMicrosoft case134 was to make available, on reasonable
and non-discriminatory terms, proprietary information on certain Windows com-
munication protocols since it refused to supply them to a rival, was not a surprise.
This suggests a very broad understanding of how EFD could be interpreted and
incorporated into the legal thought process of the EC or judiciary. In their expansive
approach, the Commission has relied on not just the precedence but adequate
economic analysis to understand tension (if at all) between IPR and competition
law, and sought to resolve it by means of sculpturing informed judgement on how
to determine whether a specific case falls under the exceptional criteria. The
interventionist approach of EC reflects its obsession with false negatives and more
confident in predicting outcomes. On the other hand, US Supreme Court feels that
‘cost of false positives counsels against an undue expansion of Section 2 liability.’
4 Application of the Doctrine in India
Interestingly, India witnesses application of EFD not through competition frame-
work, but through intervention of sectoral regulatory institutions. And in post-
Trinko era, having regulatory agencies manage the doctrine in their respective
industries, is no unusual in the West either.135 The regulatory agencies do possess
superior competence and information over competition courts for managing
130‘DG Competition Discussion Paper on the Application of Aricle 82 of the Treaty to
Exclusionary Abuse’ (Brussel—European Commission 2005) <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf> accessed 24 April 2018.
131ibid 64–67.
132‘Deutsche Post AG-Interception of Cross Border Mail’, OJ 2001 L 331/40, para 103. See also
Discussion paper, para 225.
133See Commission Decision of Jun. 4, 2004, Case COMP/38.096, Clearstream (Clearing and
Settlement); see also Sea Containers v Stena Sealink-Internal measures, OJ 1994 L 15/8, paras
70–74.
134Microsoft (n 106), paras 4.1.2, 5.3.1, 6.1.1. United States (n 105).
135Joesph D Kearney and Thomas W Merrill, ‘The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries
Law’ (1998) 98(6) Colum L Rev 1323.
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complex access arrangements.136 These sector regulators are intimately linked with
infrastructure provisions, and therefore relate to physical assets more than
non-tangible ones. Primary legislative frameworks in this regard are that of the
Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act (TRAI) 1997, the Electricity Act 2003
and the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board Act (PNGRB) 2006.137
Section 11(1) (c) and Section 11(1) (l) of the TRAI Act, mandate interconnec-
tion and technical compatibility between various service providers and maintain a
register of such agreements.138 Enacting the Telecommunication (Broadcasting and
Cable Services) Interconnection Regulation 2004 where the arrangements to guide
the interconnection and revenue share among service providers is enumerated, is a
step in this direction.139 In addition, TRAI has also enacted The Telecommunication
Interconnection (Reference Interconnect Offer) Regulation 2002 which specified
the terms and conditions on which interconnection of its network with that of other
service providers seeking interconnection rests. In 2003, the Telecommunication
Interconnection Usage Charges (IUC) Regulation was passed that encouraged
regular consultation with stakeholders to preserve coherence in the interconnection
regime was followed.140
The Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board Act (PNGRB) 2006 Act
exhibits the idea of essential facilities in the definition of ‘common carrier’ or
‘contract carrier. Section 2(j) mentions that there is non-discriminatory open access
given by the Board from time to time to pipelines for transportation of petroleum
and related products. Section 2(m), which defines ‘contract carrier’ as ‘such
pipelines for transportation of petroleum, petroleum products and natural gas by
more than one entity pursuant to firm contracts … as may be declared by the
Board…’. The board can also regulate the open access and transportation rate under
Section 61(e).141 Further, in 2008, the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas
136Philip J Weiser, ‘The Relationship of Antitrust and Regulation in a Deregulatory Era’ (2005) 50
(4) Antitrust Bull 549.
137For an illustrative account, see Pradeep Mehta, ‘Is there a Case for Essential Facility Doctrine in
India?’ in Pradeep S Mehta (ed), Competition and Regulation in India 2011: Leveraging Economic
Growth Through Better Regulation (Jaipur: CUTS International & CIRC 2012).
138The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act 1997 (TRAI), ss 11 (1)(c), 11 (1)(l).
139s 3(2) of the Act asserts that ‘Every broadcaster shall provide on request signals of its TV
channels on non-discriminatory terms to all distributors of TV channels….’.
140This success of the interconnect regime engineered by the telecom regulator is reflected in the
growth of the sector as well. The number of subscribers has increased to 764.77 million in 2010
from merely 76.54 million in 2004. Private sector participation which was 5% in 1999 has
increased to 84.5% in 2010. Growth rate of rural telephones has also increased from 16% in 2004
to 32.81% in 2010 of which 84.5% of telephone connections are provided by the private operators.
See Economic Survey (2010–11), Government of India.
141The Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board Act (PNGRB) 2006, s 61(e).
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issued a draft regulation according to which, once an infrastructure is declared
common user facility, it is compulsory for the body owning the capacity to share it
with the other users.142
The Electricity Act 2003 captures elements of EFD by defining what it terms,
‘open access’ (stated under Section 42(2) and 47(2) of the Act).143 Open access
implies non-discriminatory provision of distribution or transmission to any licensee,
consumer or a person engaged in generation in accordance with the regulations
specified by the Appropriate Commission. Further, the Act under Section 38(2)(d)
directs the Central Transmission Utility to provide non-discriminatory access of
transmission to the licensee or generating company on payment of transmission
charges and to any consumer when open access is provided by State
Commission.144 A similar provision is made for the State Transmission Utility and
Transmission Licensee under Section 39(2)(d) and 40(2)(d) respectively.145
In the context of IPR, relevant statutory provision in Competition Act 2002 is 3
(5), which immunises those from competition law, who are protecting their IPR, as
long as such protection is reasonable.146 However, even though there is no sug-
gestive list of what actions would be unreasonable, one can craftily interpret
exclusive licensing or no licensing (given certain necessary conditions) as one of
those actions. This was affirmed by the High Court of Delhi, in Gramophone
Company of India Ltd. v Super Cassette Industries Ltd.147 The Supreme Court, in
Entertainment Network (India) Ltd. v Super Cassette Industries Ltd.,148 noted that
even though the copyright owner has complete freedom to decide the licensing
provisions, this right is not absolute and is subject to the compulsory licensing
schemes. The Bayer v Natco case which involved first issuance of compulsory
license in India is one major case that has potential to create strong precedent. The
case law is rather scanty with little help to estimate the general ideological pattern
that seems to be emerging in IP-competition law conflict. And perhaps more
importantly, no case as yet has been filed with the Commission invoking EFD.
142The industry has responded positively to these interventions leading to explorations off the East
coast and development of new Liquefied Natural Gas terminals like Dabhol and Kochi. See D
Bhattacharyya and D Singh, ‘India’ in Geoffrey Picton-Turberville (ed), The International
Comparative Legal Guide to: Gas Regulation 2010 (Global Legal Group: UK 2010).
143The Electricity Act 2003, ss 42(2), 47(2).
144ibid, s 38(2) (d).
145State Transmission Utility and Transmission Licensee Act, ss 39(2)(d), 40(2)(d).
146Competition Act 2002, s 3(5).
147Gramophone Company of India Ltd. v Super Cassette Industries Ltd. MIPR 2010 (2) 349.
148Entertainment Network (India) Ltd. v Super Cassette Industries Ltd. (2008) Supreme Court,
(4) ALD 47.
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5 Problems with the Indian Approach
While it appears that infrastructure provision has in spirit, captured the essence of
EFD in India, there are inherent conflicts in this setting. Firstly, the impact has not
been uniform. For instance, the said ‘open access’ in electricity has not translated
facility sharing in reality for a variety of complex reasons.149 Secondly, and at
principle level, regulatory response is ex-ante as compared to intervention by
competition authorities, which is usually ex-post in such cases.150 The regulatory
agencies aim to ‘build’ markets and the competition commissions are expected to
‘repair’ them. In countries like India, where concept of regulatory institutions is
rather new (as imported from Washington Consensus) the need to repair is high
because of fossilised structure of markets that has high likelihood of being anti-
competitive and distortionary. Consider the pre-liberalization monopolists still
seeking rent that began in the license raj.151 Scholarly literature on regulatory
institutions of Global South is emerging slowly,152 and there is little doubt in the
scepticism shared by scholars in its nascent position and modest success.153 Ex-ante
approaches should be preferred when old market structures are in sync with con-
temporary growth trajectory of the country—this is clearly not the case with India.
After experimenting with first stage of reforms,154 India is witnessing paradigm
shifts in which interactions between state and the market are occurring. In such
dynamic shifts, ex-ante regulation needs a very crucial support of ex post moni-
toring, and ‘remedy’ the fissures that surface in time. Competition authorities, by
nature and definitional mandate, have been equipped to provide these very
remedies.
Thirdly, there are significant overlaps between sector regulators and Competition
authorities in India, and their resolution is important.155 This was clear in a suit
brought by Reliance Industries Ltd. to Competition Commission of India (CCI) for
alleged cartel of its three competitors in supplying fuel to an airline. However, the
defendants challenged the jurisdiction of CCI to deal with the matter, in Delhi High
149See Pradeep Mehta (n 137) 149.
150Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, ‘Regulation v Competition’ (2011) The Journal of Regulation,
I-1.30:550.
151Phillipe Aghion and others, ‘The Unequal Effects of Liberalization: Evidence from Dismantling
the License Raj in India’ (2008) 98(4) American Economic Review 1397.
152Navroz K Dubash and Bron Wen Morgan, The Rise of the Regulatory State of the South:
Infrastructure and Development in Developing Economies (Oxford University Press 2013).
153ibid.
154Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission, Report of the Financial Sector Legislative
Reforms Commission (2013).
155See, for an overview of the issue, Pradeep Mehta and Natasha Nayak, ‘Harmonising Regulatory
Conflicts’ (CUTS International 2012) <http://oldwebsite.iica.in/images/Harmonising%
20Regulatory%20Conflicts.pdf> accessed 10 May 2018.
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Court and argued that sector regulator was a more competent authority. The court
passed an interim order in favour of the three companies’ claim.156 Similar treatment
was suffered by CCI yet again in its case involving investigation of abuse of dom-
inant position by three electricity companies when the state electricity regulatory
commission intervened in the investigation claiming its sole jurisdiction to deal with
these matters.157 In the banking sector as well, Reserve Bank of India has argued that
issues of mergers in banks should be kept outside the purview of CCI.158 Even
though the Competition Act 2002 encourages cooperation between sector regulators
and CCI, particularly in Section 21 and 21 A,159 little has been achieved on that front.
With regard to non-tangible products, which invokes EFD for IPR related
competition issues, the framework is restricted squarely to the concepts of com-
pulsory licensing. Even though the Patent Act 2005 possesses clauses in favor of
compulsory licensing, it has only been used once for pharmaceutical products.160 In
terms of pharmaceutical innovation, India never needed compulsory licensing until
WTO emerged, because Indian Patents Act 1970 follows a process patent system.
Although law permitted process patents on medicines,161 it was rarely sought and
had limited scope.162 This therefore gave rise to a number of local pharmaceutical
firms increasing their share of the market.163 Indian pharmaceutical firms became
larger and more sophisticated. They employed reverse engineering methods to
develop new processes for the drugs. Over the next three decades, Indian phar-
maceutical industry became extremely competitive and diverse164 and by 1990s,




159Competition Act 2002, ss 21, 21(a).
160Bayer Corporation v Union of India, Controller of Patents and NATCO Pharma Limited MIPR
2013 (2) 97.
161See The Patents Act 1970, No. 39, s 53(1) (a). For example, such patents only lasted for the
shorter of five years from the date of grant or seven years from the date the patent was filed.
162H Ashok Chandra Prasad and Shripad Bhat, ‘Strengthening India’s Patent System: Implications
for Pharmaceutical Sector’ (1993) 28 Economic and Political Weekly 1037.
163This was accompanied by other regulatory and policy measures that the government took to
encourage building local markets against foreign firms.
164For an overview of how pharmaceutical industry developed after patent law was enacted, see
Sudip Chaudhuri, The WTO and India’s Pharmaceutical Industry: Patent Protection, TRIPS and
Developing Countries (Oxford University Press, New Delhi 2005). See also Aradhna Aggarwal,
‘Strategic Approach to Strengthening the International Competitiveness in Knowledge Based
Industries: The Indian Pharmaceutical Industry’ (Research and Information System for Developing
Countries 2004) Discussion paper no 80 <http://www.ris.org.in/strategic-approach-strengthening-
international-competitiveness-knowledge-based-industries-indian-0> accessed 24 April 2018.
165ibid.
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from patent policy’s perspective, access to medicines was not a concern166—
meaning Patent Act 1970 has produced a favored system for access to medicine in
India.167
In 1995, WTO introduced TRIPS, setting up minimum standards of IP regula-
tion,168 specifying enforcement mechanisms, dispute resolution features and
remedies. India opposed TRIPS initially,169 but finally acceded to the Agreement,
since staying out of WTO framework was a difficult choice. However, India bought
time until 2005 to comply with TRIPS. By this time, Doha Development Agenda
had been carved out as well. In 2005, India adopted TRIPS, and thereby institu-
tionalised product patent regime in pharmaceutical sector, supplanting the earlier
process patent approach in pharmaceutical industry in the Patents Act 2005. But at
the same time, invoked the flexibility provided for in the TRIPS Agreement170 and
provide for compulsory licensing regime.171 The compulsory licensing provisions
in the Act could be broadly classified into (a) general compulsory licensing pro-
visions; (b) a provision relating to pharmaceutical patents in case of emergency; and
(c) a license to export pharmaceuticals to countries with insufficient manufacturing
166For the role of patents in the evolution of the Indian pharmaceutical industry, see Biswajith
Dhar and Niranjan Rao, ‘Transfer of Technology for Successful Integration into the Global
Economy: A Case Study of the Pharmaceutical Industry in India’ (2002) UNCTAD/UNDP
Programme on Globalization, Liberalization and Sustainable Development, New Delhi. See also
Sudip Chaudhuri, WTO and India’s Pharmaceutical Industry: Patent Protection, TRIPS and
Developing Countries (New Delhi: Oxford University Press 2006).
167Access to medicines has been a primary concern from the perspectives of affordability though,
and largely so. India is overburdened by communicable and infectious diseases alongside an
emerging epidemic of non-communicable diseases. But public health spending constitutes around
0.9% of Gross Domestic Product. Government expenditure of health in India is 17.9% of the total
health expenditure and remaining 82.1% is private in nature. See Central Bureau of Health
Intelligence, National Health Profile (New Delhi: Ministry of Health and Family Welfare,
Government of India 2005) 77–79. For the details of health financing in India, see also Ministry of
Health and Family Welfare, ‘National Health Accounts of India 2001–2002’ (New Delhi: Ministry
of Health and Family Welfare 2005). The World Health Organization’s World Medicine Situation
Report based 1999 data state that out of (the then) 998 million people in India, only 17% has the
access to medicine. For an overview, see K M Gopakumar, ‘Product Patents and Access to
Medicines in India: Critical Review of Implementation of TRIPS Patent Regime’ (2010) 3 Law
and Development Review 325.
168TRIPS contains requirements that nations’ laws must meet for copyright rights, including the
rights of performers, producers of sound recordings and broadcasting organizations; geographical
indications, including appellations of origin; industrial designs; integrated circuit
layout-designs; patents; monopolies for the developers of new plant varieties; trademarks; trade
dress; and undisclosed or confidential information.
169George K Foster, ‘Opposing Forces in a Revolution in International Patent Protection: The US
and India in the Uruguay Round and Its Aftermath’ (1998) 3(1) UCLA J Int’l L & Foreign Aff
283.
170See TRIPS Agreement, art 31.
171For a broad overview of Indian patent structure and compulsory licensing, see N S
Gopalakrishnan and T G Agitha, ‘The Indian Patent System: The Road Ahead’ in Ryō Shimanami
(ed), The future of the patent system (Edward Elgar Publishing 2012).
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capabilities; and the grounds on which a general compulsory license can be
requested by an interested person after the expiry of three years from the granting of
a patent are: (a) the reasonable requirements of the public have not been satisfied;
(b) the patented invention is not available to the public at a reasonably affordable
price; or (c) the invention is not worked in the territory of India.172 However, in the
last eight years after the enactment of the law, barely any legislation has emerged in
this regard. The only case, which has been very popular, is that of Natco v Bayer,
decided in 2012 which raised significant reactions.173 Yet, given how multinational
companies are engaging vigorously in making generic drugs and entering into
strategic alliance with Indian companies, it is difficult to say with certainty how the
judgement will impact the general application of principle of EFD in IPR in
India.174
Until date, there has not been a single competition law case that has invoked the
principle of EFD.175 Yet, the legislative framework on which competition authority
is built provides sufficient possibilities for EFD to be explored. For instance,
Section 4(c) of the Competition Act 2002, which asserts that denial of market
access to others by a dominant player would be an abuse of dominant position,
furnishes a fertile platform to invoke EFD. More precisely, Section 4(2)(e) of the
Competition Act 2002176 in India stipulates that an enterprise shall be considered to
172Indian Patents Act 2005, ss 84, 87, 92, 92A. See also s 107A, which is also known as Bolar
exception rule, which permits activities for the development of information required by the
authorities for approval of a generic version of a patented medicine.
173See Peter Roderick and Allyson M Pollock, ‘India's patent laws under pressure’ (2012) The
Lancet 380.9846: e2-e4 <https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(12)
61513-X/fulltext?rss=yes> accessed 11 May 2018. See also, Betsy Vinolia Rajasingh, ‘India's
First Compulsory Licence Over Bayer's Patent’ (2012) Journal of Intellectual Property Law and
Practice 482.
174See for instance, Sudip Choudhary, ‘Multinationals and Monopolies: Pharmaceutical Industry
in India After TRIPS’ (2012) 48 (12) Economic and Political Weekly 46.
175Something akin to the essential facilities doctrine has been noted by the Supreme Court, albeit
not in the context of antimonopoly law but the duty of private bodies performing public functions.
In the case of VST Industries Limited v VST Industries Workers’ Union and Anr (2001) 1 SCC 298
it was held that:
It is noticed that not all the activities of the private bodies are subject to private law, e.g., the
activities by private bodies may be governed by the standards of public when its decisions
are subject to duties conferred by statute or when by virtue of the function it is performing
or possible its dominant position in the market, it is under an implied duty to act in the
public interest (emphasis added)….
Further, the court asserted that any private company in India that is controlling infrastructure
facility through concession agreement as awarded by the government will be considered as per-
forming a public function and thus is expected to act in public interest. If the company refuses to
deal with any competitor then it would be under judicial scrutiny for performing an arbitrary action
of a body discharging public functions.
176The Competition Act 2002 (n 12).
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have abused its dominant position if it uses its dominant position in one market to
enter another market. Under the EC Treaty, Section 82 may involve markets where
there is no dominant company,177 and ‘leveraging’ may occur when a monopolist
uses power in one market to induce or foreclose sales in another market and thereby
monopolise both.178
Leveraging is a label for various types of conduct that have in common the
feature that they involve a firm that is active in two or more related markets.179 A
monopolistic firm may assert or ‘leverage’ its power to extend its monopoly to other
markets and thereby increase the social harm caused by the initial monopoly.180 In
the Microsoft case, leveraging was read into both infringements, regarding refusal
to supply interoperability information under Article 82(b) EC and tying of
Windows and Windows Media Player under Article 82(d) EC.
Leveraging, even though characterised by specificities and not universally
anticompetitive,181 affords very powerful way to justify application of EFD.
The CCI can make creative use of few other clauses to rest its case on EFD
principles. Section 18 provides for duty of the Commission to ‘eliminate practices
having adverse effect on competition’ and it should be construed broadly. Article
19 (3) and 19 (4) allow Commission to have regard with several factors that may
potentially threaten competition viz. barriers to new entrants, vertical integration of
the enterprise, etc. The Commission also has the liberty to make new regulations,
which could be done to conceptualise and produce a statutory understanding of
EFD.
177See, eg, ‘DG Competition Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to
ExclusionaryAbuses’ (2005) 8<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf>
accessed 10 May 2018.
178Robin Cooper Feldman, ‘Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust’ (1999) 87(6) Geo LJ 2079.
179McDonald (n 61) 207. See also, Louis Kaplow, ‘Extension of Monopoly Power through
Leverage’ (1985) 85(3) Colum L Rev 515.
180See Phillip E Areeda, Louis Kaplow and Aaron S Edlin, Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text and
Cases (6th edn, Aspen 2004) 382.
181There is a need to distinguish pro-competitive and anticompetitive leveraging. A firm indulging
in activities in several markets would constantly leverage. Not all leveraging conduct is violative
of competition law. For example, economies of scope-where it is cheaper to produce the two
products together than to make each separately-are an example of legitimate leveraging. See
Donoghue and Padilla (n 61) 208. The traditional belief that a firm with a monopoly in one
market always an incentive to extend that monopoly to a market for a complementary product, and
thereby get two monopoly profits instead of one has been positively influenced by the Chicago
School’s ‘single monopoly profit theorem’, according to which, a monopoly can choose to
exercise its power in other markets or can link markets, but in doing so it does not earn more than
one monopoly profit, it does not gain monopoly power over additional markets, and it does not
increase the harm caused to the society (see ibid). But recent developments rearticulate the design
of leveraging and proposed that it was possible to develop models in which leveraging behaviour
could be shown to harm consumer welfare (Donoghue and Padilla (n 61) 179).
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6 Why should Indian Practice be Sympathetic to a Liberal
Interpretation of EFD
There are several compelling reasons that warrant the Indian law on refusal to deal
to be modeled on the lines of European law. In fact, a plain reading of Article 82(b)
EC and Section 4(2)(b) of the Competition Act 2002 (which are the provisions
relating to refusal to deal), bring to notice the stark similarities in the language of
the provisions. A basic objective of Article 82 EC is to ensure fairness and protect
small and medium-sized firms. For instance, rules relating to predatory pricing were
justified on the basis that, below-cost prices could drive away undertakings as
efficient as dominant firms but which, because of their smaller financial resources,
are incapable of withstanding the competition waged against them.182 Several
prominent members who laid the foundation for the European Community belon-
ged to the ordoliberal school of thought, which believed that collaboration between
the Nazi regime and several private cartels led to the disintegration of Germany.183
They believed that social welfare was achievable only through an economic order
based on competition, where law would have the specific role of creating and
maintaining the conditions under which competition could function properly.
Ordoliberal thinking184 on the goal of competition law was based on notions of
‘fairness’ and that firm with market power should behave ‘as if’ there was effective
competition. Dominant firms were commercially free to compete on the merits. But
small and medium-sized enterprises were important to consumer welfare and should
receive some protection. Such an objective is consistent with the Indian policies.
The Indian Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act has been
enacted ‘to provide for facilitating the promotion and development and enhancing
the competitiveness of micro, small and medium enterprises.’185 The number of
micro, small and medium enterprises in India is estimated to be around 361 lakh,
which contribute about 37.5% to GDP, over 40% to the manufacturing output and
around 40% to the national exports.186 Thus a competition policy in India will have
to protect and foster the small and medium enterprises and not stifle their growth.
This part will develop a theoretical framework, in order to explain why countries
like India are in need to following EU approach towards EFD. Refusal to license
182See Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v Commission [1991] ECR 1-3359, para 72.
183McDonald (n 61) 8–9. See also David J Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century
Europe: Protecting Prometheus (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1998).
184McDonald (n 183).
185The Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act 2006, No 27 of 2006.
186Annual Report 2015–16, Government of India, Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium
Enterprises <http://msme.gov.in/sites/default/files/MEME%20ANNUAL%20REPORT%202015-
16%20ENG.pdf> accessed 18 August 2017, which used the data collected in the Fourth All
India Census of MSMEs 2006–2007, Government of India, Development Commissioner (MSME),
Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises <http://www.dcmsme.gov.in/publications/
census10.pdf> accessed 18 August 2017.
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cases could be costlier for India (and other developing nations), where IPR regime
is weak, and incurs high transaction costs. Following part shows that EFD is a
liability regime, compared to the property regime of voluntary licensing, and
compare the two regimes from transaction costs perspective. From theories of
bargaining power, it is clear that refusal to license is a result of high transaction
costs. Further, chapter also shows, through nontrivial empirical work that refusal to
license results from weak IPR regime of the society. This way, authors connect
weakness of IPR regime with high transaction cost, and because liability rules are
suitable for societies with high transaction costs, there is merit in appreciating the
value of EFD in those societies. India is one such society, given the weakness of its
IPR regime. Through such analytical framework, this chapter builds a powerful tool
of transaction costs as a determinant of deciding, which judicial direction should be
taken as regards EFD.
6.1 The Property-Liability Framework as Explained
Through Transaction Costs
An interesting theoretical treatment of ‘need for EFD’ can be developed from
property-liability dichotomy.187 The elegant difference between property rules and
liability rules was set in the analytical manner in Calabresi-Melamed’s seminal
paper published in 1972.188 This was an interesting and convincing analytical tool
stimulating scholars in various disciplines—most notably in law and economics—
to cross-navigate beyond established terminology to appreciate functional and
formal differences/congruence between two different areas of law—property and
liability.189 The property-liability rule framework has inspired a range of scholar-
ship in issues related to legal protection of information goods,190 and has been
187This framework is developed in detail, in Padmanabha Ramanujam and Yugank Goyal, ‘One
View of Compulsory Licensing: Comparative Perspectives from India and Canada’ (2014) 18(2)
Marq Intell Prop L Rev 369.
188Calabresi and Melamed (n 13).
189It was because of this article, along with his other seminal work in tort law that he is considered
to be a founder of law and economics movement, along with Ronald Coase and Richard Posner.
Under his influence (he was the Dean of Yale Law School) Yale Law School became one of the
leading centre for economics influenced legal scholarship.
190See Roger D Blair and Thomas F Cotter, ‘An Economic Analysis of Damages Rules in
Intellectual Property Law’ (1998) 39(5) Wm & Mary L Rev 1585 (for demonstrating using
Cathedral’s paper how should baseline recovery in case of IP infringement be decided—plaintiff’s
damages or defendant’s profits accrued from infringement). For a critical argument utilizing
Cathedral paper in favour of injunctive relief in internet context, see Dan L Burk, ‘The Trouble
with Trespass’ (2000) 4(1) J Small & Emerging Bus L 27. See also, in context of copyright law,
Alex Kozinski and Christopher Newman, ‘What's So Fair about Fair Use—The 1999 Donald C.
Brace Memorial Lecture Delivered at Fordham University School of Law on November 11, 1999’
(1999) 46(4) J Copyright Society USA 513.
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extremely useful in understanding copyright collectives,191 determining appropriate
protection of incentives to innovate192 and explaining relationship between several
property, including IP regimes.193
Calabresi-Melamed’s work differentiates property and liability approach to
entitlement in a fairly neat way:
An entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent that someone who wishes to
remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in
which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller. It is the form of entitlement
which gives rise to the least amount of state intervention: once the original entitlement is
decided upon, the state does not try to decide its value. It lets each of the parties say how
much the entitlement is worth to him, and gives the seller a veto if the buyer does not offer
enough… Whenever someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an
objectively determined value for it, an entitlement is protected by a liability rule…
Obviously, liability rules involve an additional stage of state intervention: not only are
entitlements protected, but their transfer or destruction is allowed on the basis of a value
determined by some organ of the state rather than by the parties themselves.194
Hence, a property rule is a legal entitlement that can be bought only after
bargaining with the entitlement holder and the price for the transaction is mutually
decided by the buyer (holder) and seller of the right. Under a liability rule on the
other hand, a tribunal (third party) will determine the appropriate compensation in
an ex-post proceeding.
But how does one choose which rule to be employed. Their paper establishes
that transaction cost195 is the primary determinant of that choice. Whenever market
transaction costs are low, property rules are preferred; while liability rules are
favoured when the transaction costs are high.196 This is easy to understand.
Whether parties can negotiate for the transaction of the right is a direct function of
how costly the bargaining process is. In other words, transaction costs will deter-
mine whether price discovery will be a result of negotiation or a third party will
impose prices it has determined on the basis of (so-called) objective criteria. The
doctrine asserts that low transaction costs favour negotiation and reaching a
191Robert P Merges, 'Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective
Rights Organizations' (1996) 84(5) Cal L Rev 1293.
192Mark Schankerman and Suzanne Scotchmer, ‘Damages and Injunctions in Protecting
Intellectual Property’ (2001) 32 Journal of Industrial Economics 199.
193J H Reichman, ‘Legal Hybrids between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms’ (1994) 94(8)
Colum L Rev 2432.
194Calabresi and Melamed (n 13).
195Simply put, transaction costs in terms of law and economics are those costs that are incurred in
making an economic exchange. These may include search and information costs, bargaining costs,
enforcement costs, contracting costs, negotiation costs. Transaction cost economics has led to
series of development in law and economics scholarship. See for first theoretical reference to it,
Ronald R Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm: Origin’ (1988) 4(1) J L Econ & Org 3. See also,
Oliver E Williamson, ‘The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach’ (1981)
87 American Journal of Sociology 548.
196Calabresi and Melamed (n 13).
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Coasian bargain,197 while high transaction costs will impede any such solution to
be achieved.198 Therefore in case of high transaction costs, parties will not be able
to come to a mutually agreeable solution, and hence the need of a third party
(tribunal or any government institution) which can declare the damage quantum and
ensure the same. Low transaction costs facilitate negotiation and adjustments, so
there is no need of a third party to enforce a bargain. The parties themselves can
contract mutually. However, when institutional design of voluntary negotiation is
ineffective due to high transaction costs, liability rule (third party enforcement) suits
best. Low transaction costs would imply that (a) parties to a transaction are easily
identifiable to each other, (b) there is no significant difference in bargaining power
between the parties so negotiations could conclude favorably, and (c) a third party
setting the terms of the exchange would have a difficult time doing so quickly and
cheaply, given the specialized nature of the assets and the varied and complex
business environments in which the assets are deployed.199 This approach generally
builds the argument that property rules are better suited to protect IP as opposed to
liability rules in case of low transaction cost. Liability rules always come with an
efficiency loss and their application in presence of low transaction costs does not
make sense since the objective can be achieved at a lesser cost. One can imagine
such efficiency losses in costs imposed by incomplete information of the third party,
inefficient fixation of price, diminished utility of the parties, procedural delays and
constraints, administrative expenses, flaws in institutional design, generation of
perverse incentives, possibilities of errors, political economy factors, psychological
costs or perhaps, the transaction not taking place at all (which happens to be the
case many a times). On the other hand, in presence of high transaction costs,
liability rules are employed to avoid the danger of adopting a suboptimal solution, a
result that flows naturally if Coase theorem is modified and viewed from a non-zero
transaction cost perspective.200 The cost of incorporating liability rule in a property
rule set-up is offset by the exercise of the transaction, which should yield a higher
optimal outcome.
An EFD framework kicks in, when one of the parties has to be forced to offer
access to its facility/facilities. This can be viewed as a standard application of
liability rule approach to have a property transaction be concluded. Indeed, if the
owner of a facility is principally free to decide who to contract with and who to
avoid in sharing the facility, an enforced obligation by either the regulatory
197Coase in his seminal article suggested that if initial entitlements are clear, they do not matter in
absence of transaction costs. Efficient solution will always be reached no matter who has the
entitlement. This is famously called Coase Theorem. He proposed that if transaction costs are
negligible, parties can effectively negotiate and contract to buy the right. Whoever values it more
will get it, and that in fact is efficient solution. See Ronald Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’
(1960) 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1.
198Calabresi and Melamed (n 13) 1106–8.
199Robert P Merges, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of
Blocking Patents’ (1994) 62(1) Tenn L Rev 75.
200See Coase (n 197) 23.
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institutions or competition courts, is imposing liability rule. From theoretical
treatment of property-liability framework flowing from Calabresi-Melamed’s paper,
it is easy to view EFD from the lens of transaction costs.
EFD therefore portrays liability framework because the rights holders are pro-
tected by a ‘liability rule’ (royalty set by the government) instead of a ‘property
rule’ (receipt of an injunction with the rights holder then negotiating the price out
with potential buyers).201 Hence, while EFD stands as a true liability rule, property
rule is invoked whenever licenses are given on voluntary basis. From purely legal
standpoint, the significant leap that this framework achieves is an alternative view
of EFD, justified by theoretical considerations and providing a technical impetus
towards sustained usage of the doctrine.
6.2 Refusal to License and Transaction Costs: View
from Bargaining Power Differences
Careful examination of the scope, complexity and quantum of individual transac-
tions involved makes it easier to believe that indeed, transaction costs are very
important. These transaction costs rests not necessarily on the ability to identify
who owns the property, or on the synchronization of their willingness to pay and
accept, but on the difference in bargaining power between the contracting parties.
To elaborate on this, authors rely on simple economic framework of bargaining
power.
Consider a bargaining space in Cartesian coordinate framework as illustrated in
Fig. 1, as simple representation of bargaining space.202 A and B are two players
who have their respective reserve levels in the absence of reaching any agreement
(or concluding a bargaining process successfully). These reserve levels can be
considered as initial endowments. The X-axis shows the utility that B receives in
executing the agreement and Y-axis refers to utility of A—this also shows pref-
erence orders of both parties—A wants the agreement to be reached as high up
along Y-axis, while B would like to stretch bargaining to take the agreement as far
along X-axis.
The circle shows all possible sets of outcomes possible. But the bargaining can
happen only in the zone of possible alternatives where players are better off in
reaching an agreement than without it. This space in Fig. 1 is shown by cross-
hatched area. Bargaining can conclude anywhere in this space. A subset of this
space from where no further gains are possible without incurring at least one of the
players lose is called Pareto frontier, denoted by the arc in the bargaining space.
Movement towards the frontier creates value for both parties (even if in different
sizes) and movement along the frontier changes redistributes the surplus. The Nash
201Calabresi and Melamed (n 13).
202See Andreas Wamtjen, ‘Bargaining’, Encyclopedia of Power (1st edn, 2011).
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bargaining solution (NBS) in the figure is also shown, which is a Pareto efficient
solution to this problem.203
Bargaining power also stems from events outside the bargaining process. This is
the concept of outside options in a bargain.204 Outside options are those events that
may affect the player’s behaviour towards bargaining process. Mathematical
models are shown in which actors restrict the bargaining space in their favor by
eliminating some unfavourable outcomes as principally unacceptable.205 A new
Fig. 1 Bargaining Space with reserve levels and Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS)
203Nash bargaining solution is an approach to find how is the bargaining surplus split between the
parties, and follows cooperative game theory. Mathematically, in mathematical terms, is a solution
that satisfies: (a) independence to affine transformations, (b) Pareto optimality, (c) independence of
irrelevant alternatives, and (d) symmetry. The seminal paper in this regard is John F Nash,
‘Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games’ Proceedings of the national academy of sciences 36.1
(1950) 48. Even non-cooperative game theory yields surprisingly similar solutions, under
appropriate conditions.
204See Avner Shaked and John Sutton, ‘Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a
Bargaining Model’ (1984) 52 (6) Econometrica 1351. Martin J Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein,
Bargaining and markets (Academic Press, San Diego 1990). Clara Ponsatí and József Sákovics,
‘Rubinstein Bargaining with Two-Sided Outside Options’ (1998) 11 (3) Economic Theory 667.
205See also Thomas C Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge MA: Harvard University
Press 1960).
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outside option tends to increase the non-agreement value for one player, and this
player achieves a higher bargaining power during the transaction. The outside
options increase reserve utility or initial endowment of the player. This pattern is
easy to visualise from Fig. 2, where the new NBS has shifted to the right, in favor
of B, because B’s initial endowment increased. If the reserve levels increase further,
they can actually fall outside the bargaining space, meaning player B will not
engage into the bargaining process at all, since payoffs in no-agreement are higher
for her, compared to the payoffs in any agreeable situation.
This is exactly what happens in a situation where EFD comes into picture. The
transaction costs of engaging into bargaining are so high that property rule approach
ceases to act. Liability rule takes over, and solutions are sought after a third party’s
intervention. Even though the owner of the facility can take license fee for access to
its facility to another party, the total surplus it can gain by retaining/capturing its
dominant position in the market is much larger than the revenues accrued from
licensing fee. This is indeed, a social loss. The solution therefore comes in the form
of an involuntary contract enforced by a third party, invoking EFD. The govern-
ment authorises itself to allow other parties to use the facility, without the voluntary
consent of the owner of the facility, and sets out to dictate licensing agreements and
fees. In these cases, the public interest in broader access to the invention is
Fig. 2 Outside option shifts bargaining solution in favour of the player, which has increased
initial endowment/reserve level
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considered more important than the private interest of the right holder to fully
exploit his exclusive rights.206
The preceding discussion helps us imagine refusal to license as an act of a party,
which has very high bargaining power, relative to the other party. If the difference in
bargaining power of randomly selected transacting parties in a society is fairly high, it
can be understood to be reflective of high transaction costs of the society.207 This is
evident in say, feudal or rural societies where the difference in bargaining power
forces non-elites to be evicted from the market and transactions between elites and
non-elites become unaffordable for the non-elites.208 In similar vein, the structure of
transaction costs can be understood from how a large difference in bargaining power
exists between transacting parties. In other words, bargaining power differences act as
a robust proxy for how high transaction costs are, in a society.
6.3 Strength of IPR Regime as Explained through
Occurrence of Refusal to License
From the preceding discussion it can be concluded that (a) liability approach is
warranted if the transaction costs are high, and (b) high transaction costs result in
refusal to license. Refusal to license is a proxy to understand the strength of IPR
regime of a society.
A license is a commercial contract between licensor and licensee. Primarily, it
specifies two basic features—the subject material which has an intellectual property
(IP) and functional use of the subject material. The licensee compensates the
licensor for use of licensed subject by a flat fee (lump-sum) and/or through royalties
based on income earned by the licensee. The royalty rate can be fixed or varying
percentage of licensee’s value of output, units of output, profits or sales.209
Licensees save the expense of independent research and development (R&D) for
the licensee and licensor derive fees and royalties.
206See for compulsory licensing, Jerome H Reichmann and Catherine Hasenzahl, ‘Non-Voluntary
Licensing of Patented Inventions’ UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable
Development (Issue Paper No 5 June 2003) <http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/docs/Reichman
%20-%20Non-voluntary%20Licensing%20-%20Blue%205.pdf> accessed 19 August 2017.
207See Duncan Kennedy, ‘Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law with
Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power’ (1982) 41(4) Md L Rev
563 for Inequality of bargaining power.
208ibid. Jim Chen, ‘The Nature of the Public Utility: Infrastructure, the Market, and the Law’
(2004) 98(4) Nw U L Rev 1617 which dwells upon the premise that rural markets are high in cost,
from a consumer-service provider bargaining perspective. However, an analogy can be drawn with
competitors in rural or feudalistic societies relying upon the notion of unequal bargaining power
increasing the transaction cost.
209For a useful working description, see Alan S Gutterman, The Law of Domestic and
International Strategic Alliances: A Survey for Corporate Management (Quorum Books,
Westport, CT 1995). See also Bharat N Anand and Tarun Khanna, ‘The Structure of Licensing
Contracts’ (2000) 48 Journal of Industrial Economics 103.
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If IPR regimes are strong—respect for property rights is high, identification of
right holder and contours of rights is clear, uncertainties and bargaining costs are
low, enforcement is high and there is emphasis on incentives to innovate over
access, there is low likelihood that licenses will be reduced. This is simply because
as long as willingness to pay is higher than willingness to accept, the trade will
happen, and there are no intervening factors that can thwart it. All intervening
factors for transaction to be successful—in strong IPR structures—favour the
transaction, keeping the costs low. On the other hand, weak IPR regimes are
characterised by under-enforcement, blurred and uncertain scope of rights, impetus
on access rather than innovation, thinly designed institutions, lack of political will
to make IPR stronger and high bargaining costs (which leads to stealth and piracy).
In such societies, licensing will be difficult to achieve due to prevalent uncertainty
and nebulous character of how rights are drawn. People have incentives to simply
get around the system rather than engaging into negotiation. Intuitively also, it is
not difficult to understand why licensing thrives in strong IP regimes.210 Since
stealing is cheaper, and observing infringement is costly, it builds incentives to
refuse license. In extreme situations, it leads to situations that invoke EFD.
There have been several studies taking different approaches but arriving at the
same conclusions. In 1984, Farok Contractor attempted to correlate patent protec-
tion and licensing using cross-sectional data, which explained the determinants of
the ratio of receipts in the US of royalties and licensing fees from unaffiliated
sources to various measures of direct investment activity.211 The study defined
patent intensity of a nation by flows of new patents in force. Technology transfer on
the other hand was used as proxy for licensing. The study found that patent
intensity did attract licensing. The argument behind this observation is that patent
protection increases the income extractable from licensing. In another well-cited
study, Edwin Mansfield established212 that multinationals are less likely to engage
in technology transfer (licensing) with firms of countries where IP protection is
weak.213 In yet another study, Pamela Smith infers214 that the effect of stronger
210For an elaborate theoretical discussion that started very early on, see Nancy T Gallini, ‘Patent
Policy and Costly Imitation’ (1984) 23 Rand Journal of Economics 52.
211Farok J Contractor, ‘Choosing Between Direct Investment and Licensing: Theoretical
Considerations and Empirical Tests’ (1984) 15 Journal of International Business Studies 167.
212Edwin Mansfield, ‘Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct Investment, and Technology
Transfer’ (International Finance Corporation 1994) Discussion Paper No 19 <http://documents.
worldbank.org/curated/en/888591468739296453/pdf/multi-page.pdf> accessed 27 September,
2017.
213However, this finding depends on the industry or nature of the technology. US firms in the
chemicals and electronics industries appeared to place a greater emphasis on intellectual property
protection, whereas firms in the metals and transportation industries were seen to be less reliant on
it. ibid 2.
214Pamela Smith, ‘How Do Foreign Patent Rights Affect US Exports, Affiliate Sales, and
Licenses?’ (2001) 48 Journal of International Economics 151.
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IPRs on international licensing depends on the imitative capabilities of host
countries, by drawing on cross-sectional data on US multinationals’ licensing
activities in 50 countries.215
Even after extending the scope and methodology, it is found that strong patent
rights and licensing activities are positively correlated. Yang and Maskus extended
the analysis of US foreign licensing to a panel data set covering three time periods
(1985, 1990 and 1995) and 23 partner countries, of which approximately ten are
emerging market economies. They found that countries with stronger patent rights
attract larger volumes of licensed technology.216 More recently, Michael Nicholson
finds that R&D intensive firms are more apt to license when patent protection is
strong.217 His approach—which involved cross-sectional empirical analysis and it
pools together data for 1995 from 49 destination countries and 82 industries—was
to focus on count data rather than value data.
While previous studies were using Bureau of Economic Analysis aggregated
industry or national level data, Branstetter and others conducted a study using
Bureau of Economic Analysis micro-data. A key finding was that IPR reforms—
signifying strength of patent protection—stimulate US firms to license abroad to
affiliated parties.218 Anand and Khanna attempted to explore how much is licensing
dependent on IPR protection levels. The study employed data on international
licensing contracts from the Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances database of the
Securities Data Company,219 and founds that while in some sectors (semiconduc-
tor), the dependence is low, but in many others (pharmaceutical and chemical, for
instance), IPR levels significantly determine activity in licensing.220
215In situations where imitative risk is low, stronger IPRs serve primarily to raise rents to rights
holders. In countries where imitative capabilities are high, stronger patent rights stimulate licensing
to unaffiliated foreign firms.
216Guifang Yang and Keith E Maskus (2001), ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing: An
Econometric Investigation’ (2001) 137 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 58.
217Michael Nicholson, ‘The Impact of Industry Characteristics on International Technology
Transfer’ (2003) Bureau of Economics, Washington, DC, Federal Trade Commission Working
Paper as referred to in Keith E Maskus, Intellectual Property, Growth and Trade: Frontiers of
Economics and Globalization, vol 2 (Emerald Group Publishing Limited 2007).
218Lee G Branstetter, Raymond Fisman and C Fritz Foley, ‘Do Stronger Intellectual Property
Rights Increase International Technology Transfer? Empirical Evidence from U. S. Firm-Level
Panel Data’ (2006) 121 (1) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 321.
219Anand (n 209).
220See, however, Andrea Fosfuri, ‘Country Risk and the International Flows of Technology:
Evidence from the Chemical Industry’ (2000) Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Working Paper
<https://e-archivo.uc3m.es/bitstream/id/63/wb022514.pdf/> accessed 11 May 2018. This paper
established weak effects of IPRs on international licensing and found that patent rights have an
insignificant or negative effect on licensing. It used firm-level data for the world chemical
industry. However, this study was focusing only on firms with process innovations. And for
such innovations, patents may not be the most effective mechanism. In fact, it has been noted
that biotechnology—a standard process innovation—firms prefer trade secrecy to patent pro-
tection. See, eg, Nikolaus Thumm, ‘Research and Patenting in Biotechnology: A Survey in
Switzerland’ (2003) Swiss Federal Institute of Intellectual Property, Publication No 1 (12.03)
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A research conducted by OECD,221 deserves our special attention because of its
elaborate methodology, recent nature and effectiveness of control variables.222 This
study considered the relationship between strengthening of IPR and licensing
activities, particularly in 1990s, in developing countries. It employed a regression
analysis to draw on an international data set to consider the relationship over time
between changes in the host-country patent regime and changes in the number of
licensing transactions between developed and developing countries. The strength of
IPR was measured by different IP index, like patent rights,223 copyrights224 and
trademarks,225 and finally the fourth index examines enforcement effectiveness.226
The study finds general support for the proposition that strengthening of IPRs has a
net positive effect on technology transfer via licensing. It is interesting to note that
licensing fees and royalties were found to vary positively with stronger patent rights
and effectiveness of the enforcement.227
6.4 Connecting the Variables
The three analytical statements are:
(a) Liability rules are favored in high transaction cost scenario (and low transaction
costs are fertile for property rule approach)
<https://www.ige.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/dienstleistungen/publikationen_institut/j10005e.pdf>
accessed 11 May 2018. Process innovations are harder to enforce compared to product
innovations.
221Walter Park and Douglas Lippoldt, ‘The Impact of Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights
on trade and Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries’ (OECD Papers, Paris 2003)
Special Issue on Trade Policy, vol 3 No 11, Paper No 294.
222The study is conducted first using aggregate data, then the firm-level data. Variables that needed
controlling were, for e.g., gross productivity, corruption, tariff rates and country risks.
223The measure of patent rights index was taken from Juan C Ginarte and Walter G Park,
‘Determinants of Patent rights: A Cross National Study’ (1997) 26 Research Policy 283; and
Walter G Park and Smita Wagh, ‘Chapter 2: Index of Patent Rights’ in James Gwartney and
Robert A Lawson (eds), Economic Freedom of the World Annual Report 2002 (Fraser Institute,
Vancouver, BC 2002) 33–42 <https://object.cato.org/pubs/efw/efw2002/efw02-ch2.pdf> accessed
11 May 2018.
224Copyrights index is taken from Taylor W Reynolds, ‘Quantifying the Evolution of Copyright
and Trademark Law’ (doctoral dissertation paper, American University 2003).
225ibid.
226No formal study has been done to measure enforcement effectiveness, but some information
collected by Park and Lippoldt comes from reports filed with US Trade Representatives. See the
annual USTR reports entitled National Trade Estimate: Report on Foreign Trade Barriers
<https://ustr.gov/archive/Document_Library/Section_Index.html> accessed 27 September 2017.
227Copyrights and trademarks rights were found to exercise comparatively weak influences. This
may be due to a number of factors, which don’t merit our attention here, except that there needs to
be due appreciation of diverse nature of these intellectual properties and therefore one must
understand that they deserve to be treated differently.
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(b) High transaction costs (emerging from difference in bargaining power) lead to
refusal to license,
(c) Refusal to license reflects weak IPR regimes
Therefore, as a corollary, it follows that
(d) Weak IPR regimes need to adopt liability rules.
This forms the central message of our theoretical treatment. With considerations
made in the analysis—which reasonably elaborate on underlying principles—this
framework has potential to aid to the existing discourse by adding new dimension
to the debate. Once EFD is understood as a liability approach, a country’s IPR
strength can be investigated and performance to devise a general approach towards
EFD, and varying the narrowness in which EFD clauses can be interpreted both at
judiciary and executive level.
6.5 Why is Indian IPR Regime Weak?
From historical standpoint, Indian intellectual tradition has been fairly open in
terms of access.228 The concepts of IP emerged only during colonial rule, and even
today, legislative construction has been largely modeled on British statutes. In fact,
the emergence of IP globally has been considered purely a European idea, emerging
in seventeenth century, strengthening through late nineteenth and twentieth century
aided by American impetus, and being transported to non-Western nations through
international treaties.229
The Indian copyright law closely parallels the development of the same law in
England. The Copyright Act 1914 of India was basically, an extension of British
Copyright Act 1911; just like the present Copyright Act 1957 is borrowed exten-
sively from Copyright Act of the United Kingdom of 1956.230 This gives it a de
jure color of copyright protection, but a de facto culture of fearless infringement.
According to studies commissioned by Motion Picture Distributors’ Association
(local office of Hollywood’s Motion Picture Association), India tops the chart for
maximum film piracy in English-speaking world.231 In 2012, the US Trade
Representative’s highest Priority Watch List had figures India amongst thirteen
228There were restrictions based on caste. But that does not affect our analysis here, since the focus
is not on reach of access but how is access provided.
229See, eg, Peter Drahos, ‘The Universality of Intellectual Property Rights: Origins and
Development’ (1998) WIPO Panel Discussion on Intellectual Property and Human Rights.
230The latest amendment was done in 2012, which even though attempts to curb piracy strongly, is
still embedded in the existing structure.
231Utpal Borpujari, ‘India Major Online Film Piracy Hub’ Deccan Herald (New Delhi, 15
December 2009) <http://www.deccanherald.com/content/41541/india-major-online-film-piracy.
html> accessed 27 September 2017.
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countries with huge online piracy.232 It continues to remain so.233 Story of trade-
marks is also similar, with huge counterfeit market of goods emerging in India even
though two experiments with re-institutionalizing the relevant statutory laws.234 In
fact, earlier studies indicate similar pattern—study sponsored by Ministry of
Human Resource and Development of Indian government, copyright piracy has
been noted to be significantly high.235 Socially, this is catapulted from very high
levels of poverty and affordability issues. In fact, a strict enforcement of copyright
will evict substantial amount of population from accessing copyrighted material and
therefore political will to curb infringement is rather low—contextually reasonable.
And hence, it is not surprising that through efforts of India, which led the devel-
oping nations to adopt Stockholm Protocol of 1967 that enables developing
countries to adopt greater access for copyright materials; the Protocol’s adoption
created a crisis in international copyright.236 In its own legislation, India has
exempted significant number of uses of copyright material exempted from
infringement.237 The wide interpretation of this fair dealing clause as illustrated in
the Act itself gives considerable latitude for accessing copyrighted material without
payment. In fact, Consumer International rated Indian Copyright Act 1957 at top
position (2009 and 2010) in terms of enabling access to knowledge.238
Evolution of patent laws is not very different, principally. Pharmaceutical patents
were first introduced by the British in 1856.239 This translated to heavy influence of
232See The Deadline Team, ‘Familiar Names on US Piracy Watchlist as Online Theft on Rise’
(Deadline, 30 April 2012) <http://www.deadline.com/2012/04/familiar-names-on-u-s-piracy-
watchlist-as-online-theft-on-rise/> accessed 27 September 2017.
233See Nayanima Basu, ‘India Likely to Remain Under ‘Priority Watch List’ in US IPR Report’
The Hindu BusinessLine (New Delhi, 11 January 2017) <http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/
economy/india-likely-to-remain-under-priority-watch-list-in-us-ipr-report/article9474144.ece>
accessed 28 September 2017.
234The first statutory design was Trade Marks Act 1940, modeled on the UK Trade Marks Act
1938. With certain modifications, The Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 came into force,
which was repealed by Trade Marks Act 1999. For newspaper coverage of recent trademark
infringement <http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/keyword/counterfeit-products> acces-
sed 28 September 2017.
235Findings of the study can be accessed online N K Nair, A K Barman and Utpal Chattopadhyay,
‘Study on Copyright Piracy in India’ (1999) National Productivity Council, Ministry of Human
Resource Development <http://copyright.gov.in/Documents/STUDY%20ON%20COPYRIGHT%
20PIRACY%20IN%20INDIA.pdf> accessed 27 September 2017.
236See H Sacks, ‘Crisis in International Copyright: The Protocol Regarding Developing Countries’
(1969) Journal of Business Law 26.
237s 52 of Indian Copyright Act 1957 mentions an extensive list of actions that will not amount to
infringement. See <http://copyright.gov.in/Documents/CopyrightRules1957.pdf> accessed 20
September 2017.
238See <https://cis-india.org/a2k/ci-ip-watchlist-report-2012> for an extensive report on India. For
Consumer International’s IP Watch List, visit, Consumer International’s website. Its 2009 IP
Watch List can be found at <https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/ip-watch-
list-20100220.pdf> both accessed 25 September 2017.
239See Parameswaran Narayanan, Patent Law (Kolkata Eastern Law House 2006).
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foreign firms (which controlled 70% of Indian market),240 and high drug prices.241
The realization came in 1970, when India enacted Indian Patents Act 1970, that
prohibited product patent on medicines. This Act has acted as the main thrust to
India’s pharmaceutical industry,242 leading to steep fall in number of patents
granted.243 Although law permitted process patents on medicines,244 it was rarely
sought and had limited scope.245 This therefore gave rise to a number of local
pharmaceutical firms increasing their share of the market.246 Indian firms employed
reverse engineering and developed new processes for the drugs. Over the next three
decades, Indian pharmaceutical industry became extremely competitive and
diverse247 and by 1990s, India started producing the most inexpensive medicines in
the world.248 The situation changed after TRIPS to which India opposed initially,249
but finally acceded. However, it incorporated several flexibilities that the TRIPS
allow, notably that of compulsory licensing. Overall, India is labeled ‘pharmacy of
the developing world’250 due to its extremely access-friendly patent laws rather
than rights-friendly structure. Even though the Patents (Amendment) Act 2005,
being TRIPS-complied, has stricter provisions for rights, the reality has not changed
240P K Ramachandran and B V Rangarao, ‘The Pharmaceutical Industry in India’ (1972) 7
Economic and Political Weekly 27.
241Staff of Senate sub-committee on Antitrust and Monopoly 87th Congress, 1st Session, Rep No
448 (27 June 1961), which showed India with the highest prices of the seventeen countries
surveyed, which included the United States. See, for report and other aspects of the sub-committee,
Daniel D Adams and William E Nelson, ‘The Drug Amendments of 1962’ (1963) 38(6) NYU L
Rev 1082.
242Jean O Lanjouw, ‘The Introduction of Pharmaceutical Product Patents in India: Heartless
Exploitation of Poor and Suffering’ (Economic Growth Center, Yale University 1997) Center
Discussion Paper No 775 <https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/98364/1/cdp775.pdf>
accessed 11 May 2018.
243ibid.
244See The Patents Act 1970, s 53(1) (a). For example, such patents only lasted for the shorter of
five years from the date of grant or seven years from the date the patent was filed.
245H Ashok Chandra Prasad and Shripad Bhat, ‘Strengthening India’s Patent System: Implications
for Pharmaceutical Sector’ (1993) 28 Economic and Political Weekly 1037.
246This was accompanied by other regulatory and policy measures that the government took to
encourage building local markets against foreign firms.
247For an overview of how pharmaceutical industry developed after patent law was enacted, see
Sudip Chaudhuri, The WTO and India’s Pharmaceutical Industry: Patent Protection, TRIPS and
Developing Countries (Oxford University Press, New Delhi 2005); and Aradhna Aggarwal,
‘Strategic Approach to Strengthening the International Competitiveness in Knowledge Based
Industries: The Indian Pharmaceutical Industry’ (Research and Information System for Developing
Countries 2004) Discussion Paper No 80 <http://ris.org.in/sites/default/files/pdf/Dp80_pap.pdf>
accessed 20 September 2017.
248ibid.
249George K Foster, ‘Opposing Forces in a Revolution in International Patent Protection: The US
and India in the Uruguay Round and its Aftermath’ (1998) 3(1) UCLA J Int'l L & Foreign Aff 283.
250Leena Menghaney, ‘Patent Dispute: Delhi High Court Gives a Boost to Access to Affordable
Medicines’ (2010) 7 Indian Journal of Medical Ethics 97.
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significantly. Indian law per se does not allow patents for softwares (it has copyright
for softwares) and business methods. Until 2008, merely 22 cases in Supreme Court
and High Courts in India dealt with the important issue of revocation of patents
(Section 64)—showing not only dismal awareness and litigiousness of IPR
cases,251 but also highlights that the general framework indicates weakness of IPR
regime.
WIPO’s Global Innovation Index Ranking 2017 places India at 60th position,
below several East European and Middle East nations.252 That this may be a result
of weak IPR regime needs further qualification, but if standard theory is correct,
there is definitely some correlation. Scholars have constructed an index of patent
rights and have shown that the index is highly correlated with per capita GDP,
accordingly Global North (producers of innovation) typically provide stronger
patent protection than their counterparts in the Global South (consumers of inno-
vation).253 India, which clearly falls under the ‘consumers of innovation’ category,
makes it abundantly evident that it is characterised by weak IPR regime.
6.6 Therefore, India needs EFD Expansively
The above finding, when placed in our analytical skeleton of viewing EFD through
transaction cost network, reaffirms the view that India requires a proactive approach
towards EFD. Since weak IPR regimes require liability approach, and India’s IP
regime is indeed weak, there is compelling reason that it adopts an extensive
manner to interpret EFD through competition authorities. Since regulatory agencies
assume the responsibility to police firms in their jurisdiction to ensure that facilities,
which are essential, not be refused to share, given certain conditions, there is a need
for such regulatory agency in the domain of IPR as well. IPR has significant
spillover effects due to its—basically—a public good nature. And it has dramatic
consequence for shaping the contours of competition in a relevant market. In fact it
is surprising to imagine that competition authority has not been able to realise its
true role and potential, in perhaps the same way as it has been done by regulatory
agencies of network goods in infrastructure. Given the theoretical framework
developed in this chapter, there is no need for CCI to be painfully cautious in
engaging with market players who seem to advocate their rights to IP trumping
everything else. At multiple levels, the CCI needs to be proactive in an evolving
competition law regime, and developing oversight to an important area of EFD will
create poor precedents for future.
251Although this has been changing rapidly. See, Sehba Hussain, ‘The Intellectual Property
Rights-What do Indians Perceive’ (2009) 5 International review of Business Research Papers 315.
252World Intellectual Property Organization, Global Innovation Rankings <http://www.wipo.int/
edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_gii_2017.pdf> accessed 27 September 2017.
253Ginarte and Park (n 223).
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7 Conclusion
In certain ways, the chapter’s contribution is straightforward. Given the charac-
teristic of the doctrine being heavily inspired from case laws across US and EU,
there is a considerable lesson that can be drawn by studying how the case laws
evolved and what are the pivots of differences between diverse approaches adopted
by US and EU. Once the case laws are distilled over time, it becomes easy to
observe the legislative designs in light of case laws as they gave emerged. This
gives us a clue towards generalizing framework of approach in India. The real
lacuna where academic intervention is sought remains in the IP driven model of
EFD. This is modeled through the property-liability conceptualization. Authors
borrow from the concept of bargaining cost, the tool of transaction costs and
positioning it—as it has been in the Calabresi and Melamed’s paper—within the
property-liability framework. The idea of bargaining power helps us develop the
tool of transaction costs which can squarely suit the purpose of EFD. The authors
conclude that for countries where strength of IPR is low, the doctrine needs broader
interpretation. This is true for India, and is easily transportable to other developing
nations.
The chapter in no way makes an argument towards completeness of the model,
in explaining factors on which characteristics of EFD depends. Indeed, a host of
other factors determine the doctrine, including royalty fee, duration, scope, legal
framework, international obligation, expected hit in FDI, market potential, public
funds towards innovation and the like. The chapter attempts to create a discourse on
one of the fundamental grounds of EFD, namely the transaction costs and issue of
public interest. This alone has several important principles endogenised. More
importantly, there is a general policy principle flowing from the analysis, which
calls for attuning liberty in EFD with the strength of the IPR framework of the
country. For instance, if the property rights are strong, it calls for a conservative and
narrow interpretation of the doctrine, perhaps as is the case in US.
In addition, like any analytical framework, our methodology does come with its
inherent limitations. The model crucially rests on property-liability framework
elucidated in Calabresi and Melamed’s paper. That model, in turn, pivots on
transaction cost economics. Considerable work has been done since then in cate-
gorization, structural layering and re-inventing the concepts of transaction costs.
The contextual application of transaction cost economics is, while very important,
our model does depend largely on the value of the transaction costs. These values
are difficult to collate, and hence most studies do not go deeper into classifications
of transaction costs. It does merit the question of what happens if the transaction
costs vary greatly in a country from across regulations affecting the same industry.
In addition, although extremely comprehensive, existence of only two categories—
low and high transaction costs—obscures subtle nuances in mid-level transaction
costs. This however, could be an interesting territory lying unchartered, which
could further aid to the development of this scholarship.
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The principle does not imply that courts should take into account the IPR
strength and weakness of a society before adjudicating on an issue of refusal to
license. However, it assumes a twofold role: firstly, a conciliatory role, where
scholars and society becomes sympathetic towards a judgement that invoked the
doctrine in a competition law case favoring the plaintiff; and secondly, a predictor
role, where the doctrine’s application could be expected in societies where strength
of IPR is rather low. In this way, the chapter proposes guiding principle to decide
which side of policy outcome, should the policy maker tilt her options, using the
legal tool of EFD.
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Chapter 15
Local Working of Patents:
The Perspective of Developing Countries
Althaf Marsoof
1 Introduction
A patent grants exclusive rights to a patentee enabling the exploitation of the
underlying invention for a prescribed period of time—the usual being 20 years.
This means that no one but the patentee, or a person authorized, will be entitled to
produce the goods, or provide the services, to which a patented invention relates.
Thus, a monopoly limited by time, over the manufacturing, production, sale,
importation and distribution of the patented product is conferred to the patentee and
no other. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate whether the imposition of a
requirement which compels a patentee to set up a local industrial plant or factory to
produce the patented product, or apply the patented process, in essence compelling
the local working of a patent, as a condition for the maintenance of exclusive patent
rights is compatible with the Agreement on the Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS), which forms one of the several covered agreements
of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In particular, the analysis will deal with
the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in Article 27:1 of TRIPS and its
apparent inconsistency with Article 5A(2) of the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property 1883 (Paris Convention), and then pose the
question whether the imposition of a local working requirement would be com-
patible with the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in Article 27:1 of TRIPS.
The last part of the chapter considers the approaches adopted in India and Sri Lanka
in relation to the local working of patents, as these South Asian jurisdictions share
similarities with many others that are both agricultural and developing economies,
while also demonstrating a significant divergence in their domestic approaches
towards local working.
A. Marsoof (&)
Nanyang Business School, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
e-mail: Althaf@ntu.edu.sg
© The Author(s) 2018
A. Bharadwaj et al. (eds.),Multi-dimensional Approaches Towards New Technology,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1232-8_15
315
2 What Is ‘Local Working’?
The exclusive rights that emanate from the grant of a patent is territorial in nature.
As such, an inventor is required to obtain patent protection in all countries in which
the invention is to be exploited making use of national registration processes and
the right to priority. From the point of view of a country granting such exclusive
patent rights, a local working requirement would oblige the patent holder to ‘work’
the patent locally, as opposed to merely using the patent ‘as an exclusive right to
prevent others from doing so or to control importation.’1 Essentially, the local
working of a patent entails that the ‘patentee must manufacture the patented pro-
duct, or apply the patented process, within the patent granting country.’2 The local
working of a patent would bring about significant benefits to the country granting
the patent, including but not limited to increased employment opportunities, transfer
of technology and development of skills and expertise of human resources. Thus, in
turn, and without doubt, working a patent locally will be useful for the dissemi-
nation of knowledge on the technology surrounding the patent, which would pro-
vide the know-how for the patent granting country to develop further and
experiment on better uses of the technology involved. It has been suggested that the
local working of patents is ‘desirable from the patent granting country’s point of
view because they contribute to a variety of public policy goals such as employ-
ment creation, industrial and technology capacity building, national balance of
payments, and economic independence.’3
On the other hand, requiring a patent owner to set up industrial plants in every
country in which an invention is to be exploited would result in increased expenses,
thus potentially reducing the yield of profit. Although through licensing arrangements,
a patent owner could grant a local entity the right to produce a patented product, or
apply a patented process, in local industrial plants or factories, this may still be less
efficient than simply importing the patented product, manufactured in a single or
multiple plants or factories elsewhere, into the patent granting country.4 This may also
result in innovators distancing themselves from the patent system, while choosing to
protect their inventions as trade secrets instead. Thus, any discussion as to the viability
of imposing a local working requirement must consider these competing interests. Most
importantly, however, one would have to consider whether a measure requiring the
local working of a patent as a condition to maintain exclusive rights detracts from the
cardinal rule against discrimination enshrined in Article 27:1 of TRIPS.
1GHC Bodenhausen, Guide to the application of the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property (WIPO Publication 1969)71 (emphasis added).
2M Halewood, ‘Regulating Patent Holders: Local Working Requirements and Compulsory
Licenses at International Law’ (1997) 35(2) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 243.
3ibid 246.
4GB Reddy and Harunrashid Kadri, ‘Local Working of Patents–Law and Implementation in India’
(2013) 18 Journal of Intellectual Property Rights 15.
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This chapter by no means postulates a blanket requirement under national law
that requires the local working of patents, as a precondition for the maintenance of
patent rights. As is pointed out in this chapter, such an approach would be contrary
to the non-discrimination obligations of WTO Members under Article 27:1 of
TRIPS. Rather, what is required is a cautions exercise of TRIPS flexibilities towards
a local working requirement that is case and context specific—thus, balancing the
interests of patentees, as well as stakeholders in the patent granting country.
3 The Principle Against Discrimination and the Local
Working Requirement
An important question that needs to be addressed is whether the imposition of a
local working requirement conflicts with a WTO Member’s obligations under
TRIPS. In order to respond to this, it is necessary to consider the principle against
discrimination set out in Article 27:1 of TRIPS. Article 27:1 reads as follows:
Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be available for any inventions,
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an
inventive step and are capable of industrial application. Subject to paragraph 4 of Article 65,
paragraph 8 of Article 70 and paragraph 3 of this Article, patents shall be available and patent
rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and
whether products are imported or locally produced (emphasis added).
Accordingly, whether the patented product is imported or produced locally,
patent protection must be available on equal terms so long as the other requirements
set out in the first sentence of Article 27:1 are met. Thus, refusing the grant of patent
protection or limiting the scope of protection available to a product solely produced
abroad and imported into the patent granting country is a form of discrimination
that is sought to be eliminated by Article 27:1. Further, engaging in such a practice
may also conflict with a WTO Member’s national treatment obligations enshrined
in Article 3:1 of TRIPS.5
5The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), art 3:1 pro-
vides that
[e]ach Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less favourable
than that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection (3) of intellectual
property’. Thus, limiting the scope of protection in relation to products that are manufac-
tured elsewhere and imported into the paten granting country (vis-à-vis patent owners who
manufacture the patented products within the patent granting country) may amount to de
facto discrimination against foreign patent owners, as it is they who in all probability would
be manufacturing the patented product in their own countries, which are then imported into
the patent granting country.
See, NP de Carvalho, The TRIPS Regime and Patent Rights (3rd edn, Kluwer Law
International 2010) 289.
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Yet, it must be noted that the principle against discrimination is at odds with a
provision in the Paris Convention–i.e. Article 5A(2). The said provision reads as
follows:
Each country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative measures providing for the
grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise of
the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work (emphasis added).
Accordingly, Article 5A(2) of the Paris Convention recognizes that a failure to
work a patent in a country in which protection is sought could amount to an abuse
of monopoly rights conferred on the patent owner. If a country makes a determi-
nation that the failure to work a patent amounts to an abuse of patent rights, such a
country has the ‘right’ to issue a compulsory license enabling the local production
of the patented product as a form of response to the patent owner’s failure to work
the patent. The only restriction under the Paris Convention is that such a:
…compulsory license may not be applied for […] before the expiration of a period of four
years from the date of filing of the patent application or three years from the date of the
grant of the patent, whichever period expires last; [and] it shall be refused if the patentee
justifies his inaction by legitimate reasons…6
It is also important to note that what amounts to a ‘failure to work’ a patent is a
matter for domestic interpretation and policy:
The member States are also free to define what they understand by ‘failure to work’.
Normally, working a patent will be understood to mean working it industrially, namely, by
manufacture of the patented product, or industrial application of a patented process. Thus,
importation or sale of the patented article, or of the article manufactured by a patented
process, will not normally be regarded as ‘working’ the patent.7
Therefore, a plain reading of Article 5A(2) of the Paris Convention suggests that
where a patented product is solely imported into a patent granting country without
being worked locally, a compulsory license may be issued provided that the
requirements stipulated in Article 5A(4) are met. In other words, while a com-
pulsory license can be issued for a patented product which is purely imported, such
a license cannot be issued if the product is manufactured in the country concerned.
Thus, locally produced patented products are favoured vis à vis purely imported
patented products. As such, the result seems to contravene the fundamental policy
against non-discrimination found in Article 27:1 of TRIPS which provides that
equal treatment must be afforded to patents irrespective of whether the underlying
product is imported or locally produced. Some countries have avoided grappling
with this inconsistency by broadly defining the term ‘working’ to include the
importation of the patented product.8 In fact, it has been suggested that only such an
interpretation would be consistent with Article 27:1 of TRIPS:
6Paris Convention, art 5A(4).
7Bodenhausen (n 1) 71.
8M Trimble, ‘Patent Working Requirements: Historical and Comparative Perspectives’ (2016) 6
UC Irvine Law Review 483.
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The trade-related context of TRIPS necessitates its own interpretation of the notion of
domestic use or local working. While Members are, pursuant to adapted Art. 5A.2 PC,
generally free to interpret domestic use, the wider context Arts 27.1 and 31 TRIPS implies
that the patent holder exercises his property right when the product is provided on the
domestic market, be it through local production or through importation.9
Not many have sought to discuss this apparent conflict between Article 27:1 of
TRIPS and Article 5A(2) of the Paris Convention. A dispute in the WTO between
the United States (US) and Brazil was the only instance when this issue was raised
at the WTO level.10 However, the dispute was settled between the parties robbing
the WTO of the opportunity to shed light on the controversial practice of imposing
a local working requirement under domestic law. Nevertheless, the US’s complaint
and Brazil’s defence were thought provoking. The primary contention of the US
was that Article 68 of the Brazilian Industrial Property Law,11 which enacted that
inter alia the ‘non-exploitation of the object of the patent within the Brazilian
territory for failure to manufacture or incomplete manufacture of the product, or
also failure to make full use of the patented process, except cases where this in not
economically feasible, when importation shall be permitted,’12 and giving Brazil a
right to impose a compulsory licence for failure to locally work a patent, was
contrary to TRIPS. Essentially, the US contended that Brazil’s law breached Article
27:1 of TRIPS by suggesting that a local working requirement for the enjoyment of
exclusive patent rights that could only be satisfied by the local production, and not
the importation, of the patented subject matter, was contrary to the policy of
non-discrimination. The US Trade Representative (USTR) submitted that:
Brazil has asserted that the US case will threaten Brazil’s widely-praised anti-AIDS pro-
gram, and will prevent Brazil from addressing its national health crisis. Nothing could be
further from the truth. For example, should Brazil choose to compulsory license
anti-retroviral AIDS drugs, it could do so under Section 71 of its patent law, which
authorizes compulsory licensing to address a national health emergency, consistent with
TRIPS, and which the United States is not challenging. In contrast, Section 68 – the
provision under dispute – may require the compulsory licensing of any patented product,
from bicycles to automobile components to golf clubs. Section 68 is unrelated to health or
access to drugs, but instead is discriminating against all imported products in favour of
locally produced products. In short, Section 68 is a protectionist measure intended to create
jobs for Brazilian nationals.13
If Brazil’s ‘access to medicine’ justification was made in today’s context,
however, its weight would be significantly diluted. This is so, owing to the
9Brand, ‘Article 2–Intellectual Property Conventions’ in P-T Stoll, J Busche and K Arend (eds),
WTO—Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Koninklijke Brill NV 2009) 140.
10Brazil—Measures Affecting Patent Protection (2001) World Trade Organization DS199.
11Law No. 9.279 of 14 May 1996 (Law on Industrial Property (Brazil)).
12Law on Industrial Property (Brazil), art 68(1)I.
13Special 301 Report of the US Trade Representative dated 30 April 2001, 10 (emphasis added).
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developments that led to the Doha Declaration14 which expressly recognized the
‘…gravity of the public health problems afflicting many developing and
least-developed countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis,
malaria and other epidemics.’15 As such, the provisions in TRIPS that permit WTO
Members to implement compulsory licenses in cases of national emergency,16
would cast doubt on the justifiability of the use of compulsory licensing for failure
to locally work a patent to achieve the same end of access to medicine.
At first blush, at least, the practice of issuing a compulsory license for failure to
locally work a patent as permitted by the Paris Convention is a prohibited measure
under TRIPS, as it directly conflicts with Article 27:1. How then could Article 5A
(2), read with 5A(4), of the Paris Convention be reconciled with TRIPS, if at all?
4 Attempting to Reconcile the Conflict
The answer to the above question lies in the manner in which the two instruments,
i.e. the Paris Convention and TRIPS, are interpreted. To begin with, it is necessary
to consider whether there is in fact a conflict at all. In this regard, reference must be
made to Article 2:1 of TRIPS, which provides that ‘[i]n respect of Parts II, III and
IV of this Agreement, Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 12, and
Article 19, of the Paris Convention.’ Thus, every WTO Member must, in addition
to TRIPS, comply with those provisions of the Paris Convention as set out in
Article 2:1 of TRIPS. The use of the term ‘comply’ indicates that the reference is to
provisions of the Paris Convention that imposes ‘obligations’ on Paris Union states.
This is buttressed by Article 2:2 of TRIPS, which provides:
Nothing in Parts I to IV of this Agreement shall derogate from existing obligations that
Members may have to each other under the Paris Convention, the Berne Convention, the
Rome Convention and the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits
(emphasis added).
Hence, the question must be posed whether Article 5A(2), read with 5A(4), of
the Paris Convention imposes any obligations on contracting states. If the answer to
this is in the affirmative, then nothing in TRIPS (including Article 27:1) could
derogate, or detract, from such an existing obligation. In this regard, it has been
submitted that provisions of the Paris Convention (and no doubt also TRIPS) falls
into two categories—the first being those that are binding on Member States and the
14Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (adopted by the WTO Ministerial
Conference in Doha on 14 Nov 2001) WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Doha Declaration).
15Doha Declaration, para 1.
16TRIPS, art 31.
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second being provisions that allow Member States to limit the scope of a certain
right.17 Commenting specifically on Article 5A(2) of the Paris Convention, it has
been submitted:
It is indeed noteworthy that paragraph 2 [of TRIPS Article 2] states that nothing in parts I to
IV ‘shall derogate from existing obligations’ under the Paris Convention. There is no
mention of derogation of rights. This has not been an oversight of negotiators. One might
think that, because any obligation corresponds to a right, paragraph 2 implicitly contains a
mention of rights, but this is not so. The Paris Convention in some instances does grant
rights to countries that the Paris Union Members, rather than to intellectual property
owners, without imposing any corresponding obligations. For instance, it was understood
that under Article 5A(2), Paris Union Members had the right (and not a mere faculty) to
impose on patentees a local working requirement. Under the TRIPS Agreement, such right
has been curtailed. The purpose of the last words of Article 27.1 is therefore to derogate
from a right that governments of Paris Union Members had under the Paris Convention and
that was deemed to diminish the substantive protection of patent owners’ rights and con-
stitute therefore an unjustifiable barrier to international trade.18
If such an interpretation is adopted, any domestic legislative measure providing
for a local working requirement would not derive from existing obligations between
Members of the Paris Union. Accordingly, it must be concluded that the principle
against discrimination in Article 27:1 of TRIPS is not subject to, or in any way
limited by, Article 5A(2), read with 5A(4), of the Paris Convention—thus giving
rise to a conflict between the principle of non-discrimination and requirement for
local working of patents. Therefore, any domestic legislative measure adopted by a
WTO Member that provides for a local working requirement can only be justified if
it is compliant with TRIPS, albeit this would otherwise have been freely permitted
under the Paris Convention. In particular, Articles 27:1, 30 and 31 of TRIPS must
be considered in this regard.
The TRIPS framework provides for exceptions that permit WTO Members to
deviate from the exclusive rights that they are mandated to confer to intellectual
property owners—including exclusive patent rights conferred under TRIPS Article
28. A domestic legislative measure adopted by a WTO Member that confers its
government or other national authority to issue a compulsory license in cases where
a patent has not been worked locally no doubt would amount to a limitation on
exclusive patent rights that TRIPS guarantees. As such, a key question that must be
considered is whether the imposition of a local working requirement under
domestic law could be regarded as a permitted exception under TRIPS Article 30.
A WTO Dispute Settlement Panel in Canada–Pharmaceutical Patents interpreting
Article 30 of TRIPS observed that:
Article 30 establishes three criteria that must be met in order to qualify for an exception:
(1) the exception must be ‘limited’; (2) the exception must not ‘unreasonably conflict with
normal exploitation of the patent’; (3) the exception must not ‘unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third
17Brand (n 9) 147.
18Carvalho (n 5) 139.
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parties’. The three conditions are cumulative, each being a separate and independent
requirement that must be satisfied. Failure to comply with any one of the three conditions
results in the Article 30 exception being disallowed.19
Thus, any local working requirement that might be introduced into domestic law
of a WTO Member must satisfy the cumulative ‘three-step’ test set out in Article 30
of TRIPS—the first of which requires a determination as to whether the legislative
measure amounts to a ‘limited’ exception. In this regard, it was observed by the
WTO Panel in Canada–Pharmaceutical Patents that:
Although the word [‘limited’] itself can have both broad and narrow definitions, […] the
narrower definition is the more appropriate when the word ‘limited’ is used as part of the
phrase ‘limited exception’. The word ‘exception’ by itself connotes a limited derogation,
one that does not undercut the body of rules from which it is made. When a treaty uses the
term ‘limited exception’, the word ‘limited’ must be given a meaning separate from the
limitation implicit in the word ‘exception’ itself. The term ‘limited exception’ must
therefore be read to connote a narrow exception - one which makes only a small diminution
of the rights in question.20
The Panel further observed that ‘[t]o determine whether a particular exception
constitutes a limited exception, the extent to which the patent owner’s rights have
been curtailed must be measured.’21 Article 28 of TRIPS entitles a patent owner to
prevent all third parties from ‘making, using, offering for sale, selling or importing’
a patented product. Whereas, a local working requirement that compels a patent
owner to locally work a patent, and if not face the consequence of the patent
becoming the subject of a compulsory license authorizing the local manufacture and
sale of the patented product, would essentially entitle the licensee to make, use,
offer for sale and sell the patented product—which affects four of the five acts that
are exclusive to a patent owner. Arguably, such an encroachment into a patentee’s
domain of exclusivity cannot be described as a small diminution of the rights in
question.22 Thus, it must be concluded that a domestic legislative measure pro-
viding for the issuance of a compulsory license for the failure to locally work a
patent cannot be regarded as a ‘limited’ exception, hence failing to satisfy the first
requirement of TRIPS Article 30.23
This is, however, not the end of the discussion, as Article 31 of TRIPS dealing
with ‘Other use without authorization of the right holder’24 must be considered.
Article 31 provides that: ‘Where the law of a Member State allows for other use of
19Canada–Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products (2000) World Trade Organization WT/
DS114/R, para 7.23.
20ibid, paras 7.30, 7.31.
21ibid, para 7.32.
22Chia-Ling Lee, ‘The Legality of Local Patent Working Requirements under the TRIPS
Agreement’ (2013) 2 NTUT Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Management 39, 47.
23P Champ and A Attaran, ‘Patent Rights and Local Working under WTO TRIPS Agreement: An
Analysis of the U.S.-Brazil Patent Dispute’ (2002) 27 Yale Journal of International Law 365, 383;
Lee (n 22) 47.
24TRIPS, art 31.
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the subject matter of a patent without the authorization of the right holder, including
use by the government or third parties authorized by the government, the following
provisions shall be respected.’
Footnote (7) referenced in Article 31 of TRIPS provides that ‘… ‘Other use’
refers to use other than that allowed under Article 30.’ In other words, exceptions to
patent rights imposed under Articles 30 and 31 are mutually exclusive. However, if
a WTO Member seeks to justify a compulsory license for failure to locally work a
patent under Article 31 of TRIPS, it must be done on an individual basis and after
ensuring that all requirements set out from paragraph (a) to (l) of Article 31 are
satisfied.
The fact that compulsory licensing under Article 31 can only be granted on
‘individual merits’25 means that there is no room for domestic legislation that calls
for the issuance of a compulsory license26 solely because a patent was not worked
locally, without there being other factors that warrant such an outcome. In the event
a WTO Member decides to issue compulsory licenses for failure to locally work a
patent on a case-by-case basis and after considering the individual merits of each
case, such a measure may be successful under Article 31 provided that the other
requirements contained therein are satisfied. The requirements that are most rele-
vant to the context of failure to work are discussed below.
First, a compulsory license can only be issued after the proposed user (typically,
the government or someone authorized by the government) ‘has made efforts to
obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and
conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period
of time.’27 Thus, before a compulsory license is issued for failure to locally work a
patent, the enabling domestic provision must require the government (or the
authorized party) to have attempted to negotiate with the patent owner to secure
authorization to work the patent locally on reasonable commercial terms and
conditions. On the other hand, a related (yet important) question is whether com-
pulsory licenses for failure to work should be refused if the patent owner justifies
his inaction by legitimate grounds in view of the specific requirement to that effect
under Article 5A(4) of the Paris Convention. In this regard, it is necessary to
consider the relationship between TRIPS Article 31 and Article 5A of the Paris
Convention. Article 5A(2) of the Paris Convention specifically deals with
25TRIPS, art 31(a).
26A Eikerman, ‘Article 31–Other Use Without Authorization of Right Holder’ in P-T Stoll, J
Busche and K Arend (eds), WTO—Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(Koninklijke Brill NV: 2009) 567.
27TRIPS, art 31(b). It must be noted that this requirement ‘may be waived by a Member in the case
of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public
non-commercial use. In situations of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency, the right holder shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon as reasonably practicable. In the
case of public non-commercial use, where the government or contractor, without making a patent
search, knows or has demonstrable grounds to know that a valid patent is or will be used by or for
the government, the right holder shall be informed promptly.
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compulsory licenses for ‘abuse’ of patent rights, including failure to work. Some
have contended that Article 31 of TRIPS is dependent on Article 5A(2) of the Paris
Convention and that ‘prevention of abuse constitutes a fundamental requirement for
the grant of compulsory licenses of any kind.’28 Yet, the preferred view is that
Article 31 of TRIPS ‘places no restrictions on the list of grounds upon which
compulsory licenses may be granted. This seems to support the view that these
unwritten grounds are to be separate from the category of abuse.’29 While this may
be true in respect of the grounds upon which a compulsory license is based, the
question that is posed here is whether the specific requirement under Article 5A(4)
of the Paris Convention should curtail the grant of compulsory licenses under
Article 31 of TRIPS, where the ground used to justify the compulsory license is a
failure to locally work a patent. In this regard, suffice to note that Article 2:2 of
TRIPS provides that nothing in TRIPS shall derogate or detract from ‘existing
obligations’ between Paris Union states (who also happen to be WTO Members).
While it was argued that a ‘right’ to issue compulsory licenses under Article 5A(2)
of the Paris Convention does not constitute an existing obligation, the requirement
that such a license must be refused in the event a patent owner’s inaction is justified
amounts to an obligation between Paris Union states. Accordingly, it may be
persuasively argued, that the requirement set out in Article 5A(4) of the Paris
Convention must be read into the context of TRIPS Article 31, where failure to
work provides the basis of a compulsory license. A similar argument would apply
to the other requirement stipulated in Article 5A(4) of the Paris Convention that
prohibits the imposition of compulsory licenses for failure to work a patent before
the expiration of four years from the filing date or three years from the date of grant,
whichever expires last.
Secondly, ‘the scope and duration of [the compulsory license] shall be limited to
the purpose for which it was authorized’30 and must be ‘terminated if and when the
circumstances which led to [the issuing of the compulsory license] cease to exist
and are unlikely to recur.’31 When a patent is not locally worked, and the patentee
has no valid reason or excuse for not doing so, the purpose of a compulsory license
is arguably to enable the patent granting country to acquire the benefits of local
working. As such, after a compulsory license on this basis is granted, where a
patentee provides an assurance to work the patent locally (either by himself or
through suitable licensing arrangements), the compulsory license should cease,
unless there are grounds to believe that the circumstances upon which the com-
pulsory license was granted (i.e. failure to locally work the patent) is likely to recur,
28J Straus, ‘Implications of the TRIPS Agreement in the Field of Patent Law’ in F-K Beier and G
Schricker (eds), From GATT to TRIPs: the agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual
property rights (Weinheim 1996) 204.




as well as subject to the interests of the party in whose favour the compulsory
license was granted.
Thirdly, compulsory licenses under TRIPS Article 31 have to be non-exclusive
and non-assignable.32 This represents the same basis upon which compulsory
licenses are permitted under Article 5A(2) of the Paris Convention, and should raise
no concern in practice.33
Notably, however, compulsory licenses under TRIPS Article 31 are subject to a
significant limitation. That is, the compulsory license ‘shall be authorized pre-
dominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member.’34 Although this
provision does not fully prohibit the exportation of products manufactured under a
compulsory license, as it does allow the export of the ‘non-predominant’ part of the
production,35 the fact that the products must be supplied ‘predominantly’ to the
local market may become a disincentive to licensees. The term ‘predominantly’
attracts a number of possible interpretations. Some suggest that where the domestic
market of the Member granting the compulsory licence takes the greatest share of
supply among all Members receiving products produced under the licence, then the
product manufactured under a compulsory license is supplied ‘predominantly’ to
the domestic market.36 Others argue that a quantitative approach should be adopted
in determining whether a product is supplied predominantly to the domestic mar-
ket37—e.g. ‘49.9% of the production under a compulsory licence could be expor-
ted.’38 Another possible interpretation is that ‘the intentions of Members should be
decisive in determining what constitutes a ‘predominant’ use of the compulsory
licence’39 according to which WTO Members would not violate their obligation
under Article 31(f) if the granting of a compulsory licence is primarily aimed at
supplying the domestic market.40 It has been suggested that unless the last of these
interpretations is adopted, WTO Members ‘with a small market would possibly be
obliged either to allow for only uneconomical production or not to issue
32ibid, arts 31(d), (e).
33Paris Convention, art 5A(4).
34TRIPS, art 31(f). However, it must be noted that this restriction does not apply to the export of
‘pharmaceutical products’ under a compulsory license to an ‘eligible importing Member’ (TRIPS,
art 31bis).
35Eikerman (n 26) 573.
36FM Abbott, ‘Compulsory Licensing for Public Health Needs: The TRIPS Agenda at the WTO
after the Doha Declaration on Public Health’ (2002) Quaker United Nations Office, Occasional
Paper No 9 26 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1977304>.
37Carlos Correa, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the
TRIPS Agreement (Oxford University Press 2007) 321.
38Jerome Reichmann and Catherine Hasenzahl, ‘Non-voluntary Licensing of Patented Inventions:
Historical Perspective, Legal Framework under TRIPS, and an Overview of the Practice in Canada
and the United States of America’ (2005) ICTSD Issue Paper No 5, 16 <https://www.ictsd.org/
downloads/2008/06/cs_reichman.hasenzahl.pdf_> accessed 1 January 2018.
39Carvalho (n 5) 241.
40Eikerman (n 26) 574.
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compulsory licences at all’41—which arguably defeats the very objectives of Article
31 of TRIPS. Accordingly, any domestic legislative measure providing for a
compulsory license for failure to locally work a patent must provide that the
licensee must primarily aim to supply the domestic market, which would not pre-
clude the possibility of export.
Based on the foregoing discussion, any domestic legislation that provides for a
local working requirement, through the vessel of a compulsory license for failure to
work, would arguably be compliant with the TRIPS framework provided that it
subscribes to the conditions expressly set out in Article 31, and those set out in
Article 5A(4) of the Paris Convention made applicable by TRIPS Article 2:2.
There is, however, one other issue that must be considered, which potentially
stands as a significant obstacle to local working requirements—i.e. TRIPS Article
27:1 which imposes an obligation against discrimination. Thus, it is necessary to
consider the relationship between Articles 27:1 and 31 of TRIPS. In Canada–
Pharmaceutical Patents the WTO Panel had to consider precisely that, but in the
context of Article 30 of TRIPS. Accordingly, the Panel concluded that ‘the
anti-discrimination rule of Article 27.1 does apply to exceptions of the kind
authorized by Article 30.’42
The dispute before the WTO Panel was whether discrimination as to the field of
technology arose in the implementation of Section 55.2(1) of Canada’s Patent Act.
The said provision, which created a regulatory review exception, provided as
follows:
It is not an infringement of a patent for any person to make, construct, use or sell the
patented invention solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of
information required under any law of Canada, a province or a country other than Canada
that regulates the manufacture, construction, use or sale of any product (emphasis added).
Thus, where a law requires approval to be granted by any authority before a
product could be placed on the market, notwithstanding the existence of a patent,
any third party which is planning to enter the market after the patent expires could
use the patented product for the limited purposes of supplying information to the
relevant authority in order to obtain approval. The rationale for this mechanism is to
eliminate any delays that may be faced by third parties as a result of having to
obtain regulatory approval prior to entering the market, especially in the pharma-
ceutical industry. While arguing that Section 55.2(1) was consistent with Article 30
of TRIPS, Canada sought to draw a distinction between TRIPS Articles 30 and 31
to suggest that the norms against discrimination enshrined in Article 27:1 do not
apply to Article 30. In the process, however, Canada admitted that the
non-discrimination principles did apply to Article 31 of TRIPS. The Panel
accordingly concluded:
41ibid.
42Canada–Pharmaceutical Patents (n 19), para 7.93 (emphasis added).
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The acknowledged fact that the Article 31 exception for compulsory licences and gov-
ernment use is understood to be subject to the non-discrimination rule of Article 27.1,
without the need for any textual provision so providing, further strengthens the case for
treating the non-discrimination rules as applicable to Article 30.43
Such a conclusion renders the imposition of a compulsory license for failure to
locally work a patent more difficult to justify—as even if a domestic measure
permitting such compulsory licenses complies with all the requirements of Article
31, it still has to withstand the policy against discrimination set out in Article
27:1.44
In view of the conclusion on the interaction between TRIPS Articles 31 and
27:1, it is necessary to determine whether there could ever be a TRIPS compliant
local working requirement. In this regard there are two matters that merit attention.
The first concerns the meaning of ‘discrimination’ in Article 27:1 of TRIPS. The
second concerns the context in which the obligation not to discriminate arises.
The term ‘discrimination’ is perhaps one of the most difficult terms to define.
The WTO Panel in the Canada–Pharmaceutical Patents dispute considered to great
detail the meaning of discrimination in relation to Article 27:1 of TRIPS. The Panel
observed in this context that:
The primary TRIPS provisions that deal with discrimination, such as the national treatment
and most-favoured-nation provisions of Articles 3 and 4, do not use the term ‘discrimi-
nation’. They speak in more precise terms. The ordinary meaning of the word ‘discriminate’
is potentially broader than these more specific definitions. It certainly extends beyond the
concept of differential treatment. It is a normative term, pejorative in connotation, referring
to results of the unjustified imposition of differentially disadvantageous treatment.
Discrimination may arise from explicitly different treatment, sometimes called ‘de jure
discrimination’, but it may also arise from ostensibly identical treatment which, due to
differences in circumstances, produces differentially disadvantageous effects, sometimes
called ‘de facto discrimination’….Discrimination’ is a term to be avoided whenever more
precise standards are available, and, when employed, it is a term to be interpreted with
caution, and with care to add no more precision than the concept contains.45
The Panel concluded that Section 55.2(1) did not amount to de jure discrimi-
nation in that a plain reading of the said provision did not discriminate one field of
technology over another. The European Commission (which was the complainant)
argued that the Canadian provision resulted in de facto discrimination as well, since
it was predominantly in the pharmaceutical industry that regulatory approval was
required before a product can be placed in the market. As regards this, the Panel
observed that:
43ibid, para 7.91.
44KJ Nowak, ‘Staying Within the Negotiated Framework: Abiding by the Non-Discrimination
Clause in TRIPS Article 27’ (2005) 26 Michigan Journal of International Law 899. Scholars are
divided on this point. Some scholars have argued that the WTO Panel was wrong in holding that
the non-discrimination rule in art 27:1 applies to exceptions.
45Canada–Pharmaceutical Patents (n 19), para 7.94 (emphasis added).
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.. de facto discrimination is a general term describing the legal conclusion that an ostensibly
neutral measure transgresses a non-discrimination norm because its actual effect is to
impose differentially disadvantageous consequences on certain parties, and because those
differential effects are found to be wrong or unjustifiable.46
Thus, in simple terms discrimination arises from subjecting persons who are
similarly situated or circumstanced, to differential treatment. In the case of Article
27:1 of TRIPS, whatever the field of technology, wherever the product is manu-
factured (i.e. whether locally produced or imported), or wherever the product was
first invented, all patentable inventions are deemed to form one single class to
which equal treatment must be afforded. Of course, in the event certain persons
within that single class are discriminated, so long as the differential effects are not
found to be wrong or unjustified, it may nonetheless be consistent with TRIPS. It is
in this background that one must assess the possibility of imposing compulsory
licenses in relation to products solely produced abroad and imported into a patent
granting country. Thus, the question that must be posed is whether the issuance of a
compulsory license that discriminates against a patent owner who solely imports the
patented product into the country concerned vis-à-vis patent owners who produce
the patented products locally, is a form of discrimination that is wrong or unjustified
so as to violate TRIPS Article 27:1.
It has been submitted that the context in which the term ‘discrimination’ in
Article 27:1 of TRIPS is used does not create an absolute bar against the forms of
discrimination specified therein.47 It was observed in Canada–Pharmaceutical
products that:
[T]he context to which the Panel may have recourse for purposes of interpretation of
specific TRIPS provisions, in this case Articles 27 and 28, is not restricted to the text,
Preamble and Annexes of the TRIPS Agreement itself, but also includes the provisions of
the international instruments on intellectual property incorporated into the TRIPS
Agreement, as well as any agreement between the parties relating to these agreements
within the meaning of Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.48
Accordingly, even though Article 5A(2), read with 5A(4), of the Paris
Convention are not provisions that cannot be overridden by TRIPS (in view of the
arguments made before concerning the effect of Article 2:1 and 2:2 of TRIPS),
these provisions in the Paris Convention, being an international instrument on
intellectual property ‘incorporated into TRIPS’, could still provide useful context
for the interpretation of TRIPS Article 27:1. In light of this, it is necessary to
consider the purpose for which Article 5A(2), read with 5A(4), was introduced to
the Paris Convention, and whether a blanket prohibition on the imposition of
compulsory licenses for failure to locally work a patent disregards that purpose.
46ibid, para 7.101 (emphasis added).
47Bryan Mercurio, and Mitali Tyagi, ‘Treaty Interpretation in WTO Dispute Settlement: The
Outstanding Question of the Legality of Local Working Requirements’ (2010) 19 Minnesota
Journal of International Law 275.
48Canada–Pharmaceutical (n 19), para 7.14 (emphasis added).
328 A. Marsoof
From a historical point of view, it must be noted that it was common practice for
states to forfeit patents that were not worked in the territory in which patent rights
were granted. One of the earliest known patent legislation, the Venetian Patent Act
1474, required the active exploitation of patents, the failure of which resulted in the
patent being cancelled.49 In other words, if a patent owner resorted to the practice of
solely importing the patented product, the country of importation was permitted to
forfeit the patent resulting in the complete extinguishment of the rights of a patent
owner in that territory. Forfeiture was regarded as too harsh a punishment, and it
was in this regard that Article 5A(1) of the Paris Convention was put into place.
Article 5A(1) of the Paris Convention provides that ‘[i]mportation by the patentee
into the country where the patent has been granted of articles manufactured in any
of the countries of the Union shall not entail forfeiture of the patent’, thus, pro-
hibiting forfeiture as a consequence of failing to locally produce a patented product.
Therefore, the purpose of Article 5A(2) of the Paris Convention is to maintain the
interests of the country granting patent protection, while also taking into account the
interests of the patent owner. It was an important balancing act to mitigate the
harshness of forfeiture and to address the abuse of patent rights that failure to locally
work a patent could give rise to. As such, in interpreting TRIPS Article 27:1, the
objectives of Article 5A(2), read with 5A(4), of the Paris Convention provides an
important context, which cannot be disregarded.
Furthermore, the context for the purpose of interpreting a treaty shall also
include its preamble.50 In this case, the relevant instrument being the TRIPS
Agreement, one may consider the preamble to TRIPS in an attempt to make sense
of the intention of the contracting parties, when they negotiated Article 27:1. Since
the preamble to TRIPS recognizes inter alia ‘…the underlying public policy
objectives of national systems for the protection of intellectual property, including
developmental and technological objectives…’ one could argue that a blanket
prohibition on the imposition of a local working requirement for the maintenance of
exclusive patent rights would defeat the aims expressly recognized in the preamble
to TRIPS. As stated earlier, imposing a local working requirement is a useful mode
of achieving some of the ‘developmental’ and ‘technological’ objectives envisaged
by TRIPS. Moreover, Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties provides that ‘[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and
in the light of its object and purpose.’
The objectives of TRIPS have been clearly laid down in Articles 7 therein, which
provides that:
49Christine MacLeod, Inventing the Industrial Revolution: The English Patent System, 1660–1800
(Cambridge University Press 1988) 11.
50Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted on 23 May 1969, entered into force on 27
January 1980), art 31 (2).
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The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology,
to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a
manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obli-
gations (emphasis added).
Thus, given that locally working a patent would no doubt carry out the objec-
tives stated in Article 7 of TRIPS, the rules of interpretation require that the pro-
visions of TRIPS including Article 27:1 be interpreted in a manner that gives effect
to these objectives. This approach too demonstrates that TRIPS as a whole does not
condemn the imposition of a local working requirement.
Also noteworthy are the principles laid down in Article 8 of TRIPS which reads
as follows:
1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures
necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors
of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development, provided that
such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.
2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right
holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the
international transfer of technology.
This stresses the need for ‘socio-economic’ and ‘technological’ development and
the need to prevent practices which ‘adversely affect the international transfer of
technology.’ Accordingly, it may be persuasively argued that on an overall reading
of TRIPS, the imposition of a local working requirement in a Member’s domestic
law does not fall afoul of TRIPS Article 27:1 if such a measure can be justified on
valid grounds. In particular, where the domestic legislative measure is grounded on
TRIPS Article 31 and compulsory licenses for failure to work are granted on a
case-by-case basis, the chances of it being compliant with TRIPS is much greater.
5 The Approaches in India and Sri Lanka
The discussion hitherto established that a local working requirement that utilizes the
compulsory licensing mechanism envisaged under TRIPS Article 31, read with
Article 5A(2) and (4) of the Paris Convention, might be compatible with the TRIPS
framework provided that any discrimination that this might give rise to is justifiable
and not wrong. In this part of the chapter, the approach adopted in India in respect
of failure to locally work patents is considered in order to inspire legal reform in a
jurisdiction further south, i.e. Sri Lanka.
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5.1 The Law in India
Section 83 of the Indian Patents Act 1970 (PA 1970),51 provides as follows:
Without prejudice to the other provisions contained in this Act, in exercising the
powers conferred by this Chapter, regard shall be had to the following general
considerations, namely,—
(a) that patents are granted to encourage inventions and to secure that the inven-
tions are worked in India on a commercial scale and to the fullest extent that is
reasonably practicable without undue delay;
(b) that they are not granted merely to enable patentees to enjoy a monopoly for the
importation of the patented article (emphasis added).
Thus, sub-section (b) of Section 83 makes it patently clear that patents are not
granted in India to merely allow patentees to exclusively import the patented
product into the country, whereas Sub-section (a) sets out that patents must be
worked in India to the extent reasonably practicable. This, arguably, establishes a
local working requirement in India. Section 146(1) of the PA 1970 facilitates this
by providing as follows:
The Controller may, at any time during the continuance of the patent, by notice in writing,
require a patentee or a licensee, exclusive or otherwise, to furnish to him within two months
from the date of such notice or within such further time as the Controller may allow, such
information or such periodical statements as to the extent to which the patented invention
has been commercially worked in India as may be specified in the notice.
Section 146(2) of the PA 1970, read with Rule 131 of the Patents Rules 2003,
requires patentees and licensees to provide an annual statement of commercial
working. The statement must comply with Form 27 (as indicated in the Second
Schedule to the Patent Rules 2003), and must include the following:
1. Whether the patent has been worked.
2. Justifications if the patent has not been worked.
3. If it had been worked, the quantum and value (in Indian Rupees) of the patented
product locally manufactured and imported from other countries including
details of those countries.
4. Details of licenses and sub-licenses granted during the year.
5. Whether the requirement to promote the public interest has been met partially,
adequately or to the fullest extent possible at a reasonable price.
Thus, while there is a possibility for a patent to be regarded as sufficiently
worked locally even though the patented product is solely imported, this seems to
be the exception rather than the norm. Unless the patentee is able to provide
51T Kongolo, ‘Agreement on Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS): New
Strategies for Developing Countries’ (2000) International Business Law Journal 345. Apart from
India, countries such as Congo, Kenya, Tanzania and Nigeria have provisions relating to local
working of patents in their domestic laws.
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justifications as to why the patented product cannot be manufactured locally, or
where the requirement to promote the public interest is met by the importation of
the patented product, it appears that a patent must be locally worked—i.e. by the
local manufacture of the patented product or application of the patented process.
This view is consistent with the decision of the High Court of Bombay in Bayer
Corporation v Union of India,52 where the court held that although the local
manufacture of the patented product is not a prerequisite for a patent to be con-
sidered as being worked in India, the patentee must establish why it is not possible
to manufacture the patented product locally.
While the failure to submit statements of commercial working as required under
the law could lead to substantial fines (up to ` one million),53 what is notable is that
the failure to locally work a patent could also become a ground upon which a
compulsory license may be granted. This is possible in view of Section 84(1) of the
PA 1970, read with Section 90. Section 84(1) permits the grant of compulsory
licenses in the following terms:
At any time after the expiration of three years from the date of the grant of a patent, any
person interested may make an application to the Controller for grant of compulsory licence
on patent on any of the following grounds, namely:
(a) that the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the patented invention
have not been satisfied, or
(b) that the patented invention is not available to the public at a reasonably affordable
price, or
(c) that the patented invention is not worked in the territory of India (emphasis added).
Thus, while Section 84(1) itself expressly specifies that a compulsory license
may be issued on the ground that a patent is not worked in India, Section 84(7) sets
out instances when ‘the reasonable requirements of the public’ is deemed not to
have been met. This includes the failure of the patentee ‘to work the patent in the
territory of India on a commercial scale to an adequate extent or to work the patent
to the fullest extent that is reasonably practicable.’54 More importantly, the rea-
sonable requirements of the public will be deemed not to have been satisfied where
the ‘working of the patented invention in the territory of India on a commercial
scale is being prevented or hindered by the importation from abroad of the patented
article.’ Notably, the general purposes for granting compulsory licenses include the
objective of ensuring that ‘patented inventions are worked on a commercial scale in
the territory of India without undue delay and to the fullest extent that is reasonably
practicable.’55
52Bayer Corporation v Union of India (2013) Bombay High Court, WP No 1323 of 2013.
53Patent Act 1970, s 122.
54ibid, s 84(7) (d).
55ibid, s 89(a).
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On a reading of the aforesaid provisions that exist in the PA 1970, it is clear that
the Indian approach requires the local working of patents, leading to the grant of
compulsory licenses in cases where the requirement is not met. Arguably, the grant
of compulsory licenses for failure to work complies with TRIPS Article 31, read
with Article 5A(2) and (4) of the Paris Convention. If at all, there could be some
controversy in respect of the requirement set out in TRIPS Article 31(f)—which
requires licenses to be granted ‘predominantly for the supply of the domestic
market.’ This is because although the grant of compulsory licenses in India are for
the predominant ‘purpose’ of supplying to the Indian market, licensees ‘may also
export the patented product, if need be.’56 However, it may be argued that this
approach is still compliant with TRIPS Article 31(f) in view of the broader, and
more flexible, interpretation that may be afforded to that provision.57 The Indian
approach would arguably also satisfy the norms on non-discrimination enshrined in
TRIPS Article 27:1, which are made relevant to the context of Article 31, since the
approach to local working under the PA 1970 is not a generalized one, and instead
adopts a case-by-case assessment in the public interest.58
5.2 The Law in Sri Lanka
Unlike India, the approach adopted in Sri Lanka in relation to local working of
patents is strikingly less specific, if not far less progressive. The law that regulates
patents in Sri Lanka is contained in Part IV of the Intellectual Property Act 2003 (IP
Act 2003). In particular Section 84(1) under the heading ‘Rights of owner of
Patent’ provides that a patentee shall have inter alia the exclusive right to exploit
the patented invention, while also empowering the patentee to exclude the unau-
thorized exploitation of the patent by third parties.59 It is noteworthy that ‘ex-
ploitation’ of a patent is defined as ‘… the making, importing, offering for sale,
selling, exporting or using the [patented] product.’60 Whereas, the IP Act 2003 does
not contain a single provision that expressly deals with failure to locally work
patents. This is a significant disadvantage to Sri Lanka, as it could discourage the
56ibid, s 90(1) (vii).
57Eikerman (n 26).
58Reddy and Kadri (n 4); Jorge Contreras, Rohini Lakshan ́e and Paxton Lewis, ‘Patent Working
Requirements and Complex Products’ (2017) 7 New York University Journal of Intellectual
Property & Entertainment Law 1.
In Bayer Corporation v Union of India, the High Court of Bombay considered the ‘failure to
work’ provisions of the Patent Act 1970 in light of TRIPS, art 27, 30 and 31. It seems that the High
Court was of the view, albeit tacitly, that the provisions in the Patent Act 1970 permitting
compulsory licenses for failure to locally work a patent is not inconsistent with TRIPS. For a more
comprehensive discussion of the Indian approach.
59Intellectual Property Act 2003, s 84(2)..
60ibid, s 84(3) (emphasis added).
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transfer of technology (being an important objective that developing countries strive
to achieve through the patent system) in fields of technology that remain
underdeveloped in Sri Lanka, while also being detrimental towards generating
employment opportunities through the setting up of local industrial plants and
factories.
However, Section 86(2) of the IP Act 2003, which replicates TRIPS Article 31,
provides for the grant of compulsory licenses, and there is a possibility that com-
pulsory licenses can be issued in cases of failure to work, albeit this has never
happened so far. Unlike in India, where compulsory licenses may be granted on
inter alia the ground that a patent has not been locally worked, the corresponding
Sri Lankan provision does not specify any grounds upon which such licenses may
be issued. In exercising his discretion, the Director General of Intellectual Property,
must only be satisfied that ‘the applicant has made efforts to obtain approval from
the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such
efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of time.’61 Unlike in the
case of the Indian provision, where a compulsory license may be granted only after
the expiration of three years from the date of grant of a patent, the corresponding Sri
Lankan provision does not contain such a restriction. While TRIPS Article 31 does
not itself impose such a requirement, in cases of failure to work, it must be recalled
that Article 5A(4) of the Paris Convention imposes this requirement. As such, in the
case of Sri Lanka, the competent authority in issuing compulsory licenses on the
ground of failure to work must comply with Article 5A(4) of the Paris Convention,
in addition to the requirements set out in TRIPS Article 31. Most significantly,
Section 86(2)(d) provides that the exploitation of a patent under a compulsory
license ‘shall be predominantly for the purpose of supply to the domestic market,’
which is included to comply with TRIPS Article 31(f). The wording of this pro-
vision is much narrower in comparison to the corresponding Indian provision
(which requires licenses to be granted for the ‘predominant purpose of supply in the
Indian market). While the Sri Lankan provision has literally reproduced TRIPS
Article 31(f), the Indian provision has adopted a style that corresponds to a broader
interpretation of the same TRIPS provision. Thus, unless the Sri Lankan competent
authority adopts a broader and more flexible approach in interpreting Section 86(2)
(d) when imposing conditions on a licensee under a compulsory license, the
requirement to supply predominantly to the domestic market may stand as a dis-
incentive to licensees in Sri Lanka. This is particularly because the Sri Lanka
market is small (in comparison to India) and unless licensees are able to engage in
exportation, their operations may become uneconomical.
Thus, it would not be all that inaccurate to suggest that the Sri Lankan position in
relation to local working is far less progressive than that of its neighbour’s. In fact,
when the Intellectual Property Bill 2003 (IP Bill) was originally introduced in
Parliament, the draft did not even contain a clause that was equivalent to Section 86
61ibid, s 86(2)(b); This requirement may be waived in cases of national emergency of public
non-commercial use (s 86(2)(c)). This complies with TRIPS, art 31(b).
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in the IP Act 2003 that provides for limited exceptions and compulsory licenses.
Yet, in view of the IP Bill’s constitutionality being challenged, the Supreme Court
made a determination that without provisions capable of providing for exceptions to
the exclusive rights conferred on patent owners for a period of 20 years under
clauses 83 and 84 of the IP Bill (the equivalent of Sections 83 and 84 of the IP Act
2003), both those clauses would be contrary to Article 12 of the Sri Lankan
Constitution, which guarantees all persons the equal protection of the law. The
Supreme Court in the course of its determination observed as follows:
None of these measures62 have been incorporated in the Bill on Intellectual Property. The
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement clearly specify that it has incorporated mitigatory
provisions, as the Agreement would be applicable for developed countries as well as to the
less developed nations. In fact, World Trade Organization (WTO) has recognized the
inequality of nations in respect of the TRIPS Agreement by prescribing a staggered time
frame for the implementation of the Agreement among countries of different economic
levels. Therefore it is an accepted fact that the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement would
be applicable to countries developed as well as developing, which cannot be treated as
equals. Article 12(1) of the Sri Lanka Constitution not only guarantees equality before the
law, but also provides for the equal protection of the law. It is well settled law that just as
much as equals should not be placed unequally, at the same time unequals should not be
treated as equals.63
Section 86 of the IP Act 2003 was a result of the Supreme Court’s intervention
and clearly intended to bring greater equality between Sri Lanka, as a nation that
was (and still is) burdened with economic difficulties, and other more developed
nations that were the proponents of the intellectual property system. Despite the
intervention, however, it is unfortunate that, in formulating Section 86 of the IP Act
2003, the drafters have not been forward thinking in their approach, and instead
thought it fit to simply reproduce TRIPS Article 30 and 31 verbatim. Thus, to
overcome the potential disadvantages of the lack of a coherent legislative frame-
work to facilitate the local working of patents, Sri Lanka would benefit by modi-
fying its current approach to compulsory licensing. In particular, the following key
points must be noted in making these modifications:
1. A list of grounds upon which compulsory licenses may be granted must be
specified in the legislation. Such a list must be sufficiently open and wide, and
must be non-exhaustive, while specifically stating that failure to locally work a
patent is one of the grounds upon which a compulsory license can be granted.
2. In cases where a compulsory license is being granted on the ground of failure to
work, in addition to the requirements set out in Article 31 of TRIPS, the leg-
islative provision must also enshrine the requirements set out in Article 5A(4) of
the Paris Convention.
3. In order to incentivize potential licensees that obtain licenses under compulsory
licensing schemes, the legislation must adopt a flexible approach to
62Here, the Supreme Court was referring to the exceptions to patent rights made available under
TRIPS, arts 30, 31.
63SC Special Determination No 14/2003 (SN Silva CJ).
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implementing the requirement in TRIPS Article 31(f)—i.e. the requirement that
licenses must be issued ‘predominantly for the supply of the domestic market’.
4. The determination of the Director General of Intellectual Property to grant a
compulsory license for failure to work must be based on rational and valid
grounds and must be made on a clear case-by-case basis in order to prevent a
violation of TRIPS Article 27:1.
6 Conclusion
Patents are aimed at encouraging innovation. However, abuse of patent rights can
lead to tremendous hardships especially in developing countries. The patent system
must attempt to draw a balance between the rights of the inventor, and others who
seek to benefit from the invention. In this regard, the interests of the patent granting
country must be taken into consideration. This would include the opportunities
available for the transfer of technology, infrastructure development and the gen-
eration of employment opportunities in the fields in which patents are granted.
These aims could not be achieved unless patents are locally worked—i.e. the
patented product is manufactured or the patented processes are applied locally. The
mere importation of a finished patented product, without any further processing in
the patent granting country, would be of no benefit and the only outcome would be
the sale of patented products at prices determined by patentees. Therefore, the
imposition of a local working requirement is a measure by which a balance could be
reached between the patent owner’s interests on the one hand, and the interests of
the patent granting country, its government and citizens. What has been suggested
in this chapter is that utilising compulsory licensing schemes permitted under
TRIPS Article 31 to implement a local working requirement could achieve that fine
balance, without unreasonably interfering with the rights and interests of patent
owners, while also ensuring compliance with the non-discrimination policy of
TRIPS Article 27:1. This chapter considered the approach to local working adopted
in India and compared it with Sri Lanka’s approach, which unfortunately is much
less developed and forward thinking. The chapter concluded by suggesting ways by
which Sri Lanka’s legislative framework could be improved to facilitate and apply a
local working requirement through the vessel of compulsory licenses permitted
under TRIPS Article 31. It is only with a coherent policy and legislative framework
on local working of patents that developing countries such as Sri Lanka could strive
to achieve socio-economic prosperity and technological advancements within the
WTO’s TRIPS framework.
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